

# **KARL MARX**

## **HISTORICAL WRITINGS**

IN TWO VOLUMES

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*by Frederick Engels*

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## PREFATORY NOTE TO THE PEASANT WAR IN GERMANY<sup>1</sup>

THE following work was written in London in the summer of 1850 while still under the immediate impression of the counter-revolution just then completed; it appeared in the fifth and sixth numbers of the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, a politico-economic review, edited by Karl Marx, Hamburg, 1850. My political friends in Germany desire it to be reprinted, and I accede to their desire, because the work is, to my great regret, still timely today.

It makes no claim to provide material from independent research. On the contrary, the entire matter on the peasant risings and on Thomas Munzer is taken from Zimmermann<sup>2</sup>. His book, despite gaps here and there, is still the best compilation of the factual material. Moreover, old Zimmermann enjoyed his subject. The same revolutionary instinct, which makes him here always take the side of the oppressed classes, made him later one of the best of the extreme Left wing in Frankfurt. It is true that since then he is said to have somewhat aged.

If, nevertheless, Zimmermann's account lacks the inner inter-connections; if it does not succeed in showing the religious-political controversies of that epoch as the reflection of

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<sup>1</sup>This Prefatory Note to *The Peasant War in Germany*, a work written by Engels in the year 1850, consists of two parts. The first part was prepared for the new edition of 1870, the second, written in June 1874, for the edition which appeared in the year 1875. On February 12, 1870, Marx wrote to Engels about this Prefatory Note to *The Peasant War in Germany*: "Your introduction is very good. I know of nothing that should be altered or added. With your treatment of 1866 I agree word for word. The double thrust at Wilhelm of the *People's Party* and at Schweitzer with his bodyguard of rascals is very pretty." The thrust at Schweitzer, a follower of Lassalle, is in the passage where Engels says that "in Germany there is only one serious adversary of the revolution—the Prussian government." The cut at Liebknecht [Wilhelm] is in the passage where Engels describes the National-Liberals and the *People's Party* as "the opposite poles of one and the same narrow-mindedness."—Ed.

<sup>2</sup>Wilhelm Zimmermann (1807-88). A German historian. The reference here is to Zimmermann's chief work, *History of the Great Peasant Wars* (first published in 1841).—Ed.

the contemporary class struggles; if it sees in these class struggles only oppressors and oppressed, good and evil, and the final victory of the evil ones; if its insight into the social conditions which determined both the outbreak and the outcome of the struggle is extremely defective, then that was the fault of the time in which the book came into existence. On the contrary, for its time, it is written even very realistically, an honourable exception among the German idealist works on history

My account, while sketching the historic course of the struggle only in its outlines, attempted to explain the origin of the Peasant War, the attitude of the various parties taking part in it, the political and religious theories through which those parties strove to become clear about their position, and finally the result of the struggle itself as necessarily following from the historically established social conditions of these classes; that is to say, to demonstrate the political constitution of Germany of that time, the revolts against it and the contemporary political and religious theories not as causes but as results of the stage of development of agriculture, industry, land and waterways, commerce and finance, which then existed in Germany. This, the only materialist conception of history, originates not from myself but from Marx, and can be found also in his works on the French Revolution of 1848-49, published in the same review,<sup>1</sup> and in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*.

The parallel between the German Revolution of 1525 and that of 1848-49 was too obvious to be rejected altogether at that time. Nevertheless, despite the uniformity in the course of events, where various local revolts were crushed by one and the same princely army despite the often ludicrous similarity in the behaviour of the city burghers in both cases, the difference also stood out clear and unmistakable.

“Who profited by the Revolution of 1525? The *princes*. Who profited by the Revolution of 1848? The *big* princes, Austria and Prussia. Behind the minor princes of 1525, chaining them to themselves by the taxes, stood the urban petty bourgeoisie; behind the big princes of 1850, behind Austria and Prussia there stood the modern big bourgeoisie, rapidly getting them under their yoke by means of the national debt. And behind the big bourgeoisie stand the proletarians.”<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>This refers to *The Class Struggles in France*.—Ed.

<sup>2</sup>This passage is cited by Engels from the last chapter of *The Peasant War in Germany*. There he compares the course and results of the Peasant Revolution of 1525 with the Revolution of 1848-49.—Ed.

I regret to have to say that in this paragraph much too much honour was done the German bourgeoisie. Both in Austria and Prussia, it has had the opportunity of getting the monarchy "under its yoke by means of the national debt"; nowhere did it ever make use of this opportunity.

By the War of 1866, Austria fell as a gift into the lap of the bourgeoisie<sup>1</sup>. But it does not know how to rule, it is powerless and incapable of anything. It can do only one thing. savagely attack the workers as soon as they begin to stir. It only remains at the helm because the *Hungarians* need it.

And in Prussia? Yes, it is true the national debt has increased by leaps and bounds, the deficit has become a permanent feature, state expenditure grows from year to year, the bourgeoisie have a majority in the Chamber and without their consent taxes cannot be increased nor loans floated—but where is their power over the state? Only a couple of months ago, when there was again a deficit, they had a most favourable position. By holding out only just a *little*, they could have forced fine concessions. What do they do? They regard it as a sufficient concession that the government *allows* them to lay at its feet close on nine millions, not for *one* year, but *every year* and for all time to come.

I do not want to blame the poor "National-Liberals"<sup>2</sup> in the Chamber more than they deserve. I know they have been left in the lurch by those who stand behind them, by the mass of the bourgeoisie. This mass does not *want* to rule. It has 1848 still in its bones.

Why the German bourgeoisie exhibits this remarkable cowardice will be discussed later.

In general, however, the above statement has been fully confirmed. Beginning with 1850, the small states have fallen more and definitely into the background, serving only as levers

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<sup>1</sup>The war between Prussia and Austria in the summer of 1866 ended with the defeat of Austria. After the defeat the Austrian emperor "granted" a Constitution. Power was in fact left essentially in the hands of the military clique and the bureaucracy. On February 18, 1867 the Constitution was introduced into the other part of the empire, into Hungary.—Ed.

<sup>2</sup>After the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 differences of opinion arose in the ranks of the Progressives, the party of the German bourgeoisie. One section was in favour of a compromise with Bismarck's government and advocated support of his foreign policy. In 1867, this section of the bourgeoisie formed the National-Liberal Party.—Ed.

for Prussian or Austrian intrigues, the struggles for hegemony between Austria and Prussia have become ever more violent, until finally came the armed conflict of 1866, with the result that Austria retained its own provinces, while Prussia obtained direct or indirect control of the whole of the North, the three states of the Southwest being left out in the cold for the time being<sup>1</sup>

In the whole of this principal and state action the only thing of importance for the German working class is as follows :

Firstly, universal suffrage has given the workers the power of being directly represented in the legislative assembly.

Secondly, Prussia has set a good example by swallowing three other crowns held by the grace of god. That *after* this operation she still has the same immaculate crown, held by the grace of god as she formerly claimed it to be, not even the National-Liberals believe any more.

Thirdly, there is now only *one* serious adversary of the revolution in Germany—the Prussian government.

And fourthly, the German Austrians will now at last have to ask themselves what they want to be, Germans or Austrians. Whom they would rather prefer to adhere to—to Germany or to their extra German Transleithanian appendages<sup>2</sup> It has been obvious for a long time that they will have to give up one or the other, but this has been continually glossed over by petty-bourgeois democracy.

As regards the other important controversies on account of 1866, which since then have been thrashed out *ad nauseam* between the "National-Liberals" on the one side and the "People's Party"<sup>3</sup> on the other, the history of the next few years will probably prove that these two standpoints are so bitterly hostile to one another because they are the opposite poles of the same narrow-mindedness.

The year 1866 has changed almost nothing in the social conditions of Germany. The few bourgeois reforms—uniform weights and measures, freedom of movement, freedom of occu-

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<sup>1</sup>After its victory over Austria in 1866, Prussia annexed the kingdom of Hanover, the principality of Hesse-Kassel and the Duchy of Nassau. The North German Alliance was established, consisting of the German states situated north of the Main. Austria, as also the South German states of Bavaria, Wurttemberg and Baden, remained outside this alliance.—*Ed*

<sup>2</sup>This refers to the Transleithanian Austrian possessions, *i.e.*, those on the other side of the Leitha (a tributary of the Danube), *viz.*, Siebenburgen, Croatia and Slavonia.—*Ed.*

<sup>3</sup>For the People's Party see note 3 on p. 524, of the present volume.—*Ed.*



pation, etc., all within limits acceptable to the bureaucracy—do not even come up to what the bourgeoisie of other West European countries have long possessed, and leave the main evil, the system of bureaucratic concessions, untouched. Apart from that, for the proletariat, freedom of movement, the right to settle anywhere, the abolition of passports and other such legislation is made quite illusory by current police practice.

What is much more important than the principal and state action in 1866 is the growth of German industry and commerce, of railways, telegraphs and ocean steamship navigation since 1848. However much this progress lags behind that of England, or even of France, during the same period, it is unprecedented for Germany and has accomplished more in twenty years than a whole century has done previously. Germany has just now been drawn, seriously and irrevocably, into *world commerce*. Capital invested in industry has multiplied rapidly, the social position of the bourgeoisie has been raised accordingly. The surest sign of industrial prosperity—*swindling*—has established itself abundantly and chained counts and dukes to its triumphal chariot. German capital is now constructing Russian and Rumanian railways—may it not come to grief—whereas, only fifteen years ago, German railways went a-begging to English firms. How then is it possible that the bourgeoisie has not conquered political power as well, that it behaves in so cowardly a manner towards the government?

The misfortune of the German bourgeoisie is that in the favourite German manner it arrived too late. The period of its ascendancy occurs at a time when the bourgeoisie of the other West European countries is already politically in decline. In England, the bourgeoisie could only get its real representative, Bright, into the government by extending the franchise, which in its consequences is bound to put an end to the whole bourgeois rule. In France, where the bourgeoisie as such, as a complete class, has only held power for two years, 1849-50, under the republican regime, it was able to continue its social existence only by surrendering its political power to Louis Bonaparte and the army. And under the present conditions of the enormously increased interrelation of the three most progressive European countries, it is today no longer possible for the bourgeoisie in Germany to settle down to a comfortable political rule when this rule has already outlived itself in England and France.

It is a peculiarity of the bourgeoisie, distinguishing it from all former ruling classes, that there is a turning point in its development after which every further increase in its means of power, that is in the first place every increase of its capital,

only tends to make it more and more incapable of ruling politically. "*Behind the big bourgeois stand the proletarians.*" To the extent that the bourgeoisie develops its industry, its commerce and its means of communication, to the same extent it also produces the proletariat. And at a certain point—which need not appear everywhere at the same time or at the same stage of development—it begins to notice that this, its proletarian double, is outgrowing it. From that moment on, it loses the power for exclusive political domination; it looks round for allies with whom it shares its domination, or to whom it cedes its whole domination, as circumstances may demand.

In Germany this turning point came for the bourgeoisie as early as 1848. And actually the German bourgeoisie was frightened not so much by the German as by the French proletariat. The June battle in Paris, in 1848, showed the bourgeoisie what it had to expect; the German proletariat was just restless enough to make it clear that the seed of the same harvest had been sown in German soil also; and from that day on the edge was taken off all bourgeois political action. The bourgeoisie looked round for allies, bargained itself away to them regardless of price—and even today it is not a step further forward.

These allies are all of a reactionary nature. There is the monarchy with its army and its bureaucracy; there is the big feudal nobility, there are the little cabbage-*Junkers* and there are even the priests. With all of these the bourgeoisie made so many pacts and bargains to save its dear skin that at last it had nothing left to barter. And the more the proletariat developed, the more it began to feel as a class and to act as a class, the more faint-hearted did the bourgeoisie become. When the astonishingly bad strategy of the Prussians triumphed over the astonishingly still worse strategy of the Austrians at Sadowa, it was difficult to say who gave a deeper sigh of relief—the Prussian bourgeois, who was also defeated at Sadowa, or the Austrian.<sup>1</sup>

Our big bourgeois of 1870 acts exactly like the middle

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<sup>1</sup>On July 3, 1866, Prussia won a decisive battle over Austria at Sadowa (Königgrätz). The Prussian bourgeoisie, which had been afraid to base itself upon the democratic mass movement, finally capitulated to the Bismarck government and openly supported the counter-revolutionary path to the unification of Germany (from above with the assistance of the Prussian monarchy), although this union meant a further strengthening of the *Junkers* politically, and the collapse of the liberal hopes of the bourgeoisie.—Ed.

bourgeois of 1525 acted As to the petty bourgeoisie, artisans and shopkeepers, they will always remain the same. They hope to raise themselves into the big bourgeoisie by swindling, they are afraid of being pushed down into the proletariat. Between fear and hope, they will in times of struggle seek to save their precious skin and to join the victors when the struggle is over Such is their nature

The social and political activity of the proletariat has kept pace with the rapid growth of industry since 1848 The role that the German workers play today in their trade unions, co-operative societies, political associations and public meetings, at elections and in the so-called Reichstag, is by itself sufficient proof of the transformation which has come unperceived over Germany in the last twenty years It greatly redounds to the credit of the German workers that *they alone* have succeeded in sending workers and workers' representatives into parliament—a feat which neither the French nor the English have so far accomplished.

Still, even the proletariat has not yet outgrown the parallelism with 1525 The class of the population entirely and permanently dependent on wages is still far from forming the majority of the German people. This class is, therefore, also compelled to seek allies. The latter can only be found among the petty bourgeoisie, the *lumpenproletariat* of the cities, the small peasants and the agricultural labourers.

The *petty bourgeoisie* have been spoken of above They are extremely unreliable except when a victory has been won, and then their shouting in the beer houses knows no bounds. Nevertheless, there are very good elements among them, who of their own accord join up with the workers

The *lumpenproletariat*, this scum of the demoralised elements of all classes, which establishes its headquarters in all the big cities, is the worst of all possible allies. This rabble is absolutely venal and absolutely brazen If the French workers, in every revolution, inscribed on the houses *Mort aux voleurs!* Death to the thieves! and even shot many, they did it, not out of enthusiasm for property, but because they rightly considered it necessary to keep that gang at distance Every leader of the workers who uses these scoundrels as guards or bases himself on them, proves himself by this action alone a traitor to the movement

The *small peasants*—for the bigger peasants belong to the bourgeoisie—are of different kinds. Either they are *feudal peasants* and still have to perform *corvée* services for their gracious lord. Now that the bourgeoisie has failed to do its duty in freeing these people from serfdom, it ought not to be

difficult to convince them that they can only expect salvation from the working class.

Or they are *tenants*. In this case the situation is for the most part the same as in Ireland. Rents are pushed so high that in times of average crops the peasant and his family can only just manage to live; when the crops are bad he almost starves, is unable to pay his rent and consequently finds himself entirely at the mercy of the landlord. For such people the bourgeoisie only does something when it is compelled. From whom then should they expect salvation except from the workers?

There remain the peasants who cultivate their *own little piece of land*. In most cases they are so burdened with mortgages that they are as dependent on the usurer as the tenant on the landlord. For them also there remains only a meagre wage, which moreover, on account of there being good and bad years, is highly uncertain. These people least of all have anything to expect from the bourgeoisie, because it is precisely the bourgeoisie, the capitalist usurers, who suck the life-blood out of them. Still these peasants cling tightly to their property, though in reality it does not belong to them but to the usurers. Nevertheless, it will be possible to bring home to them that only when a government dependent on the people will have transformed all mortgages into a state debt, and thereby have lowered the interest rates, will they be able to free themselves from the usurer. And this can only be achieved by the working class.

Wherever medium-sized and large estates prevail, *agricultural labourers* form the most numerous class in the countryside. This is the case throughout the entire North and East of Germany and it is *here*, that the industrial workers of the towns find their *most numerous and most natural allies*. In the same way as the capitalist confronts the industrial worker, the landowner or large tenant confronts the agricultural labourer. The same measures that help the one must also help the other. The industrial workers can free themselves only by transforming the capital of the bourgeois, *i.e.*, the raw materials, machines and tools, and the foodstuffs, necessary for production, into social property, *i.e.*, into their own property, used by them in common. Similarly, the agricultural labourers can be rescued from their hideous misery only when their chief subject of labour, the land itself, is withdrawn from the private ownership of the large peasants and the still larger feudal lords, transformed into social property and cultivated by co-operative associations of agricultural workers on a common account. And here we come to the

famous decision of the International Workers' Congress in Basle<sup>1</sup>: that it is in the interest of society to transform landed property into common national property. This resolution was adopted primarily for the countries where there is a large-scale landed property, and, connected with that, the cultivation of large farms, with one master and many labourers on every estate. This state of affairs, however, is still as a whole predominant in Germany, and therefore, next to England, the decision was *most timely precisely for Germany*. The agricultural proletariat, the farm labourers—that is the class from which the bulk of the armies of the princes is recruited. It is the class which, thanks to universal suffrage, sends into parliament the great mass of feudal lords and *Junkers*. But it is also the class nearest to the industrial workers of the towns, which shares their living conditions, which is even steeped still deeper in misery than they. To call into life and to draw into the movement this class, powerless because split and scattered, but whose hidden power is so well known to the government and nobility that they purposely allow the schools to fall into decay in order that it should remain ignorant, this is the immediate, most urgent task of the German workers' movement. From the day when the mass of agricultural labourers have learned to understand their own interests, from that day a reactionary, feudal, bureaucratic or bourgeois movement in Germany becomes an impossibility.

\*                      \*                      \*

The preceding lines were written over four years ago. They are still valid today. What was true after Sadowa and the partition of Germany, is being confirmed also after Sedan and the establishing of the Holy German Empire of the Prussian nation." So little can "world-shaking" principal and state actions in the realm of so-called high politics change

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<sup>1</sup>The Basle Congress of the First International in September 1869 adopted a resolution that "it is in the interest of society to abolish private property in land and to convert it into social ownership"—*Ed*

<sup>2</sup>In the Franco-Prussian War the Prussian army gained a decisive victory over the French army at Sedan, on September 2, 1870. This removed the last obstacle in the way of a union of North and South Germany (*viz.*, the French empire of Napoleon III was interested in keeping Germany broken up into small states and had hindered the union), German unification was carried out from above by the counter-revolutionary path and the German Reich was established. Nevertheless, this unification was far from being complete (The German Reich still contained twenty-two monarchies and three free cities, Austria was excluded from it.)—*Ed*.

the direction of the movement of history.

What, on the other hand, these principal and state actions are in, a position to do is to hasten the tempo of this movement. And in this respect, the authors of the above-mentioned "world-shaking" events have had involuntary successes, which they themselves surely find most undesirable, but which, however, for better or worse, they have to take into the bargain.

The War of 1866 had already shaken the old Prussia to its foundations. After 1848 it had already been difficult to bring the rebellious industrial element of the Western provinces, bourgeois as well as proletarian, under the old discipline; still, this had been accomplished, and the interests of the *Junkers* of the Eastern provinces, together with those of the army, again became dominant in the state. In 1866 almost all Northwest Germany became Prussian. Apart from the irreparable moral injury suffered by the Prussian crown by the grace of god owing to having swallowed three other crowns by the grace of god, the centre of gravity of the monarchy now shifted considerably westward. The five million Rhinelanders and Westphalians were reinforced by the Germans annexed through the North German Alliance, first of all by the four millions annexed directly, and then by the six millions annexed indirectly. And in 1870 were further added the eight million Southwest Germans, so that in the "new Reich," the fourteen and a half million old Prussians (from the six East Elbian provinces, including moreover two million Poles) were confronted by some twenty-five millions who had long outgrown the old Prussian *Junker* feudalism. In this way the very victories of the Prussian army displaced the entire basis of the Prussian state, the *Junker* domination became ever more intolerable even for the government itself. At the same time, however, the extremely rapid industrial development caused the struggle between the bourgeois and the workers to supplant the struggle between *Junkers* and bourgeois, so that internally also the social foundations of the old state suffered a complete transformation. The fundamental condition for the existence of the monarchy, which had been slowly rotting since 1840, was the struggle between nobility and bourgeoisie, in which the monarchy held the balance. From the moment when it was no longer a question of protecting the nobility against the pressure of the bourgeoisie, but of protecting all propertied classes against the pressure of the working class, the old, absolute monarchy had to go over completely to the form of state expressly devised for this purpose: the *Bonapartist monarchy*. This transition of Prussia to Bonapartism I have already discussed in another place (*Zur*

*Wohnungsfrage* [*The Housing Question*] Part. 2.)<sup>1</sup> What I did not have to stress there, but what is very essential here, is that this transition was the *greatest progress* made by Prussia after 1848, so much had Prussia lagged behind in point of modern development. It was still a semi-feudal state, whereas Bonapartism is, at all events, a modern form of state which presupposes the abolition of feudalism. Hence Prussia has to decide to get rid of its numerous remnants of feudalism, to sacrifice *Junkerdom* as such. This naturally is being done in the mildest possible form and to the favourite tune of: always slowly forward! Thus, for example in the notorious *Kreisordnung*,<sup>2</sup> it abolishes the feudal privileges of the individual *Junker* in relation to his estate, but only to restore them as privileges of the whole of the big landowners in relation to the entire district. The substance remains, being only translated from the feudal into the bourgeois dialect. The old Prussian *Junker* is being compulsorily transformed into something akin to an English squire, and he need not have offered so much resistance because the one is as stupid as the other.

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<sup>1</sup>Engels refers to the following passage from his pamphlet, *The Housing Question*, written in 1872

"In reality, however, the state as it exists at present in Germany is also the necessary product of the social basis out of which it has developed. In Prussia—and Prussia is now decisive—there exists side by side with a landowning aristocracy which is still powerful, a comparatively young and markedly very cowardly bourgeoisie, which up to the present has not won either direct political domination, as in France, or more or less indirect as in England. Side by side with these two classes, however, there exists further a rapidly increasing proletariat, which is intellectually highly developed and which is becoming more and more organised every day. We find, therefore, in Germany alongside of the basic condition of the old absolute monarchy, an equilibrium between the landowning aristocracy and the bourgeoisie, also the basic condition of modern Bonapartism, an equilibrium between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.

But both in the old absolute monarchy and in the modern Bonapartist monarchy, the real governing power lies in the hands of a special caste of army officers and state officials. In Prussia this caste is supplemented partly from its own ranks, partly from the lesser aristocracy owning the entailed estates, more rarely the higher aristocracy and least of all from the bourgeoisie. The independence of this caste, which appears to occupy a position outside, and so to speak, above society, gives the state the semblance of independence in relation to society" (Engels, *The Housing Question*, pp 71-72.)—Ed.

<sup>2</sup>Legislation establishing distinct local authorities.—Ed.

Thus it has been the peculiar fate of Prussia to complete its bourgeois revolution, begun in 1803 to 1813<sup>1</sup> and advanced further in 1848, in the pleasant form of Bonapartism at the end of this century. And if everything goes well, and the world remains nice and quiet, and we all become old enough, we may live to see—perhaps in 1900—that the government of Prussia has actually abolished all feudal institutions and Prussia has finally arrived at the point where France stood in 1792

The abolition of feudalism, expressed positively, means the establishment of bourgeois conditions. In the measure that the privileges of the nobility fall, legislation becomes more and more bourgeois. And here we come to the central point of the relation of the German bourgeoisie to the government. We have seen that the government is *compelled* to introduce these slow and petty reforms. As against the bourgeoisie, however, it portrays each of these small concessions as a *sacrifice* made to the bourgeois, as a concession wrung from the crown with the greatest difficulty, and for which the bourgeois must in return concede something to the government. The bourgeois, though fairly clear as to the true state of affairs, allow themselves to be fooled. This is the source of the tacit agreement which is the basis of all Reichstag and Chamber debates in Berlin. On the one hand, the government reforms the laws at a snail's pace in the interests of the bourgeoisie, removes the obstacles to industry arising from feudalism and the multiplicity of small states, establishes unity of coinage, of weights and measures, gives freedom of occupation, puts Germany's labour power at the unrestricted disposal of capital by granting freedom of movement and fosters trade and swindling. On the other hand, the bourgeoisie leaves in the hands of the government all actual political power, votes taxes, loans and soldiers and helps to frame all new reform laws in such a way that the old police power over undesirable individuals remains in full force. The bourgeoisie buys its gradual social emancipation at the price of immediate renunciation of its own political power. Naturally, the chief motive which makes such an agreement acceptable to the bourgeoisie is not the fear of the government but the fear of the proletariat.

However miserable a figure our bourgeoisie may cut in the political field, it cannot be denied that as far as industry and commerce are concerned, it is at last doing its duty. The impetuous growth of industry and commerce referred to

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<sup>1</sup>During these years the feudal authorities of Prussia, weakened by the blows of Napoleon, carried out a number of reforms, even if insignificant ones—*Ed.*



in the introduction to the second edition has since then developed with still greater vigour. What has taken place in this respect since 1869 in the Rhenish-Westphalian industrial region is quite unprecedented for Germany, and recalls the rapid growth in the English manufacturing districts at the beginning of this century. The same thing will hold good of Saxony and Upper Silesia, Berlin, Hanover and the sea cities. At last we have world trade, a really big industry and a really modern bourgeoisie. But in return we have also had a real crisis, and have likewise got a real, powerful proletariat.

For the future historian, the roar of battle at Spichern, Mars la Tour and Sedan and everything connected therewith, will be of much less importance in the history of Germany from 1869-74 than the unpretentious, quiet but constantly forward-moving development of the German proletariat. As early as 1870, the German workers were subjected to a severe test: the Bonapartist war provocation and its natural effect: the general national enthusiasm in Germany. The German workers did not allow themselves to be led astray for a single moment. Not a trace of national chauvinism showed among them. In the midst of the wildest intoxication of victory they remained cool, demanding "an equitable peace with the French republic and no annexations" and not even martial law was able to silence them.<sup>1</sup> No battle glory, no talk of German "imperial magnificence" produced any effect on them; their sole aim remained the liberation of the entire European proletariat. We may surely say that in no other country up to now have the workers been put to so hard a test and have passed through it so brilliantly.

After martial law during the war came the trials for treason, *lese majeste* and libel of officials and the ever-increasing police chicanery of peace-time. The *Volksstaat*<sup>2</sup> had usually three or four editors in prison at the same time and the other

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<sup>1</sup>From the very start of the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71), the German workers, headed by the Social-Democratic Party (the Eisenachers), protested against the war and expressed their solidarity with the French workers in a number of resolutions and manifestoes. After the victory of Prussia at Sedan they demanded "an equitable peace with the French republic and no annexations" and protested against the seizure of Alsace-Lorraine. Bebel and Liebknecht made a sharp protest in the Reichstag against the war and abstained from voting the war credits; after Sedan they voted *against* the war credits.—*Ed.*

<sup>2</sup>The central organ of the *Social-Democratic Workers' Party of Germany*, published from 1869-76 in Leipzig. Its editor-in-chief was Wilhelm Liebknecht.—*Ed.*

papers in proportion. Every party speaker at all well known had to face prosecution at least once a year and was almost always convicted. Deportations, confiscations, suppressions of meetings followed one another, thick as hail. All in vain. The place of every prisoner or deportee was immediately filled by another; for every suppressed meeting, two others were substituted, and thus the arbitrary power of the police was worn down in one place after the other by endurance and strict conformity to the law. All the persecution had the opposite effect to that intended. Far from breaking the workers' party or even bending it, it only brought ever new recruits to it and consolidated the organisation. In their struggle both against the authorities and individual bourgeois, the workers showed themselves superior, intellectually and morally, and proved particularly in their conflicts with the so-called "*providers of work*," that they, the workers, were now the educated class and the capitalists the *Knoten*.<sup>2</sup> And in their fights they fought for the most part with a sense of humour, which is the best proof of how sure they were of their cause and how conscious they were of their superiority. A struggle thus conducted, on historically prepared soil, must yield great results. The successes of the January elections stand out unique in the history of the modern workers' movement and the astonishment aroused by them throughout Europe was fully justified.

The German workers have two important advantages over those of the rest of Europe. First, they belong to the most theoretical people of Europe; they have retained that sense of theory which the so-called "educated" people of Germany have completely lost. Without German philosophy which preceded it, particularly that of Hegel, German scientific socialism—the only scientific socialism that has ever existed—would never have come into being. Without a sense of theory among the workers, this scientific socialism would never have passed so entirely into their flesh and blood as has been the case. What an immeasurable advantage this is may be seen, on the one hand, from the indifference towards all theory, which is one of the main reasons why the English workers' movement moves so slowly in spite of the splendid organisation of the individual unions; on the other hand, from the mischief and confusion wrought by Proudhonism in its original form among the French and Belgians, and in the

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<sup>2</sup>Handicraftsmen. Marx and Engels often used this term for the backward, non-class conscious workers still under the influence of guild ideology.—Ed.

further caricatured form at the hands of Bakunin, among the Spaniards and Italians.

The second advantage is that chronologically speaking the Germans were almost the last to come into the workers' movement. Just as German theoretical socialism will never forget that it rests on the shoulders of Saint-Simon, Fourier and Owen, three men who, in spite of all their fantastic notions and utopianism,<sup>1</sup> have their place among the most eminent thinkers of all times, and whose genius anticipated innumerable things the correctness of which is now being scientifically proved by us—so the practical workers' movement in Germany must never forget that it has developed on the shoulders of the English and French movements, that it was able simply to utilise their dearly-bought experience, and could now avoid their mistakes, which in their time were mostly unavoidable. Without the English trade unions and the French workers' political struggles which came before, without the gigantic impulse given especially by the Paris Commune, where would we be now?

It must be said to the credit of the German workers that they have exploited the advantages of their situation with rare understanding. For the first time since a workers' movement has existed, the struggle is being conducted from its three sides, the theoretical, the political and the practical-economic (resistance to the capitalists), in harmony, co-ordination and in a planned way. It is precisely in this, as it were, concentric attack, that the strength and invincibility of the German movement lies.

It is due to this advantageous situation on the one hand, to the insular peculiarities of the English and to the forcible suppression of the French movement on the other, that the German workers have for the moment been placed in the vanguard of the proletarian struggle. How long events will allow them to occupy this post of honour cannot be foretold. But as long as they occupy it, let us hope that they will fill it in a fitting manner. This demands redoubled efforts in every field of struggle and agitation. It is in particular the duty of the leaders to gain an ever clearer insight into all theoretical questions, to free themselves more and more from the influence of traditional phrases inherited from the old world outlook, and constantly to keep in mind that socialism, since it has become a science, must be pursued as a science, *i.e.*, it must be studied. The task will be to spread with increased

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<sup>1</sup>On utopian socialism, cf. Engels, *Socialism. Utopian and Scientific.*—Ed.

zeal among the masses of the workers the ever clearer insight, thus acquired,<sup>1</sup> to knit together ever more firmly the organisation both of the party and of the trade unions. Even if the votes cast for the socialists in January already make quite a decent army,<sup>1</sup> they are still far from constituting the majority of the working class; and encouraging as are the successes of the propaganda among the rural population, infinitely more still remains to be done precisely in this field. Hence, there must be no slackening in the struggle, the task must be to wrest from the enemy one town, one constituency after the other. But above all it is necessary to observe the true international spirit which allows no patriotic chauvinism to manifest itself, and which joyfully greets each new advance of the proletarian movement, no matter from which nation it comes. If the German workers proceed in this way, they will not be marching exactly at the head of the movement—it is not at all in the interest of this movement that the workers of any one country should march at its head—but they will occupy an honourable place in the battle line, and they will stand armed for battle when either unexpectedly grave trials or momentous events will demand from them heightened courage, heightened determination and the power to act.

London, July 1, 1874.

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<sup>1</sup>At the Reichstag elections on January 10, 1874, the Social-Democratic candidates received 351,670 votes (an increase of 200 per cent compared with the 1871 results) and eight representatives in the Reichstag. In addition eleven Social-Democratic candidates had a relative majority and thus went to the second ballot, which resulted in a victory in two more constituencies. The successes of the Social-Democrats, who were then being persecuted by the government, made a great impression both in Germany and abroad.—*Ed*

## THE PEASANT WAR IN GERMANY

### CHAPTER I

THE GERMAN people are by no means lacking in revolutionary tradition. There were times when Germany produced characters that could match the best men in the revolutions of other countries, when the German people manifested an endurance and energy which, in a centralised nation, would have brought the most magnificent results; when the German peasants and plebeians were pregnant with ideas and plans which often made their descendants shudder.

In contrast to present-day enfeeblement which appears everywhere after two years of struggle (since 1848) it is timely to present once more to the German people those awkward but powerful and tenacious figures of the great peasant war. Three centuries have flown by since then, and many a thing has changed; still the peasant war is not as far removed from our present-day struggles as it would seem, and the opponents we have to encounter remain essentially the same. Those classes and fractions of classes which everywhere betrayed 1848 and 1849, can be found in the role of traitors as early as 1525, though on a lower level of development. And if the robust vandalism of the peasant wars appeared in the movement of the last years only sporadically, in the Odenwald, in the Black Forest, in Silesia, it by no means shows a superiority of the modern insurrection.

Let us first review briefly the situation in Germany at the beginning of the Sixteenth Century.

German industry had gone through a considerable process of growth in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries. The local industry of the feudal countryside was superseded by the guild organisation of production in the cities, which produced for wider circles and even for remote markets. Weaving of crude woollen stuffs and linens had become a well-established, ramified branch of industry, and even finer woollen and linen fabrics, as well as silks, were already being produced in Augsburg. Outside of the art of weaving, there had arisen those branches of industry, which, approaching

the finer arts, were nurtured by the demands for luxuries on the part of the ecclesiastic and lay lords of the late mediæval epoch: gold- and silver-smithing, sculpture and wood-carving, etching and wood-engraving, armour-making, medal-engraving, wood-turning, etc., etc. A series of more or less important discoveries culminating in the invention of gunpowder and printing had considerably aided the development of the crafts. Commerce kept pace with industry. The Hanseatic League, through its century-long monopoly of sea navigation, had brought about the emergence of the entire north of Germany out of mediæval barbarism; and even when, after the end of the Sixteenth Century, the Hanseatic League had begun to succumb to the competition of the English and the Dutch, the great highway of commerce from India to the north still lay through Germany, Vasco da Gama's discoveries notwithstanding. Augsburg still remained the great point of concentration for Italian silks, Indian spices, and all Levantine products. The cities of upper Germany, namely, Augsburg and Nuernberg, were the centres of opulence and luxury remarkable for that time. The production of raw materials had equally progressed. The German miners of the Fifteenth Century had been the most skilful in the world, and agriculture was also shaken out of its mediæval crudity through the blossoming forth of the cities. Not only had large stretches of land been put under cultivation, but dye plants and other imported cultures had been introduced, which in turn had a favourable influence on agriculture as a whole.

Still, the progress of national production in Germany had not kept pace with the progress of other countries. Agriculture lagged far behind that of England and Holland. Industry lagged far behind the Italian, Flemish and English, and as to sea navigation, the English, and especially the Dutch, were already driving the Germans out of the field. The population was still very sparse. Civilisation in Germany existed only in spots, around the centres of industry and commerce; but even the interests of these individual centres diverged widely, with hardly any point of contact. The trade relations and markets of the South differed from those of the North; the East and the West had almost no intercourse. No city had grown to become the industrial and commercial point of gravity for the whole country, such as London was for England. Internal communication was almost exclusively confined to coastwise and river navigation and to a few large commercial

highways, like those from Augsburg and Nuerenberg through Cologne to the Netherlands, and through Erfurt to the North. Away from the rivers and highways of commerce there was a number of smaller cities which, excluded from the great trade centres, continued a sluggish existence under conditions of late mediaeval times, consuming few non-local articles, and yielding few products for export. Of the rural population, only the nobility came into contact with wide circles and new wants; the mass of the peasants never overstepped the boundaries of local relations and local outlook.

While in England, as well as in France, the rise of commerce and industry had brought about a linking of interests over the entire country, the political centralisation of Germany had succeeded only in the grouping of interests according to provinces and around purely local centres. This meant political decentralisation which later gained momentum through the exclusion of Germany from world commerce. In the degree as the purely feudal empire was falling apart, bonds of unity were becoming weakened, great feudal vassals were turning into almost independent princes, and cities of the empire on the one hand, the knights of the empire on the other, were forming alliances either against each other, or against the princes or the emperor. The imperial power, now uncertain as to its own position, vacillated between the various elements opposing the empire, and was constantly losing authority; the attempt at centralisation, in the manner of Louis XI<sup>e</sup> brought about nothing but the holding together of the Austrian hereditary lands, this in spite of all intrigues and violent actions. The final winners, who could not help winning in this confusion, in this helter-skelter of numerous conflicts, were the representatives of centralisation amidst disunion, the representatives of local and provincial centralisation, the princes, beside whom the emperor gradually became no more than a prince among princes.

Under these conditions the situation of the classes emerging from mediaeval times had considerably changed. New classes had been formed besides the old ones.

Out of the old nobility came the princes. Already they were almost independent of the emperor, and possessed the major part of sovereign rights. They declared war and made peace of their own accord, they maintained standing armies, called local councils, and levied taxes. They had already drawn a large part of the lower nobility and cities under their

lordly power ; they did everything in their power to incorporate in their lands all the rest of the cities and baronies which still remained under the empire Towards such cities and baronies they appeared in the role of centralisers, while as far as the imperial power was concerned, they were the decentralising factor. Internally, their reign was already autocratic, they called the estates only when they could not do without them They imposed taxes, and collected money whenever they saw fit The right of the estates to ratify taxes was seldom recognised, and still more seldom practised And even when they were called, the princes ordinarily had a majority, thanks to the knights and the prelates which were the two estates freed from taxes, participating, nevertheless, in their consumption. The need of the princes for money grew with the taste for luxuries, with the increase of the courts and the standing armies, with the mounting costs of administration The taxes were becoming more and more oppressive. The cities being in most cases protected against them by privileges, the entire weight of the tax burden fell upon the peasants, those under the princes themselves, as well as the serfs and bondsmen of the knights bound by vassalage to the princes, wherever direct taxation was insufficient, indirect taxes were introduced ; the most skilful machinations of the art of finance were utilised to fill the gaping holes of the fiscal system. When nothing else availed, when there was nothing to pawn and no free imperial city was willing to grant credit any longer, one resorted to coin manipulations of the basest kind, one coined depreciated money, one set a higher or lower rate of legal tender most convenient for the prince. Trading in city and other privileges, subsequently to be taken away by force, in order that they might again be sold, seizing every attempt at opposition as an excuse for incendiarism and robbery of every kind, etc., etc., were lucrative and quite ordinary sources of income for the princes of those times. The administration of justice was also a constant and not unimportant article of trade for the princes. In brief, the subjects who, besides the princes, had to satisfy the private appetites of their magistrates and bailiffs as well, were enjoying the full taste of the "fatherly" system. Of the mediaeval feudal hierarchy, the knighthood of moderate possessions had almost entirely disappeared; it had either climbed up to the position of independence of small princes, or it had sunk into the ranks of the lower nobility. The lower nobility,



the knighthood, was fast moving towards extinction. A large portion of it had already become pauperised, and lived on its services to the princes, either in military or in civil capacity ; another portion was bound by vassalage to the sovereignty of the prince ; a very small portion was directly under the empire. The development of military science, the rising importance of infantry, the spread of firearms, had dwarfed their military importance as heavy cavalry, at the same time destroying the invincibility of their castles. The knights had become superfluous through the progress of industry, just as the artisans had become obviated by the same progress. The dire need of the knighthood for money added considerably to their ruin. The luxurious life in the castles, the competition in magnificence at tournaments and feasts, the price of armaments and of horses all increased with the progress of civilisation, whereas the sources of income of the knights and barons, increased but little, if at all. Feuds with accompanying plunders and incendiarism, lying in ambush, and similar noble occupations, became in the course of time too dangerous. The cash payments of the knights' subjects brought in hardly more than before. In order to satisfy mounting requirements, the noble masters resorted to the same means as were practised by the princes ; the peasantry was being robbed by the masters with greater dexterity every year. The serfs were being wrung dry. The bondsmen were burdened with ever new payments of various descriptions upon every possible occasion. Serf labour, dues, ground rents, land sale taxes, death taxes, protection moneys and so on, were increased at will in spite of old agreements. Justice was denied or sold for money, and wherever the knight could not obtain the peasants' money otherwise, he threw him into the tower without much ado, and compelled him to pay ransom.

With the other classes, the lower nobility courted no friendly relations either. Vassal knights strove to become vassals of the empire, vassals of the empire strove to become independent. This led to incessant conflicts with the princes. The knighthood looked upon the clergy with their resplendent grandeur as upon a powerful but superfluous class. It envied them their large estates and their riches held secure by celibacy and the church constitution. With the cities, the knighthood was continually on the war path ; it owed them money, it fed on plundering their territory, on robbing their merchants, on the ransom paid for prisoners captured in conflicts. The

struggle of the knighthood against all these estates became more vehement as the estates themselves began to realise that the money question was a life problem for them

The clergy, representatives of the ideology of mediaeval feudalism, felt the influence of the historic transformation no less acutely. The invention of the art of printing, and the requirements of extended commerce, robbed the clergy not only of its monopoly of reading and writing, but also of that of higher education. Division of labour was being introduced also into the realm of intellectual work. The newly arising class of jurists drove the clergy out of a series of very influential positions. The clergy was also beginning to become largely superfluous, and it acknowledged this fact by growing lazier and more ignorant. The more superfluous it became, the more it grew in numbers, thanks to the enormous riches which it still kept on augmenting by fair means or foul.

The clergy was divided into two distinct groups. The feudal hierarchy of the clergy formed the aristocratic group—bishops and archbishops, abbots, priors and other prelates. These high church dignitaries were either imperial princes themselves, or they reigned as vassals of other princes over large areas with numerous serfs and bondsmen. They not only exploited their subjects as recklessly as the knighthood and the princes, but they practised this in an even more shameful manner. They used not only brutal force, but all the intrigues of religion as well; not only the horrors of the rack, but also the horror of excommunication, or refusal of absolution; they used all the intricacies of the confessional in order to extract from their subjects the last penny, or to increase the estates of the church. Forging of documents was a widespread and beloved means of extortion in the hands of those worthy men, who, receiving from their subjects feudal payments, taxes and tithes, were still in constant need of money. The manufacture of miracle-producing saints' effigies and relics, the organisation of praying-centres endowed with the power of salvation, the trade in indulgences was resorted to in order to squeeze more payments out of the people. All this was practised long and with not little success.

The prelates and their numerous gendarmeries of monks which grew with the spread of political and religious baiting, were the objects of hatred not only of the people but also of the nobility. Being directly under the empire, the prelates were in the way of the princes. The fast living of the corpora-

lent bishops and abbots with their army of monks, roused the envy of the nobility and the indignation of the people who bore the burden. Hatred was intensified by the fact that the behaviour of the clergy was a slap in the face of their own preaching.

The plebeian faction of the clergy consisted of preachers, rural and urban. The preachers were outside the feudal hierarchy of the church and participated in none of its riches. Their activities were less rigorously controlled and, important as they were for the church, they were for the moment far less indispensable than the police services of the barracked monks. Consequently, they were paid much less than the monks, and their prebends were far from lucrative. Being of a middle-class or plebeian origin, they were nearer to the life of the masses, thus being able to retain middle-class and plebeian sympathies, in spite of their status as clergy. While the participation of the monks in the movements of their time was the exception, that of the plebeian clergy was the rule. They gave the movement its theorists and ideologists, and many of them, representatives of the plebeians and peasants, died on the scaffold. The hatred of the masses for the clergy seldom touched this group.

What the emperor was to the princes and nobility, the people was to the higher and lower clergy. As the emperor received the "common penny," the imperial taxes, so the pope was paid the general church taxes, out of which he defrayed the expenses of the luxurious Roman court. In no country were his taxes collected with such conscientiousness and rigour as in Germany, due to the power and the number of the clergy. The annates were collected with particular severity when a bishopric was to become vacant. With the growth of the court's demands, new means for raising revenues were invented, such as the traffic in relics and indulgences, jubilee collections, etc. Large sums of money were thus yearly transported from Germany to Rome, and the increased pressure fanned not only the hatred towards the clergy, but it also aroused national feelings, particularly among the nobility, the then most national class.

In the cities, the growth of commerce and handicraft produced three distinct groups out of the original citizenry of mediaeval times.

The city population was headed by the *patrician families*, the so-called "honourables." Those were the richest families.

They alone sat in the council, and held all the city offices. They not only administered all the revenues of the city, but they also consumed them. Strong in their riches and their ancient aristocratic status, recognised by emperor and empire, they exploited in every possible way the city community as well as the peasants belonging to the city. They practised usury in grain and money; they secured for themselves monopolies of various kinds; they gradually deprived the community of every right to use the city forests and meadows, and used them directly for their own private benefit. They imposed road, bridge and gate payments and other duties; they sold trade and guild privileges, master and citizen rights; and they traded with justice. The peasants of the city area were treated by them with no more consideration than by the nobility and the clergy. On the contrary, the city magistrates and bailiffs, mostly patricians, brought into the villages, together with aristocratic rigidity and avarice, a certain bureaucratic punctuality in collecting duties. The city revenues thus collected were administered in a most optional fashion; city book-keeping was as neglectful and confused as possible; defraudation and treasury deficits were the order of the day. How easy it was for a comparatively small caste, surrounded by privileges, and held together by family ties and community of interests, to enrich itself enormously out of the city revenues, will be understood when one considers the numerous frauds and swindles which 1848 witnessed in many city administrations.

The patricians took care to make dormant the rights of the city community everywhere, particularly as regards finance. Later, when the extortions of these gentlemen became too severe, the communities started a movement to bring at least the city administration under their control. In most cities they actually regained their rights, but due, on the one hand, to the eternal squabbles between the guilds and, on the other, to the tenacity of the patricians and their protection by the empire and the governments of the allied cities, the patrician council members soon restored by shrewdness or force their dominance in the councils. At the beginning of the Sixteenth Century, the communities of all the cities were again in the opposition.

The city opposition against the patricians was divided into two factions which stood out very clearly in the course of the peasant war.

*The middle-class opposition*, the predecessor of our modern liberals, embraced the richer middle-class, the middle-class of moderate means, and a more or less appreciable section of the poorer elements, according to local conditions. This opposition demanded control over the city administration and participation in the legislative power either through a general assemblage of the community or through representatives (big council, city committee). Further, it demanded modification of the patrician policy of favouring a few families which were gaining an exceptional position inside the patrician group. Aside from this, the middle-class opposition demanded the filling of some council offices by citizens of their own group. This party, joined here and there by dissatisfied elements of impoverished patricians, had a large majority in all the ordinary general assemblies of the community and in the guilds. The adherents of the council and the more radical opposition formed together only a minority among the real citizens.

We shall see how, in the course of the Sixteenth Century, this moderate, "law-abiding," well-off and intelligent opposition played exactly the same role and exactly with the same success as its heir, the constitutional party in the movements of 1848 and 1849. The middle-class opposition had still another object of heated protest: the clergy, whose loose way of living and luxurious habits aroused its bitter scorn. The middle-class opposition demanded measures against the scandalous behaviour of those illustrious people. It demanded that the inner jurisdiction of the clergy and its right to levy taxes should be abolished, and that the number of the monks should be limited.

*The plebeian opposition* consisted of ruined members of the middle-class and that mass of the city population which possessed no citizenship rights: the journeymen, the day labourers, and the numerous beginnings of the *lumpenproletariat* which can be found even in the lowest stages of development of city life. This low-grade proletariat is, generally speaking, a phenomenon which, in a more or less developed form, can be found in all the phases of society hitherto observed. The number of people without a definite occupation and a stable domicile was at that time gradually being augmented by the decay of feudalism in a society in which every occupation, every realm of life, was intrenched behind a number of privileges. In no modern country was the number of vagabonds so great as in Germany in the first half of the

Sixteenth Century. One portion of these tramps joined the army in wartime, another begged its way through the country, a third sought to eke out a meagre living as day-labourers in those branches of work which were not under guild jurisdiction. All three groups played a role in the peasant war; the first in the army of the princes to whom the peasant succumbed, the second in the conspiracies and in the troops of the peasants where its demoralising influence was manifested every moment; the third, in the struggles of the parties in the cities. It must be borne in mind, however, that a large portion of this class, namely, the one living in the cities, still retained a considerable foundation of peasant nature, and had not developed that degree of venality and degradation which characterise the modern civilised low-grade proletariat.

It is evident that the plebeian opposition of the cities was of a mixed nature. It combined the ruined elements of the old feudal and guild societies with the budding proletarian elements of a coming modern bourgeois society; on the one hand, impoverished guild citizens, who, due to their privileges, still clung to the existing middle-class order, on the other hand, driven out peasants and ex-officers who were yet unable to become proletarians. Between these two groups were the journeymen, for the time being outside official society and so close to the standard of living of the proletariat as was possible under the industry of the times and the guild privileges, but, due to the same privileges, almost all prospective middle-class master artisans. The party affiliations of this mixture were, naturally, highly uncertain, and varying from locality to locality. Before the peasant war, the plebeian opposition appeared in the political struggles, not as a party, but as a shouting, rapacious tail-end to the middle-class opposition, a mob that could be bought and sold for a few barrels of wine. It was the revolt of the peasants that transformed them into a party, and even then they were almost everywhere dependent upon the peasants, both in demands and in action,—a striking proof of the fact that the cities of that time were greatly dependent upon the country. In so far as the plebeian opposition acted independently, it demanded extension of city trade privileges over the rural districts, and it did like to see the city revenues curtailed by abolition of feudal burdens in the rural area belonging to the city, etc. In brief, in so far as it appeared independently, it was reactionary. It submitted to its own middle-class elements, and thus formed a

characteristic prologue to the tragic comedy staged by the modern petty-bourgeoisie in the last three years under the head of democracy

Only in Thuringia and in a few other localities was the plebeian faction of the city carried away by the general storm to such an extent that its embryo proletarian elements for a brief time gained the upper hand over all the other factors of the movement. This took place under the direct influence of Muenzer in Thuringia, and of his disciples in other places. This episode, forming the climax of the entire peasant war, and grouped around the magnificent figure of Thomas Muenzer, was of very brief duration. It is easily understood why these elements collapse more quickly than any other, why their movement bears an outspoken, fantastic stamp, and why the expression of their demands must necessarily be extremely indefinite. It was this group that found least firm ground in the then existing conditions.

At the bottom of all the classes, save the last one, was the huge exploited mass of the nation, *the peasants*. It was the peasant who carried the burden of all the other strata of society: princes, officialdom, nobility, clergy, patricians and middle-class. Whether the peasant was the subject of a prince, an imperial baron, a bishop, a monastery or a city, he was everywhere treated as a beast of burden, and worse. If he was a serf, he was entirely at the mercy of his master. If he was a bondsman, the legal deliveries stipulated by agreement were sufficient to crush him; even they were being daily increased. Most of his time, he had to work on his master's estate. Out of that which he earned in his few free hours, he had to pay tithes, dues, ground rents, war taxes, land taxes, imperial taxes, and other payments. He could neither marry nor die without paying the master. Aside from his regular work for the master, he had to gather litter, pick stawberries, pick bilberries, collect snail-shells, drive the game for the hunting, chop wood, and so on. Fishing and hunting belonged to the master. The peasant saw his crop destroyed by wild game. The community meadows and woods of the peasants had almost everywhere been forcibly taken away by the masters. And in the same manner as the master reigned over the peasant's property, he extended his wilfulness over his person, his wife and daughters. He possessed the right of the first night. Whenever he pleased, he threw the peasant into the tower, where the rack waited for him just as surely as the investigat-

ing attorney waits for the criminal in our times Whenever he pleased, he killed him or ordered him beheaded. None of the instructive chapters of the Carolina which speaks of "cutting of ears," "cutting of noses," "blinding," "chopping of fingers," "beheading," "breaking on the wheel," "burning," "pinching with burning tongs," "quartering," etc., was left unpractised by the gracious lord and master at his pleasure. Who could defend the peasant? The courts were manned by barons, clergymen, patricians, or jurists, who knew very well for what they were being paid. Not in vain did all the official estates of the empire live on the exploitation of the peasants.

Incensed as were the peasants under terrific pressure, it was still difficult to arouse them to revolt. Being spread over large areas, it was highly difficult for them to come to a common understanding, the old habit of submission inherited from generation to generation, the lack of practise in the use of arms in many regions, the unequal degree of exploitation depending on the personality of the master, all combined to keep the peasant quiet. It is for these reasons that, although local insurrections of peasants can be found in mediaeval times in large numbers, not one general national peasant revolt, least of all in Germany, can be observed before the peasant war. Moreover, the peasants alone could never make a revolution as long as they were confronted by the organised power of the princes, nobility and the cities. Only by allying themselves with other classes could they have a chance of victory, but how could they have allied themselves with other classes when they were equally exploited by all?

At the beginning of the Sixteenth Century the various groups of the empire, princes, nobility, clergy, patricians, middle-class, plebeians and peasants formed a highly complicated mass with the most varied requirements crossing each other in different directions. Every group was in the way of the other, and stood continually in an overt or covert struggle with every other group. A splitting of the entire nation into two major camps, as witnessed in France at the outbreak of the first revolution, and as at present manifest on a higher stage of development in the most progressive countries, was under such conditions a rank impossibility. Something approaching such division took place only when the lowest stratum of the population, the one exploited by all the rest, arose, namely, the plebeians and the peasants. The tangle of interests, views and endeavours of that time will be easily under-



stood when one remembers what a confusion was manifested in the last two years in a society far less complicated and consisting only of feudal nobility, bourgeoisie, petty-bourgeoisie, peasants and proletariat.

## CHAPTER II

THE grouping of the numerous and variegated groups into bigger units was at that time made impossible by decentralisation, by local and provincial independence, by industrial and commercial isolation of the provinces from each other, and by poor means of communication. This grouping develops only with the general spread of revolutionary, religious and political ideas, in the course of the Reformation. The various groups of the population which either accept or oppose those ideas, concentrate the nation, very slowly and only approximately indeed, into three large camps, the reactionary or Catholic, the reformist middle-class or Lutheran, and the revolutionary elements. If we discover little logic even in this great division of the nation, if the two camps include partly the same elements, it is due to the fact that most of the official groupings brought over from the Middle Ages had begun to dissolve and to become decentralised, which circumstance gave to the same groups in different localities a momentary opposing orientation. In the last years we have so often met with similar facts in Germany that we will not be surprised at this apparent mixture of groups and classes under the much more complicated conditions of the Sixteenth Century.

The German ideology of to-day sees in the struggles to which the Middle Ages had succumbed nothing but violent theological bickerings, this notwithstanding our modern experience. Had the people of that time only been able to reach an understanding concerning the celestial things, say our patriotic historians and wise statesmen, there would have been no ground whatever for struggle over earthly affairs. These ideologists were gullible enough to accept on their face value all the illusions which an epoch maintains about itself, or which the ideologists of a certain period maintained about that period. This class of people, which saw in the revolution of 1789 nothing but a heated debate over the advantages of a constitutional monarchy as compared with absolutism, would see in the July Revolution a practical controversy over the un-

tenability of the empire by the grace of God, and in the February Revolution, an attempt at solving the problem of a republic or monarchy, etc. Of the *class struggles* which were being fought out in these convulsions, and whose mere expression is being every time written as a political slogan on the banner of these class struggles, our ideologists have no conception even at the present time, although manifestations of them are audible enough not only abroad, but also from the grumbling and the resentment of many thousands of home proletarians.

In the so-called religious wars of the Sixteenth Century, very positive material class-interests were at play, and those wars were class wars just as were the later collisions in England and France. If the class struggles of that time appear to bear religious earmarks, if the interests, requirements and demands of the various classes hid themselves behind a religious screen, it little changes the actual situation, and is to be explained by conditions of the time

The Middle Ages had developed out of raw primitiveness. It had done away with old civilisation, old philosophy, politics and jurisprudence, in order to begin anew in every respect. The only thing which it had retained from the old shattered world was Christianity and a number of half-ruined cities deprived of their civilisation. As a consequence, the clergy retained a monopoly of intellectual education, a phenomenon to be found in every primitive stage of development, and education itself had acquired a predominantly theological nature.

In the hands of the clergy, politics and jurisprudence, as well as other sciences, remained branches of theology, and were treated according to the principles prevailing in the latter. The dogmas of the church were at the same time political axioms, and Bible quotations had the validity of law in every court. Even after the formation of a special class of jurists, jurisprudence long remained under the tutelage of theology. This supremacy of theology in the realm of intellectual activities was at the same time a logical consequence of the situation of the church as the most general force co-ordinating and sanctioning existing feudal domination.

It is obvious that under such conditions, all general and overt attacks on feudalism, in the first place attacks on the church, all revolutionary, social and political doctrines, necessarily became theological heresies. In order to be attacked, existing social conditions had to be stripped of their aureole

of sanctity.

The revolutionary opposition to feudalism was alive throughout all the Middle Ages. According to conditions of the time, it appeared either in the form of mysticism, as open heresy, or of armed insurrection. As mysticism, it is well known how indispensable it was for the reformers of the Sixteenth Century. Muenzer himself was largely indebted to it. The heresies were partly an expression of the reaction of the patriarchal Alpine shepherds against the encroachments of feudalism in their realm (Waldenses<sup>3</sup>), partly an opposition to feudalism of the cities that had out-grown it (The Albigenses, Arnold of Brescia, etc.) and partly direct insurrections of peasants (John Ball, the master from Hungary in Picardy, etc.). We can omit, in this connection, the patriarchal heresy of the Waldenses, as well as the insurrection of the Swiss, which by form and contents, was a reactionary attempt at stemming the tide of historic development, and of a purely local importance. In the other two forms of mediaeval heresy, we find as early as the Twelfth Century the precursors of the great division between the middle-class and the peasant-plebeian opposition which caused the collapse of the peasant war. This division is manifest throughout the later Middle Ages.

The heresy of the cities, which is the actual official heresy of the Middle Ages, directed itself primarily against the clergy, whose riches and political importance it attacked. In the very same manner as the bourgeoisie at present demands a "*gouvernement a bon marche*" (cheap government), so the middle-class of mediaeval times demanded first of all an "*eglise a bon marche*" (cheap church). Reactionary in form, as is every heresy which sees in the further development of church and dogma only a degeneration, the middle-class heresy demanded the restoration of the ancient simple church constitution and the abolition of an exclusive class of priests. This cheap arrangement would eliminate the monks, the prelates, the Roman court, in brief, everything which was expensive for the church. In their attack against papacy, the cities, themselves republics although under the protection of monarchs, expressed for the first time in a general form the idea that the normal form of government for the bourgeoisie was the republic. Their hostility towards many a dogma and church law is partly explained by the foregoing and partly by their conditions. Why they were so bitter against celibacy, no one has given a better explanation than Boccaccio Arnold of Brescia<sup>4</sup>

in Italy and Germany, the Albigenses<sup>f</sup> in south France,, John Fychliffe<sup>g</sup> in England, Huss<sup>7</sup> and the Calixtines<sup>h</sup> in Bohemia, were the chief representatives of this opposition. That the opposition against feudalism should appear here only as an opposition against religious feudalism, is easily understood when one remembers that, at that time, the cities were already a recognised estate sufficiently capable of fighting lay feudalism with its privileges either by force of arms or in the city assemblies.

Here, as in south France, in England and Bohemia, we find the lower nobility joining hands with the cities in their struggle against the clergy and in their heresies, a phenomenon due to the dependence of the lower nobility upon the cities and to the community of interests of both groups as against the princes and the prelates. The same phenomenon is found in the peasant war.

A totally different character was assumed by that heresy which was a direct expression of the peasant and plebeian demands, and which was almost always connected with an insurrection. This heresy, sharing all the demands of middle-class heresy relative to the clergy, the papacy, and the restoration of the ancient Christian church organisation, went far beyond them. It demanded the restoration of ancient Christian equality among the members of the community, this to be recognised as a rule for the middle-class world as well. From the equality of the children of God it made the implication as to civil equality, and partly also as to equality of property. To make the nobility equal to the peasant, the patricians and the privileged middle-class equal to the plebeians, to abolish serfdom, ground rents, taxes, privileges, and at least the most flagrant differences of property—these were demands put forth with more or less definiteness and regarded as naturally emanating from the ancient Christian doctrine. This peasant-plebeian heresy, in the fullness of feudalism, e.g., among the Albigenses, hardly distinguishable from the middle-class opposition, grew in the course of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries to be a strongly defined party opinion appearing independently alongside the heresy of the middle-class. This is the case with John Ball, preacher of the Wat Tyler insurrection in England alongside the Wycliffe movement. This is also the case with the Taborites<sup>8</sup> alongside the Calixtines in Bohemia. The Taborites showed even a republican tendency under theocratic colouring, a view later developed by the representatives

of the plebeians in Germany in the Fifteenth and at the beginning of the Sixteenth Century.

This form of heresy was joined in by the dream-visions of the mystic sects, such as the Scourging Friars,<sup>9</sup> the Lollards,<sup>10</sup> etc., which in times of suppression continued revolutionary tradition

The plebeians of that time were the only class outside of the existing official society. It was outside the feudal, as well as outside the middle-class organisation. It had neither privileges nor property, it was deprived even of the possessions owned by peasant or petty bourgeois, burdened with crushing duties as much as they might be, it was deprived of property and rights in every respect; it lived in such a manner that it did not even come into direct contact with the existing institutions, which ignored it completely. It was a living symptom of the dissolution of the feudal and guild middle-class societies, and it was at the same time the first precursor of modern bourgeois society.

This position of the plebeians is sufficient explanation as to why the plebeian opposition of that time could not be satisfied with fighting feudalism and the privileged middle-class alone, why, in fantasy, at least, it reached beyond modern bourgeois society then only in its inception, why, being an absolutely propertyless faction, it questioned institutions, views and conceptions common to every society based on division of classes. The chiliastic dream-visions<sup>11</sup> of ancient Christianity offered in this respect a very serviceable starting point. On the other hand, this reaching out beyond not only the present but also the future could not help being violently fantastic. At the first practical applications, it naturally fell back into narrow limits set by prevailing conditions. The attack on private property, the demand for community of possession had to solve itself into a crude organisation of charity; vague Christian equality could result in nothing but civic equality before the law; abolition of all officialdom transformed itself finally in the organisation of republican governments elected by the people. Anticipation of communism by human fantasy was in reality anticipation of modern bourgeois conditions.

This anticipation of coming stages of historic development, forced in itself, but a natural outcome of the life conditions of the plebeian group, is first to be noted in Germany, in the teachings of Thomas Muenzer and his party. Already the Taborites showed a kind of chiliastic community of property.

but this was a purely military measure. Only in the teachings of Muenzer did these communist notions find expression as the desires of a vital section of society. Through him they were formulated with a certain definiteness, and were afterwards found in every great convulsion of the people, until gradually they merged with the modern proletarian movement. Something similar we observe in the Middle Ages, where the struggles of the free peasants against increasing feudal domination merged with the struggles of the serfs and bondsmen for the complete abolition of the feudal system.

While the first of the three large camps, the conservative Catholics, embraced all the elements interested in maintaining the existing imperial power, the ecclesiastical and a section of the lay princes, the richer nobility, the prelates and the city patricians—the middle-class moderate Lutheran reform gathered under its banner all the propertied elements of the opposition, the mass of the lower nobility, the middle-class and even a portion of the lay princes who hoped to enrich themselves through the confiscation of the church estates and to seize the opportunity for establishing greater independence from the empire. As to the peasants and plebeians, they grouped themselves around the revolutionary party whose demands and doctrines found their boldest expression in Muenzer.

Luther<sup>12</sup> and Muenzer, in their doctrines, in their characters, in their actions, accurately embodied the tenets of their separate parties.

Between 1517 and 1525, Luther had gone through the same transformations as the German constitutionalists between 1846 and 1849. This has been the case with every middle-class party which, having marched for a while at the head of the movement, has been overwhelmed by the plebeian-proletarian party pressing from the rear.

When in 1517 opposition against the dogmas and the organisation of the Catholic church was first raised by Luther, it still had no definite character. Not exceeding the demands of the earlier middle-class heresy, it did not exclude any trend of opinion which went further. It could not do so because the first moment of the struggle demanded that all opposing elements be united, the most aggressive revolutionary energy be utilised, and the totality of the existing heresies fighting the Catholic orthodoxy be represented. In a similar fashion, our liberal bourgeoisie of 1847 were still revolutionary. They called themselves socialists and communists, and they discussed

emancipation of the working class. Luther's sturdy peasant nature asserted itself in the stormiest fashion in the first period of his activities. "If the raging madness [of the Roman churchmen] were to continue, it seems to me no better counsel and remedy could be found against it than that kings and princes apply force, arm themselves, attack those evil people who have poisoned the entire world, and once and for all make an end to this game, *with arms, not with words*. If thieves are being punished with swords, murderers with ropes, and heretics with fire, why do we not seize, with arms in hand, all those evil teachers of perdition, those popes, bishops, cardinals, and the entire crew of Roman Sodom? Why do we not wash our hands in their blood?"

This revolutionary ardour did not last long. The lightning thrust by Luther caused a conflagration. A movement started among the entire German people. In his appeals against the clergy, in his preaching of Christian freedom, peasants and plebeians perceived the signal for insurrection. Likewise, the moderate middle-class and a large section of the lower nobility joined him, and even princes were drawn into the torrent. While the former believed the day had come in which to wreak vengeance upon all their oppressors, the latter only wished to break the power of the clergy, the dependence upon Rome, the Catholic hierarchy, and to enrich themselves through the confiscation of church property. The parties became separated from each other, and each found a different spokesman. Luther had to choose between the two. Luther, the protege of the Elector of Saxony, the respected professor of Wittenberg who had become powerful and famous overnight, the great man who was surrounded by a coterie of servile creatures and flatterers, did not hesitate a moment. He dropped the popular elements of the movement, and joined the train of the middle-class, the nobility and the princes. Appeals to a war of extermination against Rome were heard no more. Luther was now preaching *peaceful progress* and passive resistance. (Cf. *To the nobility of the German nation*, 1520, etc.) Invited by Hutten to visit him and Sickingen in the castle of Ebern, the centre of the noble conspiracy against clergy and princes, Luther replied: "*I should not like to see the Gospel defended by force and bloodshed.* The world was conquered by the Word, the Church has maintained itself by the Word, and as Antichrist gained ascendancy without violence, so without violence he ~~will~~ fall."

Out of this turn of mind, or, to be more exact, out of this definite delineation of Luther's policy, sprang that policy of bartering and haggling over institutions and dogmas to be retained or reformed, that ugly diplomatising, conceding, intriguing and compromising, the result of which was the Augsburg Confession,<sup>12</sup> the final draft of the constitution of the reformed middle-class church. It was the same petty trading which, in the political field, repeated itself *ad nauseam* in the recent German national assemblies, unity gatherings, chambers of revision, and in the parliaments of Eriurt. The Philistine middle-class character of the official reformation appeared in these negotiations most clearly.

There were valid reasons why Luther, now the recognised representative of middle-class reform, chose to preach lawful progress. The mass of the cities had joined the cause of moderate reform, the lower nobility became more and more devoted to it, one section of the princes joined it, another vacillated. Success was almost certain at least in a large portion of Germany. Under continued peaceful development the other regions could not in the long run withstand the pressure of moderate opposition. Violent convulsions, on the other hand, were bound to result in a conflict between the moderates and the extreme plebeian and peasant party, thus to alienate the princes, the nobility, and a number of cities from the movement and to leave open the alternative of either the middle-class party being over-shadowed by the peasants and plebeians, or the entire movement being crushed by Catholic restoration. How middle-class parties, having achieved the slightest victory, attempt to steer their way between the Scylla of revolution and the Charybdis of restoration by means of lawful progress, we have had occasions enough to observe in the events of recent times.

It was in the nature of the then prevailing social and political conditions that the results of every change were advantageous to the princes, increasing their power. Thus it came about that the middle-class reform, having parted ways with the plebeian and peasant elements, fell more and more under the control of the reform princes. Luther's subservience to them increased, and the people knew very well what they were doing when they accused him of having become a slave of the princes as were all the others, and when they pursued him with stones in Orlamuende.

When the peasant war broke out, becoming more predo-



minant in regions with Catholic nobility and princes, Luther throve to maintain a conciliatory position. He resolutely attacked the governments. He said it was due to their oppression that the revolts had started, that not the peasants alone were against them, but God as well. On the other hand, he also said that the revolt was ungodly and against the Gospel. He advised both parties to yield, to reach a peaceful understanding.

Notwithstanding these sincere attempts at conciliation, however, the revolt spread rapidly over large areas, including such sections as were dominated by Protestant Lutheran princes, nobles and cities, and rapidly outgrew the middle-class "circumspect" reform. The most determined faction of the insurgents under Muenzer opened their headquarters in Luther's very proximity, in Thuringia. A few more successes, and Germany would have been one big conflagration, Luther would have been surrounded, perhaps piked as a traitor, and middle-class reform would have been swept away by the tides of a peasant-plebeian revolution. There was no more time for circumspection. In the face of the revolution, all old animosities were forgotten. Compared with the hordes of peasants, the servants of the Roman Sodom were innocent lambs, sweet-tempered children of God. Buigher and prince, noble and clergyman, Luther and the pope united "against the murderous and plundering hordes of the peasants." "They should be knocked to pieces, strangled and stabbed, secretly and openly, by everybody who can do it, just as one must kill a mad dog!" Luther cried. "Therefore, dear gentlemen, hearken here, save there, stab, knock, strangle them at will, and if thou diest, thou art blessed, no better death canst thou ever attain." No false mercy was to be practised in relation to the peasants. "Whoever hath pity on those whom God pities not, whom He wishes punished and destroyed, shall be classed among the rebellious himself." Later, he said, the peasants would learn to thank God when they had to give away one cow in order that they might enjoy the other in peace. Through the revolution, he said, the princes would learn the spirit of the mob which could reign by force only. "The wise man says '*Cibus, onus et virgam asino.*' The heads of the peasants are full of chaff. They do not hearken to the Word, and they are senseless, so they must hearken to the virga and the gun, and this is only just. We must pray for them that they obey. Where they do not, there should not be much mercy.

Let the guns roar among them, or else they will make it a thousand times worse."

It is the same language that was used by our late socialist and philanthropic bourgeoisie, when, after the March days the proletariat also demanded its share in the fruits of victory.

Luther had given the plebeian movement a powerful weapon—a translation of the Bible. Through the Bible, he contrasted feudal Christianity of his time with moderate Christianity of the first century. In opposition to decaying feudal society, he held up the picture of another society which knew nothing of the ramified and artificial feudal hierarchy. The peasants had made extensive use of this weapon against the forces of the princes, the nobility, and the clergy. Now Luther turned the same weapon against the peasants, extracting from the Bible a veritable hymn to the authorities ordained by God—a feat hardly exceeded by any lackey of absolute monarchy. Princesdom by the grace of God, passive resistance, even serfdom, were being sanctioned by the Bible. Thus Luther repudiated not only the peasant insurrection but even his own revolt against religious and lay authority. He not only betrayed the popular movement to the princes, but the middle class movement as well.

Need we mention other bourgeois who recently gave us examples of repudiating their own past?

Let us now compare the plebeian revolutionary, Muenzer, with the middle-class reformist, Luther.

Thomas Muenzer was born in Stolberg, in the Harz, in 1498. It is said that his father died on the scaffold, a victim of the wilfulness of the Count of Stolberg. In his fifteenth year, Muenzer organised at the Halle school a secret union against the Archbishop of Magdeburg and the Roman Church in general. His scholarly attainments in the theology of his time brought him early the doctor's degree and the position of chaplain in a Halle nunnery. Here he began to treat the dogmas and rites of the church with the greatest contempt. At mass he omitted the words of the transubstantiation, and ate, as Luther said, the almighty gods unconsecrated. Mediaeval mystics, especially the chivalastic works of Joachim of Calabria,<sup>32</sup> were the main subject of his studies. It seemed to Muenzer that the millennium and the day of judgment over the degenerated church and the corrupted world, as announced and pictured by that mystic, had come in the form of the Reformation and the general restlessness of his time. He preached

in his neighbourhood with great success. In 1520 he went to Zwickau as the first evangelist preacher. There he found one of those dreamy chiliastic sects which continued their existence in many localities, hiding behind an appearance of humility and detachment, the rankly growing opposition of the lower strata of society against existing conditions, and with the growth of agitation, beginning to press to the foreground more boldly and with more endurance. It was the sect of the Anabaptists headed by Nicolas Storch.<sup>24</sup> The Anabaptists preached the approach of the Day of Judgment and of the millennium: they had "visions, convulsions, and the spirit of prophecy." They soon came into conflict with the council of Zwickau. Muenzer defended them, though he had never joined them unconditionally, and had rather brought them under his own influence. The council took decisive steps against them, they were compelled to leave the city, and Muenzer departed with them. This was at the end of 1521.

He then went to Prague and, in order to gain ground, attempted to join the remnants of the Hussite movement. His proclamations, however, made it necessary for him to flee Bohemia also. In 1522, he became preacher at Altstedt in Thuringia. Here he started with reforming the cult. Before even Luther dared to go so far, he entirely abolished the Latin language, and ordered the entire Bible, not only the prescribed Sunday Gospels and epistles, to be read to the people. At the same time, he organised propaganda in his locality. People flocked to him from all directions, and soon Altstedt became the centre of the popular anti-priest movement of entire Thuringia.

Muenzer at that time was still theologian before everything else. He directed his attacks almost exclusively against the priests. He did not, however, preach quiet debate and peaceful progress, as Luther had begun to do at that time, but he continued the early violent preachments of Luther, appealing to the princes of Saxony and the people to rise in arms against the Roman priests. "Is it not Christ who said: 'I have come to bring, not peace, but the sword'? What can you [the princes of Saxony] do with that sword? You can do only one thing: If you wish to be the servants of God, you must drive out and destroy the evil ones who stand in the way of the Gospel. Christ ordered very earnestly (Luke, 19, 27): 'But these mine enemies, that would not that I should reign over them, bring hither, and slay them before

me.' Do not resort to empty assertions that the power of God could do it without aid of our sword, since then it would have to rust in its sheath. We must destroy those who stand in the way of God's revelation, we must do it mercilessly, as Hezekiah, Cyrus, Josiah, Daniel and Elias destroyed the priests of Baal, else the Christian Church will never come back to its origins. We must uproot the weeds in God's vineyard at the time when the crops are ripe. God said in the Fifth Book of Moses, 7, 'Thou shalt not show mercy unto the idolaters, but ye shall break down their altars, dash in pieces their graven images and burn them with fire and I shall not be wroth at you'."

But these appeals to the princes were of no avail, whereas the revolutionary agitation among the people grew day by day. Muenzer, whose ideas became more definitely shaped and more courageous, now definitely relinquished the middle-class reformation, and at the same time appeared as a direct political agitator.

His theologic-philosophic doctrine attacked all the main points not only of Catholicism but of Christianity as such. Under the cloak of Christian forms, he preached a kind of pantheism, which curiously resembles the modern speculative mode of contemplation, and at times even taught open atheism. He repudiated the assertion that the Bible was the only infallible revelation. The only living revelation, he said, was reason, a revelation which existed among all peoples at all times. To contrast the Bible with reason, he maintained, was to kill the spirit by the letter, for the Holy Spirit of which the Bible spoke was not a thing outside of us, the Holy Spirit was our reason. Faith, he said, was nothing else but reason become alive in man, therefore, he said, pagans could also have faith. Through this faith, through reason come to life, man became godlike and blessed, he said. Heaven was to be sought in this life, not beyond, and it was, according to Muenzer, the task of the believers to establish Heaven, the kingdom of God, here on earth. As there is no Heaven in the beyond, he asserted, so there is no Hell in the beyond, and no damnation, and there are no devils but the evil desires and cravings of man. Christ, he said, was a man, as we are, a prophet and a teacher, and his "Lord's Supper" is nothing but a plain meal of commemoration wherein bread and wine are being consumed with mystic additions.

Muenzer preached these doctrines mostly in a covert fashion, under the cloak of Christian phraseology which the

new philosophy was compelled to utilise for some time. The fundamental heretic idea, however, is easily discernible in all his writings, and it is obvious that the biblical cloak was for him of much less importance than it was for many a disciple of Hegel in modern times. Still, there is a distance of three hundred years between Muenzer and modern philosophy.

Muenzer's political doctrine followed his revolutionary religious conceptions very closely, and as his theology reached far beyond the current conceptions of his time, so his political doctrine went beyond existing social and political conditions. As Muenzer's philosophy of religion touched upon atheism, so his political programme touched upon communism, and there is more than one communist sect of modern times which, on the eve of the February Revolution, did not possess a theoretical equipment as rich as that of Muenzer of the Sixteenth Century. His programme, less a compilation of the demands of the then existing plebeians than a genius's anticipation of the conditions for the emancipation of the proletarian element that had just begun to develop among the plebeians, demanded the immediate establishment of the kingdom of God, of the prophesied millennium on earth. This was to be accomplished by the return of the church to its origins and the abolition of all institutions that were in conflict with what Muenzer conceived as original Christianity, which, in fact, was the idea of a very modern church. By the kingdom of God, Muenzer understood nothing else than a state of society without class differences, without private property, and without superimposed state powers opposed to the members of society. All existing authorities, as far as they did not submit and join the revolution, he taught, must be overthrown, all work and all property must be shared in common, and complete equality must be introduced. In his conception, a union of the people was to be organised to realise this programme, not only throughout Germany, but throughout entire Christendom. Princes and nobles were to be invited to join, and should they refuse, the union was to overthrow or kill them, with arms in hand, at the first opportunity.

Muenzer immediately set to work to organise the union. His preachings assumed a still more militant character. He attacked, not only the clergy, but with equal passion the princes, the nobility and the patricians. He pictured in burning colours the existing oppression, and contrasted it with the vision of the millennium of social republican equality which he

created out of his imagination. He published one revolutionary pamphlet after another, sending emissaries in all directions, while he personally organised the union in Altstedt and its vicinity.

The first fruit of this propaganda was the destruction of St Mary's Chapel in Mellerbach near Altstedt, according to the command of the Bible (Deut. 7, 5) : "Ye shall break down their altars, and dash in pieces their pillars, and hew down their Asherim, and burn their graven images with fire." The princes of Saxony came in person to Altstedt to quell the upheaval, and they called Muenzer to the castle. There he delivered a sermon, which they had never heard from Luther, "that easy living flesh of Wittenberg," as Mueznier called him. He insisted that the ungodly rulers, especially the priests and monks who treated the Gospel as heresy, must be killed; for confirmation he referred to the New Testament. The ungodly have no right to live, he said, save by the mercy of the chosen ones. If the princes would not exterminate the ungodly, he asserted, God would take their sword from them because the right to wield the sword belongs to the community. The source of the evil of usury, thievery and robbery, he said, were the princes and the masters who had taken all creatures into their private possession—the fishes in the water, the birds in the air, the plants in the soil. And the usurpers, he said, still preached to the poor the commandment, "Thou shalt not steal," while they grabbed everything, and robbed and crushed the peasant and the artisan. "When, however, one of the latter commits the slightest transgression," he said, "he has to hang, and Dr. Liar says to all this 'Amen'." The masters themselves created a situation, he argued, in which the poor man was forced to become their enemy. If they did not remove the causes of the upheaval, how could things improve in times to come? he asked. "Oh, my dear gentlemen, how the Lord will smite with an iron rod all these old pots! When I say so, I am considered rebellious. So be it!" (Cf Zimmermann's *Peasant War*, II, p. 75.)

Muenzer had the sermon printed. His Altstedt printer was punished by Duke Johann of Saxony with banishment. His own writings were to be henceforth subjected to the censorship of the ducal government in Weimar. But he paid no heed to this order. He immediately published a very inciting paper in the imperial city of Muehlhausen, wherein he admonished the people "to widen the hole so that all the world may

see and comprehend who our fools are who have blasphemously turned our Lord into a painted mannikin." He concluded with the following words "All the world must suffer a big jolt. The game will be such that the ungodly will be thrown off their seats and the downtrodden will rise." As a motto, Thomas Muenzer, "the man with the hammer," wrote the following on the title page: "Beware, I have put my words into thy mouth, I have lifted thee above the people and above the empires that thou mayest uproot, destroy, scatter and overthrow, and that thou mayest build and plant A wall of iron against the kings, princes, priests, and for the people hath been erected. Let them fight, for victory is wondrous, and the strong and godless tyrants will perish."

The breach between Muenzer and Luther with his party had taken place long before that. Luther himself was compelled to accept some church reforms which were introduced by Muenzer without consulting him. Luther watched Muenzer's activities with the nettled distrust of a moderate reformer towards an energetic far-aiming radical. Already in the spring of 1524, in a letter to Melanchthon, that model of a hectic stay-at-home Philistine, Muenzer wrote that he and Luther did not understand the movement at all. They were seeking, he said, to choke it by adherence to the letter of the Bible, and their doctrine was worm-eaten. "Dear brethren," he wrote, "stop your delaying and hesitating. The time has come, the summer is knocking at our doors. Do not keep friendship with the ungodly who prevent the Word from exercising its full force. Do not flatter your princes in order that you may not perish with them. Ye tender, bookish scholars, do not be wroth, for I cannot do otherwise"

Luther had more than once invited Muenzer to an open debate. The latter, however, being always ready to accept battle in the presence of the people, did not have the slightest desire to plunge into a theological squabble before the partisan public of the Wittenberg University. He had no desire "to bring the testimony of the spirit before the high school of learning exclusively." If Luther was sincere, he wrote, let him use his influence to stop the chicaneries against his, Muenzer's, printers, and to lift the censorship in order that their controversy might be freely fought out in the press.

When the above-mentioned revolutionary brochure appeared, Luther openly denounced Muenzer. In his "Letter to the Princes of Saxony Against the Rebellious Spirit," he

declared Muenzer to be an instrument of Satan, and demanded of the princes to intervene, and drive the instigators of the upheaval out of the country, since, he said, they did not confine themselves to preaching their evil doctrine, but incited to insurrection, to violent lawless action against the authorities.

On August 1st, Muenzer was compelled to appear before the princes in the castle of Weimar, to defend himself against the accusation of incendiary machinations. There were highly compromising facts quoted against him, his secret union had been traced, his hand was discovered in the organisation of the pitmen and the peasants. He was being threatened with banishment. Upon returning to Altstedt, he learned Duke Georg of Saxony demanded his extradition. Union letters in his handwriting had been intercepted, wherein he called Georg's subjects to armed resistance against the enemies of the Gospel. The council would have extradited him had he not left the city.

In the meantime, the rising agitation among the peasants and the plebeians had enormously lightened Muenzer's task of propaganda. In the person of the Anabaptists he found invaluable agents. This sect, having no definite dogmas, held together by common opposition against all ruling classes and by the common symbol of second baptism, ascetic in their mode of living, untiring, fanatic and intrepid in propaganda, had grouped itself more closely around Muenzer. Made homeless by constant persecutions, its members wandered over the length and breadth of Germany, announcing everywhere the new gospel wherein Muenzer had made clear to them their own demands and wishes. Numberless Anabaptists were put on the rack, burned or otherwise executed. But the courage and endurance of these emissaries were unshaken, and the success of their activities amidst the rapidly rising agitation of the people was enormous. That was one of the reasons why, on his flight from Thuringia, Muenzer found the ground prepared wherever he turned.

In Nuernberg, a peasant revolt had been nipped in the bud a month previous. Here Muenzer conducted his propaganda under cover. Soon there appeared persons who defended his most audacious theological doctrines of the non-obligatory power of the Bible and the meaninglessness of sacraments, declaring Christ to have been a mere man, and the power of lay authorities to be ungodly. "We see there Satan stalking, the spirit of Altstedt!" Luther exclaimed. In Nuernberg,



Muenzer printed his reply to Luther. He accused him of flattering the princes and supporting the reactionary party by his moderate position. "The people will free themselves in spite of everything," he wrote, "and then the fate of Dr. Luther will be that of a captive fox." The city council ordered the paper confiscated, and Muenzer was compelled to leave the city. From there he went through Suabia to Alsace, then to Switzerland, and then back to the Upper Black Forest where the insurrection had started several months before, precipitated largely by the Anabaptist emissaries. There is no doubt that this propaganda trip of Muenzer's added much to the organisation of the people's party, to a clear formulation of its demands and to the final general outbreak of the insurrection in April, 1525. It was through this trip that the dual nature of Muenzer's activities became more and more pronounced—on the one hand, his propaganda among the people whom he approached in the only language then comprehensible to the masses, that of religious prophecy, on the other hand, his contact with the initiated, to whom he could disclose his ultimate aims. Even previous to this journey he had grouped around himself in Thuringia a circle of the most determined persons, not only from among the people, but also from among the lower clergy, a circle whom he had put at the head of the secret organisation. Now he became the centre of the entire revolutionary movement of south-west Germany, organising connections between Saxony and Thuringia through Franconia and Suabia up to Alsace and the Swiss frontier and counting among his disciples and the heads of the organisation such men as Hubmaier of Waldshut, Conrad Grebel of Zurich, Franz Rabmann of Griessen, Schappelar of Memmingen, Jakob Wehe of Leipzig, and Dr Mantel in Stuttgart, the most revolutionary of priests. He kept himself mostly in Griessen on the Schaffhausen frontier, undertaking journeys through the Hegau, Klettgau, etc. The bloody persecutions undertaken by the alarmed princes and masters everywhere against this new plebeian heresy, aided not a little in fanning the rebellious spirit and closing the ranks of the organisation. In this way, Muenzer passed five months in upper Germany. When the outbreak of the general movement was at hand, he returned to Thuringia, where he wished to lead the movement personally. There we will find him later.

We shall see how truly the character and the behaviour of the two party heads reflected the position of their respective

parties. Luther's indecision, his fear of the movement, assumed serious proportions, his cowardly servility towards the princes corresponded closely to the hesitating, vacillating policy of the middle-classes. The revolutionary energy and decisiveness of Muenzer, on the other hand, was seen in the most advanced faction of the plebeians and peasants. The difference was that while Luther confined himself to an expression of the ideas and wishes of a majority of his class and thereby acquired among it a very cheap popularity, Muenzer, on the contrary, went far beyond the immediate ideas and demands of the plebeians and peasants, organising out of the then existing revolutionary elements a party, which, as far as it stood on the level of his ideas and shared his energy, still represented only a small minority of the insurgent masses.

### CHAPTER III

ABOUT fifty years after the suppression of the Hussite movement, the first symptoms of a budding revolutionary spirit became manifest among the German peasants.

The first peasant conspiracy came into being in 1476, in the bishopric of Wuerzburg, a country already impoverished "by bad government manifold taxes, payments, feuds, enmity, war, fires, murders, prison, and the like," and continually plundered by bishops, clergy and nobility in a shameless manner. A young shepherd and musician, Hans Boenheim of Niklashausen, also called the "Drum-Beater" and "Hans the Piper," suddenly appeared in Taubergrund in the role of a prophet. He related that the Virgin had appeared to him in a vision, that she told him to burn his drum, to cease serving the dance and the sinful gratification of the senses, and to exhort the people to do penance. Therefore, he said, everybody should purge himself of sin and the vain lusts of the world, forsake all adornments and embellishments, and make a pilgrimage to the Madonna of Niklashausen to attain forgiveness.

Already among these precursors of the movement we notice an asceticism which is to be found in all mediaeval uprisings that were tinged with religion, and also in modern times at the beginning of every proletarian movement. This austerity of behaviour, this insistence on relinquishing all enjoyment of life, contrasts the ruling classes with the principle of Spar-

tan equality Nevertheless, it is a necessary transitional stage, without which the lowest strata of society could never start a movement. In order to develop revolutionary energy, in order to become conscious of their own hostile position towards all other elements of society, in order to concentrate as a class, the lower strata of society must begin with stripping themselves of everything that could reconcile them to the existing system of society They must renounce all pleasures which would make their subdued position in the least tolerable and of which even the severest pressure could not deprive them

This plebeian and proletarian asceticism differs widely, both by its wild fanatic form and by its contents, from the middle-class asceticism as preached by the middle-class Lutheran morality and by the English Puritans (to be distinguished from the independent and farther-reaching sects) whose whole secret is middle-class thrift. It is quite obvious that this plebeian-proletarian asceticism loses its revolutionary character when the development of modern productive forces increases the number of commodities, thus rendering Spartan equality superfluous, and on the other hand, the very position of the proletariat in society, and thereby the proletariat itself becomes more and more revolutionary Gradually, this asceticism disappears from among the masses. Among the sects with which it survives, it degenerates either into bourgeois parsimony or into high-sounding virtuousness which, in the end, is nothing more than Philistine or guild-artisan niggardliness Besides, renunciation of pleasures need not be preached to the proletariat for the simple reason that it has almost nothing to renounce

Hans the Piper's call to penitence found a great response. All the prophets of rebellion started with appeals against sin, because, in fact, only a violent exertion, a sudden renunciation of all habitual forms of existence could bring into unified motion a disunited, widely scattered generation of peasants grown up in blind submission. A pilgrimage to Niklashausen began and rapidly increased, and the greater the masses of people that joined the procession, the more openly did the young rebel divulge his plans. The Madonna of Niklashausen, he said, had announced to him that henceforth there should be neither king nor princes, neither pope nor other ecclesiastic or lay authority. Every one should be a brother to each other and win his bread by the toil of his hands, possessing no more than his neighbour All taxes, ground rents, serf duties, tolls

and other payments and deliveries should be abolished forever. Forests, waters and meadows should be free everywhere

The people received this new gospel with joy. The fame of the prophet, "the message of our Mother," spread everywhere, even in distant quarters. Hordes of pilgrims came from the Odenwald, from Main, from Kocher and Jaxt, even from Bavaria and Suabia, and from the Rhine. Miracles supposed to have been performed by the Piper were being related, people fell on their knees before the prophet, praying to him as to a saint, people fought for small strips from his cap as for relics or amulets. In vain did the priests fight him, denouncing his visions as the devil's delusions and his miracles as hellish swindles. But the mass of believers increased enormously. The revolutionary sect began to organise. The Sunday sermons of the rebellious shepherd attracted gatherings of 40,000 and more to Niklashausen.

For several months Hans the Piper preached before the masses. He did not intend, however, to confine himself to preaching. He was in secret communication with the priest of Niklashausen and with two knights, Kunz of Thunfeld and his son, who accepted the new gospel and were singled out as the military leaders of the planned insurrection. Finally, on the Sunday preceding the day of St. Kilian, when the shepherd believed his power to be strong enough, he gave the signal. He closed his sermon with the following words: "And now go home, and weigh in your mind what our Holiest Madonna has announced to you, and on the coming Saturday leave your wives and children and old men at home, but you, you men, come back here to Niklashausen on the day of St. Margaret, which is next Saturday, and bring with you your brothers and friends, as many as they may be. Do not come with pilgrims' staves, but convered with weapons and ammunition, in one hand a candle, in the other a sword and a pike or halberd, and the Holy Virgin will then announce to you what she wishes you to do." But before the peasants came in masses, the horsemen of the bishop seized the prophet of rebellion at night, and brought him to the Castle of Wuerzburg. On the appointed day, 34,000 armed peasants appeared, but the news had a discouraging effect on the mass; the majority went home, the more initiated retained about 16,000 with whom they moved to the castle under the leadership of Kunz of Thunfeld and his son Michael. The bishop, by means of promises, persuaded them to go home, but as soon as they began to disperse, they

were attacked by the bishop's horsemen, and many were imprisoned. Two were decapitated, and Hans the Piper was burned. Kunz of Thunfeld fled, and was allowed to return only at the price of ceding all his estates to the monastery. Pilgrimages to Niklashausen continued for some time, but were finally suppressed.

After this first attempt, Germany remained quiet for some time; but at the end of the century rebellions and conspiracies of the peasants started anew.

We shall pass over the Dutch peasant revolt of 1491 and 1492 which was suppressed by Duke Albrecht of Saxony in the battle near Heemskerk, also the revolt of the peasants of the Abbey of Kempton in Upper Suabia which occurred simultaneously, and the Frisian revolt under Shaard Ahlva, about 1497, which was also suppressed by Albrecht of Saxony. These revolts were mostly too far from the scene of the actual Peasant War. In part they were struggles of hitherto free peasants against the attempt to force feudalism upon them. We now pass to the two great conspiracies which prepared the Peasant War: the *Union Shoe* and the *Poor Konrad*.

The rise in the price of commodities which had called forth the revolt of the peasants in the Netherlands, brought about, in 1493, in Alsace, a secret union of peasants and plebeians with a sprinkling of the purely middle-class opposition party, and a certain amount of sympathy even among the lower nobility. The seat of the union was the region of Schlettstadt, Sulz, Dambach, Rossheim, Scherweiler, etc. The conspirators demanded the plundering and extermination of the Jews, whose usury then, as now, sucked the blood of the peasants of Alsace, the introduction of a jubilee year to cancel all debts, the abolition of taxes, tolls and other burdens, the abolition of the ecclesiastical and Rottweil (imperial) court, the right to ratify taxation, the reduction of the priests' incomes to a prebend of between fifty and sixty guilders, the abolition of the auricular confession, and the establishment in the communities of courts elected by the communities themselves. The conspirators planned, as soon as they became strong enough, to overpower the stronghold of Schlettstadt, to confiscate the treasures of the monasteries and the city, and from there to arouse the whole of Alsace. The banner of the union to be unfurled at the moment of insurrection, contained a peasant's shoe with long leather strings, the so-called Union Shoe, which

gave a symbol and a name to the peasant conspiracies of the following twenty years.

The conspirators held their meetings at night on the lone-some Hungerberg. Membership in the Union was connected with the most mysterious ceremonies and threats of severest punishment against traitors. Nevertheless, the movement became known about Easter Week of 1493, the time appointed for the attack on Schlettstadt. The authorities immediately intervened. Many of the conspirators were arrested and put on the rack, to be quartered or decapitated. Many were crippled by chopping their hands and fingers, and driven out of the country. A large number fled to Switzerland. The Union Shoe, however, was far from being annihilated and continued its existence in secret. Numerous exiles, spread over Switzerland and south Germany, became its emissaries. Finding everywhere the same oppression and the same inclination towards revolt, they spread the Union Shoe over the territory of present-day Baden. The greatest admiration is due the tenacity and endurance with which the peasants of upper Germany conspired for thirty years after 1493, with which they overcame the obstacles to a more centralised organisation in spite of the fact that they were scattered over the countryside, and with which, after numberless dispersions, defeats, executions of leaders, they renewed their conspiracies over and over again, until an opportunity came for a mass upheaval.

In 1502, the bishopric of Speyer, which at that time embraced also the locality of Bruchsal, showed signs of a secret movement among the peasants. The Union Shoe had here reorganised itself with considerable success. About 7,000 men belonged to the organisation whose centre was Untergrombach, between Bruchsal and Weingarten, and whose ramifications reached down the Rhine to the Main, and up to the Margraviate of Baden. Its articles provided: No ground rent, tithe, tax or toil to be paid to the princes, the nobility or the clergy; serfdom to be abolished; monasteries and other church estates to be confiscated and divided among the people, and no other authority to be recognised aside from the emperor.

We find here for the first time expressed among the peasants the two demands of secularising the church estates in favour of the people and of a unified and undivided German monarchy—demands which henceforth will be found regularly in the more advanced faction of the peasants and plebeians.

In Thomas Muenzer's programme, the division of the

church estates was transformed into confiscation in favour of common property, and the unified German *empire*, into the unified and undivided *republic*.

The renewed Union Shoe had, as well as the old, its own secret meeting places, its oath of silence, its initiation ceremonies, and its union banner with the legend, "Nothing but God's Justice." The plan of action was similar to that of the Alsatian Union Bruchsal, where the majority of the population belonged to the Union, was to be overpowered. A union army was to be organised and dispatched into the surrounding principalities as moving points of concentration.

The plan was betrayed by a clergyman to whom one of the conspirators revealed it in the confessional. The governments immediately resorted to counter action. How widespread the Union had become, is apparent from the terror which seized the various imperial estates in Alsace and in the Union of Suabia. Troops were concentrated, and mass arrests were made. Emperor Maximilian, "the last of the knights," issued the most bloodthirsty, punitive decree against the undertaking of the peasants. Hordes of peasants assembled here and there, and armed resistance was offered, but the isolated peasant troops could not hold ground for a long time. Some of the conspirators were executed and many fled, but the secrecy was so well preserved that the majority, and also the leaders, could remain unmolested in their own localities or in the countries of the neighbouring masters.

After this new defeat, there followed a prolonged period of apparent quiet in the class struggles. The work, however, was continued in an underground way. Already, in the first years of the Sixteenth Century, *Poor Konrad* was formed in Suabia, apparently in connection with the scattered members of the Union Shoe. In the Black Forest, the Union Shoe continued in isolated circles until, ten years later, an energetic peasant leader succeeded in uniting the various threads and combining them into a great conspiracy. Both conspiracies became public, one shortly after the other, in the restless years from 1513 to 1515, in which the Swiss, Hungarian and Slovenian peasants made a series of significant insurrections.

The man who restored the Upper Rhemish Union Shoe was Joss Fritz of Untergrombach, a fugitive from the conspiracy of 1502, a former soldier, in all respects an outstanding figure. After his fight, he had kept himself in various localities between the Lake Constance and the Black Forest, and finally settled

as a vassal near Freiburg in Breisgau, where he even became a forester. Interesting details as to the manner in which he reorganised the Union from this point of vantage and as to the skill with which he managed to attract people of different character, are contained in the investigations. It was due to the diplomatic talent and the untiring endurance of this model conspirator that a considerable number of people of the most divergent classes became involved in the Union: knights, priests, burghers, plebeians and peasants, and it is almost certain that he organised several grades of the conspiracy, one more or less sharply divided from the other. All serviceable elements were utilised with the greatest circumspection and skill. Outside of the initiated emissaries who wandered over the country in various disguises, the vagrants and beggars were used for subordinate missions. Joss stood in direct communication with the beggar kings, and through them he held in his hand the numerous vagabond population. In fact, the beggar kings played a considerable role in his conspiracy. Very original figures they were, these beggar kings. One roamed the country with a girl using her seemingly wounded feet as a pretext for begging; he wore more than eight insignia on his hat—the fourteen deliverers, St. Ottilie, Our Mother in Heaven, etc; besides, he wore a long red beard, and carried a big knotty stick with a dagger and pike. Another, begging in the name of St. Velten, offered spices and worm-seeds; he wore a long iron-coloured coat, a red barret, with the Baby of Trient attached thereto, a sword at his side, and many knives and a dagger on his girdle. Others had artificial open wounds, besides similar picturesque attire. There were at least ten of them, and for the price of two thousand guilders they were supposed to set fire simultaneously in Alsace, in the Margraviate of Baden, and in Breisgau, and to put themselves, with at least 2,000 men of their own, under the command of George Schneider, the former Captain of the Lansquenets, on the day of the Zabern Parish Fair in Rozen, in order to conquer the city. A courier service from station to station was established between real members of the union. Joss Fritz and his chief emissary, Stoffel of Freiburg, continually riding from place to place, reviewed the armies of the neophytes at night. There is ample material in the documents of the court investigations relative to the spread of the Union in the Upper Rhine and Black Forest regions. The documents contain many names of members from the various localities in that region, toge-



ther with descriptions of persons. Most of those mentioned were journeymen, peasants and innkeepers, a few nobles, priests (like that of Lehen himself), and unemployed Lansquenets. This composition shows the more developed character that the Union Shoe had assumed under Joss Fritz. The plebeian element of the cities began to assert itself more and more. The ramifications of the conspiracy went over into Alsace, present-day Baden, up to Wuerttemberg and the Main. Larger meetings were held from time to time on remote mountains such as the Kniebis, etc., and the affairs of the Union were discussed. The meetings of the chiefs, often participated in by local members as well as by delegates of the more remote localities, took place on the Hartmatte near Lehen, and it was here that the fourteen articles of the Union were adopted: No master besides the emperor, and (according to some) the pope; abolition of the Rottweil imperial court, limitation of the church court to religious affairs; abolition of all interest which had been paid so long that it equalled the capital; an interest of 5 per cent. as the highest permissible rate; freedom of hunting, fishing, grazing, and wood cutting; limitation of the priests to one prebend for each; confiscation of all church estates and monastery gems in favour of the union; abolition of all inequitable taxes and tolls; eternal peace within entire Christendom, energetic action against all opponents of the Union, union taxes; seizure of a strong city, such as Freiburg, to serve as the centre of the Union; opening of negotiations with the emperor as soon as the Union hordes were gathered, and with Switzerland in case the emperor declined—these were the points agreed upon. We see that the demands of the peasants and plebeians assumed a more and more definite and decisive form, although concessions had to be made in the same measure to the more moderate and timid elements as well.

The blow was to be struck about Autumn, 1513. Nothing was lacking but a Union banner, and Joss Fritz went to Heilbrunn to have it painted. It contained, besides all sorts of emblems and pictures, the Union Shoe and the legend "God help thy divine justice." While he was away, a premature attempt was made to overwhelm Freiburg, but the attempt was discovered. Some indiscretions in the conduct of the propaganda put the council of Freiburg and the Margrave of Baden on the right track. The betrayal of two conspirators completed the series of disclosures. Presently the Margrave,

the council of Freiburg, and the imperial government of Ensisheim sent out their spies and soldiers. A number of Union members were arrested, tortured and executed. But the majority escaped once more, Joss Fritz among them. The Swiss government now persecuted the fugitives with great assiduity and even executed many of them. However, it could not prevent the majority of the fugitives from keeping themselves continually in the vicinity of their homes and gradually returning there. The Alsace government in Ensisheim was more cruel than the others. It ordered very many to be decapitated, broken on the wheel, and quartered. Joss Fritz kept himself mainly on the Swiss bank of the Rhine, but he also went often to the Black Forest without ever being apprehended.

Why the Swiss made common cause with the neighbouring governments this time is apparent from the peasant revolt that broke out the following year, 1514, in Berne, Solothurne and Lucerne, and resulted in a purging of the aristocratic governments and the institution of patricians. The peasants also forced through some privileges for themselves. If these Swiss local revolts succeeded, it was simply due to the fact that there was still less centralisation in Switzerland than in Germany. The local German masters were all subdued by the peasants of 1525, and if they succumbed, it was due to the organised mass armies of the princes. These latter, however, did not exist in Switzerland.

Simultaneously with the Union Shoe in Baden, and apparently in direct connection with it, a second conspiracy was formed in Wuerttemberg. According to documents, it had existed since 1503, but since the name Union Shoe became too dangerous after the dispersal of the Untergrombach conspirators, it adopted the name of Poor Konrad. Its seat was the valley of Rems underneath the mountain of Hohenstaufen. Its existence had been no mystery for a long time, at least among the people. The shameless pressure of Duke Ulrich's government, and the series of famine years which so greatly aided the outbreaks of 1513 and 1514, had increased the number of conspirators. The newly imposed taxes on wine, meat and bread, as well as capital tax of one penny yearly for every gulder, caused the new outbreak. The city of Schorndorf, where the heads of the complot used to meet in the house of a cutler named Kaspar Pregizer, was to be seized first. In the spring of 1514, the rebellion broke out. Three thousand and, according to others, five thousand peasants appeared before

the city, and were persuaded by the friendly promises of the Duke's officers to move on. Duke Ulrich, having promised the abolition of the new tax, came riding fast with eighty horsemen, to find that everything was quiet in consequence of the promise. He promised to convene a diet where all complaints would be examined. The chiefs of the organisation, however, knew very well that Ulrich sought only to keep the people quiet until he had recruited and concentrated enough troops to be able to break his word and collect the taxes by force. They issued from Kaspar Pregizer's house, "the office of Poor Konrad," a call to a Union congress, this call having the support of emissaries everywhere. The success of the first uprising in the valley of Rems had everywhere strengthened the movement among the people. The papers and the emissaries found a favourable response, and so the congress held in Untertuerkheim on May 28, was attended by numerous representatives from all parts of Wuerttemberg. It was decided immediately to proceed with the propaganda and to strike a decisive blow in the valley of Rems at the first opportunity in order to spread the uprising from that point in every direction. While Bantelshans of Dettingen, a former soldier, and Singerhans of Wuertingen, a prominent peasant, were bringing the Suabian Alps into the Union, the uprising broke out on every side. Though Singerhans was suddenly attacked and seized, the cities of Backnang, Winnenden, and Markgroeningen fell into the hands of the peasants combined with the plebeians, and the entire territory from Weinsberg to Blaubeuren and from there up to the frontiers of Baden, was in open revolt. Ulrich was compelled to yield. However, while he was calling the Diet for June 25, he sent out a circular letter to the surrounding princes and free cities, asking for aid against the uprising, which, he said, threatened all princes, authorities and nobles in the empire, and which "strangely resembled the Union Shoe."

In the meantime, the Diet, representing the cities, and many delegates of the peasants who also demanded seats in the Diet, convened on June 18 in Stuttgart.

The prelates were not there as yet. The knights had not been invited. The opposition of the city of Stuttgart, as well as two threatening hordes of peasants at Leonberg nearby in the valley of Rems, strengthened the demands of the peasants. Their delegates were admitted, and it was decided to depose and punish three of the hated councillors of the Duke—Lam-

parter, Thumb and Lorcher, to add to the Duke a council of four knights, four burghers and four peasants, to grant him a civil list, and to confiscate the monasteries and the endowments in favour of the State treasury.

Duke Ulrich met these revolutionary decisions with a *coup d'état*. On June 21, he rode with his knights and councillors to Tuebingen, where he was followed by the prelates. He ordered the middle-class to come there as well. This was obeyed, and there he continued the session of the Diet without the peasants. The burghers, confronted with military terrorism, betrayed their allies, the peasants. On July 8, the Tuebingen agreement came into being, which imposed on the country almost a million of the Duke's debt, imposed on the Duke some limitations of power which he never fulfilled, and disposed of the peasants with a few meagre general phrases and a very definite penal law against insurrection. Of course, nothing was mentioned about peasant representation in the Diet. The plain people cried "Treason!" but the Duke, having acquired new credits after his debts were taken over by the estates, soon gathered troops while his neighbours, particularly the Elector Palatine, were sending military aid. Thus, by the end of July, the Tuebingen agreement had been accepted all over the country, and a new oath taken. Only in the valley of Rems did Poor Konrad offer resistance. The Duke, who rode there in person, was almost killed. A peasant camp was formed on the mountain of Koppel. But the affair dragged on, most of the insurgents running away for lack of food; later the remaining ones also went home after concluding an ambiguous agreement with some representatives of the Diet. Ulrich, whose army had in the meantime been strengthened by voluntarily offered troops of the cities which, having attained their demands, now fanatically turned against the peasants, attacked the valley of Rems contrary to the terms of the agreement, and plundered its cities and villages. Sixteen hundred peasants were captured, sixteen of them decapitated, and the rest receiving heavy fines in favour of Ulrich's treasury. Many remained in prison for a long time. A number of penal laws were issued against a renewal of the organisation, against all gatherings of peasants, and the nobility of Suabia formed a special union for the suppression of all attempts at insurrection. Meantime, the chief leaders of Poor Konrad had succeeded in escaping into Switzerland, whence most of them returned home singly, after the lapse of a few years.

Simultaneously with the Wuerttemberg movement, symptoms of new Union Shoe activities became manifest in Breisgau and in the Margraviate of Baden. In June, an insurrection was attempted at Buehl, but it was immediately dispersed by Margrave Philipp—the leader, Gugel-Bastian of Freiburg, having been seized and executed on the block.

In the spring of the same year, 1514, a general peasant war broke out in Hungary. A crusade against the Turks was being preached, and, as usual, freedom was promised to the serfs and bondsmen who would join it. About 60,000 congregated, and were to be under the command of Gyorgy Dozsa,<sup>15</sup> a Szekler, who had distinguished himself in the preceding Turkish wars and even attained nobility. The Hungarian knights and magnates, however, looked with disfavour upon the crusade which threatened to deprive them of their property and slaves. They hastily followed the individual hordes of peasants, and took back their serfs by force and mistreated them. When the army of crusaders learned about it, all the fury of the oppressed peasants was unleashed. Two of the men, enthusiastic advocates of the crusade, Lawrence Meszaros and Barnabas, fanned the fire, inciting the hatred of the army against the nobility by their revolutionary speeches. Dozsa himself shared the anger of his troops against the treacherous nobility. The army of crusaders became an army of the revolution, and Dozsa assumed leadership of the movement.

He camped with his peasants in the Rakos field near Pest. Hostilities were opened with encounters between the peasants and the people of the nobility in the surrounding villages and in the suburbs of Pest. Soon there were skirmishes, and then followed Sicilian Vespers for all the nobility who fell into the hands of the peasants, and burning of all the castles in the vicinity. The court threatened in vain. When the first acts of the people's justice towards the nobility had been accomplished under the walls of the city, Dozsa proceeded to further operations. He divided his army into five columns. Two were sent to the mountains of Upper Hungary in order to effect an insurrection and to exterminate the nobility. The third, under Ambros Szaleves, a citizen of Pest, remained on the Rakos to guard the capital. The fourth and fifth were led by Dozsa and his brother Gregor against Szegedin.

In the meantime, the nobility gathered in Pest, and called to its aid Johann Zapolya, the *vovode* of Transylvania. The

nobility, joined by the middle-class of Budapest, attacked and annihilated the army on the Rakos, after Szaleves with the middle-class elements of the peasant army had gone over to the enemy. A host of prisoners were executed in the most cruel fashion. The rest were sent home minus their noses and ears.

Dozsa suffered defeat before Szegedin and moved to Czanad which he captured, having defeated an army of the nobility under Batory Istvan and Bishop Esakye, and having perpetrated bloody repressions on the prisoners, among them the Bishop and the royal Chancellor Teleky, for the atrocities committed on the Rakos. In Czanad he proclaimed a republic, abolition of the nobility, general equality and sovereignty of the people, and then moved toward Temesvar, to which place Batory had rushed with his army. But during the siege of this fortress which lasted for two months and while he was being reinforced by a new army under Anton Hosza, his two army columns in Upper Hungary suffered defeat in several battles at the hand of the nobility, and Johann Zapolya, with his Transylvanian army, moved against him. The peasants were attacked by Zapolya and dispersed. Dozsa was captured, roasted on a red hot throne, and his flesh eaten by his own people, whose lives were granted to them only under this condition. The dispersed peasants, reassembled by Lawrence and Hosza, were defeated again, and whoever fell into the hands of the enemies were either impaled or hanged. The peasants' corpses hung in thousands along the roads or at the entrances of burned-down villages. According to reports, about 60,000 either fell in battle, or were massacred. The nobility took care that at the next session of the Diet, the enslavement of the peasants should again be recognised as the law of the land.

The peasant revolt in Carinthia, Carniola and Styria, the "windy marshes," which broke out at the same time, originated in a conspiracy akin to the Union Shoe, organised as early as 1503 in that region, wrung dry by imperial officers, devastated by Turkish invasions, and tortured by famines. It was this conspiracy that made the insurrection possible. Already in 1513, the Slovenian as well as the German peasants of this region had once more raised the war banner of the Stara Prawa (Ten Old Rights). They allowed themselves to be placated that time, and when in 1514 they gathered anew in large masses, they were again persuaded to go home by a direct promise of the Emperor Maximilian to restore the old rights.

Still, the war of vengeance by the deceived people broke out in the Spring of 1515 with much more vigour. Here, as in Hungary, castles and monasteries were destroyed, captured nobles being tried and executed by peasant juries. In Styria and Carinthia, the emperor's captain Dietrichstein soon succeeded in crushing the revolt. In Carniola, it could be suppressed only through an attack from the Rain (Autumn, 1516) and through subsequent Austrian atrocities which formed a worthy counterpart to the infamies of the Hungarian nobility.

It is clear why, after a series of such decisive defeats, and after these mass atrocities of the nobility, the German peasants remained quiescent for a long time. Still, neither conspiracies nor local uprisings were totally absent. Already in 1516 most of the fugitives of the Union Shoe and Poor Konrad had returned to Suabia and to the upper Rhine. In 1517 the Union Shoe was again in full swing in the Black Forest. Joss Fritz himself, who still carried in his bosom the old Union Shoe banner of 1513, traversed the Black Forest in various directions, and developed great activity. The conspiracy was being organised anew. Meetings were again held on the Kniebis as they had been four years before. Secrecy, however, was not maintained. The governments learned the facts and interfered. Many were captured and executed. The most active and intelligent members were compelled to flee, among them Joss Fritz, who, although still not captured, seems, however, to have died in Switzerland a short time afterwards. At any rate, his name is not mentioned again.

## CHAPTER IV

WHILE the fourth Union Shoe organisation was being suppressed in the Black Forest, Luther, in Wittenberg, gave the signal to a movement which was destined to draw all the estates into its torrent, and to shake the whole empire. The theses of this Augustinian from Thuringia had the effect of lightning in a powder magazine. The manifold and contradictory strivings of the knights and the middle-class, the peasants and the plebeians, the princes craving for sovereignty, the lower clergy secretly playing at mysticism and the learned writer's opposition of a satirical and burlesque nature, found in Luther's theses a common expression around which they grouped themselves with astounding rapidity. This alliance of

all the opposing elements, though formed overnight and of brief duration, suddenly revealed the enormous power of the movement, and gave it further impetus.

But this very rapid growth of the movement was also destined to develop the seeds of discord which were hidden in it. It was destined to tear asunder at least those portions of the aroused mass which, by their very situation in life, were directly opposed to each other, and to put them in their normal state of mutual hostility. Already in the first years of the Reformation, the assembling of the heterogeneous mass of the opposition around two central points became a fact. Nobility and middle-class grouped themselves unconditionally around Luther. Peasants and plebeians, as yet failing to see in Luther a direct enemy, formed a separate revolutionary party of the opposition. This was nothing new, since now the movement had become much more general, much broader in scope and deeper than it was in the pre-Luther times, which necessarily brought about a sharp antagonism and an open struggle between the two parties. This direct opposition soon became apparent. Luther and Muenzer, fighting in the press and in the pulpit, were as much opposed to each other as were the armies of princes, knights and cities (consisting, as they did, mainly of Lutherans or of forces at least inclined towards Lutherism), and the hordes of peasants and plebeians routed by those armies.

The divergence of interests of the various elements accepting the Reformation became apparent even before the Peasant War in the attempt of the nobility to raise its demands as against the princes and the clergy.

The situation of the German nobility at the beginning of the Sixteenth Century has been depicted above. The nobility was losing its independence to the ever-increasing power of the lay and clerical princes. It realised that in the same degree as it was going down as a group in society, the power of the empire was going down as well, dissolving itself into a number of sovereign principalities. The collapse of the nobility coincided, in its own opinion, with the collapse of the German nation. Added to it was the fact that the nobility, especially that section of it which was under the empire, by virtue of its military occupation and its attitude towards the princes directly represented the empire and the imperial power. The nobility was the most national of the estates, and it knew that the stronger were the imperial power and the unity of Germany,



and the weaker and less numerous the princes, the more powerful would the nobility become. It was for that reason that the knighthood was generally dissatisfied with the pitiful political situation of Germany, with the powerlessness of the empire in foreign affairs, which increased in the same degree as, by inheritance, the court was adding to the empire one province after the other, with the intrigues of foreign powers inside of Germany and with the plottings of German princes with foreign countries against the power of the empire. It was for that reason, also, that the demands of the nobility instantly assumed the form of a demand for the reform of the empire, the victims of which were to be the princes and the higher clergy. Ulrich of Hutten, the theoretician of the German nobility, undertook to formulate this demand in combination with Franz von Sickingen, its military and diplomatic representative

The reform of the empire as demanded by the nobility was conceived by Hutten in a very radical spirit and expressed very clearly. Hutten demanded nothing else than the elimination of all princes, the secularisation of all church principalities and estates, and the restoration of a *democracy of the nobility* headed by a monarchy,—a form of government reminiscent of the heyday of the late Polish republic. Hutten and Sickingen believed that the empire would again become united, free and powerful, should the rule of the nobility, a predominantly military class, be re-established, the princes, the elements of disintegration, removed, the power of the priests annihilated, and Germany torn away from under the dominance of the Roman Church

Founded on serfdom this democracy of the nobility, the prototype of which could be found in Poland and, in the empires conquered by the Germanic tribes, at least in their first centuries, is one of the most primitive forms of society, and its normal course of development is to become an extensive feudal hierarchy, which was a considerable advance. Such a powerful democracy of the nobility had already become an impossibility in Germany of the Sixteenth Century, first of all because there existed at that time important and powerful German cities and there was no prospect of an alliance between nobility and the cities such as brought about in England the transformation of the feudal order into a bourgeois constitutional monarchy. In Germany, the old nobility survived, while in England it was exterminated by the Wars of the

Roses,<sup>10</sup> only twenty-eight families remaining, and was superseded by a new nobility of middle-class derivation and middle-class tendencies. In Germany, serfdom was still the common practice, the nobility drawing its income from *feudal* sources, while in England serfdom had been virtually eliminated, and the nobility had become plain middle-class land owners, with a *middle-class* source of income—the ground rent. Finally, that centralisation of absolute monarchical power which in France had existed and kept growing since Louis XI due to the clash of interests between nobility and middle-class, was impossible in Germany where conditions for national centralisation existed in a very rudimentary form, if at all.

Under these conditions, the greater was Hutten's determination to carry out his ideals in practice, the more concession was he compelled to make, and the more clouded did his plan of reforming the empire become. Nobility, alone, lacked power to put the reform through. This was manifest from its weakness in comparison with the princes. Allies were to be looked for, and these could only be found either in the cities, or among the peasantry and influential advocates of reform. But the cities knew the nobility too well to trust them, and they rejected all forms of alliance. The peasants justly saw in the nobility, which exploited and mistreated them, their bitterest enemy, and as to the theoreticians of reform, they made common cause with the middle-class, the princes, or the peasants. What advantages, indeed, could the nobility promise the middle-class or the peasants from a reform of the empire whose main task it was to lift the nobility into a higher position? Under these circumstances Hutten could only be silent in his propaganda writings about the future interrelations between the nobility, the cities and the peasants, or to mention them only briefly, putting all evils at the feet of the princes, the priests, and the dependence upon Rome, and showing the middle-class that it was in their interests to remain at least neutral in the coming struggle between the nobility and the princes. No mention was ever made by Hutten of abolishing serfdom or other burdens imposed upon the peasants by the nobility.

The attitude of the German nobility towards the peasants of that time was exactly the same as that of the Polish nobility towards its peasants in the insurrections since 1830. As in the modern Polish upheavals, the movement could have been brought to a successful conclusion only by an alliance of all

the opposition parties, mainly the nobility and the peasants. But of all alliances, this one was entirely impossible on either side. The nobility was not ready to give up its political privileges and its feudal rights over the peasants, while the revolutionary peasants could not be drawn by vague prospects into an alliance with the nobility, the class which was most active in their oppression. The nobility could not win over the German peasant in 1522, as it failed in Poland in 1830. Only total abolition of serfdom, bondage and all privileges of nobility could have united the rural population with it. The nobility, like every privileged class, had not, however, the slightest desire to give up its privileges, its favourable situation, and the major parts of its sources of income.

Thus it came about that when the struggle broke out, the nobles were alone in the field against the princes. It was obvious that the princes, who, for two centuries had been taking the ground from under the nobility's feet, would this time also gain a victory without much effort.

The course of the struggle itself is well known. Hutten and Sickingen, already recognised as the political and military chiefs of the middle German nobility, organised in Landau, in 1522, a union of the Rhenish, Suabian and Franconian nobility for the duration of six years, ostensibly for self-defence. Sickingen assembled an army, partly out of his own means and partly in combination with the neighbouring knights. He organised the recruiting of armies and reinforcements in Franconia, along the Lower Rhine, in the Netherlands and in Westphalia, and in September, 1522, he opened hostilities by declaring a feud against the Elector-Archbishop of Trier. While he was stationed near Trier, his reinforcements were cut off by a quick intervention of the princes. The Landgrave of Hesse and the Elector Palatine went to the aid of the Archbishop of Trier, and Sickingen was hastily compelled to retreat to his castle, Landstuhl. In spite of all the efforts of Hutten and the remainder of his friends, the united nobility, intimidated by the concentrated and quick action of the princes, left him in the lurch. Sickingen was mortally wounded, surrendered Landstuhl, and soon afterwards he died. Hutten was compelled to flee to Switzerland, where he died a few months later on the Isle of Ufnau, on the Lake of Zurich.

With this defeat, and with the death of both leaders the power of the nobility as a body, independent of the princes, was broken. From then on the nobility appeared only in

the service and under the leadership of the princes. The Peasant War, which soon broke out, drove the nobles still more deeply under the direct or indirect protection of the princes. It proved that the German nobility preferred to continue the exploitation of the peasants under princely sovereignty, rather than overthrow the princes and priests through an open alliance with the *emancipated* peasants.

## CHAPTER V

FROM the moment when Luther's declaration of war against the Catholic hierarchy set into motion all the opposition elements of Germany, not a year passed without the peasants coming forth with their demands. Between 1518 and 1523, one local revolt followed another in the Black Forest and in upper Suabia. Beginning in the Spring of 1524, these revolts assumed a systematic character. In April of that year, the peasants of the Abbey of Marchthal refused serf labour and duties, in May of the same year, the peasants of St. Blasien refused serf payments, in June, the peasants of Steinheim near Memmingen declared they would pay neither the tithe nor other duties; in July and August, the peasants of Thurgau rebelled and were quieted partly through the mediation of Zurich, partly through the brutality of the confederacy which executed many of them. Finally, a decisive uprising took place in the Margraviate of Stuehlingen, which may be looked upon as the *real beginning of the Peasant War*.

The peasants of Stuehlingen suddenly refused deliveries to the Landgrave and assembled in strong numbers. On October 24, 1524, they moved towards Waldshut under Hans Mueller of Bulgenbach. Here they organised an evangelical fraternity, jointly with city middle-class. The latter joined the organisation the more willingly since they were in conflict with the government of Upper Austria over the religious persecutions of their preacher, Baltaser Hubmaier, a friend and disciple of Thomas Muenzer's. A union tax of three kreutzer weekly was imposed. It was an enormous sum for the value of money of that time. Emissaries were sent out to Alsace, to the Moselle, to the entire Upper Rhine and to Franconia, to bring peasants everywhere into the Union. The aims of the Union were proclaimed as following: abolition of feudal power; destruction of all castles and monasteries; elimination of all masters outside

of the emperor. The German tricolour was the banner of the Union.

The uprising spread rapidly over the entire territory of present-day Baden. A panic seized the nobility of Upper Suabia, whose military forces were all engaged in Italy, in a war against Francis I of France. Nothing remained for it but to gain time by protracted negotiations, meanwhile collecting money and recruiting troops, pending the moment when it would feel strong enough to punish the peasants for their audacity by "burning and scorching, plundering and murdering." From that moment there began that systematic betrayal, that consistent recourse to perfidiousness and secret malice, which distinguished the nobility and the princes throughout the entire Peasant War, and which was their strongest weapon against decentralised peasants. The Suabian Union, comprising the princes, the nobility, and the imperial cities of Southwest Germany, tried conciliatory measures without guaranteeing the peasants real concessions. The latter continued their movement. Hans Mueller of Bulgenbach marched, from September 30 to the middle of October, through the Black Forest up to Urach and Furtwangen, increased his troops to 3,500 and took a position near Eratingen, not far from Stuehlingen. The nobility had no more than 1,700 men at their disposal, and even those were divided. It had to agree to an armistice, which was concluded in the camp at Eratingen. The peasants were promised a peaceful agreement, either directly between the interested parties, or by means of an arbitrator, and an investigation of complaints by the court at Stockach. The troops of both the nobility and the peasants were dispersed.

The peasants formulated sixteen articles, the acceptance of which was to be demanded of the court at Stockach. The articles were very moderate. They included abolition of the hunting right, of serf labour, of excessive taxes and master privileges in general, protection against wilful arrests and against partisan courts. The peasants' demands went no farther.

Nevertheless, immediately after the peasants went home, the nobility demanded continuation of all contested services pending the court decision. The peasants refused, advising the masters to go to the court. Thus the conflict was renewed, the peasants reassembled, and the princes and masters once again concentrated their troops. This time the movement spread far over the Breisgau and deep into Wuerttemberg.

The troops under Georg Truchsess of Waldburg, the Alba of the Peasant War, observed the peasants' movements, attacked individual reinforcements, but did not dare to attack the main force. Georg Truchsess negotiated with the peasant chiefs, and here and there he effected agreements.

By the end of December, proceedings began before the court at Stockach. The peasants protested against the court, composed entirely of nobles. In reply, an imperial edict to this effect was read. The proceedings lagged, while the nobility, the princes and the Suabian Union authorities were arming themselves. Archduke Ferdinand who dominated, besides hereditary lands then still belonging to Austria, also Württemberg, the Black Forest and Southern Alsace, ordered the greatest severity against the rebellious peasants. They were to be captured, mercilessly tortured and killed; they were to be exterminated in the most expeditious manner, their possessions to be burned and devastated, and their wives and children driven from the land. It was in that way that the princes and masters kept the armistice, and this is what passed for amicable arbitration and investigation of grievances. Archduke Ferdinand, to whom the house of Welser of Augsburg advanced money, armed himself very carefully. The Suabian Union ordered a special tax, and a contingent of troops to be called in three instalments.

The foregoing rebellions coincided with the five months' presence of Thomas Muenzer in the Highland. Though there are no direct proofs of his influence over the outbreak and the course of the movement, it is, nevertheless, indirectly ascertained. The most outspoken revolutionaries among the peasants were mostly his disciples, defending his ideas. The Twelve Articles, as well as the Letter of Articles of the Highland peasants, were ascribed to him by all the contemporaries, although the first was certainly not composed by Muenzer. Already, on his way back to Thuringia, he issued a decisive revolutionary manifesto to the insurgent peasants.

Duke of Ulrich, who, since 1519, had been an exile from Württemberg, was now intriguing to regain his land with the aid of the peasants. Since the beginning of his exile he had been trying to utilise the revolutionary party, and had supported it continuously. In most of the local disturbances taking place between 1520 and 1524 in the Black Forest and in Württemberg, his name appeared. Now he armed himself directly for an attack on Württemberg to be launched out of

his castle, Hohentweil. However, he was only utilised by the peasants without influencing them, and without enjoying their confidence.

The winter passed without anything decisive happening on either side. The princely masters were in hiding. The peasant revolt was gaining scope. In January, 1525, the entire country between the Danube, the Rhine and the Lech, was in a state of fermentation. In February, the storm broke. While the Black Forest Megau troops, under Hans Mueller of Bulgenbach, were conspiring with Ulrich of Wuerttemberg, partly sharing his futile march on Stuttgart (February and March, 1525), the peasants arose on February 9 in Ried above Ulm, assembled in a camp near Baltringen which was protected by marshes, hoisted the red flag, and formed, under the leadership of Ulrich Schmid, the Baltringen troop. They were 10,000 to 12,000 strong.

On February 25, the Upper Allgaeu troops, 7,000 strong, assembled at Schusser, moved by the rumour that troops were marching against the dissatisfied elements who had appeared in this locality as everywhere else. The people of Kempten, who had conducted a fight against their archbishop throughout the winter, assembled on the 26th and joined the peasants. The cities of Memmingen and Kaufbeuren joined the movement on certain conditions. The ambiguity of the position of the cities in this movement was already apparent. On March 7, the twelve Memmingen articles were proclaimed in Memmingen for all the peasants of Upper Allgaeu.

A message from the Allgaeu peasants brought about the formation on Lake Constance of the Lake Troop under Eitel Hans. This troop also grew fast. Its headquarters were in Bermatingen.

The peasants also arose in Lower Allgaeu in the region of Ochsenhausen and Schellenberg, in the localities of Zeil and Waldburg, and in the estates of Truchsess. The movement started in the early days of March. This Lower Allgaeu troop, which consisted of 7,000 men, camped near Wurzach.

All these troops adopted the Memmingen articles, which, it must be noted, were still more moderate than the Hegau articles, manifesting, as they did, a remarkable lack of determination in points relating to the attitude of the armed troops towards the nobility and the governments. Such determination, wherever manifested, appeared only in the later stages of the war, when the peasants learned to know from expe-

rience the mode of action of their enemies.

A sixth troop was formed on the Danube, simultaneously with the others. From the entire region, Ulm to Donauwörth, from the valleys of the Iller, Roth and Biber, the peasants came to Leipheim, and opened camp there. From fifteen localities, every able-bodied man had come, while reinforcements were drawn from 117 places. The leader of the Leipheim troop was Ulrich Schoen. Its preacher was Jakob Wehe, the priest of Leipheim.

Thus, at the beginning of March, there were between 30,000 and 40,000 insurgent peasants of Upper Suabia in six camps under arms. The peasant troops were a heterogeneous lot. Muenzer's revolutionary party was everywhere in the minority but it formed the backbone of the peasant camps. The mass of the peasants were always ready to venture compacts with the peasants wherever they were promised those concessions which they hoped to force upon their enemies by their menacing attitude. Moreover, as the uprising dragged on and the princes' armies began to approach, the peasants became weary. Most of those who still had something to lose, went home. Added to all the difficulties was the fact that the vagabond masses of the low grade proletariat had joined the troops. This made discipline more difficult, and demoralised the peasants, as the vagabonds were an unreliable element, coming and going all the time. This, alone, is sufficient explanation why, at the beginning, the peasants remained everywhere on the defensive, why they were becoming demoralised in their camps, and why, aside from tactical shortcomings and the rarity of good leaders, they could not match the armies of the princes.

While the troops were assembling, Duke Ulrich invaded Wuerttemberg from Hobentweil with recruited troops and a number of Hegau peasants. Were the peasants now to proceed from the other side, from Waldburg against Truchsess' troops, the Suabian Union would have been lost. But because of the defensive attitude of the peasant troops, Truchsess soon succeeded in concluding an armistice with those of Baltringen, Allgau, and the Lake, starting negotiations and fixing a date for terminating the whole undertaking, namely, Judica Sunday (April 2). In the meantime, he was able to proceed against Duke Ulrich, to besiege Stuttgart, compelling him to leave Wuerttemberg as early as March 17. Then he turned against the peasants, but the Lansquenets revolted in his own army and refused to proceed against the peasants. Truchsess



succeeded in placating the disgruntled soldiers and moved towards Ulm, where new reinforcements were being gathered. He left an observation post at Kirchheim under the supervision of Teck.

At last the Suabian Union, with free hands and on command of the first contingents, threw off its mask, declaring itself "to be ready, with arms in hand and with the aid of God, to change that which the peasants wilfully ventured."

The peasants adhered strictly to the armistice. On Judica Sunday they submitted their demands, the famous Twelve Articles, for consideration. They demanded the election and removal of clergymen by the communities; the abolition of the small tithe and the utilisation of the large tithe, after subtraction of the priests' salaries, for public purposes; the abolition of serfdom, of fishing and hunting rights, and of death tolls; the limitation of excessive bonded labour, taxes and ground rents; the restitution of the forests, meadows and privileges forcibly withdrawn from the communities and individuals, and the elimination of wilfulness in the courts and the administration. It is obvious that the moderate conciliatory section still had the upper hand among the peasant troops. The revolutionary party had formulated its programme earlier, in the *Letter of Articles*. It was an open letter to all the peasantry, admonishing them to join "the Christian Alliance and Brotherhood" for the purpose of removing all burdens either by goodness, "which will hardly happen," or by force, and threatening all those who refuse to join with the "lay anathema," that is, with expulsion from the society and from any intercourse with the Union members. All castles, monasteries and priests' endowments were also, according to the Letter, to be placed under lay anathema unless the nobility, the priests and the monks relinquished them of their own accord, moved into ordinary houses like other people, and joined the Christian Alliance. We see that this radical manifesto which obviously had been composed before the Spring insurrection of 1525, deals in the first place with the revolution, with complete victory over the ruling classes, and that the "lay anathema" only designates those oppressors and traitors that were to be killed, the castles that were to be burned, and the monasteries and endowments that were to be confiscated, their jewels to be turned into cash.

Before the peasants succeeded in presenting their Twelve Articles to the proper courts of arbitration, they learned that

the agreement had been broken by the Suabian Union and that its troops were approaching. Steps were taken immediately by the peasants. A general meeting of all Allgaeu, Baltringen and Lake peasants was held at Geisbeuren. The four divisions were combined and reorganised into four columns. A decision was made to confiscate the church estates, to sell their jewels in favour of the war chest, and to burn the castles. Thus, aside from the official Twelve Articles, the Letter of the Articles became the rule of warfare, and Judica Sunday, designated for the conclusion of peace negotiations became the date of general uprising.

The growing agitation everywhere, the continued local conflicts of the peasants with the nobility, the news of a growing revolt in the Black Forest for the preceding six months and of its spread up to the Danube and the Lech, are sufficient to explain the rapid succession of peasant revolts in two-thirds of Germany. The fact, however, that the partial revolts took place simultaneously, proves that there were men at the head of the movement who had organised it through Anabaptists and other emissaries. Already in the second half of March, disorders broke out in Wuerttemberg, in the lower regions of the Neckar and the Odenwald, and in Upper and Middle Franconia. April 2, Judica Sunday, however, had already been named everywhere as the day of the general uprising, and everywhere the decisive blow, the revolt of the masses, fell in the first week of April. The Allgaeu, Hegau and Lake peasants sounded the alarm bells on April 1, calling into the camp a mass meeting of all able-bodied men, and together with the Baltringen peasants, they immediately opened hostilities against the castles and monasteries.

In Franconia, where the movement was grouped around six centres, the insurrection broke out everywhere in the first days of April. In Noerdlingen two peasant camps were formed about that time, and the revolutionary party of the city under Anton Forner, aided by the peasants, gained the upper hand, appointing Forner the Mayor, and completing a union between the city and the peasants. In the region of Anspach, the peasants revolted everywhere between April 1 and 7, and from here the revolts spread as far as Bavaria. In the region of Rottenburg, the peasants were already under arms on March 22. In the city of Rottenburg the rule of the honourables was overthrown, by the lower middle-class and plebeians under Stephan of Menzingen, but since the peasant dues were the

chief source of revenue for the city, the new government was able to maintain a vacillating and equivocal attitude towards the peasants. In the Grand Chapter of Wurzburg there was a general uprising, early in April, of the peasants and the small cities. In the bishopric of Bamberg, a general insurrection compelled the bishop to yield within five days. In the North, on the border of Thuringia, the strong Bildhausen Peasant Camp was organised.

In the Odenwald, where Wendel Hipler, a noble and former chancellor of the Count of Hohenlohe, and George Metzler, an innkeeper at Ballenberg near Krautheim, were at the head of the revolutionary party, the storm broke out on March 26. The peasants marched from all directions towards the Tauber. Two thousand men from the Rottenburg camp joined. George Metzler took command, and having received all reinforcements, marched on April 4 to the monastery of Schoenthal on the Jaxt, where he was joined by the peasants of the Necker valley. The latter, led by Jaeklein Rohrbach, an innkeeper at Boeckingen near Heilbronn, had proclaimed on Judica Sunday, the insurrection in Flein, Southeim, etc., while, simultaneously, Wendel Hipler, with a number of conspirators, took Oehringen by surprise and drew the surrounding peasants in the movement. In Schoenthal, the two peasants columns, combined into the Gay Troop, accepted the Twelve Articles, and organised expeditions against the castles and monasteries. The Gay Troop was about 8,000 strong, and possessed cannon, as well as 3,000 guns. Florian Geyer, a Franconian knight also joined the troop and formed the Black Host, a select division which had been recruited mainly from the Rottenburg and Oehringen infantry.

The Wuerttemberg magistrate in Neckarsulm, Count Ludwig von Helfenstein, opened hostilities. Without much ado, he ordered all peasants that fell into his hands to be executed. The Gay Troop marched against him. The peasants were embittered by the massacres as well as by news of the defeat of the Leipheim Troop, of Jakob Wehe's execution, and the Truchsess atrocities. Von Helfenstein, who had precipitously moved into Weinsberg, was there attacked. The castle was stormed by Florian Geyer. The city was won after a prolonged struggle, and Count Ludwig was taken prisoner, as were several knights. On the following day, April 17, Jaeklein Rohrbach, together with the most resolute members of the troops, held court over the prisoners, and ordered fourteen of

them, with von Helfenstein at the head, to run the gauntlet, this being the most humiliating death he could invent for them. The capture of Weinsberg and the terroristic revenge of Jaecklein against von Helfenstein, did not fail to influence the nobility. Count von Loebenstein joined the Peasant Alliance. The Counts von Hohenlohe, who had joined previously without offering any aid, immediately sent the desired cannon and powder.

The chiefs debated among themselves whether they should not make Goetz von Berlichingen their commander "since he could bring to them the nobility." The proposal found sympathy, but Florian Geyer, who saw in this mood of the peasants and their chiefs the beginning of reaction, seceded from the troop, and together with his Black Host, marched first through the Neckar Region, then the Wuerzburg territory, everywhere destroying castles and priests' nests.

The remainder of the troop marched first towards Heilbronn. In this powerful and free imperial city, the patriciate was confronted, as almost everywhere, by a middle-class and revolutionary opposition. The latter, in secret agreement with the peasants, opened the gates before G. Metzler and Jaecklein Rohrbach, on April 17, in the course of a general disturbance. The peasant chiefs with their people took possession of the city. They accepted membership in the brotherhood, and delivered 12,000 guilders in money and a squad of volunteers. Only the possessions of the clergy and the Teutonic Order were pillaged. On the 22nd, the peasants moved away, leaving a small garrison. Heilbronn was designated as the centre of the various troops, the latter actually sending delegates and conferring over common actions and common demands of peasantry. But the middle-class opposition and the honourables who had joined them after the peasant invasion, regained the upper hand in the city, preventing it from taking decisive steps and only waiting for the approach of the princes' troops in order to betray the peasants definitely.

The peasants marched toward the Odenwald. Goetz von Berlichingen who, a few days previous, had offered himself to the Grand Elector Palatine, then to the peasantry, then again to the Grand Elector, was compelled on April 24 to join the Evangelist Fraternity, and to take over the supreme command of the Gay Bright Troop (in contrast to the Black Troop of Florian Geyer). At the same time, however, he was the prisoner of the peasants who mistrusted him and bound him

to a council of chiefs without whom he could undertake nothing. Goetz and Metzler moved with a mass of peasants over Buchen to Armorbach, where they remained from April 30, until May 5, arousing the entire region of the Main. The nobility was everywhere compelled to join, and thus its castles were spared. Only the monasteries were burned and pillaged. The troops had obviously become demoralised. The most energetic men were away, either under Florian Geyer or under Jaecklein Rohrbach, who, after the capture of Heilbronn, also separated himself from the troops, apparently because he, judge of Count von Helfenstein, could no longer remain with a body which was in favour of reconciliation with the nobility. This insistence on an understanding with the nobility was in itself a sign of demoralisation. Later, Wendel Hippler proposed a very fitting reorganisation of the troops. He suggested that the Lansquenets, who offered themselves daily, should be drawn into the service, and that the troops should no longer be renewed monthly by assembling fresh contingents and dismissing old ones, but that those of them who had received more or less military training should be retained. The community assembly rejected both proposals. The peasants had become arrogant, viewing the entire war as nothing but a pillage. They wanted to be free to go home as soon as their pockets were full, but the competition of the Lansquenets promised them little. In Amorbach, it went so far that Hans Berlin, a member of the council of Heilbronn, induced the chiefs and the councils of the troops to accept the *Declaration of the Twelve Articles*, a document wherein the remaining sharp edges of the Twelve Articles were removed, and in which, a language of humble supplication was put into the mouths of the peasants. This was too much for the peasants, who rejected the Declaration under great tumult, and insisted on the retention of the original Articles.

In the meantime, a decisive change had taken place in the region of Wuerzburg. The bishop who, after the first uprising early in April, had withdrawn to the fortified Frauenberg near Wuerzburg, from there to send unsuccessful letters in all directions asking for aid, was finally compelled to make temporary concession. On May 2, a Diet was opened with the peasants represented, but before any results could be achieved, letters were intercepted which proved the bishop's traitorous machinations. The Diet immediately dispersed, and hostilities broke out anew between the insurgent city inhabitants and the

peasants on one hand, and the bishop's forces on the other. The bishop fled to Heidelberg on May 5, and on the following day Florian Geyer, with the Black Troop, appeared in Wuerzburg and with him the Franconian Tauber Troop which consisted of the peasants of Mergentheim, Rottenburg and Anspach. On May 7, Goetz von Berlichingen with his Gay Bright Troop came, and the siege of Frauenberg began.

In the vicinity of Limpurg and in the region of Ellwangen and Hall, another contingent was formed by the end of March and the beginning of April, that of Gaidorf or the Common Gay Troop. Its actions were very violent. It aroused the entire region, burned many monasteries and castles, including the castle of Hohenstaufen, compelled all the peasants to join it, and compelled all nobles, even the cup-bearers of Limpurg, to enter the Christian Alliance. Early in May it invaded Wuerttemberg, but was persuaded to withdraw. The separatism of the German system of small states stood then, as in 1848, in the way of a common action of the revolutionaries of the various state territories. The Gaidorf troop, limited to a small area, was naturally bound to disperse when all resistance within that area was broken. The members of this troop concluded an agreement with the city of Gmuend, and leaving only 500 under arms, they went home.

In the Palatinate, peasant troops were formed on either bank of the Rhine by the end of April. They destroyed many castles and monasteries, and on May 1 they took Neustadt on the Hardt. The Bruchrain peasants, who appeared in this region, had on the previous day forced Speyer to conclude an agreement. The Marshal of Zabern, with the few troops of the Elector, was powerless against them, and on May 10 the Elector was compelled to conclude an agreement with the peasants, guaranteeing them a redress of their grievances, to be effected by a Diet.

In Wuerttemberg the revolt had occurred early in separate localities. As early as February, the peasants of the Urach Alp formed a union against the priests and masters, and by the end of March the peasants of Blaubeurer, Urach, Muenzingen, Balngen and Rosenfeld revolted. The Wuerttemberg region was invaded by the Gaidorf troop at Goepplingen, by Jaeklein Rohrbach at Brackenheim, and by the remnants of the vanquished Leipheim troop at Pfuelling. All these newcomers aroused the rural population. There were also serious disturbances in other localities. On April 6, Pfuelling capitulated.

lated before the peasants. The Government of the Austrian Archduke was in a very difficult situation. It had no money and but few troops. The cities and castles were in a bad condition, lacking garrisons or munitions, and even Asperg was practically defenseless. The attempt of the government to call out city reserves against the peasants, decided its temporary defeat. On April 16 the reserves of the city of Bottwar refused to obey orders, marching, instead of to Stuttgart, to Wunnenstein near Bottwar, where they formed the nucleus of a camp of middle-class people and peasants, and added other numbers rapidly. On the same day the rebellion broke out in Zabergau. The monastery of Maulbronn was pillaged, and a number of monasteries and castles were ruined. The Gaeu peasants received reinforcements from the neighbouring Bruchram.

The command of the Wunnenstein troop was taken by Matern Feuerbacher, a councillor of the city of Bottwar, one of the leaders of the middle-class opposition compromised enough to be compelled to join the peasants. In spite of his new affiliations, however, he remained very moderate, prohibiting the application of the Letter of Articles to the castles, and seeking everywhere to reconcile the peasants with the moderate middle-class. He prevented the amalgamation of Wuerttemberg peasants with the Gay Bright Troop, and afterwards he also persuaded the Gaidorf troop to withdraw from Wuerttemberg. On April 19 he was deposed in consequence of his middle-class tendencies, but the next day he was again made commander. He was indispensable, and even when Jaecklein Rohrbach came, on April 22, with 200 of his associates to join the Wuerttemberg peasants, he could do nothing but leave Feuerbacher in his place of commander, confining himself to rigid supervision of his actions.

On April 18, the government attempted to negotiate with the peasants stationed at Wunnenstein. The peasants insisted upon acceptance of the Twelve Articles, but this the government's representatives refused to do. The troop now proceeded to act. On April 20, it reached Laufen, when for the last time, it rejected the offers of the government delegates. On April 22, the troops, numbering 6,000, appeared in Bietigheim, threatening Stuttgart. Most of the city council had fled, and a citizens' committee was placed at the head of the administration. The citizenry here was divided, as elsewhere, between the parties of the honourables, the middle-class oppo-

sition, the revolutionary plebeians. On April 25, the latter opened the gates for the peasants, and Stuttgart was immediately garrisoned by them. Here the organisation of the Gay Christian Troop (as the Wuerttemberg insurgents called themselves) was perfected, and rules and regulations were established for remuneration, division of booty and alimentation. A detachment of Stuttgarters, under Theus Gerber, joined the troops.

On April 29, Feuerbacher with all his men marched against the Gaildorf troops, which had entered the Wuerttemberg region at Schorndorf. He drew the entire region into his alliance and thus persuaded the Gaildorf troops to withdraw. In this way, he prevented the revolutionary elements of his men under Rohrbach from combining with the reckless troops of Gaildorf and thus receiving a dangerous reinforcement. Having been informed of Truchsess' approach, he left Schorndorf to meet him, and on May 1 encamped near Kirchheim under Teck.

We have thus traced the origin and the development of the insurrection in that portion of Germany which must be considered the territory of the first group of peasant armies. Before we proceed to the other groups (Thuringia and Hesse, Alsace, Austria and the Alps) we must give an account of the military operations of Truchsess, in which he, alone at the beginning, later supported by various princes and cities, annihilated the first group of insurgents. We left Truchsess near Ulm, where he came by the end of March, having left an observation corps under Teck, under the command of Dietrich Spaet. Truchsess' corps which together with the Union reinforcements concentrated in Ulm counted hardly 10,000, among them 7,200 infantrymen, was the only army at his disposal capable of an offensive against the peasants. Reinforcements came to Ulm very slowly, due in part to the difficulties of recruiting in insurgent localities, in part to the lack of money in the hands of the government, and also to the fact that the few available troops were everywhere indispensable for garrisoning the fortresses and the castles. We have already observed what a small number of troops were at the disposal of the princes and cities that did not belong to the Suabian Union. Everything depended upon the successes which George Truchsess with his union army would score.

Truchsess turned first against the Baltringen troops which, in the meantime, had begun to destroy castles and monasteries in the vicinity of Ried. The peasants who, with the approach



of the Union troops withdrew into Ried, were driven out of the marshes by an enveloping movement, crossed the Danube and ran into the ravines and forests of the Suabian Alps. In this region, where cannon and cavalry, the main source of strength of the Union army, were of little avail, Truchsess did not pursue them further. He marched instead against the Leipheim troops which numbered 5,000 men stationed at Leipheim, 4,000 in the valley of Mindel, and 6,000 at Illertissen, and was arousing the entire region, destroying monasteries and castles and preparing to march against Ulm with its three columns. It seems that a certain demoralisation had set in among the peasants of this division, which had undermined their military morale, for Jakob Wehe tried at the very beginning to negotiate with Truchsess. The latter, however, now backed by sufficient military power, declined negotiations, and on April 4 attacked the main troops at Leipheim and entirely disrupted them. Jakob Wehe and Ulrich Schoen, together with two other peasant leaders, were captured and beheaded. Leipheim capitulated, and after a few marches through the surrounding country, the entire region was subdued.

A new rebellion of the Lansquenets, caused by a demand for plunder and additional remuneration, again stopped Truchsess' activities until April 10, when he marched south-west against the Baltringen troop which in the meantime had invaded his estates, Waldburg, Zeil and Wolfegg, and besieged his castles. Here, also, he found the peasants disunited, and defeated them, on April 11 and 12, one after the other, in various encounters which completely disrupted the Baltringen troops. Its remnants withdrew under the command of the priest Florin, and joined the Lake troops. Truchsess now turned against the latter. The Lake troops which in the meantime had made not only military marches but had also drawn the cities Buchhorn (Friedrichshafen) and Wollmatingen into the fraternity, held, on April 13, a big military council in the monastery of Salem, and decided to move against Truchsess. Alarm bells were sounded and 10,000 men, joined by the defeated remnants of the Baltringen troops, assembled in the camp of Bermatingen. On April 15 they stood their own in a combat with Truchsess, who did not wish to risk his army in a decisive battle, preferring to negotiate, the more so since he received news of the approach of the Allgau and Hegau troops. On April 17, in Weingarten, he concluded an agreement with the Lake and Baltringen peasants which seemed quite favourable

to them, and which they accepted without suspicion. He also induced the delegates of the Upper and Lower Allgaeu peasants to accept the agreement, and then moved towards Wuerttemberg.

Truchsess' cunning saved him here from certain ruin. Had he not succeeded in fooling the weak, limited, for the most part demoralised peasants and their usually incapable, timid and venal leaders, he would have been closed in with his small army between four columns numbering at least from 25,000 to 30,000 men, and would have perished. It was the narrow-mindedness of his enemies, always inevitable among the peasant masses, that made it possible for him to dispose of them at the very moment when, with one blow, they could have ended the entire war, at least as far as Suabia and Franconia were concerned. The Lake peasants adhered to the agreement, which finally turned out to be their undoing, so rigidly that they later took up arms against their allies, the Hegau peasants. And although the Allgaeu peasants, involved in the betrayal by their leaders, soon renounced the agreement, Truchsess was then out of danger.

The Hegau peasants, though not included in the Weingarten agreement, gave a new example of the appalling narrow-mindedness and the stubborn provincialism which ruined the entire Peasant War. When, after unsuccessful negotiations with them, Truchsess moved towards Wuerttemberg, they followed him continually pressing his flank, but it did not occur to them to unite with the Wuerttemberg Gay Christian Troops, because previously the peasants of Wuerttemberg and the Neckar valley refused to come to their assistance. When Truchsess had moved far enough from their home country, they returned peacefully and marched to Freiburg.

We left the Wuerttemberg peasants under the command of Matern Feuerbacher at Kirchheim below Teck, from where the observation corps left by Truchsess had withdrawn towards Urach under the command of Dietrich Spaet. After an unsuccessful attempt to take Urach, Feuerbacher turned towards Neurtungen, sending letters to all neighbouring insurgent troops, calling reinforcements for the decisive battle. Considerable reinforcements actually came from the Wuerttemberg lowlands as well as from Gaeu. The Gaeu peasants had grouped themselves around the remnants of the Leipheim troop which had withdrawn to West Wuerttemberg, and they

aroused the entire valleys of Necker and Nagoldt up to Boetlingen and Leonberg. Those Gaeu peasants, on May 5, came in two strong columns to join Feuerbacher at Nuertingen. Truchsess met the united troops at Boetlingen. Their number, their cannon and their position perplexed him. As usual, he started negotiations and concluded an armistice with the peasants. But as soon as he had thus secured his position, he attacked them on May 12 *during the armistice*, and forced a decisive battle upon them. The peasants offered a long brave resistance until finally Boetlingen was surrendered to Truchsess owing to the betrayal of the middle-class. The left wing of the peasants, deprived of its base of support, was forced back and encompassed. This decided the battle. The undisciplined peasants were thrown into disorder and, later, into a wild flight, those that were not killed or captured by the horsemen of the Union threw away their weapons and went home. The Bright Christian Troop, and with it the entire Wuerttemberg insurrection was gone. Theus Gerber fled to Esslingen, Feuerbacher fled to Switzerland, Jaecklein Rohrbach was captured and dragged in chains to Neckargartach, where Truchsess ordered him chained to a post, surrounded by firewood and roasted to death on a slow fire, while he, feasting with horsemen, gloated over this noble spectacle.

From Neckargartach, Truchsess gave aid to the operations of the Elector Palatine by invading Kraichgau. Having received word of Truchsess' successes, the Elector, who meanwhile had gathered troops, immediately broke his agreement with the peasants, attacked Bruchrain on May 23, captured and burned Malsch after vigorous resistance, pillaged a number of villages, and garrisoned Bruchsal. At the same time Truchsess attacked Eppingen and captured the chief of the local movement, Anton Eisenhut, whom the Elector immediately executed with a dozen other peasant leaders. Bruchrain and Kraichgau were thus subjugated and compelled to pay an indemnity of about 40,000 guilders. Both armies, that of Truchsess now reduced to 6,000 men in consequence of the preceding battles, and that of the Elector (6,500 men), united and moved towards the Odenwald.

Word of the Boetlingen defeat spread terror everywhere among the insurgents. The free imperial cities which had come under the heavy hand of the peasants, sighed in relief. The city of Heilbronn was the first to take steps towards reconciliation with the Suabian Union. Heilbronn was the

seat of the peasants' main office and that of the delegates of the various troops who deliberated over the proposals to be made to the emperor and the empire in the name of all the insurgent peasants. In these negotiations which were to lay down general rules for all of Germany, it again became apparent that none of the existing estates, including the peasants, was developed sufficiently to be able to reconstruct the whole of Germany according to its own viewpoint. It became obvious that to accomplish this, the support of the peasantry and particularly of the middle-class must be gained. In consequence, Wendel Hipler took over the conduct of the negotiations. Of all the leaders of the movement, Wendel Hipler had the best understanding of the existing conditions. He was not a far-seeing revolutionary of Muenzer's type; he was not a representative of the peasants as were Metzler or Rohrbach; his many-sided experiences, his practical knowledge of the position of the various estates towards each other prevented him from representing one of the estates engaged in the movement in opposition to the other. Just as Muenzer, a representative of the beginnings of the proletariat then outside of the existing official organisation of society, was driven to the anticipation of communism, Wendel Hipler, the representative, as it were, of the average of all progressive elements of the nation, anticipated modern bourgeois society. The principles that he defended, the demands that he formulated, though not immediately possible, were the somewhat idealised, logical result of the dissolution of feudal society. In so far as the peasants agreed to propose laws for the whole empire, they were compelled to accept Hipler's principles and demands. Centralisation demanded by the peasants thus assumed, in Heilbronn, a definite form, which, however, was worlds away from the ideas of the peasants themselves on the subject. Centralisation, for instance, was more clearly defined in the demands for the establishment of uniform coins, measures and weights, for the abolition of internal customs, etc., in demands, that is to say, which were much more in the interests of the city middle-class than in the interests of the peasants. Concessions made to the nobility were a certain approach to the modern system of redemption and aimed, finally, to transform feudal land ownership into bourgeois ownership. In a word, so far as the demands of the peasants were combined into a system of "imperial reform," they did not express the temporary demands of the peasants but became subordinate to

the general interests of the middle-class as a whole. .

While this reform of the empire was still being debated in Heilbronn, the author of the Declaration of the Twelve Articles, Hans Berlin, was already on his way to meet Truchsess, to negotiate in the name of the honourables, the middle-class and the citizenry on the surrender of the city. Reactionary movements within the city supported this betrayal, and Wendel Hipler was obliged to flee, as were the peasants. He went to Weinsberg where he attempted to assemble the remnants of the Wuerttemberg peasants and those few of the Gaildorf troops which could be mobilised. The approach of the Elector Palatine and of Truchsess, however, drove him out of there and he was compelled to go to Wuerzburg to cause the Gay Bright Troop to resume operations. In the meantime, the armies of the Union and the Elector subdued the Neckar region, compelled the peasants to take a new oath, burned many villages, and stabbed or hanged all fleeing peasants that fell into their hands. To avenge the execution of Helfenstein, Weinsberg was burned.

The troops that were assembled in front of Wuerzburg had in the meantime besieged Frauenberg. On May 15, before a gap was made by their fusillade, they bravely but unsuccessfully attempted to storm the fortress. Four hundred of the best men, mostly of Florian Geyer's host, remained in the ditches, dead or wounded. Two days later, May 17, Wendel Hipler appeared and ordered a military council. He proposed to leave at Frauenberg only 4,000 men and to place the main force, about 20,000 men, in a camp at Krautheim on the Jaxt, before the very eyes of Truchsess, so that all reinforcements might be assembled there. The plan was excellent. Only by keeping the masses together, and by a numerical superiority, could one hope to defeat the army of the princes which now numbered about 13,000 men. The demoralisation and discouragement of the peasants, however, had gone too far to make any energetic action possible. Goetz von Berlichingen, who soon afterwards openly appeared as a traitor, may have helped to hold the troop back. Thus Hipler's plan was never put into action; the troops were divided as ever, and only on May 23 did the Gay Bright Troop start action after the Franconians had promised to follow quickly. On May 26, the detachments of the Margrave of Anspach, located in Wuerzburg, were called, due to the word that the Margrave had opened hostilities against the peasants. The rest of the

besieging army, with Florian Geyer's Black Troop, took position at Heudingsfeld not far from Wuerzburg.

The Gay Bright Troop arrived on May 24 in Krautheim in a condition far from good. Many peasants learned that in their absence their villages had taken the oath at Truchsess' behest, and this they used as a pretext to go home. The troops moved further to Neckarsulm, and on May 28 started negotiations with Truchsess. At the same time messengers were sent to the peasants of Franconia, Alsace and Black Forest-Hegau, with the demand to hurry reinforcements. From Neckarsulm Goetz marched towards Oehringen. The troops melted from day to day. Goetz von Berlichingen also disappeared during the march. He rode home, having previously negotiated with Truchsess through his old brother-in-arms, Dietrich Spaet, concerning his going over to the other side. In Oehringen, a false rumour of the enemy approaching threw the helpless and discouraged mass into a panic. The troop was rapidly disintegrating and it was with difficulty that Metzler and Wendel Hipler succeeded in keeping together about 2,000 men, whom they again led towards Krautheim. In the meantime, the Franconian army, 5,000 strong, had come, but in consequence of a side march over Loewenstein towards Oehringen, ordered by Goetz apparently with treacherous intentions, it missed the Gay Troop and moved towards Neckarsulm. This small town, defended by a detachment of the Gay Bright Troop, was besieged by Truchsess. The Franconians arrived at night and saw the fires of the Union army, but their leaders had not the courage to brave an attack. They retreated to Krautheim, where they at last found the remainder of the Gay Bright Troop. Receiving no aid, Neckarsulm surrendered on the 29th to the Union troops. Truchsess immediately ordered 13 peasants executed, and went to meet the troop, burning, pillaging and murdering all along the way through the valleys of Neckar, Kocher and Jaxt. Heaps of ruins and bodies of peasants hanging on trees marked his march.

At Krautheim the Union army met the peasants who, forced by a flank movement of Truchsess, had withdrawn towards Koenigshofen on the Tauber. Here they took their position, 8,000 in number, with 32 cannon. Truchsess approached them, hidden behind hills and forests. He sent out columns to envelop them, and on June 2, he attacked them with such a superiority of forces and energy that in spite of the stubborn resistance of several columns lasting into the

night, they were defeated and dispersed. As everywhere, the horsemen of the Union, "the peasants' death," were mainly instrumental in annihilating the insurgent army, throwing themselves on the peasants, who were shaken by artillery gun fire and lance attacks, disrupting their ranks completely, and killing individual fighters. The kind of warfare conducted by Truchsess and his horsemen is manifested in the fate of 300 Koenigshof middle-class men united with the peasant army. During the battle, all but fifteen were killed, and of these remaining fifteen, four were subsequently decapitated.

Having thus completed his victory over the peasants of Odenwald, the Neckar valley and lower Franconia, Truchsess subdued the entire region by means of punitive expeditions, burning entire villages and causing numberless executions. From there he moved towards Wuerzburg. On his way he learned that the second Franconian troops under the command of Florian Geyer and Gregor von Burg-Bernsheim was stationed at Sulzdorf. He immediately moved against them.

Florian Geyer, who, after the unsuccessful attempt at storming Frauenberg, had devoted himself mainly to negotiations with the princes and the cities, especially with Rottenburg and Margrave Casimir of Anspach, urging them to join the peasants fraternity, was suddenly recalled in consequence of word of the Koenigshofen defeat. His troops were joined by those of Anspach under the command of Gregor von Burg-Bernsheim. The latter troops had been only recently formed. Margrave Casimir had managed, in true Hohenzollern style, to keep in check the peasant revolt in his region, partly by promises and partly by the threat of smashing troops. He maintained complete neutrality towards all outside troops as long as they did not include Anspach subjects. He tried to direct the hatred of the peasants mainly towards the church endowments, through the ultimate confiscation of which he hoped to enrich himself. As soon as he received word of the Boetlingen battle, he opened hostilities against his rebellious peasants, pillaging and burning their villages, and hanging or otherwise killing many of them. The peasants, however, quickly assembled, and under the command of Gregor von Burg-Bernsheim defeated him at Windsheim, May 29. While they were still pursuing him, the call of the hardpressed Odenwald peasants reached them, and they turned towards Heidingsfeld and from there with Florian Geyer, again towards Wuerzburg (June 2). Still without word from the Odenwald,

they left 5,000<sup>1</sup> peasants there, and with the remaining 4,000—many had run away—they followed the others. Reassured by false rumours of the outcome of Koenigshofen battle, they were attacked by Truchsess at Sulzdorf and completely defeated. The horsemen and servants of Truchsess perpetrated, as usual, a terrible massacre. Florian Geyer kept the remainder of his Black Troop, 600 in number, and battled his way through the village of Ingolstadt. He placed 200 men in the church and cemetery and 400 in the castle. He had been pursued by the Elector Palatine's forces, of whom a column of 1,200 men captured the village and set fire to the church. Those who did not perish in the flames were slaughtered. The Elector's troops then fired on the castle, made a gap in the ancient wall, and attempted to storm it. Twice beaten back by the peasants who stood hidden behind an internal wall, they shot the wall to pieces, and attempted a third storming, which was successful. Half of Geyer's men were massacred; with the other 200 he managed to escape. Their hiding place, however, was discovered the following day (Whit-Monday). The Elector Palatine's soldiers surrounded all the men. Only seventeen prisoners were taken during those two days. Florian Geyer again fought his way through with a few of his most intrepid fighters and turned towards the Gaildorf peasants, who had again assembled in a body of about 7,000 men. Upon his arrival, he found them mostly dispersed, in consequence of crushing news from every side. He made a last attempt to assemble the dispersed peasants in the woods on June 9, but was attacked by the troops, and fell fighting.

Truchsess, who, immediately after the Koenigshofen victory, had sent word to the besieged Frauenberg, now marched towards Wuerzburg. The council came to a secret understanding with him so that, on the night of June 7, the Union army was in a position to surround the city where 5,000 peasants were stationed, and the following morning to march through the gates opened by the council, without even lifting a sword. By this betrayal of the Wuerzburg "honourables" the last troops of the Franconian peasants were disarmed and all the leaders arrested. Truchsess immediately ordered 81 of them decapitated. Here in Wuerzburg the various Franconian princes appeared, one after the other, among them the Bishop of Wuerzburg himself, the Bishop of Bamberg and the Margrave of Brandenburg-Anspach. The gracious lords distributed the roles among themselves. Truchsess marched with the Bishop



of Bamberg, who presently broke the agreement concluded with his peasants and offered his territory to the raging hordes of the Union army, who pillaged, massacred and burned. Margrave Casimir devastated his own land. Teinungen was burned, numerous villages were pillaged or made fuel for the flames. In every city the Margrave held a bloody court. In Neustadt, on the Aisch, he ordered eighteen rebels beheaded, in the Buergel March, forty-three suffered a similar fate. From there he went to Rottenburg where the honourables, in the meantime, had made a counter revolution and arrested Stephan von Menzingen. The Rottenberg lower middle-class and plebeians were now compelled to pay heavily for the fact that they behaved towards the peasants in such an equivocal way, refusing to help them to the very last moment and in their local narrow-minded egotism insisting on the suppression of the countryside crafts in favour of the city guilds, and only unwillingly renouncing the city revenues flowing from the feudal services of the peasants. The Margrave ordered sixteen of them executed, Menzingen among them. In a similar manner the Bishop of Wuerzburg marched through his region, pillaging, devastating and burning everywhere. On his triumphal march he ordered 256 rebels to be decapitated, and upon his return to Wuerzburg he crowned his work by decapitating thirteen more from among the Wuerzburg rebels.

In the region of Mainz the viceroy, Bishop Wilhelm von Strassburg, restored order without resistance. He ordered only four men executed. Rheingau, where the peasants had also been restless, but where, nevertheless, everybody had long before gone home was subsequently invaded by Frowen von Hutten, a cousin of Ulrich, and finally "pacified" by the execution of twelve ringleaders. Frankfurt, which also had witnessed revolutionary movements of a considerable size, was held in check first by the conciliatory attitude of the council, then of recruited troops in the Rhenish Palatinate. Eight thousand peasants had assembled anew after the breach of agreement by the Elector, and had again burned monasteries and castles, but the Archbishop of Trier came to the aid of the Marshal of Zabern, and defeated them as early as May 23 at Pfedersheim. A series of atrocities (in Pfedersheim alone eighty-two were executed) and the capture of Weissenburg on July 7 terminated the insurrection here.

Of all the divisions of troops there remained only two to be vanquished, those of Hegau-Black Forest and of Allgau.

Archduke Ferdinand had tried intrigues with both. In the same way as Margrave Casimir and other princes tried to utilise the insurrection to annex the church territories and principalities, so Ferdinand wished to utilise it to strengthen the power of the House of Austria. He had negotiated with the Allgau commander, Walter Bach, and with the Hegau commander, Hanz Mueller, with the aim of inducing the peasants to declare their adherence to Austria, but, both chiefs being venal, their influence with the troops went only so far that the Allgau troop concluded an armistice with the Archbishop and observed neutrality towards Austria.

Retreating from the Wuerttemberg region, the peasants of Hegau destroyed a number of castles, and received reinforcements from the provinces of the Margraviate of Baden. On May 13 they marched towards Freiburg; on May 18 they bombarded it, and on May 23, the city having capitulated, they entered it with flying colours. From there they moved towards Stockach and Radolfzell, and waged a prolonged petty war against the garrisons of those cities. The latter, together with the nobility and other surrounding cities, appealed to the Lake peasants for help in accordance with the Weingarten agreement. The former rebels of the Lake Troop rose, 5,000 strong, against their former allies. So potent was the narrow-mindedness of the peasants who were confined to their local horizon, that only 600 refused to fight and expressed a desire to join the Hegau peasants, for which they were slaughtered. The Hegau peasants, themselves, persuaded by Hans Mueller of Bulgenbach, who had sold himself to the enemy, lifted their siege, and Hans Mueller having run away, most of them dispersed forthwith. The remaining ones entrenched themselves on the Hilzingen Steep, where, on July 16, they were beaten and annihilated by the troops that had in the meantime become free of other engagements. The Swiss cities negotiated an agreement with the Hegau peasants, which, however, did not prevent the other side from capturing and murdering Hans Mueller, his Laufenburg betrayal notwithstanding. In Breisgau, the city sent troops against it, but because of the weakness of the fighting forces of the princes, here as elsewhere, an agreement was reached (September 18), which also included Sundgau. The eight groups of the Black Forest and the Klettgau peasants, who were not yet disarmed, were again driven to an uprising by the tyranny of Count von Sulz, and were repulsed in October. On November 13, the Black Forest

peasants were forced into an agreement, and on December 6, Walzhut, the last bulwark of the insurrection in the Upper Rhine, fell.

The Allgaeu peasants had, after the departure of Truchsess, renewed their campaign against the monasteries and castles and were using repressive measures in retaliation for the devastations caused by the Union army. They were confronted by few troops which braved only insignificant skirmishes, not being able to follow them into the woods. In June, a movement against the honourables started in Memmingen which had hitherto remained more or less neutral, and only the accidental nearness of some Union troops which came in time to the rescue of the nobility, made its suppression possible. Schapelar, the preacher and leader of the plebeian movement, fled to St Gallen. The peasants appeared before the city and were about to start firing to break a gap, when they learned of the approach of Truchsess on his way from Wuerzburg. On June 27 they started against him, in two columns, over Babenhausen and Oberguenzburg. Archduke Ferdinand again attempted to win over the peasants to the House of Austria. Citing the armistice concluded with the peasants, he demanded of Truchsess to march no further against them. The Suabian Union, however, ordered Truchsess to attack them, but to refrain from pillaging and burning. Truchsess, however, was too clever to relinquish his primary and most effective means of battle, even were he in a position to keep in order the Lansquenets whom he had led between Lake Constance and the Main from one excess to another. The peasants took a stand behind the Iller and the Luibas, about 23,000 in number. Truchsess opposed them with 11,000. The positions of both armies were formidable. The cavalry could not operate on the territory that lay ahead, and if the Truchsess Lansquenets were superior to the peasants in organisation, military resources and discipline, the Allgaeu peasants counted in their ranks a host of former soldiers and experienced commanders and possessed numerous well-manned cannon. On July 19, the armies of the Suabian Union opened a cannonade which was continued on every side on the 20th, but without result. On July 21, George von Frundsberg joined Truchsess with 300 Lansquenets. He knew many of the peasant commanders who had served under him in the Italian military expeditions and he entered into negotiations with them. Where military resources were insufficient, treason succeeded. Walter

Bach and several other commanders and artillerymen sold themselves. They set fire to the powder store of the peasants and persuaded the troops to make an enveloping movement, but as soon as the peasants left their strong position they fell into the ambush placed by Truchsess in collusion with Bach and the other traitors. They were less capable of defending themselves since their traitorous commanders had left them under the pretext of reconnoitering and were already on their way to Switzerland. Thus two of the peasant camps were entirely disrupted. The third, under Knopf of Luibas, was still in a position to withdraw in order. It again took its position on the mountain of Kollen near Kampten, where it was surrounded by Truchsess. The latter did not dare to attack these peasants, but he cut them off from all supplies, and tried to demoralise them by burning about 200 villages in the vicinity. Hunger, and the sight of their burning homes, finally brought the peasants to surrender (July 25). More than twenty were immediately executed. Knopf of Luibas, the only leader of this troop who did not betray his banner, fled to Biegenz. There he was captured, however, and hanged, after a long imprisonment.

With this, the Peasant War in Suabia and Franconia came to an end.

## CHAPTER VI

IMMEDIATELY after the outbreak of the first movement in Suabia, Thomas Muenzer again hurried to Thuringia, and since the end of February and the beginning of March, he established his quarters in the free imperial city of Muehlhausen, where his party was stronger than elsewhere. He held the threads of the entire movement in his hand. He knew what storm was about to break in Southern Germany, and he undertook to make Thuringia the centre of the movement for North Germany. He found very fertile soil. Thuringia, the main arena of the Reformation movement, was in the grip of great unrest. The economic misery of the downtrodden peasants, as well as the current revolutionary, religious and political doctrine, had also prepared the neighbouring provinces, Hesse, Saxony, and the region of the Harz, for the general uprising. In Muehlhausen itself, whole masses of the lower middle-class

had been won over to the extreme Muenzer doctrine, and could hardly wait for the moment when they would assert themselves by a superiority of numbers against the haughty honourables. In order not to start before the proper moment, Muenzer was compelled to appear in the role of moderator, but his disciple, Pfeifer, who conducted the movement there, had committed himself to such an extent that he could not hold back the outbreak, and as early as March 17, 1525, before the general uprising in Southern Germany, Muehlhausen had its revolution. The old patrician council was overthrown, and the government was handed over to the newly-elected "eternal council," with Muenzer as president.

The worst thing that can befall a leader of an extreme party is to be compelled to take over a government in an epoch when the movement is not yet ripe for the domination of the class which he represents and for the realisation of the measures which that domination would imply. What he *can* do depends not upon his will but upon the sharpness of the clash of interests between the various classes, and upon the degree of development of the material means of existence, the relations of production and means of communication upon which the clash of interests of the classes is based every time. What he *ought* to do, what his party demands of him, again depends not upon him, or upon the degree of development of the class struggle and its conditions. He is bound to his doctrines and the demands hitherto propounded which do not emanate from the interrelations of the social classes at a given moment, or from the more or less accidental level of relations of production and means of communication, but from his more or less penetrating insight into the general result of the social and political movement. Thus he necessarily finds himself in a dilemma. What he *can* do is in contrast to all his actions as hitherto practised, to all his principles and to the present interests of his party; what he *ought* to do cannot be achieved. In a word, he is compelled to represent not his party or his class, but the class for whom conditions are ripe for domination. In the interests of the movement itself, he is compelled to defend the interests of an alien class, and to feed his own class with phrases and promises, with the assertion that the interests of that alien class are their own interests. Whoever puts himself in this awkward position is irrevocably lost. We have seen examples of this in recent times. We need only be reminded of the position taken in the last French provisional

government by the representatives of the proletariat, though they represented only a very low level of proletarian development. Whoever can still look forward to official positions after having become familiar with the experiences of the February government—not to speak of our own noble German provisional governments and imperial regencies—is either foolish beyond measure, or at best pays only lip service to the extreme revolutionary party.

Muenzer's position at the head of the "eternal council" of Muehlhausen was indeed much more precarious than that of any modern revolutionary regent. Not only the movement of his time, but the whole century, was not ripe for the realisation of the ideas for which he himself had only begun to grope. The class which he represented not only was not developed enough and incapable of subduing and transforming the whole of society, but it was just beginning to come into existence. The social transformation that he pictured in his fantasy was so little grounded in the then existing economic conditions that the latter were a preparation for a social system diametrically opposed to that of which he dreamt. Nevertheless, he was bound to his preachings of Christian equality and evangelical community of possessions. He was at least compelled to make an attempt at their realisation. Community of all possessions, universal and equal labour duty, and the abolition of all authority were proclaimed. In reality, Muehlhausen remained a republican imperial city with a somewhat democratic constitution, with a senate elected by universal suffrage and under the control of a forum, and with the hastily improvised feeding of the poor. The social change, which so horrified the Protestant middle-class contemporaries, in reality never went beyond a feeble and unconscious attempt prematurely to establish the bourgeois society of a later period.

Muenzer, himself, seems to have realised the wide abyss between his theories and surrounding realities. This abyss must have been felt the more keenly, the more distorted the views of this genius of necessity appeared, reflected in the heads of the mass of his followers. He threw himself into widening and organising the movement with a zeal rare even for him. He wrote letters and sent out emissaries in all directions. His letters and sermons breathed a revolutionary fanaticism which was amazing in comparison with his former writings. Gone completely was the naive youthful humour of Muenzer's revolutionary pamphlets. The quiet instructive

language of the thinker, which had been so characteristic of him, appeared no more. Muenzer was now entirely a prophet of the revolution. Incessantly he fanned the flame of hatred against the ruling classes. He spurred the wildest passions, using forceful terms of expression the like of which religious and nationalist delirium had put into the mouths of the Old Testament prophets. The style up to which he worked himself reveals the level of education of that public which he was to affect. The example of Muehlhausen and the propaganda of Muenzer had a quick and far-reaching effect. In Thuringia, Eichsfeld, Harz, in the duchies of Saxony, in Hesse and Fulda, in Upper Franconia and in Vogtland, the peasants arose, assembled in armies, and burned castles and monasteries. Muenzer was more or less recognised as the leader of the entire movement, and Muehlhausen remained the central point, while in Erfurt a purely middle-class movement became victorious, and the ruling party there constantly maintained an undecided attitude towards the peasants.

In Thuringia, the princes were at the beginning just as helpless and powerless in relation to the peasants as they had been in Franconia and Suabia. Only in the last days of April, did the Landgrave of Hesse succeed in assembling a corps. It was that same Landgrave Philipp, whose piety is being praised so much by the Protestant and bourgeois histories of the Reformation, and of whose infamies towards the peasants we will presently have a word to say. By a series of quick movements and by decisive action, Landgrave Philipp subdued the major part of his land. He called new contingents, and then turned towards the region of the Abbot of Fulda, who hitherto was his lord. On May 3, he defeated the Fulda peasant troop at Frauenberg, subdued the entire land and seized the opportunity not only to free himself from the sovereignty of the Abbot, but to make the Abbey of Fulda a vassalage of Hesse, naturally pending its subsequent secularisation. He then took Eisenach and Langensalza, and jointly with the Saxon troops, moved towards the headquarters of the rebellious Muehlhausen. Muenzer assembled his forces at Frankenhausen 8,000 men and several cannons. The Thuringian troops were far from possessing that fighting power which the Suabian and Franconian troops developed in their struggle with Truchsess. The men were poorly armed and badly disciplined. They counted few ex-soldiers among them, and sorely lacked leadership. It appears that Muenzer pos-

sessed no military knowledge whatsoever. Nevertheless, the princes found it proper to use here the same tactics that so often helped Truchsess to victory—breach of faith. On May 16, they entered negotiations, concluded an armistice, but attacked the peasants before the time of the armistice had elapsed.

Muenzer stood with his people on the mountain which is still called Mount Battle (Schlachtberg), entrenched behind a barricade of wagons. The discouragement among the troops was rapidly increasing. The princes had promised them amnesty should they deliver Muenzer alive. Muenzer assembled his people in a circle, to debate the princes' proposals. A knight and a priest expressed themselves in favour of capitulation. Muenzer had them both brought inside the circle, and decapitated. This act of terrorist energy, jubilantly met by the outspoken revolutionaries, caused a certain halt among the troops, but most of the men would have gone away without resistance had it not been noticed that the princes' Lansquenets, who had encircled the entire mountain, were approaching in close columns, in spite of the armistice. A front was hurriedly formed behind the wagons, but already the cannon balls and guns were pounding the half-defenseless peasants, unused to battle, and the Lansquenets reached the barricade. After a brief resistance, the line of the wagons was broken, the peasants' cannon captured, and the peasants dispersed. They fled in wild disorder, and fell into the hands of the enveloping columns and the cavalry, who perpetrated an appalling massacre among them. Out of 8,000 peasants, over 5,000 were slaughtered. The survivors arrived at Frankenhäus, and simultaneously with them, the princes' cavalry. The city was taken. Muenzer, wounded in the head, was discovered in a house and captured. On May 25, Muehlhausen also surrendered. Pfeifer, who had remained there, ran away, but was captured in the region of Eisenach.

Muenzer was put on the rack in the presence of the princes, and then decapitated. He went to his death with the same courage with which he had lived. He was barely twenty-eight when he was executed. Pfeifer, with many others, was also executed. In Fulda, that holy man, Philpp of Hesse, had opened his bloody court. He and the Prince of Hesse ordered many others to be killed by the sword—in Eisenach, twenty-four; in Langensalza, forty-one, after the battle of Frankenhäus, 300, in Muehlhausen, over 100; at Gernar,



twenty-six, at Tunga, fifty; at Sangenhauseu, twelve; in Leipzig, eight, not to speak of mutilations and the more moderate measures of pillaging and burning villages and cities.

Muehlhausen was compelled to give up its liberty under the empire, and was incorporated into the Saxon lands, just as the Abbey of Fulda was incorporated in the Landgraviate of Hesse.

The prince moved through the forest of Thuringia, where Franconian peasants of the Bildhaus camp had united with the Thuringians, and burned many castles. A battle took place before Meiningen. The peasants were beaten and withdrew towards the city, which closed its gates to them, and threatened to attack them from the rear. The troops, thus placed in a quandary by the betrayal of their allies, capitulated before the prince, and dispersed, while negotiations were still under way. The camp of Bildhaus had long dispersed, and with this, the remnants of the insurgents of Saxony, Hesse, Thuringia, and Upper Franconia, were annihilated.

In Alsace the rebellion broke out after the movement had started on the right side of the Rhine. The peasants of the bishopric of Strassbourg arose as late as the middle of April. Soon after, there was an upheaval of the peasants of Upper Alsace and Sundgau. On April 18, a contingent of Lower Alsace peasants pillaged the monastery of Altdorf. Other troops were formed near Ebersheim and Barr, as well as in the Urbis valley. These were soon concentrated into the large Lower Alsace division and proceeded in an organised way to take cities and towns and to destroy monasteries. One out of every three men was called to the colours. The Twelve Articles of this group were considerably more radical than those of the Suabian and Franconian groups.

While one column of the Lower Alsace peasants first concentrated near St Hippolite early in May, attempting to take the city but without success, and then, through an understanding with the citizens, came into possession of Barmen on May 10, of Rappoldtsweiler on May 13, and Reichenweiler on May 14, a second column under Erasmus Gerber marched to attack Strassbourg by surprise. The attempt was unsuccessful, and the column now turned towards the Vosges, destroyed the monastery of Mauersmuenster, and besieged Zabern, taking it on May 13. From here it moved towards the frontier of Lorraine and aroused the section of the duchy adjoining the frontier, at the same time fortifying the mountain passes. Two

columns were formed at Herbolzheim on the Saar, and at Neuburg, at Saagemund, 4,000 German-Lorraine peasants entrenched themselves. Finally, two advanced troops, the Kolben in the Vosges at Stuerzelbrunn, and the Kleeberg at Weissenburg, covered the front and the right flank, while the left flank was adjoining those of Upper Alsace.

The latter, in motion since April 20, had forced the city of Sulz into the peasant fraternity on May 10, Gebweiler, on May 12, and Sennheim and vicinity, May 15. The Austrian government and the surrounding imperial cities immediately united against them, but they were too weak to offer serious resistance, not to speak of attack. Thus, in the middle of May, the whole of Alsace, with the exception of only a few cities came into the hands of the insurgents.

But already the army was approaching which was destined to break the ungodly attack of the Alsace peasants. It was the French who effected here the restoration of the nobility. Already, on May 16, Duke Anton of Lorraine marched out with an army of 30,000, among them the flower of the French nobility, as well as Spanish, Piedmontese, Lombardic, Greek and Albanian auxiliary troops. On May 16 he met 4,000 peasants at Luetzelstein whom he defeated without effort, and on the 17th he forced Zabern, which was besieged by the peasants, to surrender. But even while the Lorrainers were entering the city and the peasants were being disarmed, the conditions of the surrender were broken. The defenseless peasants were attacked by the Lansquenets and most of them were slaughtered. The remaining Lower Alsace columns disbanded, and Duke Anton went to meet the Upper Alsations. The latter, who had refused to join the Lower Alsations at Zabern, were now attacked at Scherweiler by the entire force of the Lorrainers. They resisted with great bravery, but the enormous numerical superiority—30,000 as against 7,000—and the betrayal of a number of knights, especially that of the magistrate of Reichenweier, made all daring futile. They were totally beaten and dispersed. The Duke subdued the whole of Alsace with the usual atrocities. Only Sundgau was spared. By threatening to call him into the land, the Austrian government forced the peasants to conclude Ensisheim agreement early in June. The government soon broke the agreement, however, ordering numbers of preachers and leaders of the movement to be hanged. The peasants made a new insurrection which ended with the inclusion of the Sundgau peasants

into the Offenbourg agreement (September 18).;

There now remains only the report of the Peasant War in the Alpine regions of Austria. These regions, as well as the adjoining Archbishopric of Salzburg were in continuous opposition to the government and the nobility ever since the Stara Prawa, and the Reformation doctrines found there a fertile soil. Religious persecutions and wilful taxation brought the rebellion to a crisis.

The city of Salzburg, supported by the peasants and the pitmen, had been in controversy with the Archbishop since 1522 over city privileges and the freedom of religious practice. By the end 1523, the Archbishop attacked the city with recruited Lansquenets, terrorised it by a cannonade from the castle, and persecuted the heretical preachers. At the same time he imposed new crushing taxes, and thereby irritated the population to the utmost. In the spring of 1525, simultaneously with the Suabian-Franconian and Thuringian uprisings, the peasants and pitmen of the entire country suddenly arose, organised themselves under the commanders Brossler and Weitmoser, freed the city and besieged the castle of Salzburg. Like the West German peasants, they organised a Christian alliance and formulated their demands into fourteen articles.

In Styria, the Upper Austria, in Carinthia and Carniola, where new extortionate taxes, duties and edicts had severely injured the interests closest to the people, the peasants arose in the Spring of 1525. They took a number of castles and at Grys, defeated the conqueror of the Stara Prawa, the old field commander Dietrichstein. Although the government succeeded in placating some of the insurgents with false promises, the bulk of them remained together and united with the Salzburg peasants, so that the entire region of Salzburg and the major part of Upper Austria, Styria, Carinthia and Carniola were in the hands of the peasants and pitmen.

In the Tyrol, the Reformation doctrines had also found Adherence. Here even more than in the other Alpine regions of Austria, Muenzer's emissaries had been successfully active. Archbishop Ferdinand persecuted the preachers of the new doctrines here as elsewhere, and impinged the rights of the population by arbitrary financial regulations. In consequence, an uprising took place in the Spring of 1525. The insurgents, whose commander was a Muenzer man named Geismaier, the only noted military talent among all the peasant chiefs, took a great number of castles, and proceeded energetically against

the priests, particularly in the south and the region of Etsch. The Vrarlberg peasants also arose and joined the Allgaeu peasants.

The Archbishop, pressed from every side, now began to make concession after concession to the rebels whom a short time before he had wished to annihilate by means of burning, scourging, pillaging and murdering. He summoned the diets of the hereditary lands, and pending their assembling, concluded an armistice with the peasants. In the meantime he was strenuously arming, in order, as soon as possible, to be able to speak to the ungodly ones in a different language.

Naturally, the armistice was not kept long. Dietrichstein, having run short of cash, began to levy contributions in the duchies; his Slavic and Magyar troops allowed themselves, besides, the most shameful atrocities against the population. This brought the Styrians to new rebellion. The peasants attacked Dietrichstein at Schlading during the night of July 3rd and slaughtered everybody who did not speak German. Dietrichstein himself was captured. On the morning of July 4, the peasants organised a jury to try the captives, and forty Czech and Croatian noble prisoners were sentenced to death. This was effective. The Archbishop immediately consented to all the demands of the estates of the five duchies (Upper and Lower Austria, Styria, Carinthia and Carniola)

In Tyrol, the demands of the Diet were also granted, and thereby the North was quieted. The South, however, insisting on its original demands as against the much more moderate decisions of the Diet, remained under arms. Only in December was the Archbishop in a position to restore order by force. He did not fail to execute a great number of instigators and leaders of the upheaval who fell into his hands.

Now 10,000 Bavarians moved against Salzburg, under George of Frundsberg. This imposing military power, as well as the quarrels that had broken out among the peasants, induced the Salzburg peasants to conclude an agreement with the Archbishop, which came into being September 1, and was also accepted by the Archduke. In spite of this, the two princes, who had meanwhile considerably strengthened their troops, soon broke the agreement and thereby drove the Salzburg peasants to a new uprising. The insurgents held their own throughout the winter. In the Spring, Geismaier came to them to open a splendid campaign against the troops which

were approaching from every side. In a series of brilliant battles in May and June, 1526, he defeated the Bavarian, Austrian and Suabian Union troops and the Lansquenets of the Archbishop of Salzburg, one after another, and for a long time he prevented the various corps from uniting. He also found time to besiege Radstadt. Finally, surrounded by overwhelming forces, he was compelled to withdraw. He battled his way through and led the remnants of his corps through the Austrian Alps into Venetian territory. The republic of Venice and Switzerland offered the indefatigable peasant chief starting points for new conspiracies. For a whole year he was still attempting to involve them in a war against Austria, which would have offered him an occasion for a new peasant uprising. The hand of the murderer, however, reached him in the course of these negotiations. Archbishop Ferdinand and the Archbishop of Salzburg could not rest as long as Geismaier was alive. They therefore paid a bandit who, in 1527, succeeded in removing the dangerous rebel from among the living.

## CHAPTER VII

AFTER Geismaier's withdrawal into Venetian territory, the epilogue of the Peasant War was ended. The peasants were everywhere brought again under the sway of their ecclesiastical, noble or patrician masters. The agreements that were concluded with them here and there were broken, and heavy burdens were augmented by the enormous indemnities imposed by the victors on the vanquished. The magnificent attempt of the German people ended in ignominious defeat and, for a time, in greater oppression. In the long run, however, the situation of the peasants did not become worse. Whatever the nobility, princes and priests could wring out of the peasants, had been wrung out even before the war. The German peasant of that time had this in common with the modern proletarian, that his share in the products of the work was limited to a subsistence minimum necessary for his maintenance and for the propagation of the race. It is true that peasants of some little wealth were ruined. Hosts of bondsmen were forced into serfdom; whole stretches of community lands were confiscated; a great number of peasants were driven into vagabondage or forced to become city plebeians by the destruction

of their dwellings and the devastation of their fields in addition to the general disorder. Wars and devastations, however, were everyday phenomena at that time, and in general, the peasant class was on too low a level to have its situation made worse for a long time through increased taxes. The subsequent religious wars and finally the Thirty Years' War with its constantly repeated mass devastations and depopulations pounded the peasants much more painfully than did the Peasant War. It was notably the Thirty Years' War which annihilated the most important parts of the productive forces in agriculture, through which, as well as through the simultaneous destruction of many cities, it lowered the living standards of the peasants, plebeians and the ruined city inhabitants to the level of Irish misery in its worst form.

The class that suffered most from the Peasant War was the *clergy*. Its monasteries and endowments were burned down, its valuables plundered, sold into foreign countries, or melted; its stores of goods consumed. They had been least of all capable of offering resistance, and at the same time the weight of the people's old hatred fell heaviest upon them. The other estates, princes, nobility and the middle-class, even experienced a secret joy at the sufferings of the hated prelates. The Peasant War had made popular the secularisation of the church estates in favour of the peasants. The lay princes, and to a certain degree the cities, determined to bring about secularisation in their own interests, and soon the possessions of the prelates in Protestant countries were in the hands of either the princes or the honourables. The power and authority of the ecclesiastical princes were also infringed upon, and the lay princes understood how to exploit the people's hatred also in this direction. Thus we have seen how the Abbot of Fulda was relegated from a feudal lord of Philipp of Hesse to the position of his vassal. Thus the city of Kempten forced the ecclesiastical prince to sell to it for a trifle a series of precious privileges which he enjoyed in the city.

The *nobility* had also suffered considerably. Most of its castles were destroyed, and a number of its most respected families were ruined and could find means of subsistence only in the service of the princes. Its powerlessness in relation to the peasants was proved. It had been beaten everywhere and forced to surrender. Only the armies of the princes had saved it. The nobility was bound more and more to lose its significance as a free estate under the empire and to fall under the

dominion of the princes.

Nor did the cities generally gain any advantages from the Peasant War. The rule of the honourables was almost everywhere reestablished with new force, and the opposition of the middle-class remained broken for a long time. Old patrician routine thus dragged on, hampering commerce and industry in every way, up to the French Revolution. Moreover, the cities were made responsible by the princes for the momentary successes which the middle-class or plebeian parties had achieved within their confines during the struggle. Cities which had previously belonged to the princes were forced to pay heavy indemnities, robbed of their privileges, and made subject to the avaricious wilfulness of the princes (Frankenhausen, Arnstadt, Schmalkalden, Wurzburg, etc.), cities of the empire were incorporated into territories of the princes (Muehlhausen), or they were at least placed under moral dependence on the princes of the adjoining territory, as was the case with many imperial cities in Franconia.

The sole gainers under these conditions were the *princes*. We have seen at the beginning of our exposition that low development of industry, commerce and agriculture made the centralisation of the Germans into a *nation* impossible, that it allowed only local and provincial centralisation, and that the princes, representing centralisation within disruption, were the only class to profit from every change in the existing social and political conditions. The state of development of Germany in those days was so low and at the same time so different in various provinces, that along with lay principalities there could still exist ecclesiastical sovereignties, city republics, and sovereign counts and barons. Simultaneously, however, this development was continually, though slowly and feebly, pressing towards *provincial* centralisation, towards subjugating all imperial estates under the princes. It is due to this that only the princes could gain by the ending of the Peasant War. This happened in reality. They gained not only relatively, through the weakening of their opponents, the clergy, the nobility and the cities, but also absolutely through the prizes of war which they collected. The church estates were secularised in their favour; part of the nobility, fully or partly ruined, was obliged gradually to place itself in their vassalage; the indemnities of the cities and peasantry swelled their treasures, which, with the abolition of so many city privileges, had now obtained a much more extended field for financial operations.

The decentralisation of Germany, the widening and strengthening of which was the chief result of the war, was at the same time the cause of its failure.

We have seen that Germany was split not only into numberless independent provinces almost totally foreign to each other, but that in every one of these provinces the nation was divided into various strata of estates and parts of estates. Besides princes and priests we find nobility and peasants in the countryside; patricians, middle-class and plebeians in the cities. At best, these classes were indifferent to each other's interests if not in actual conflict. Above all these complicated interests there still were the interests of the empire and the pope. We have seen that, with great difficulty, imperfectly, and differing in various localities, these various interests finally formed three great groups. We have seen that in spite of this grouping achieved with so much labour, every estate opposed the line indicated by circumstances for the national development, every estate conducting the movement of its own accord, coming into conflict not only with the conservatives but also with the rest of the opposition estates. Failure was, therefore, inevitable. This was the fate of the nobility in Sickingen's uprising, the fate of the peasants in the Peasant War, of the middle-class in their tame Reformation. This was the fate even of the peasants and plebeians who in most localities of Germany could not unite for common action and stood in each other's way. We have also seen the causes of this split in the class struggle and the resultant defeat of the middle-class movement.

How local and provincial decentralisation and the resultant local and provincial narrow-mindedness ruined the whole movement, how neither middle-class nor peasantry nor plebeians could unite for concerted national action; how the peasants of every province acted only for themselves, as a rule refusing aid to the insurgent peasants of the neighbouring region, and therefore being annihilated in individual battles one after another by armies which in most cases counted hardly one-tenth of the total number of the insurgent masses,—all this must be quite clear to the reader from this presentation. The armistices and the agreements concluded by individual groups with their enemies also constituted acts of betrayal of the common cause, and the grouping of the various troops according to the greater or smaller community of their own actions, the only possible grouping, but according to the community of



the special adversary to whom they succumbed, is striking proof of the degree of the mutual alienation of the peasants in various provinces.

The analogy with the movement of 1848-50 is here also apparent. In 1848 as in the Peasant War, the interests of the opposition classes clashed with each other and each acted of its own accord. The bourgeoisie, developed sufficiently not to tolerate any longer the feudal and bureaucratic absolutism, was not powerful enough to subordinate the claims of other classes to its own interests. The proletariat, too weak to be able to count on skipping the bourgeois period and immediately conquering power for itself, had, still under absolutism, tasted too well the sweetness of bourgeois government, and was generally far too developed to identify for one moment its own emancipation with the emancipation of the bourgeoisie. The mass of the nation, small bourgeois artisans and peasants, were left in the lurch by their nearest and natural allies, the bourgeoisie, because they were too revolutionary, and partly by the proletariat because they were not sufficiently advanced. Divided in itself, this mass of the nation achieved nothing, while opposing their fellow opponents on the right and the left. As to provincial narrow-mindedness, it could hardly have been greater in 1525 among the peasants than it was among the classes participating in the movement of 1848. The hundred local revolutions as well as the hundred local reactions following them and completed without hindrance, the retention of the split into numerous small states—all this speaks loud enough indeed. *He who, after the two German revolutions, of 1525 and 1848, and their results, still dreams of a federated republic, belongs in a house for the insane.*

Still, the two revolutions, that of the Sixteenth Century and that of 1848-50, are, in spite of all analogies, materially different from each other. The revolution of 1848 bespeaks, if not the progress of Germany, the progress of Europe

Who profited by the revolution of 1525? The princes. Who profited by the revolution of 1848? The big princes, Austria and Prussia. Behind the princes of 1525 there stood the lower middle-class of the cities, held chained by means of taxation. Behind the big provinces of 1850, there stood the modern big bourgeoisie, quickly subjugating them by means of the State debt. Behind the big bourgeoisie stand the proletarians

The revolution of 1525 was a local German affair. The

English, French, Bohemians and Hungarians had already gone through their peasant wars when the Germans began theirs. If Germany was decentralised, Europe was so to a much greater extent. The revolution of 1848 was not a local German affair, it was one phase of a great European movement. The moving forces throughout the period of its duration were not confined to the narrow limits of one individual country, not even to the limits of one-quarter of the globe. In fact, the countries which were the arena of the revolution were least active in producing it. They were more or less unconscious raw materials without a will of their own. They were moulded in the course of a movement in which the entire world participated, a movement which under existing social conditions may appear to us as an alien power, but which, in the end, is nothing but our own. This is why the revolution of 1848-50 could not end in the way that the revolution of 1525 ended.

## THE TWELVE ARTICLES OF THE PEASANTS\*

THE fundamental and correct chief articles of all the peasants and of those subject to ecclesiastical lords, relating to these matters in which they feel themselves aggrieved

*M cccc, quadratum, lx et duplicatum*

*V cum transibit, christiana secta peribit.*

*Peace to the Christian Reader and the Grace of God through Christ*

There are many evil writings put forth of late which take occasion, on account of the assembling of the peasants, to cast scorn upon the gospel, saying. Is this the fruit of the new teaching, that no one should obey but all should everywhere rise in revolt and rush together to reform or perhaps destroy altogether the authorities, both ecclesiastic and lay? The articles below shall answer these godless and criminal fault-finders, and serve in the first place to remove the reproach from the word of God, and in the second place to give a Christian excuse for the disobedience or even the revolt of the entire

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\*Translations and Reprints from the Original Sources of European History, Vol. II, published by the Department of History, University of Pennsylvania

Peasantry. In the first place the Gospel is not the cause of revolt and disorder, since it is the message of Christ, the promised Messiah, the Word of Life, teaching only love, peace, patience and concord. Thus, all who believe in Christ should learn to be loving, peaceful, long-suffering and harmonious. This is the foundation of all the articles of the peasants (as will be seen) who accept the Gospel and live according to it. How then can the evil reports declare the Gospel to be a cause of revolt and disobedience? That the authors of the evil reports and the enemies of the Gospel oppose themselves to these demands is due, not to the Gospel, but to the Devil, the worst enemy of the Gospel, who causes this opposition by raising doubts in the minds of his followers, and thus the word of God, which teaches love, peace and concord, is overcome. In the second place, it is clear that the peasants demand that this Gospel be taught them as a guide in life and they ought not to be called disobedient or disorderly. Whether God grant the peasants (earnestly wishing to live according to His word) their requests or no, who shall find fault with the will of the Most High? Who shall meddle in His judgments or oppose his majesty? Did he not hear the children of Israel when they called upon Him and saved them out of the hands of Pharaoh? Can He not save His own today? Yes, He will save them and that speedily. Therefore, Christian reader, read the following articles with care and then judge. Here follow the articles.

*The First Article*—First, it is our humble petition and desire, as also our will and resolution, that in the future we should have power and authority so that each community should choose and appoint a pastor, and that we should have the right to depose him should he conduct himself improperly. The pastor thus chosen should teach us the Gospel pure and simple, without any addition, doctrine or ordinance of man. For to teach us continually the true faith will lead us to pray God that through His grace this faith may increase within us and become part of us. For if His grace work not within us we remain flesh and blood, which availeth nothing; since the Scripture clearly teaches that only through true faith can we come to God. Only through His mercy can we become holy. Hence such a guide and pastor is necessary and in this fashion grounded upon the Scriptures.

*The Second Article*—According as the just tithe is established by the Old Testament and fulfilled in the New, we are ready and willing to pay the fair tithe of grain. The word of

God plainly provided that in giving according to right to God and distributing to His people the services of a pastor are required. We will that, for the future, our church provost, whomsoever the community may appoint, shall gather and receive this tithe. From this he shall give to the pastor, elected by the whole community, a decent and sufficient maintenance for him and his, as shall seem right to the whole community (or, with the knowledge of the community). What remains over shall be given to the poor of the place, as the circumstances and the general opinion demand. Should anything farther remain, let it be kept, lest any one should have to leave the country from poverty. Provision should also be made from this surplus to avoid laying any land tax on the poor. In case one or more villages themselves have sold their tithes on account of want, and each village has taken action as a whole, the buyer should not suffer loss, but we will that some proper agreement be reached with him for the repayment of the sum by the village with due interest. But those who have tithes which they have not purchased from a village, but which were appropriated by their ancestors, should not, and ought not, to be paid anything farther by the village which shall apply its tithes to the support of the pastors elected as above indicated, or to solace the poor as is taught by the Scriptures. The small tithes, whether ecclesiastical or lay, we will not pay at all, for the Lord God created cattle for the free use of man. We will not, therefore, pay farther an unseemly tithe which is of man's invention.

*The Thurd Article*—It has been the custom hitherto for men to hold us as their own property, which is pitiable enough, considering that Christ has delivered and redeemed us all, without exception, by the shedding of His precious blood, the lowly as well as the great. Accordingly, it is consistent with Scripture that we should be free and wish to be so. Not that we would wish to be absolutely free and under no authority. God does not teach us that we should lead a disorderly life in the lusts of the flesh, but that we should love the Lord our God and our neighbour. We would gladly observe all this as God has commanded us in the celebration of the communion. He has not commanded us not to obey the authorities, but rather that we should be humble, not only towards those in authority, but towards every one. We are thus ready to yield obedience according to God's law to our elected and regular authorities in all proper things becoming to a Christian.

We, therefore, take it for granted that you will release us from serfdom as true Christians, unless it should be shown us from the Gospel that we are serfs.

*The Fourth Article.*—In the fourth place it has been the custom heretofore, that no poor man should be allowed to catch venison or wild fowl or fish in flowing water, which seems to us quite unseemly and unbrotherly as well as selfish and not agreeable to the word of God. In some places the authorities preserve the game to our great annoyance and loss, recklessly permitting the unreasoning animals to destroy to no purpose our crops which God suffers to grow for the use of man, and yet we must remain quiet. This is neither godly nor neighbourly. For when God created man he gave him dominion over all the animals, over the birds of the air and over the fish in the water. Accordingly it is our desire if a man holds possession of waters that he should prove from satisfactory documents that his right has been unwittingly acquired by purchase. We do not wish to take it from him by force, but his rights should be exercised in a Christian and brotherly fashion. But whosoever cannot produce such evidence should surrender his claim with good grace.

*The Fifth Article*—In the fifth place we are aggrieved in the matter of wood-cutting, for the noble folk have appropriated all the woods to themselves alone. If a poor man requires wood he must pay double for it (or, perhaps, two pieces of money). It is our opinion in regard to a wood which has fallen into the hands of a lord whether spiritual or temporal, that unless it was duly purchased it should revert again to the community. It should, moreover, be free to every member of the community to help himself to such fire-wood as he needs in his home. Also, if a man requires wood for carpenter's purposes he should have it free, but with the knowledge of a person appointed by the community for that purpose. Should, however, no such forest be at the disposal of the community let that which has been duly bought be administered in a brotherly and Christian manner. If the forest, although unfairly appropriated in the first instance, was later duly sold let the matter be adjusted in a friendly spirit and according to the Scriptures.

*The Sixth Article.*—Our sixth complaint is in regard to excessive services demanded of us which are increased from day to day. We ask that this matter be properly looked into so that we shall not continue to be oppressed in this way, but

that some gracious consideration be given us, since our forefathers were required only to serve according to the word of God

*The Seventh Article*.—Seventh, we will not hereafter allow ourselves to be farther oppressed by our lords, but will let them demand only what is just and proper according to the word of the agreement between the lord and the peasant. The lord should no longer try to force more services or other dues from the peasant without payment, but permit the peasant to enjoy his holding in peace and quiet. The peasant should, however, help the lord when it is necessary, and at proper times when it will not be disadvantageous to the peasant and for a suitable payment.

*The Eighth Article*.—In the eighth place, we are greatly burdened by holdings which cannot support the rent exacted from them. The peasants suffer loss in this way and are ruined, and we ask that the lords may appoint persons of honour to inspect these holdings, and fix a rent in accordance with justice, so that the peasants shall not work for nothing, since the labourer is worthy of his hire

*The Ninth Article*.—In the ninth place, we are burdened with a great evil in the constant making of new laws. We are not judged according to the offence, but sometimes with great ill will, and sometimes much too leniently. In our opinion we should be judged according to the old written law so that the case shall be decided according to its merits, and not with partiality.

*The Tenth Article*.—In the tenth place, we are aggrieved by the appropriation by individuals of meadows and fields which at one time belonged to a community. These we will take again into our own hands. It may, however, happen that the land was rightfully purchased. When, however, the land has unfortunately been purchased in this way, some brotherly arrangement should be made according to circumstances.

*The Eleventh Article*. In the eleventh place we will entirely abolish the due called *Todfall* (that is, heriot) and will no longer endure it, nor allow widows and orphans to be thus shamefully robbed against God's will, and in violation of justice and right, as has been done in many places, and by those who should shield and protect them. These have disgraced and despoiled us, and although they had little authority they assumed it. God will suffer this no more, but it shall be wholly done away with, and for the future no man shall be

bound to give little or much.

*Conclusion.*—In the twelfth place it is our conclusion and final resolution, that if any one or more of the articles here set for should not be in agreement with the word of God, as we think they are, such article we will willingly recede from when it is proved really to be against the word of God by a clear explanation of the Scripture. Or if articles should now be conceded to us that are hereafter discovered to be unjust, from that hour they shall be dead and null and without force. Likewise, if more complaints should be discovered which are based upon truth and the Scriptures and relate to offenses against God and our neighbour, we have determined to reserve the right to present these also, and to exercise ourselves in all Christian teaching. For this we shall pray God, since He can grant these, and He alone. The peace of Christ abide with us all.

## EXPLANATORY NOTES

1 *Louis XI*, King of France, son of Charles VII. Born 1423, reigned 1461-1483. He founded the absolute monarchy on the ruins of feudalism in France, and extended the boundaries of his country to the Jura, the Alps, and the Pyrenees. In his youth, as dauphin, Louis participated in the uprising of the nobility against Charles VII. Having ascended the throne after the death of his father, he started a fight against the feudal lords but was opposed by the Common Welfare League which united the big and small feudal lords of France. In his wars against the League, Louis, instead of using the crude methods of feudal policies, practised not only force but cunning, a diplomatic system of lies, deception and caution. Louis XI was defeated and compelled to sign a peace pact with the feudal lords on October 29, 1461. But peace with the feudal lords was not achieved. Aided by the commercial class, he started a new war in November, 1470. All of western France rose against him, but this time he was victorious. In order to be able more successfully to oppose the feudal lords, Louis XI decided to reform the army by freeing the cities from military duties, and to create an army of 50,000. His infantry consisted of Swiss hirelinge. In 1481, he added Provence and Liege to his domains and subdued the whole of France outside of Navarre and the duchy of Breton. The absolute power of Louis XI could establish itself in France only through the support of the commercial elements. Louis XI in his turn protected commerce, industry and agriculture. Under his reign the old institution of the Roman empire, the mail was restored.—*Ed.*

2. *Carolina*, a criminal code of the Sixteenth Century, published in 1532 under Emperor Charles V. In the Sixteenth Century, Germany counted over 300 states, each having its own criminal laws with its own methods of cruelty. Justice at that time aimed at extorting a confession from the prisoner by means of torture. The prevailing Roman law, in the hands of the princes was a cruel tool for the exploitation of the people. The development of a money economy, however, and the growth of absolutism, demanded a uniform criminal legislation and a reform of the existing laws. Attempts at reform had been made in Germany as early as the end of the Fifteenth and the beginning of the Sixteenth Century. The Reichstag, meeting in Augsburg and Regensburg in 1532, finally adopted a draft of a criminal code known as Carolina ("Emperor Charles V's and the Holy Roman Empire's order of Penal Law"). This code did not abolish the Roman law, but was an attempt only to combine the prevailing Roman with the local law. Neither did the Carolina abolish the codes of the separate states, the new code serving only as a sort of guide for the princes and



electors. The new code brought insignificant changes in the court procedure. It mitigated the inquisitorial order of investigation and defined the right of defense. But torture as a means of examination of the defendant was retained in the new code. The chapters concerning the "cutting of ears," "cutting of noses," "burning," "quartering," adorned the new code as well. The code retained its great importance, however, up to the Eighteenth Century.—Ed.

3. *Waldenses*, a religious sect which sprang up in the cities of southern France in the middle of the Twelfth Century. The cities of northern Italy and southern France of that time represented very favourable ground for the development of a religious reformist movement. Commerce and industry had developed here earlier than in the west, the bourgeoisie had come into existence, the crafts flourished. But while the cities of northern Italy, which were partly interested in the exploitation of Rome, since they derived from it no small profits, began to show spiritual independence only in relation to the doctrines of the Catholic Church, the cities of southern France, which were no less developed economically but at the same time less dependent upon Rome, started the first serious upheaval against the pope's domination.

According to the legend, the sect of the Waldenses was founded by a rich merchant of Lyons called Petrus Waldus. It is possible, however, that it existed prior to that time. Petrus Waldus decided to follow the law of the Gospel. He distributed his possessions among the poor, gathered around himself a considerable number of followers, and began preaching (1176). Soon the Waldenses combined in Lombardy with the sect of the Humiliates, who also called themselves the paupers of Lyons. The Waldenses did not confine their preachings to southern France. We find them also in Italy, Germany and Bohemia. In southern France, as elsewhere, they recruited their followers from among the artisans, particularly the weavers.

Originally, the Waldenses did not plan to secede from the church. But their free reading of the Gospel and their lay preachings, their disagreement with Catholicism in understanding the mysteries of transubstantiation, as well as their militant character, compelled the official authorities, the clergy, to start a campaign of cruel persecution against them. Pope Sixtus IV even declared a crusade against them in 1477. Those persecutions continued down to the Eighteenth Century. In 1685, French and Italian armies killed 3,000 Waldenses and captured 1,000. Only in 1848 did they attain civil rights and religious freedom in Piedmont and Savoy. Italian Waldenses are to be found even at present in the Alpine valleys, Val-Martino, Val-Angrona. The Twentieth Century finds 46 communities of Waldenses with 6,276 parishioners.

The Evangelist communism of the Waldenses in the Middle Ages was of a monklike character. For the "perfect" members of their community they made communism and celibacy obligatory. The "disciples," however, were allowed to marry and

to possess property. The Waldenses rejected military service and the oath. They devoted their attention to the education of the masses. In those communities of the Waldenses where the peasants and the middle class prevailed, they turned into a bourgeois-democratic sect. Where the proletarian elements prevailed, the Waldenses became communist "dreamers."—*Ed.*

4. *Arnold of Brescia* made the first serious attempt to reform the Catholic Church as early as the middle of the Twelfth Century. Arnold of Brescia was born between 1100 and 1110 in Brescia, Italy. A disciple of the theologian and philosopher, Abelard, he adopted his critical attitude towards the religious dogmas and the teachings of the fathers. In 1136, he participated, with his native city, Brescia, in its struggle against its lord, the bishop. Arnold of Brescia strove to bring the clergy back to the real Christianity of the Gospel. He demanded that the clergy should relinquish lay authority and should hand over its possessions to the lay rulers. The clergymen who preached must content themselves with the tithe and voluntary contributions, he said. At the second Lateran church council (1139), the Bishop of Brescia accused him of heresy. Arnold of Brescia was compelled to flee to Paris. In 1146, he returned to Rome, where he participated in the struggle between the city democracy and the pope.

Rome in the middle of the Twelfth Century was a spiritual and political centre whither material wealth was flowing from all sections of the Christian world. The popes ably exploited the favourable situation of the Christian capital. Arnold of Brescia appealed to the people to depose the pope and to restore the ancient Roman republic. Pope Hadrian IV, however, succeeded in expelling him from the city. He was taken prisoner by Emperor Frederick Barbarossa and extradited to the authorities of Rome. He was hanged as a rabid heretic, and his body was burned (1155).—*Ed.*

5. *The Albigenses*, a religious sect of southern France, were widespread in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries. Their name was derived from the city of Albi in Languedoc, one of the most important centres of the moment. The Albigenses preached apostolic Christianity and simple life according to the Gospel. They were called the "good men." The pope and the councils of the church claimed that they denied the Trinity doctrine, the Holy Communion and marriage, as well as the doctrine of the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. At the council of Toulouse (1119), Pope Calixtus II, and subsequently in 1139 Pope Innocent II, excommunicated them. Finally, in 1209, Pope Innocent III organised a crusade against them. The war covered twenty years.

The stubbornness of the bloody fight against the Albigenses is explained partly by the fact that the Albigenses were aided in their war against the pope by the local feudal lords of southern France. When a papal legate and inquisitor was killed on the territory of Count Raymond VI of Toulouse, Pope Innocent III decided to use this occurrence as the occasion for taking away the lands from Count Raymond,

who maintained a tolerant attitude towards the heretics. A struggle ensued between the lords of southern France and the pope, who was supported by the lords of the north. Northern France was in conflict with the south, which being economically more developed was, therefore, a menace to it. The northern armies were headed by Count Simon de Montfort and papal legates. When the armies of the north took the city of Beziers, they killed 20,000 Albigenses. In the course of the ensuing struggle hundreds of thousands fell. The provinces of Provence and Languedoc were devastated. Peace was concluded only as late as 1229. In consequence of the wars against the Albigenses the wealthy south was destroyed and the territories of the French crown were expanded.—Ed

6. *John Wycliffe* (born October, 1320, died 1384), an English reformer. One of those ideologists who, even prior to the Reformation (Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries), drew an outline of the coming reforms. John Wycliffe was a professor of Oxford University. Prior to his appearance on the social and political arena, he devoted himself entirely to research work in the fields of physics, logic and philosophy. The Fourteenth Century was an epoch of stubborn fighting between the royal power of England and the pope. The pope exploited England cruelly. In the Thirteenth Century, the English kingdom paid to the pope a yearly tribute of 1,000 pounds of silver. Under Edward III (Fourteenth Century), Parliament complained that the country was paying the pope a sum five times the amount of the taxes paid to the king. The development of industry and commerce increased the resisting power of England. The struggle between Rome and England was deepened by the Hundred Years' War between England and France (1339-1456). This was affected the interests of all classes of the English people. The governing classes of England sought possession of the treasuries of Netherland, and they also looked with a covetous eye on the riches of the French nobility. The middle-class saw in this war a means of enrichment. The burden of the war fell primarily upon the peasantry. It is not surprising, therefore, that the pope, having become an ally of France, aroused universal hatred in England. In 1336, Parliament abolished the tribute to the pope. Heresies persecuted in Italy and France now spread to England. Wycliffe's preachings were popular among all the strata of the people. He taught that in case of necessity the State had a right to deprive the Church of its possessions, that power was based upon service, and that consequently only service could justify the levying of taxes and duties by the clergy. In 1374, in disputes with the representatives of the Roman court, Wycliffe disclosed also the abuses of the Roman Church in appointing candidates to ecclesiastical posts in England. He was severely persecuted by the clergy, and only the interference of the court, and the intervention of the university and the cities, saved him.

.. In his doctrines, Wycliffe never overstepped the boundaries

laid down by the ruling classes. He preached poverty and equality in Christ, but only for the clergy. He proposed that their lands should be expropriated; but this was entirely in the interests of the landowners and the king. The relations between man and God, Wycliffe pictured in the image of the feudal relations of his time. Man holds all his possessions, he said, from God. God's mercy is the condition of this vassalage. Mortal sin deprives man, he preached, of his right to hold possessions by the mercy of God. Therefore, he said, the clergy should have common property, and should submit to civil jurisdiction. The supreme judge of the human conscience, he said, was not the pope, but God.

After the peasant insurrection of 1381, a general sympathy for Wycliffe in his struggle against the pope changed into a hatred on the part of the propertied classes. Oxford University condemned his Twelve Articles, which rejected the doctrine of transubstantiation. Wycliffe died in peace, but his doctrines were cruelly persecuted. In 1415, the church council at Constance decided to burn his remains—Ed.

7. With the name of *John Huss* is connected the struggle against the Catholic Church in Bohemia, the so-called Hussite movement of the Fifteenth Century. During the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries, the Roman Catholic Church had lost its authority among the masses of the people. The Roman pope was, in the eyes of all peoples, an exploiter who deprived them of earthly goods in the name of God and heavenly life. In England, France and Spain, the Church was assuming a national character, severing its relations with Rome. The exception was Germany, which became the object of the avaricious appetite of the pope. If the other countries were in a more favourable condition, if they were earlier in a position to free themselves from under the papal yoke, it is to be explained only by the development of capitalism, the growth of wealth, and the power of the middle-class and the princes. Of all Germany, only Bohemia was, in this respect, in an exceptional situation. Bohemia developed economically in the Fourteenth Century with incredible rapidity because of its silver mines. The Church and the king with his court, as well as the merchants and the artisans, received enormous profits. The pope and the emperor were keenly watching Bohemia lest it free itself from their dependence. Dissatisfaction had begun to gather in the country. The lower nobility, the peasantry and the middle-class were dissatisfied. A price revolution, due to the abundance of silver, caused a general dearth. Besides, the masses of the people in Bohemia were Czechs, while the exploiting upper layer, the lay and ecclesiastical authorities, were Germans. Therefore the class struggle here assumed the character of a religious and national struggle of the Bohemians against the Germans and the pope. In this revolutionary medium, the ideas of the English reformist, Wycliffe, penetrated into Bohemia. John Huss was the literary defender and propounder of Wycliffe's ideas.

Huss was born in 1369, in a well-to-do peasant family. He

was professor, and at one time rector, in the then famous Prague University, and also preacher in the Chapel of Bethlehem, where services were held in the Czech language. When the Prague University took a stand against the forty-five theses of Wycliffe, Huss came to their defence (1409). In 1412, Pope John XXIII, being in need of money, organised the sale of indulgences in Prague. Huss came forth with a heated sermon against the corruption of the Church, and demanded the termination of the traffic. He also opposed "miracles." In a special treatise, Huss proved that true Christians needed no miracles, and that true faith was contained only in the Holy Scriptures. Huss asserted that the Church was only an assembly of the faithful destined for Heaven, whereby he provoked the hatred of the ruling clique, who saw in the Church the dominance of the higher clergy.

On June 6, 1410, the books of Huss were burned, and he was excommunicated. In 1414, the Church council at Constance accused him of heresy, and though Huss declared that he wished to receive guidance and instruction from the princes of the Church as to wherein his opinions differed from the Word of God, he was turned over to the authorities and burned at the stake (June 6, 1415). His ashes were thrown into the Rhine—Ed

8. *Hussites* (Taborites and Calixtines). The execution of John Huss set a revolution afoot in Bohemia. All the classes of the Bohemian people arrayed themselves against the power of the pope—for a church reform, and against the Germans—for national independence. In this nationalist religious struggle the masses of the people revealed their social hatred for the propertied classes. At the beginning, however, all classes of Bohemia acted in unison. The slogan of the struggle was the demand for communion under two forms. The rites of the Catholic Church gave to the layman in communion bread alone, and to the priests bread and wine. The masses rising against the privileges of the Church demanded equality in communion. "A chalice for the layman!"—that was the slogan of the movement. The nobility which joined the movement used this struggle to annex the lands of the Church; and the clergy held no less than one-quarter of the kingdom's territory. The rich bourgeoisie saw in the Hussite war also a means of gaining more riches from the clergy and the possessions of the German Catholic cities (Kuttenberg, with its famous silver mines was the most desirable of all). The nobility and the rich Bohemian bourgeoisie that joined the Hussite movement formed the moderate party of the *Calixtines* or *Utraquists*. Their centre was the city of Prague. Side by side with this moderate movement, however, there existed also a democratic one. Its bulk was formed by the peasants who wished to be free owners of the land, especially after the nobility had appropriated the land of the clergy. The lower middle-class of the cities and the proletarians were with the peasants. They were concentrated in the smaller cities of Bohemia. The democratic elements later began to call them-

selves Taborites after the name of their military and political centre, the communist city of Tabor. The Hussite movement was now headed by a group of communists

In 1414,, the people drove King Wenceslaus out of Prague, after which heretics began to flow into Bohemia from all parts of Europe

The Beghards and the Waldenses found in Bohemia a refuge from persecution. The communists fortified themselves in Tabor where they started their propaganda. They declared that the Millennium of Christ had come, that there would be no more servants and masters, and that the people would return to the state of pristine innocence. In various cities, particularly in Tabor, the insurgents began to organise communist centres. Tabor was located in the vicinity of gold mines. Commerce and industry flourished there. When the communists became strong in Tabor they attracted large masses of the people. It is said that one gathering numbered 42,000 (July 22, 1419). The inhabitants of Tabor called each other brother and sister, and recognised no difference between "thine" and "mine". The Taborites taught that "there should be no kings, no masters, no subjects on earth, and that taxes and duties should be abolished". According to their doctrine there was to be no coercion, everything was to belong to all, and therefore, they said, he who possesses property commits a mortal sin. This communism, however, was of a Christian nature. It was a communism of consumption, not production. Every family worked for itself, contributing its surplus to the general treasury. There were among the Taborites the most extreme communists, who allowed no concessions, and denied the family. Those "brothers and sisters of the free spirit" called themselves Adamites. The majority of the inhabitants of Tabor and the knights, under the leadership of Zizka, launched a struggle against the Adamites.

The communist community of Tabor was surprisingly well organised. As a military community it alarmed the German princes for a long while. The Taborites represented the first regular army, and they were the first to use artillery in battle. That the Taborites could hold their own for almost a generation is explained by their attention to education, by the order and discipline in their community. Tabor fell, due, mainly, to a split among the Hussites. The moderate Calixtines, having appropriated the land of the clergy, did not wish to recognise the supremacy of Tabor. The war of the Taborites against the king, the pope, and all of Europe, was not in the interests of the nobility. After the victory of the Taborites at Taus (1431), it seemed that there was no enemy capable of coping with them. But the Calixtines started negotiations with the enemy. They decided to call to a Diet all barons, knights, and representatives of the cities, to discuss a plan for a state organisation. Tabor itself was divided. The lower middle-class and the peasantry were indifferent to the communist programme. They wanted peace. Tabor's communism was not stable. It had not the foundation of communist pro-

duction, therefore equality of the means of subsistence soon disappeared. There were both rich and poor in Tabor.

The army of Tabor was being overcrowded by "crooks and riff-raff of all nations." As soon as the nobility began to recruit soldiers for a war against Tabor, offering better conditions than the communist community, treason crept into the ranks of the Taborite army, and wholesale desertion began. This explains the fall of Tabor. On May 30, 1434, the Taborites suffered a crushing defeat near Czeski Brod. Out of 18,000 Taborite soldiers, 13,000 were killed. In 1437, they were compelled to conclude a treaty with Sigismund, who guaranteed them the independence of Tabor. But in spite of this the communist community of Tabor soon disappeared.—Ed.

9. *Scourging Friars (Flagellants)*—a sect of people who whip themselves. It appeared in Europe as early as the Eleventh Century, and became widespread in the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries. From Italy, the movement spread through southern France, Netherlands, Alsace and Lorraine. The Flagellants taught that it was possible to obtain absolution from sin by inflicting sufferings on one's body. One of the first ecclesiastical theorists of this sect, George VII, taught that in this way the faithful emulated Christ, laboured to obtain a martyr's crown, deadened and castigated their flesh, and expiated their sins. This doctrine was in line with the prevailing asceticism of the Middle Ages, which demanded of the faithful to harden and torture their bodies by fasting, poor clothing, etc., in the name of Christ. The Flagellant movement, however, assumed the character of an epidemic, of a mass psychosis. Thus, in the Thirteenth Century, bands of people marched through the cities of Italy, whipping themselves with straps and lashes, and praying for absolution. After the devastating epidemic of the "Black Death," the movement assumed a dangerous character. In many localities of Germany, France and Flanders, Flagellants in mortal terror, imagining that Christ was about to destroy the world for the sins of mankind, inflicted cruel punishment upon themselves. In German cities, Flagellant communities began to come into existence. "Those desirous of partaking of self-castigation had to pay a small fee, and this was all demanded of proselytes." In the Fifteenth Century, the movement weakened, but it did not disappear. The Flagellants of the Fifteenth Century spoke evil of the monks and demanded a series of church reforms. The Roman Church, which at the beginning had not opposed the movement since, in Italy, it was anti-imperial and therefore, a means of strengthening the Church, began to persecute the Flagellants. In the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, the movement became fashionable at court. Sex elements began to dominate in it. Traces of this sect can be found even in the Nineteenth Century.—Ed.

10. *The Lollards* were a religious sect widespread among the working population of England in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries. The heresies of those times found favourable ground not only among the master classes. As a matter

of fact, every class formulated its demands through the reform movement. Thus, among the poorest weavers of England the sect of *Beghards*, or, as they were commonly called in England, *Lollards*, came into existence. (The *Lollards* were funeral chanters). The *Beghards* first appeared in the Netherlands (Flanders and Brabant), in a country where commerce and industry had progressed earlier than in the rest of Europe and where sheep-breeding and the woollen industry were highly developed. The sect of *Beghards* was in most cases a fraternity of weavers. Unmarried artisans belonging to the sect lived in common houses, where they kept a communist household. The movement started in England when the weavers of Flanders migrated into that country. Norfolk, the centre of the woollen industry, became also the centre of the movement of the English *Beghards*, the *Lollards*. The *Lollard* propagandists, called "poor brothers," spread the new doctrine over the country. Errant "poor ministers" preached to the people that lay and ecclesiastical possessions should be common property. They urged the people to pay neither dues nor tithes to the clergy, and appealed to the servants to refuse to work for the masters. In 1395, the *Lollards* petitioned Parliament, demanding a reform of the Anglican Church, abolition of its worldly possessions and celibacy. The petition was rejected.

The most outstanding representative of the *Lollards* was John Ball, the mad minister of Kent. Coming from the ranks of the Franciscan monks who sympathised with the *Lollard* movement, he became one of the leaders of the peasant uprising of 1381 in England. Beginning with 1356, John Ball preached mainly in Essex and in Norfolk, delivering his sermons in city squares and cemeteries. They became very popular. He preached common property, and urged the people to exterminate the nobility. Only then, he said, would people be equal, and the masters would be no higher than the rest. All men originated from Adam and Eve, he said. "When Adam dolt and Eve span, who was then the gentleman?" he queried. He was killed during the suppression of the revolt in 1381.

The *Lollard* movement gained in importance when it became connected with the peasant uprising and with the opposition movement of the middle-class in the cities. After 1381, the *Lollards* found themselves in a precarious situation. Every *Lollard* was considered a criminal and treated accordingly. Terrorist acts against the sect continued for a long while, but it did not disappear from the lower strata of the working population, as is proven by pamphlets appearing even at the end of the Fourteenth and the beginning of the Fifteenth Century. "The Ploughman's Prayer" and "The Lanthorne of Light." The *Lollards* spread among the people a knowledge of the Bible in the English language.—Ed.

11. *Chilastic dreams, Chiliasm*—the doctrine of the second coming of Christ and the Millennium on earth. This Millennium was pictured as one thousand years of joy and



happness. All sufferings and privations, the adherents of this doctrine said, would disappear, and perfect harmony between mankind and rejuvenated nature, would be re-established. The dreams of a Millennium became widespread in the Middle Ages, in years of elemental sufferings and socio-political cataclysms, in more quiet epochs, Chiliasm was the doctrine of small insignificant sects. Large masses of people were fired with Chilastic dreams during the persecutions of the Christians in the Tenth Century, because the end of the world was expected to come in the year of Christ 1000. More widespread, however, were the Chilastic dreams in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries, in the Reformation period. A back-to-the-Gospel movement, religious unrest, coupled with an increasing exploitation of the working population, were fertile soil for Chilastic visions. Thomas Muenzer, the Anabaptists, and the Taborites, all paid tribute to the mystic doctrine of the Millennium.

Social conditions prevailing in the Middle Ages created an atmosphere favourable for mysticism. The ignorance of the masses nurtured it. Besides, Chiliasm, belief in miracles, and mystic visions were an outlet at a time when the masses saw no way of improving their condition by their own efforts. Only a miracle could, in their opinion, overthrow all oppressors and exploiters. The masses were driven to believe in the miracle of the second coming of Christ, in order that they should not sink into despair.—Ed.

12. With the name *Martin Luther* is connected the history of the religious and socio-political transformation of the Germany of the Sixteenth Century, the history of the so-called Reformation. Luther was not the initiator of that movement. His activities and doctrines by no means cover the social history of the Reformation. In the revolutionary movement of the Sixteenth Century, he was the representative of the coalition of the middle-class and the nobility.

From the Fourteenth to the Sixteenth Century, trade capital transformed the old natural economy of the European peoples, and rendered superfluous the political system of feudalism. The victory of absolutism became an economic necessity. On the other hand, development of commercial capital induced the masters to increase the exploitation of the peasants. Freeing the peasants from the feudal yoke, the masters increased their burdens, substituting cash payments for manual labour and payments in kind. The peasants were being driven off the land, and thus the nucleus of the future proletarian class was formed. This incipient proletariat was utilised by the army commanders and the merchants, by the former as material for the armies, by the latter as workers in their manufacturing. In a period of economic revolution, feudal nobility became a hindrance to historic development. The lower nobility, the knights, took an intermediary position between the peasantry and the high nobility. The knighthood attempted to halt its own imminent ruin. In Germany, the struggle of these two class groupings was complicated by the

peculiarities of German economic development. At the beginning of the Sixteenth Century, Germany, because of its mines and commerce, was still a powerful country economically. But the economic centre of Europe soon moved from the Mediterranean basin to the coast of the Atlantic. The development of Germany, as of all Eastern Europe, became stagnant. Under these circumstances well-established social and political conditions were either breaking down or changing radically. For a century Europe was shaken by terrific wars and revolutions. The exploitation on the part of the Roman Church was most keenly felt in Germany. The monasteries and the princes of the Church exploited the peasantry and the cities to the point of ruin. The middle-classes protested against the aid that the monasteries gave to the poor, because it limited them in their exploitation of the masses.

The Roman Church found a lucrative source of income in the sale of church offices and especially in the sale of the so-called indulgences—absolution for cash. The princes of the Church exploited the people in their own realm, as did the feudal land owners and the capitalist merchants in theirs. A struggle against the Roman Church became inevitable. But while England and France, economically more advanced than Germany, soon succeeded in freeing themselves from papal rule, Germany required a long and stubborn struggle.

In Germany, all classes of the population suffered gravely under papal exploitation, but each formulated its own programme. Luther's propaganda was the centre which originally united, first, the knighthood struggling against the princes, second, the lower clergy and the peasantry struggling against the princes of the Church and the feudal barons, and, third, the city middle-class chafing under the rule of the city aristocracy, the patricians.

Luther was born November 10, 1483, in a peasant family. His father worked in the mines. In 1501, he entered Erfurt University where he led a very gay life in the circles of the Humanists, those advocates of radical ideas. In 1505, he entered a monastery, and, as every good Catholic, went to see the pope. In 1509, Luther gave a course of lectures in the Wittenberg University. In 1517, when Tetzel, the representative of Pope Leo X, opened a sale of indulgences in Saxony, Luther hung out on the doors of the Wittenberg chapel, his ninety-five theses against indulgences. His first protest against the Roman Church was very timid. Luther protested against corruption. Thesis 21 read "Advocates of indulgences are mistaken when they say that through papal absolution a man is freed of all punishment." Thesis 27 "It is nonsense to preach that as soon as the penny jingles in the box, the soul leaves purgatory." Luther was surprised at the effect of his theses. He gave impetus to a movement which had started before him, and it engulfed all classes of Germany. Three groups became engaged in the struggle: the Catholic conservatives, the middle-class reformists, and the plebeian revolutionists. As a leader of the middle-class reformist movement, Luther at first

appealed to violence, to the use of fire and iron for the extermination of the cancer that, he said, was destroying the world. He called for a decisive struggle against the lay and clerical princes. Between 1517 and 1522, Luther was ready to enter an alliance with the democratic factions. Between 1522 and 1525, however, he betrayed his allies, the peasantry and the lower clergy. His change was due to the Anabaptists in Zwickau and the peasant movement. He was also influenced by the uprising of the knighthood (Autumn, 1522).

At the head of the uprising of the knighthood were *Franz von Sickingen* and *Ulrich von Hutten*. The former was the commander, and the latter the ideologist of the movement. Their hatred for the pope and the princes and their striving for the reconstruction of a united Germany made them, by the middle of the Sixteenth Century, the heroes of the German bourgeoisie. In substance, however, the movement of united knighthood in a society where capitalism had begun to develop, was reactionary. Sickingen and Hutten dreamed of a renewed mediaeval state where power was in the hands of the nobles and the emperor was their subject. They never aimed at freeing the cities or the peasantry, though they were compelled to appeal to them for aid. In the summer of 1522, Franz von Sickingen led troops against the "priestly nest" of Trier. But the armies of the united Rhenish and Suabian princes dealt him a decisive blow. Many castles were destroyed and many knights perished. Luther did not support that movement, but condemned it as well as that of the peasants.

In his first works, where he called the princes "the greatest fools on earth and the most heinous scoundrels," and in his first appeals relative to the Peasant War, Luther defended the insurgents. He wrote, for instance, "It is not the peasants who arose against you masters, but God himself, who wishes to punish you for your evil doings." Luther hoped to find in the peasant movement a support for his struggle against Rome. But when, in April and May, the peasantry revolted all over the country, burning and destroying castles, the movement assuming a communist character, Luther defended the princes against the insurgent peasants. He attributed the movement to the peasants' easy life. He urged the princes to "strangle them as you would mad dogs." When the insurrection was quelled, he bragged that he "had killed the peasants because he had given the orders to kill." "All their blood is upon me," he said.

An alliance was established between Luther and the princes, who were well satisfied with the acquisition of the church estates. The Reformation was profitable both to them and to the insurgents of the big cities. In 1526, at a Diet session in Speyer, it was for the first time decreed that the subject must follow the faith of his master. This saved the princes, who openly joined Luther. It is true that in 1529 Catholic services were reinstated and the confiscation of the lands of the clergy was halted in the provinces of the Lutheran princes, but the Lutheran minority protested against this decision—

hence the name *Protestants*. In 1530, at a Diet session in Augsburg, the Protestant princes submitted to Emperor Charles V the so-called *Augsburg Confession* of the Lutherans. It consisted of two parts, the first giving an exposition of the new faith, and the second condemning the corruption of the Roman Church and outlining the necessary reforms.

"We reject those," says the Augsburg Confession, "who preach that absolutism can be reached, not by faith, but by good deeds." Man can find favour in the eyes of God, says the document, only by the word of God and by the guidance of the Holy Spirit. We must not, it says, confuse the authority of the State with the authority of the pope, the Church has the power to preach the Gospel and to perform rites, but it should not participate in the affairs of the State.

The publication of the Augsburg Confession was not the end of the struggle. In September, 1555, at the Augsburg Diet, the so-called Augsburg Religious Peace confirmed the decision of 1526 relative to the obligation of the subjects to follow the faith of their masters. This decision made it obvious that Germany was to remain dismembered, under the rule of the princes.

Lutherism became the religion of the economically backward countries. It spread in northern and western Germany, Denmark and Sweden, where the princes, the bishops and the landlords became the protectors of the Lutheran Church. But even this partial reform could succeed only as a result of the revolutionary movement of the peasantry, the cities and the knighthood.—*Ed.*

13. *Joachim of Floris* (of Calabria) was an Italian mystic of the Twelfth Century. His doctrine of the *eternal gospel* is known under the name of Joachimism. In his conception, the Apocalypse teaches us that the world passes through three ages, the age of the Law, or of the Father, the age of the Gospel or of the Son, and the age of the Spirit, which will bring the ages to an end. The first age, he said, corresponds to the Old Testament, the rule of lay authority, of external law and the preponderance of the flesh. The second age marks the predominance of the clergy, and the combination of spiritual and material interests. This, he said, was the age he lived in. The third age, he prophesied, would soon come and would be marked by a dominance of the spirit over the flesh, the monks becoming the ruling power, and the eternal gospel being the law of the world. Joachim denied that humanity was saved by Christ.

Joachim was of an urban family. Stricken by the horrors of the plague epidemic, he became a monk and founded the monastery of San Giovanni in Fiore. He wrote two books *The Concordance Between the New and the Old Testaments* and *Commentary on the Apocalypse*. Several decades later (1260), the Joachimites were cursed by the pope and severely persecuted.—*Ed.*

14. *Nicolas Storch* was a cloth-maker in Zwickau, where he became famous by preaching religious communism. Thomas

Muenzer was under his influence and asserted that he knew the Bible better than all priests combined. In a short time, a whole community, which counted twelve apostles in its midst, gathered around Storch. His disciples believed that the truth was given to him in holy revelations. On May 16, 1521, the community of Zwickau invited a new preacher, Nicolas Hausmann of Schneeberg, a devoted friend of Luther's, and thus Storch's activities met with a stubborn opposition. He was expelled from the city, and went to the city of Wittenberg, where the "Zwickau prophets" hoped to find support in Carlstadt, a former co-worker of Luther. But they were compelled to flee to southern Germany where Storch dreamed of establishing the kingdom of God on earth. A holy revelation, he said, made clear to him the true paths of social reformation. In 1522, Storch settled in Thuringia, where he became one of the initiators and leaders of the Peasant War. In collaboration with Muenzer, Pfeifer and others, he composed a programme of demands, which declared property to belong to all alike, since God had created all men equally bare and had given to them everything on the land, in the water and under the sky. All officers, lay and ecclesiastical alike, the programme said, must be removed from their offices, or killed. Every man could freely preach the law of God, as every one had a free will and was able to accept the good and reject the evil. Storch died in Munich in 1525.—*Ed*

15. *Gyorgy Dozsa*—leader of the peasant insurrection of the Sixteenth Century in Hungary. At that time, the struggle between the absolute power of the king and the feudal lords of Hungary still continued. After the death of King Matthias, who, supported by the people, had conducted a successful struggle against the feudal lords, the latter regained the upper hand under Uladislaus, and abolished all the reforms of King Matthias including the standing army. The country was suffering under the struggles of the feudal lords. In 1514, the pope declared a new crusade against the Mohammedans Gyorgy Dozsa, who had become famous as a warrior in the fight against the Turks, was offered the post of commander. Within twenty days he gathered a people's militia numbering 60,000 men. Dozsa was the head of military operations. He was accompanied by two priests, who aroused the soldiers, peasants and city folks by their sermons. The feudal lords were loth to let their servants join the crusade, and, as harvest time was approaching, they demanded their return. In reply, Dozsa and the priests appealed to the people to rebel. The peasants arose all over Hungary, and the war with the feudal barons began. The situation of the peasantry in Hungary of that time was less intolerable than it was in the other countries, but having a little more freedom in Hungary, the peasants felt more keenly the yoke of serfdom. Incessant wars with the Turks were ruining the country; the population was being enormously depleted, and the peasants found themselves in a position to force upon the feudal lords a number of concessions. The peasants, however, being skilled in the art of war, hoped for

full liberation. The lower clergy of the villages, hating the princes of the Church, joined the peasants. But they, along with the city middle-class, which also joined the peasant movement, soon betrayed it.

The leaders of the peasant uprising (1514) preached that the nobles were a criminal class which had enslaved the body and the soul of the peasant. They encouraged the destruction of the houses and the castles of the lords. Gyorgy Dozsa, who had taught the peasants the use of arms, called them to rise all over the country. An army of feudal barons under John Zapolya moved against him. This army, aided by the city middle-class and the nobility, the former allies of the peasants, suppressed the movement cruelly. Gyorgy Dozsa offered long and stubborn resistance. He proclaimed a republic declaring the power of the king and the privileged classes abolished. Notwithstanding the sympathy of the peasant masses throughout the country, Gyorgy Dozsa was defeated at Temesvar. His execution was a refined torture. He was placed on a red hot iron throne, his head was adorned with a red hot iron crown, and a red hot iron sceptre was forced into his hand. Dozsa's only exclamation was: "These hounds!" No less than 60,000 peasants were killed in this uprising. The lords in Diet assembled, decided to increase the burden of the peasantry and declared serfdom a perpetual institution—Ed.

16. *The War of the Roses*—(1455-1485). After the termination of the Hundred Years' War between England and France (1339-1450) and after the English armies were compelled to evacuate France, a bloody war started between the two dynasties, Lancaster and York, which lasted over thirty years. The Lancaster dynasty, with a red rose as its emblem, represented the interests of the large feudal masters in the Wales and in the north where their large estates were located. The York dynasty, with a white rose as its emblem, depended on the commercial southeast, the city population, the peasants and the House of Commons. The stubborn feud between the two dynasties was to decide whether England would become an absolute monarchy in case of the victory of the York dynasty, or whether it would be divided among the feudal masters with the victory of the Lancaster dynasty.

As early as the Fourteenth Century, large land possessions concentrated in the hands of a few noble families. In the Fifteenth Century, the House of Lords counted only one-third of its old members. The surviving dynasties annexed the land of those families that had disappeared. When the Hundred Years' War was over, the army was disbanded and the former soldiers taken into the service of the feudal masters. In the second half of the Fifteenth Century, the war between the two dynasties began. In the battle of Northampton (1460), York captured the king and compelled the House of Lords to recognise him as the protector of the state and the heir to the throne. He was defeated by the army of the hostile dynasty, but his son Edward returned to London victorious (1461). Edward's armies dealt mercilessly with the nobility. In the Taunton

battle, forty-two knights and two lords were executed, while Warwick, one of Edward's commanders, saw to it that little harm was done to the Commons.

The ascension to the throne of Edward IV, that is, the victory of the White Rose, marked the beginning of the period of absolutism. Edward IV did not raise the question of his election by the English Parliament. He expelled all feudal masters, even his closest friends who opposed his will (his fight against Warwick, "the maker of kings") In his struggle against the feudal masters he used hired armies, thus making the feudal militia superfluous. He cruelly annihilated the adherents of the Lancaster dynasty. To make his victory secure, he refused to make new compulsory loans and to secure the aid of the peasantry he demanded of Parliament laws prohibiting the dispossession of peasants. Thus the War of the Roses strengthened absolutism in England.—Ed

## REVOLUTION IN SPAIN

### EDITOR'S FOREWORD

THIS volume contains the writings of Marx and Engels on revolutionary struggles in nineteenth-century Spain.

In the summer of 1854 a rebellion broke out in the Spanish army. It developed swiftly into a revolution, which spread throughout the country. This conflict occurred during a period of dark reaction on the continent. For the first time since the defeat of the revolutions of 1848, Europe beheld barricades and stormy demonstrations of the people—this time in the streets of Madrid and Barcelona.

Marx and Engels watched the development of the Spanish situation intently. Realizing its importance, Marx—who was living in London at the time—did not confine himself to merely observing the events which were taking place, but made a detailed examination of the historical background of the Peninsula since the sixteenth century. With great care, he studied the history of the popular revolts in the first half of the nineteenth century. In a letter dated September 2, 1854, he informed Engels of his progress:

My principal study now is Spain. So far, mainly from Spanish sources, I have been hard at work on the epoch from 1808 to 1814 and from 1820 to 1823. Now I am going on to the period from 1834 to 1843. It is a pretty confused history. It is even harder to trace the causes of the developments.... The whole thing, when greatly condensed, should make approximately six articles for the *Tribune*.\*

As a result of his research, Marx wrote nine articles. Eight of them were published in the *New York Daily Tribune* between September and December, 1854, under the title "Revolutionary Spain"† This series, which opens the present volume, is a penetrating analysis of the peculiarities of modern Spanish history.

The first section deals with the unique mode of decay of feudal society in the countries on the Peninsula. Here Marx

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\*Marx and Engels, *Gesamtausgabe* (Collected Works), Dritte Abteilung, Band 2, p. 51 (1930).

†The ninth article, dealing with Spanish events during the year 1833, was not published. See Karl Marx, *Chronik Seines Lebens* (*The Chronology of His Life*), p. 148 (1934).



supplies an answer to one of the puzzles of Spanish history. "But how are we to account for the singular phenomenon that . . . in the very country, where of all the feudal states absolute monarchy first arose in its most unmitigated form, centralization has never succeeded in taking root?" Marx asks; and his answer supplies one of the keys to the development of modern Spain. He then goes on to show how, during Napoleon's invasion (1808-1814), this very incompleteness in the process of centralization—one of the sources and symptoms of Spain's weakness—operated against the French invaders. Napoleon learned from bitter experience that if "the Spanish State was dead, Spanish society was full of life, and every part of it overflowing with powers of resistance"; that, moreover, "the centre of Spanish resistance was nowhere and everywhere"

Marx depicts the dual character of the great popular movement of 1808-1814. The ruling classes deserted ignominiously to the invaders, and Napoleon thought that Spain was at his feet. But when he had overthrown the old dynasty, and thereby weakened the chains that hampered the revolutionary movement of the masses, Napoleon suddenly found himself face to face with the infuriated people, and saw his glorified army powerless against the peasant masses of the country

Invincible in the struggle against the foreign invaders, the Spanish people became the victim of internal treachery. Having no leadership of their own, the masses fell in behind the nobles, the prelates, the juntas of landlords and bourgeoisie, who were more afraid of the people than they were of the invading army. As Marx says, the Central junta "not satisfied with hanging as a deadweight on the Spanish revolution . . . actually worked in the sense of the counter-revolution, by re-establishing the ancient authorities, by forging anew the chains which had been broken, by stifling the revolutionary fire wherever it broke out, by themselves doing nothing and by preventing others from doing anything"

Thus, in 1814, the people of Spain found themselves back in the old yoke. Furthermore, the newly-restored "order" was guarded by the Holy Alliance, which was stamping out every spark of the revolutionary movement in Europe. But the power of revolutionary resistance was so great that the Spanish people, unafraid of their own or of the foreign hangmen, raised the standard of revolt again in 1820.

The initiative came from the army, however, as Marx

emphasizes, Riego's military mutiny would have collapsed had it not been supported by revolutionary action of the masses. But again, international counter-revolution came to the rescue of the feudal-aristocratic clique. Spain was invaded by an army of a hundred thousand French interventionists who, with the support of tsarist Russia, occupied Madrid and suppressed the revolution. As Marx observed in a letter to Engels: "For ten years, he [Chateaubriand, the French Minister], together with his friend Alexander [the Russian Tsar], left Spain in the biggest cesspool in which she had ever been."<sup>4</sup>

But reaction and intervention could only postpone the next revolutionary outbreak. In 1834 Spain once more became an arena of revolutionary conflict. This new stage of the struggle for freedom is dealt with in Marx's brilliant article, "Espana," included in this volume. Marx mercilessly dissects Espana, whose role was to "pour oil on the troubled waters" of revolution and restrain the masses. Fearing the revolt of the people, Espana capitulated to the extreme reactionaries, and in 1843 the dismal night of reaction descended upon Spain, this time for a whole decade.

## II

THEN occurred the revolutionary eruption of 1854. Marx was reporting European events for the *Tribune* at this time, and he included articles and notes on the Spanish situation. His contributions, made during the summer and autumn of the year, were written on the heels of the events which they describe.

Once more the army had given the signal for revolt; but as soon as the first details became known in London, Marx wrote: " . little surprise ought to be felt, if a general movement should now arise in the Peninsula from a mere military rebellion. . . " A few days later Marx was able to report that the military rebellion had received the support of a popular uprising; and that the masses, unlike their actions in 1843, were proceeding more independently, the army playing a minor part in deciding the course of events.

Yet the revolutionary movement of 1854 shared the same fate as its predecessors. "The barricades were scarcely removed at Madrid, at the request of Espana," Marx wrote,

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<sup>4</sup>*Collected Works, op. cit.*, p. 62

"before the counter-revolution was busy at work."

Marx and Engels attached great international significance to the Spanish events of this year. To quote Engels :

Whatever may be the real character and the end of the Spanish rising, so much at least may be affirmed, that it bears to a future revolution the same relation as the Swiss and Italian movements of 1847 to the revolution of 1848. There are two grand facts in it: first, the military, the actual rulers of the continent since 1849, have got divided among themselves, and have given up their calling of preserving order.. Secondly, we have had the spectacle of a successful barricade fight. Wherever barricades had been raised since June, 1848, they had hitherto proved of no avail. Barricades, the resistance of the population of a large town against the military, seemed of no effect whatever. That prejudice has fallen. We have again seen victorious, unassailable barricades. The spell is broken. A new revolutionary era is rendered possible ..\*

Early in August, 1856, two leading articles by Marx, entitled "The Revolution in Spain," dealing with the new outbreak, appeared in the *Tribune*. They were a continuation of the series published in 1854, in them Marx disclosed the basic peculiarities of the Spanish revolution of the 'fifties and, at the same time, the basic causes of its defeat.

A proletarian socialist revolution was, of course, out of the question in Spain. As Marx says, "The social question in the modern sense of the word [had] no foundation" in the country. Spain was faced with a bourgeois-democratic revolution, in which the agrarian question was paramount. But the Spanish bourgeoisie did not assume the leadership of the masses, who were extremely oppressed by the feudal grandees and princes of the Church; it did not lead the lower classes in the struggle for a victorious bourgeois-democratic revolution. Neither in 1808-1814, nor in 1820-1823, when the workers were still an insignificant percentage of the urban population, did the bourgeoisie have the courage to do so. It grew no bolder in 1834-1843. And now—after the June, 1848 battle in Paris, after Madrid had witnessed the spectacle of armed workers stubbornly fighting the army, in spite of the capitulation of the bourgeois brigades—the big bourgeoisie was least disposed to commit its destinies to the vicissitudes of civil war. As before, the chain of treachery was repeated: Espartero betrayed the Cortes, the Cortes betrayed the leaders, the

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\*"That Bore of a War," *New York Daily Tribune*, August 17, 1854

leaders betrayed the bourgeoisie, and the bourgeoisie betrayed the people.

### III

THE present collection also includes articles by Engels dealing with the military history of Spain. His observations on "The Spanish Army" (which was a section of his survey, "The Armies of Europe," published in instalments in *Putnam's Magazine* during 1855) give a precise, if unsightly, picture of the Spanish army at that time. Citing the famous remark of the Abbe de Pradt—"The Spaniards are a warlike but not a soldier-like people"—Engels observes: "They certainly have, of all European nations, the greatest antipathy to military discipline. Nevertheless, it is possible that the nation, which for more than a hundred years was celebrated for its infantry, may yet again have an army of which it can be proud. But, to attain this end, not only the military system, but civil life, still more, requires to be reformed."

In his sketches, "Badajoz" and "Bidasoa"—contributed to the *New American Cyclopaedia* (1858)\*—Engels recalls vivid episodes from the history of the Spanish war during 1811-1813; in these sketches Engels displays his profound knowledge of the military art and of military history. The same keen understanding is shown in his three letters on the war in Spanish Morocco, written for the *Tribune* in 1860 and printed as "leaders."

In the last article in this volume, "The Bakuninists at Work," Engels sums up the stubborn fight which Marx and he were waging against Bakunin's Anarchism. Analyzing the causes of the defeat of the Spanish uprising in 1873, Engels shows in this concluding article, the fatality of Anarchist tactics, especially in a period of revolutionary warfare. These are tactics of sporadic, planless, extempore actions, flash-in-the-pan tactics, tactics of struggle against discipline and organization in the revolutionary ranks, against a centralized leadership. Engels shows what enormous damage the tactics and ideology of Anarchism did to the fight of the Spanish people for social and national emancipation. "The Bakuninists in Spain," he says at the end of his masterly analysis, "have given us an unsurpassable example of how *not* to make a revolution."

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\*The article on Bolivar, also published in this *Cyclopaedia*, was written by Marx

MARX' and Engels' analysis of the Spanish situation made about three-quarters of a century ago, cannot be applied mechanically to modern Spain. But, in the light of international experience since that time, and the development of Marxism-Leninism, these writings furnish invaluable data for an understanding of present-day events. With an utterly different international situation and great changes inside the country, the Spanish people are again, as in the time of Marx and Engels, fighting to achieve democratic aims.

In 1873, in his article on the Bakuninists, Engels wrote :

Spain is so backward a country industrially, that *immediate*, complete emancipation of the working class is still entirely out of the question. Before it gets that far, Spain must pass through various preliminary stages of development and clear away quite a number of obstacles. The republic offered an opportunity to compress the course of these preliminary stages into the shortest possible period of time, and to rapidly eliminate these obstacles. But this opportunity could be made use of only through the active *political* intervention of the Spanish working class.

The advice which Marx and Engels gave to the Spanish workers held good in subsequent stages of the revolutionary conflict. Three decades later, in 1905, Lenin had good reason to characterize Engels' standpoint on questions of the Spanish revolution as the *model* of what a proletarian leader's standpoint should be at a moment of actual civil war. After quoting the above sentences from Engels, Lenin continued :

Above all, Engels emphasizes that the struggle for a republic in Spain was not and could not by any means be a struggle for a socialist revolution. Nevertheless, Engels had a mighty high opinion of the very active part which the workers played in the struggle for the republic. Engels demanded from the leaders of the proletariat that they should subordinate all their activity to the necessity of victory in the struggle that had begun, furthermore Engels himself as one of the leaders of the proletariat even went into the details of military organization. Engels put aggressive style of action and the centralization of the revolutionary forces before everything\*.

Engels and Lenin might have written these words today. The Spanish people are fighting to solve the issues of the

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\*V. I. Lenin, "The Provisional Revolutionary Government," *Collected Works*, Volume VII, pp. 324, 327-8, Russian edition.

democratic revolution not only against domestic mutineers but also against fascist interventionists. The struggle for the completion of the democratic revolution is at the same time a battle against fascism; and this affords the opportunity of uniting the overwhelming majority of the people—workers, peasants, the urban petty-bourgeois, and even certain groups of the upper bourgeoisie, particularly among the formerly oppressed nationalities such as the Basques and Catalans—in the anti-fascist People's Front. The Spanish masses are fighting heroically against the fascist invaders who are attempting to enslave their country. They are continuing the glorious tradition of the Spanish people, who have defended their national independence and fought for democratic liberation.

The soldiers of Republican Spain—struggling against the fascist mercenaries of General Franco and his German and Italian overlords—are one of the vanguards of humanity, fighting for the peace and freedom of all peoples. That is why the sympathy and support of millions of people throughout the world is on their side. This was clearly and directly expressed in the message of Joseph Stalin to Jose Diaz, secretary of the Communist Party of Spain—a message which voices the thoughts and feelings of millions of working people throughout the world.

The emancipation of Spain from the yoke of the fascist reactionaries is not the private affair of the Spaniards, but the common cause of all advanced and progressive mankind.

The staunchest supporter of the Spanish people is the Soviet Union. The international labour movement and all other democratic forces throughout the world are giving material and moral support to the people's government and the masses of Spain in the struggle to maintain their democratic republic. Thousands of sincere democrats from many lands have organized volunteer battalions and fought side by side with the Spanish Loyalists against a common enemy. The glorious record of the International Brigade has become part of that tradition of international solidarity which marked such events as the American war for independence and similar struggles for democratic liberation in world history.

The contributions to this volume, with the exception of the last article, were originally printed in American publications. "The Bakuninists at Work" is translated from the German. A biographical index is appended.

PART ONE  
REVOLUTIONARY SPAIN

I

THE revolution in Spain has now so far taken on the appearance of a permanent condition that, as our correspondent at London has informed us, the wealthy and conservative classes have begun to emigrate and to seek security in France. This is not surprising; Spain has never adopted the modern French fashion, so generally in vogue in 1848, of beginning and accomplishing a revolution in three days. Her efforts in that line are complex and more prolonged. Three years seems to be the shortest limit to which she restricts herself, while her revolutionary cycle sometimes expands to nine. Thus her first revolution in the present century extended from 1808 to 1814; the second from 1820 to 1823; and the third from 1834 to 1843. How long the present one will continue, or in what it will result, it is impossible for the keenest politician to foretell; but it is not much to say that there is no other part of Europe, not even Turkey and the Russian war, which offers so profound an interest to the thoughtful observer, as does Spain at this instant

Insurrectionary risings are as old in Spain as that sway of court favourites against which they are usually directed. Thus at the end of the fourteenth century the aristocracy revolted against King Juan II, and his favourite, Don Alvaro de Luna. In the fifteenth century still more serious commotions took place against King Henry IV and the head of his camarilla, Don Juan de Pacheco, Marquis de Villena. In the seventeenth century the people at Lisbon tore to pieces Vascoscellos, the Sartorius of the Spanish Viceroy in Portugal, as they did at Saragosa with Santa Coloma, the favourite of Philip IV. At the end of the same century, under the reign of Carlos II, the people of Madrid rose against the Queen's camarilla, composed of the Countess de Barlepsch and the Counts Oropesa and Melgar, who had imposed on all provisions entering the capital an oppressive duty, which they shared among themselves. The people marched to the royal palace, forced the King to appear on the balcony, and himself to

denounce the Queen's camarilla. They then marched to the palaces of the Counts Oropesa and Melgar, plundered them, destroyed them by fire, and tried to lay hold of their owners, who, however, had the good luck to escape, at the cost of perpetual exile. The event which occasioned the insurrectionary rising in the fifteenth century was, the treacherous treaty which the favourite of Henry IV, the Marquis de Villena, had concluded with the King of France, according to which Catalonia was to be surrendered to Louis XI. Three centuries later, the treaty of Fontainebleau, concluded on October 27, 1807, by which the favourite of Carlos IV and the minion of his Queen, Don Manuel Godoy, the Prince of Peace, contracted with Bonaparte for the partition of Portugal and the entrance of the French armies into Spain, caused a popular insurrection at Madrid against Godoy, the abdication of Carlos IV, the assumption of the throne by Ferdinand VII, his son, the entrance of the French army into Spain, and the following war of independence. Thus the Spanish war of independence commenced with a popular insurrection against the camarilla, then personified in Don Manuel Godoy, just as the civil war of the fifteenth century commenced with the rising against the camarilla, then personified in the Marquis de Villena. So, too, the revolution of 1854, commenced with the rising against the camarilla, personified in the Count San Luis.

Notwithstanding these ever-recurring insurrections, there has been in Spain, up to the present century, no serious revolution, except the war of the Holy League in the times of Carlos I, or Charles V, as the Germans call him. The immediate pretext, as usual, was then furnished by the clique who, under the auspices of Cardinal Adrian, the Viceroy, himself a Fleming, exasperated the Castilians by their rapacious insolence, by selling the public offices to the highest bidder, and by open traffic in law-suits. The opposition against the Flemish camarilla was only at the surface of the movement. At its bottom was the defence of the liberties of medieval Spain against the encroachments of modern absolutism.

The material basis of the Spanish monarchy having been laid by the union of Aragon, Castile and Granada, under Ferdinand and the Catholic, and Isabella I, Charles I attempted to transform that still feudal monarchy into an absolute one. Simultaneously he attacked the two pillars of Spanish liberty, the Cortes and the *Ayuntamientos*—the former a modification of the ancient Gothic *concilia*, and the latter transmitted almost



without interruption from the Roman times, the *Ayuntamientos* exhibiting the mixture of the hereditary and elective character proper to the Roman municipalities. As to municipal self-government, the towns of Italy, of Provence, Northern Gaul, Great Britain, and part of Germany, offer a fair similitude to the then estate of the Spanish towns ; but neither the French States General, nor the British Parliaments of the Middle Ages, are to be compared with the Spanish Cortes. There were circumstances in the formation of the Spanish kingdom peculiarly favourable to the limitation of royal power. On the one side, small parts of the Peninsula were recovered at a time, and formed into separate kingdoms, during the long struggles with the Arabs. Popular laws and customs were engendered in these struggles. The successive conquests, being principally effected by the nobles, rendered their power excessive, while they diminished the royal power. On the other hand, the inland towns and cities rose to great consequence, from the necessity people found themselves under of residing together in places of strength, as a security against the continual irruptions of the Moors; while the peninsular formation of the country, and constant intercourse with Provence and Italy, created first-rate commercial and maritime cities on the coast. As early as the fourteenth century, the cities formed the most powerful part in the Cortes, which were composed of their representatives, with those of the clergy and the nobility. It is also worthy of remark, that the slow recovery from Moorish dominion through an obstinate struggle of almost eight hundred years, gave the Peninsula, when wholly emancipated, a character altogether different from that of contemporaneous Europe, Spain finding itself, at the epoch of European resurrection, with the manners of the Goths and the Vandals in the North, and with those of the Arabs in the South

Charles I having returned from Germany, where the imperial dignity had been bestowed upon him, the Cortes assembled at Valladolid, in order to receive his oath to the ancient laws and to invest him with the crown. Charles, declining to appear, sent commissioners who, he pretended, were to receive the oath of allegiance on the part of the Cortes. The Cortes refused to admit these commissioners to their presence, notifying the monarch that, if he did not appear and swear to the laws of the country, he should never be acknowledged as King of Spain. Charles thereupon yielded ; he

appeared before the Cortes and took the oath—as historians say, with a very bad grace. The Cortes on this occasion told him: “You must know, Senor, that the King is but the paid servant of the nation.” Such was the beginning of the hostilities between Charles I and the towns. In consequence of his intrigues, numerous insurrections broke out in Castile, the Holy League of Avila was formed, and the united towns convoked the assembly of the Cortes at Tordesillas, whence, on October 20, 1520, a “protest against the abuses” was addressed to the King, in return for which he deprived all the Deputies assembled at the Tordesillas of their personal rights. Thus civil war had become inevitable; the commoners appealed to arms; their soldiers under the command of Padilla seized the fortress of Torre Lobaton, but were ultimately defeated by superior forces at the battle of Villalar on April 23, 1521. The heads of the principal “conspirators” rolled on the scaffold, and the ancient liberties of Spain disappeared.

Several circumstances conspired in favour of the rising power of absolutism. The want of union between the different provinces deprived their efforts of the necessary strength; but it was, above all, the bitter antagonism between the classes of the nobles and the citizens of the towns which Charles employed for the degradation of both. We have already mentioned that since the fourteenth century the influence of the towns was prominent in the Cortes, and since Ferdinand the Catholic, the Holy Brotherhood (Santa Hermandad), had proved a powerful instrument in the hands of the towns against the Castilian nobles, who accused them of encroachments on their ancient privileges and jurisdiction. The nobility, therefore, were eager to assist Carlos I in his project of suppressing the Holy League. Having crushed their armed resistance, Carlos occupied himself with the reduction of the municipal privileges of the towns, which, rapidly declining in population, wealth and importance, soon lost their influence in the Cortes. Carlos now turned round upon the nobles, who had assisted him in putting down the liberties of the towns, but who themselves retained a considerable political importance. Mutiny in his army for want of pay obliged him, in 1539, to assemble the Cortes, in order to obtain a grant of money. Indignant at the misapplication of former subsidies to operations foreign to the interests of Spain, the Cortes refused all supplies. Carlos dismissed them in a rage; and, the nobles having insisted on a privilege of exemption from

taxes, he declared that those who claimed such a right could have no claim to appear in the Cortes, and consequently excluded them from that assembly. This was the deathblow of the Cortes, and their meetings were henceforth reduced to the performance of a mere court ceremony. The third element in the ancient Constitution of the Cortes, viz.: the clergy, enlisted since Ferdinand the Catholic under the banner of the Inquisition, had long ceased to identify its interests with those of feudal Spain. On the contrary, by the Inquisition, the Church was transformed into the most formidable tool of absolutism.

If after the reign of Carlos I the decline of Spain, both in a political and social aspect, exhibited all those symptoms of inglorious and protracted putrefaction so repulsive in the worst times of the Turkish Empire, under the Emperor at least the ancient liberties were buried in a magnificent tomb. This was the time when Vasco Nunez de Balboa planted the banner of Castile upon the shores of Darien, Cortez in Mexico, and Pizarro in Peru; when Spanish influence reigned supreme in Europe, and the Southern imagination of the Iberians was bewildered with visions of Eldorados, chivalrous adventures, and universal monarchy. Then Spanish liberty disappeared under the clash of arms, showers of gold, and the terrible illuminations of the *auto-da-fe*.

But how are we to account for the singular phenomenon that, after almost three centuries of a Hapsburg dynasty, followed by a Bourbon dynasty—either of them quite sufficient to crush a people—the municipal liberties of Spain more or less survive? that in the very country, where of all the feudal states absolute monarchy first arose in its most unmitigated form, centralization has never succeeded in taking root? The answer is not difficult. It was in the sixteenth century that were formed the great monarchies which established themselves everywhere on the downfall of the conflicting feudal classes—the aristocracy and the towns. But in the other great States of Europe absolute monarchy presents itself as a civilizing centre, as the initiator of social unity. There it was the laboratory, in which the various elements of society were so mixed and worked, as to allow the towns to change the local independence and sovereignty of the Middle Ages for the general rule of the middle classes, and the common sway of civil society. In Spain, on the contrary, while the aristocracy sunk into degradation without losing their worst

privilege, the towns lost their medieval power without gaining modern importance.

Since the establishment of absolute monarchy they have vegetated in a state of continuous decay. We have not here to state the circumstances, political or economical, which destroyed Spanish commerce, industry, navigation and agriculture. For the present purpose it is sufficient to simply recall the fact. As the commercial and industrial life of the towns declined, internal exchanges became rare, the mingling of the inhabitants of different provinces less frequent, the means of communication neglected, and the great roads gradually deserted. Thus the local life of Spain, the independence of its provinces and communes, the diversified state of society originally based on the physical configuration of the country, and historically developed by the detached manner in which the several provinces emancipated themselves from the Moorish rule, and formed little independent commonwealths—was now finally strengthened and confirmed by the economical revolution which dried up the sources of national activity. And while the absolute monarchy found in Spain material in its very nature repulsive to centralization, it did all in its power to prevent the growth of common interests arising out of a national division of labour and the multiplicity of internal exchanges—the very basis on which alone a uniform system of administration and the rule of general laws can be created. Thus the absolute monarchy in Spain, bearing but a superficial resemblance to the absolute monarchies of Europe in general, is rather to be ranged in a class with Asiatic forms of government. Spain, like Turkey, remained an agglomeration of mismanaged republics with a nominal sovereign at their head. Despotism changed character in the different provinces with the arbitrary interpretation of the general laws by the viceroys and governors; but despotic as was the government it did not prevent the provinces from subsisting with different laws and customs, different coins, military banners of different colours, and with their respective systems of taxation. The oriental despotism attacks municipal self-government only when opposed to its direct interests, but is very glad to allow those institutions to continue so long as they take off its shoulders the duty of doing something and spare it the trouble of regular administration.

Thus it happened that Napoleon, who, like all his contemporaries, considered Spain as an inanimate corpse, was

fatally surprised at the discovery that when the Spanish State was dead, Spanish society was full of life, and every part of it overflowing with powers of resistance. By the treaty of Fontainebleau he had got his troops to Madrid; by alluring the royal family into an interview at Bayonne he had forced Carlos IV to retract his abdication, and then to make over to him his dominions; and he had intimidated Ferdinand VII into a similar declaration. Carlos IV, his Queen and the Prince of Peace conveyed to Compiegne, Ferdinand VII and his brothers imprisoned in the castle of Valencay, Bonaparte conferred the throne of Spain on his brother Joseph, assembled a Spanish junta at Bayonne, and provided them with one of his ready-made constitutions. Seeing nothing alive in the Spanish monarchy except the miserable dynasty which he had safely locked up, he felt quite sure of this confiscation of Spain. But, only a few days after his *coup de main*, he received the news of an insurrection at Madrid. Murat, it is true, quelled that tumult by killing about 1,000 people; but when this massacre became known, an insurrection broke out in Asturias, and soon afterward embraced the whole monarchy. It is to be remarked that this first spontaneous rising originated with the people, while the "better" classes had quietly submitted to the foreign yoke.

Thus it is that Spain was prepared for her more recent revolutionary career, and launched into the struggles which have marked her development in the present century. The facts and influences we have thus succinctly detailed still act in forming her destinies and directing the impulses of her people. We have presented them as necessary not only to an appreciation of the present crisis, but of all she has done and suffered since the Napoleonic usurpation—a period now of nearly fifty years—not without tragic episodes and heroic efforts,—indeed, one of the most touching and instructive chapters in all modern history.\*

*New York Daily Tribune*, September 9, 1854.

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\*When this article appeared in the *Tribune*, the editors added the following sentence—it was not written by Marx: "Let us hope that the additions now being made to their annals by the Spanish people may prove neither unworthy nor fruitless of good to themselves and to the world." (Cf. Letter of Marx to Engels, November 10, 1854, *Gesamtausgabe*. Dritte Abteilung, Band 2, pp 63-65 )—Ed

## II.

WE have already laid before our readers a survey of the earlier revolutionary history of Spain, as a means of understanding and appreciating the developments which that nation is now offering to the observation of the world. Still more interesting, and perhaps equally valuable as a source of present instruction, is the great national movement that attended the expulsion of the Bonapartes, and restored the Spanish Crown to the family in whose possession it yet remains. But to rightly estimate that movement, with its heroic episodes and memorable exhibition of vitality in a people supposed to be moribund, we must go back to the beginning of the Napoleonic assault on the nation. The efficient cause of the whole was perhaps first stated in the treaty of Tilsit, which was concluded on July 7, 1807, and is said to have received its complement through a secret convention, signed by Prince Kourakin and Talleyrand. It was published in the Madrid *Gaceta* on August 25, 1812, containing, among other things, the following stipulations :

“ *Art I* Russia is to take possession of European Turkey, and to extend her possessions in Asia as far as she may think it convenient.

“ *Art. II* The Bourbon dynasty in Spain and the house of Braganza in Portugal will cease to reign. Princes of the Bonaparte family will succeed to both of these crowns

Supposing this treaty to be authentic, and its authenticity is scarcely disputed, even in the recently published memoirs of King Joseph Bonaparte, it formed the true reason for the French invasion of Spain in 1808, while the Spanish commotions of that time would seem to be linked by secret threads with the destinies of Turkey.

“ When, consequent upon the Madrid massacre and the transactions at Bayonne, simultaneous insurrections broke out in the Asturias, Galicia, Andalusia and Valencia, and a French army occupied Madrid, the four northern fortresses of Pamploña, San Sebastian, Figueras and Barcelona had been seized by Bonaparte under false pretences ; part of the Spanish army had been removed to the island of Funen, destined for an attack upon Sweden ; lastly, all the constituted authorities, military, ecclesiastic, judicial and administrative, as well as the aristocracy, exhorted the people to submit to the foreign intruder. But there was one circumstance to compensate for

all the difficulties of the situation. Thanks to Napoleon, the country was rid of its King, its royal family, and its Government. Thus the shackles were broken which might else have prevented the Spanish people from displaying their native energies. How little they were able to resist the French under the command of their Kings and under ordinary circumstances, had been proved by the disgraceful campaigns of 1794 and 1795.

Napoleon had summoned the most distinguished persons in Spain to meet him at Bayonne, and to receive from his hands a King and a Constitution. With very few exceptions, they appeared there. On June 7, 1808, King Joseph received at Bayonne a deputation of the *grandees* of Spain, in whose name the Duke of Infantado, Ferdinand VII's most intimate friend, addressed him as follows :

Sire, the *grandees* of Spain have at all times been celebrated for their loyalty to their Sovereign, and in them your Majesty will now find the same fidelity and adhesion

The royal Council of Castile assured poor Joseph that "he was the principal branch of a family destined by Heaven to reign." Not less abject was the congratulation of the Duke del Parque, at the head of a deputation representing the army. On the following day the same persons published a proclamation, enjoining general submission to the Bonaparte dynasty. On July 7, 1808, the new Constitution was signed by 91 Spaniards of the highest distinction, among them Dukes, Counts and Marquises, as well as several heads of the religious orders. During the discussions on that Constitution, all they found cause to remonstrate against was the repeal of their old privileges and exemptions. The first Ministry and the first royal household of Joseph were the same persons who had formed the Ministry and the royal household of Ferdinand VII. Some of the upper classes considered Napoleon as the providential regenerator of Spain, others as the only bulwark against revolution ; none believing in the chances of national resistance.

Thus from the very beginning of the Spanish war of independence the high nobility and the old Administration lost all hold upon the middle classes and upon the people, because of their having deserted them at the commencement of the struggle. On the one side stood the *Afrancesados* (the Frenchified), and on the other the nation. At Valladolid, Cartagena,

Granada, Jaén, San Lucar, Carolina, Ciudad Rodrigo, Cadiz and Valencia, the most prominent members of the old Administration—governors, generals, and other marked personages presumed to be French agents and obstacles to the national movement—fell victims to the infuriated people. Everywhere the existing authorities were displaced. Some months previous to the rising, on March 19, 1808, the popular commotions that had taken place at Madrid intended to remove from their posts *El Choricero* (the sausage-maker, a nickname of Godoy) and his obnoxious satellites. This object was now gained on a national scale, and with it the internal revolution was accomplished so far as contemplated by the masses, and as not connected with resistance to the foreign intruder. On the whole, the movement appeared to be directed rather *against* revolution than *for* it. National by proclaiming the independence of Spain from France, it was at the same time dynastic by opposing the "beloved" Ferdinand VII to Joseph Bonaparte; reactionary by opposing the old institutions, customs, and laws to the rational innovations of Napoleon; superstitious and fanatical by opposing "holy religion," against what was called French Atheism, or the destruction of the special privileges of the Roman Church. The priests, terrified by the fate that had fallen upon their brethren in France, fostered the popular passions in the interest of self-preservation. "The patriotic fire," says Southey, "flamed higher for this holy oil of superstition."

All the wars of independence waged against France bear in common the stamp of regeneration, mixed up with reaction; but nowhere to such a degree as in Spain. The King appeared in the imagination of the people in the light of a romantic prince, forcibly abused and locked up by a giant robber. The most fascinating and popular epochs of their past were encircled with the holy and miraculous traditions of the war of the cross against the crescent, and a great portion of the lower classes were accustomed to wear the livery of mendicants, and live upon the sanctified patrimony of the Church. A Spanish author, Don Jose Clemente Carnicero, published in the years 1814 and '16, the following series of works: *Napoleon, the True Don Quixote of Europe, Principal Events of the Glorious Revolution of Spain; The Inquisition Rightly Re-established*; it is sufficient to note the titles of these books to understand this one aspect of the Spanish revolution which we meet with in the several manifestoes of the provincial



juntas, all of them proclaiming the King, their holy religion, and the country, and some even telling the people that "their hopes of a better world were at stake, and in very imminent danger"

However, if the peasantry, the inhabitants of small inland cities, and the numerous army of the mendicants, frocked and unfrocked, all of them deeply imbued with religious and political prejudices, formed the great majority of the national party, it contained on the other hand an active and influential minority which considered the popular rising against the French invasion as the signal given for the political and social regeneration of Spain. This minority was composed of the inhabitants of the seaports, commercial towns, and part of the provincial capitals, where, under the reign of Charles V, the material conditions of modern society had developed themselves to a certain degree. They were strengthened by the more cultivated portion of the upper and middle classes, authors, physicians, lawyers, and even priests, for whom the Pyrenees had formed no sufficient barrier against the invasion of the philosophy of the eighteenth century. As a true manifesto of this faction may be considered the famous memorandum of Jovellanos on the improvements of agriculture and agrarian law, published in 1795 and drawn up by order of the royal Council of Castile. There was finally, the youth of the middle classes, such as the students of the University, who had eagerly adopted the aspirations and principles of the French Revolution, and who, for a moment, even expected to see their country regenerated by the assistance of France.

So long as the common defence of the country alone was concerned, the two great elements composing the national party remained in perfect union. Their antagonism did not appear till they met together in the Cortes, on the battleground of a new Constitution there to be drawn up. The revolutionary minority, in order to foment the patriotic spirit of the people, had not hesitated themselves to appeal to the national prejudices of the old popular faith. Favourable to the immediate objects of national resistance, as these tactics might have appeared, they could not fail to prove fatal to this minority when the time had arrived for the conservative interests of the old society to intrench themselves behind these very prejudices and popular passions, with a view of defending themselves against the proper and ulterior plans of the revolutionists.

When Ferdinand left Madrid upon the summons of Bonaparte, he had established a Supreme junta of Government under the Presidency of the Infante Don Antonio. But in May this junta had already disappeared. There existed then no central Government, and the insurgent towns formed juntas of their own, presided over by those of the provincial capitals. These provincial juntas constituted, as it were, so many independent Governments, each of which set on foot an army of its own. The junta of Representatives at Oviedo declared that the entire sovereignty had developed into their hands, proclaimed war against Bonaparte, and sent deputies to England to conclude an armistice. The same was done afterward by the junta of Seville. It is a curious fact that by the mere force of circumstances these exalted Catholics were driven to an alliance with England, a power which the Spaniards were accustomed to look upon as the incarnation of the most damnable heresy, and little better than the Grand Turk himself. Attacked by French Atheism, they were thrown into the arms of British Protestantism. No wonder that Ferdinand VII, on his return to Spain, declared, in a decree re-establishing the Holy Inquisition, that one of the causes "that had altered the purity of religion in Spain was the sojourn of foreign troops of different sects, all of them equally infected with hatred against the holy Roman Church."

The provincial juntas which had so suddenly sprung into life, altogether independent of each other, conceded a certain, but very slight and undefined degree of ascendancy to the supreme junta of Seville, that city being regarded as the capital of Spain while Madrid was in the hands of the foreigner. Thus a very anarchical kind of federal Government was established, which the shock of opposite interests, local jealousies, and rival influences made a rather bad instrument for bringing unity into the military command, and to combine the operations of a campaign.

The addresses to the people issued by these several juntas, while displaying all the heroic vigour of a people suddenly awakened from a long lethargy and aroused by an electric shock into a feverish state of activity, are not free from that pompous exaggeration, that style of mingled buffoonery and bombast, and that redundant grandiloquence which caused Sismondi to put upon Spanish literature the epithet of Oriental. They exhibit no less the childish vanity of the Spanish character, the members of the juntas for instance assuming the

title of Highness and loading themselves with gaudy uniforms.

There are two circumstances connected with these juntas—the one showing the low standard of the people at the time of their rising, while the other was detrimental to the progress of the revolution. The juntas were named by general suffrage; but “the very zeal of the lower classes, displayed itself in obedience.” They generally elected only their natural superiors, the provincial nobility and gentry backed by clergymen and very few notabilities of the middle class. So conscious were the people of their own weakness that they limited their initiative to forcing the higher classes into resistance against the invader, without pretending to share in the direction of that resistance. At Seville, for instance, “the first thought of the people was that the parochial clergy and the heads of the Convents should assemble, to choose the members of the junta.” Thus the juntas were filled with persons chosen on account of their previous station, and very far from being revolutionary leaders. On the other hand, the people when appointing these authorities did not think either of limiting their power or of fixing a term to their duration. The juntas, of course, thought only of extending the one and of perpetuating the other. Thus these first creations of the popular impulse at the commencement of the revolution remained during its whole course as so many dykes against the revolutionary current when threatening to overflow.

On July 20, 1808, when Joseph Bonaparte entered Madrid, 14,000 French, under Generals Dupont and Vidal, were forced by Castanos to lay down their arms at Bailen, and Joseph a few days afterwards had to retire from Madrid to Burgos. There were two events besides which greatly encouraged the Spaniards; the one being the expulsion of Lefebvre from Saragossa by General Palafox, and the other the arrival of the army of the Marquis de la Romana, at Coruna, with 7,000 men, who had embarked from the island of Funen in spite of the French, in order to come to the assistance of their country.

It was after the battle of Bailen that the revolution came to a head, and that part of the high nobility who had accepted the Bonaparte dynasty or wisely kept back, came forward to join the popular cause—an advantage to that cause of a very doubtful character.

*New York Daily Tribune*, September 25, 1854.

### III

THE division of power among the provincial juntas had saved Spain from the first shock of the French invasion under Napoleon, not only by multiplying the resources of the country, but also by putting the invader at a loss for a mark whereat to strike; the French being quite amazed at the discovery that the centre of Spanish resistance was nowhere and everywhere. Nevertheless, shortly after the capitulation of Bailen and the evacuation of Madrid by Joseph, the necessity of establishing some kind of central Government became generally felt. After the first successes, the dissensions between the provincial juntas had grown so violent that Seville, for instance, was barely prevented by General Castanos from marching against Granada. The French army which, with the exception of the forces under Marshal Bessieres, had withdrawn to the line of the Ebro in the greatest confusion, so that, if vigorously harassed, it would then have easily been dispersed, or at least compelled to repass the frontier, was thus allowed to recover and to take up a strong position. But it was, above all, the bloody suppression of the Bilbao insurrection by General Merlin, which evoked a national cry against the jealousies of the juntas and the easy *laissez-faire* of the commanders. The urgency of combining military movements; the certainty that Napoleon would soon reappear at the head of a victorious army, collected from the banks of the Niemen, the Oder, and the shores of the Baltic, the want of a general authority for concluding treaties of alliance with Great Britain or other foreign powers, and for keeping up the connection with, and receiving tribute from Spanish America; the existence at Burgos of a French central power, and the necessity of setting up altar against altar,—all these circumstances conspired to force the Seville junta to resign, however reluctantly, its ill-defined and rather nominal supremacy, and to propose to the several provincial juntas to select each from its own body two Deputies the assembling of whom was to constitute a *Central junta*, while the provincial juntas were to remain invested with the internal management of their respective districts, “but under due subordination to the General Government.” Thus the Central junta, composed of 35 deputies from provincial juntas (34 for the Spanish juntas, and one for the Canary Islands), met at Aranjuez on December 26, 1808, just one day before the potentates of Russia and Germany prostrated themselves

before Napoleon at Erfurt.

Under revolutionary, still more than under ordinary circumstances, the destinies of armies reflect the true nature of the civil government. The Central junta, charged with the expulsion of the invaders from the Spanish soil, was driven by the success of the hostile arms from Madrid to Seville, and from Seville to Cadiz, there to expire ignominiously. Its reign was marked by a disgraceful succession of defeats, by the annihilation of the Spanish armies, and lastly by the dissolution of regular warfare into guerilla exploits. As Urquijo, a Spanish nobleman, said to Cuesta, the Captain-General of Castile, on April 3, 1808 :

Our Spain is a Gothic edifice, composed of heterogeneous morsels, with as many forces, privileges, legislations, and customs, as there are provinces. There exists in her nothing of what they call public spirit in Europe. These reasons will prevent the establishment of any central power of so solid a structure as to be able to unite our national forces.

If, then, the actual state of Spain at the epoch of the French invasion, threw the greatest possible difficulties in the way of creating a revolutionary centre, the very composition of the Central junta incapacitated it from proving a match for the terrible crisis in which the country found itself placed. Being too numerous and too fortuitously mixed for an executive government, they were too few to pretend to the authority of National Convention. The mere fact of their power having been delegated from the provincial juntas rendered them unfit for overcoming the ambitious propensities, the ill will, and the capricious egotism of those bodies. These juntas—the members of which, as we have shown in a former article, were elected on the whole in consideration of the situation they occupied in the old society, rather than of their capacity to inaugurate a new one—sent in their turn to the “Central” Spanish grandees, prelates, titularies of Castile, ancient Ministers, high civil and military officials, instead of revolutionary upstarts. At the outset the Spanish revolution failed by its endeavour to remain legitimate and respectable.

The two most marked members of the Central junta, under whose banners its two great parties ranged themselves, were Floridablanca and Jovellanos, both of them martyr's of Godoy's persecution, former Ministers, valetudinarians, and grown old in the regular and pedantic habits of the procrastinating Spanish regime, the solemn and circumstantial slowness of which

had become proverbial even at the time of Bacon, who once exclaimed, "May death reach me from Spain: it will then arrive at a late hour!"

Floridablanca and Jovellanos represented an antagonism, but an antagonism belonging to that part of the eighteenth century which preceded the era of the French Revolution; the former a plebeian bureaucrat, the latter an aristocratic philanthropist; Floridablanca a partisan and a practiser of the enlightened despotism represented by Pombal, Frederick II and Joseph II; Jovellanos, a "friend of the people," hoping to raise them to liberty by an anxiously wise succession of economic laws, and by the literary propaganda of generous doctrines, both opposed to the traditions of feudalism, the one by trying to disentangle the monarchical power, the other by seeking to rid civil society of its shackles. The part acted by either in the history of their country corresponded with the diversity of their opinions. Floridablanca ruled supreme as the Prime Minister of Charles III, and his rule grew despotic according to the measure in which he met with resistance. Jovellanos, whose Ministerial career under Charles IV was but short-lived, gained his influence over the Spanish people, not as a Minister, but as a scholar; not by decrees, but by essays. Floridablanca, when the storm of the times carried him to the head of a revolutionary Government, was an octogenarian, unshaken only in his belief in despotism, and his distrust of popular spontaneity. When delegated to Madrid he left with the Municipality of Murcia a secret protest, declaring that he had only ceded to force and to the fear of popular assassinations, and that he signed this protocol with the express view to prevent King Joseph from ever finding fault with his acceptance of the people's mandate. Not satisfied with returning to the traditions of his manhood, he retraced such steps of his Ministerial past as he now judged to have been too rash. Thus, he who had expelled the Jesuits from Spain, was hardly installed in the Central junta, when he caused it to grant leave for their return "in a private capacity." If he acknowledged any change to have occurred since his time, it was simply this: that Godoy, who had banished him and had dispossessed the great Count of Floridablanca of his Governmental omnipotence, was now again replaced by that same Count of Floridablanca, and driven out in his turn. This was the man whom the Central junta chose as its President, and whom its majority recognized as an infallible leader.

Jovellanos, who commanded the influential minority of the Central junta, had also grown old, and lost much of his energy in a long and painful imprisonment inflicted upon him by Godoy. But even in his best times he was not a man of revolutionary action, but rather a well-intentioned reformer, who, from over-niceness as to the means, would never have dared to accomplish an end. In France, he would perhaps have gone the length of Mounier or Lally-Tollendal, but not a step further. In England, he would have figured as a popular member of the House of Lords. In insurrectionized Spain, he was fit to supply the aspiring youth with ideas, but practically no match even for the servile tenacity of a Floridablanca. Not altogether free from aristocratic prejudices, and therefore with a strong leaning toward the Anglomania of Montesquieu, this fair character seemed to prove that if Spain had exceptionally begot a generalizing mind, she was unable to do it except at the cost of individual energy, which she could only possess for local affairs.

It is true that the Central junta included a few men—headed by Don Lorenzo Calvo de Rosas, the delegate of Saragossa—who, while adopting the reform views of Jovellanos, spurred on at the same time to revolutionary action. But their numbers were too few and their names too unknown to allow them to push the slow State-coach of the junta out of the beaten track of Spanish ceremonial.

This power, so clumsily composed, so nervelessly constituted, with such outlived reminiscences at its head, was called upon to accomplish a revolution and to beat Napoleon. If its proclamations were as vigorous as its deeds were weak, it was due to Don Manuel Quintana, a Spanish poet, whom the junta had the taste to appoint as their secretary and to intrust with the writing of their manifestoes.

Like Calderon's pompous heroes who, confounding conventional distinction with genuine greatness, used to announce themselves by a tedious enumeration of all their titles, the junta occupied itself in the first place with decreeing the honours and decorations due to its exalted position. Their President received the predicate of "Highness," the other members that of "Excellency," while to the junta *in corpore* was reserved the title of "Majesty." They adopted a species of fancy uniform resembling that of a general, adorned their breasts with badges representing the two worlds, and voted themselves a yearly salary of 120,000 reals. It was a true idea

of the old Spanish school, that, in order to make a great and dignified entrance upon the historical stage of Europe, the chiefs of insurgent Spain ought to wrap themselves in theatrical costumes.

We should transgress the limits of these sketches by entering into the internal history of the junta and the details of its administration. For our end it will suffice to answer two questions. What was its influence on the development of the Spanish revolutionary movement? What on the defence of the country? These two questions answered, much that until now has appeared mysterious and unaccountable in the Spanish revolutions of the nineteenth century will have found its explanation.

At the outset the majority of the Central junta thought it their main duty to suppress the first revolutionary transports. Accordingly they tightened anew the old trammels of the press, and appointed a new Grand Inquisitor, who was happily prevented by the French from resuming his functions. Although the greater part of the real property of Spain was then locked up in mortmain—in the entailed estates of the nobility, and the unalienable estates of the Church—the junta ordered the selling of the mortmains, which had already begun to be suspended, threatening even to amend the private contracts affecting the ecclesiastical estates that had already been sold. They acknowledged the national debt, but took no financial measure to free the civil list from a world of burdens, with which a secular succession of corrupt governments had encumbered it, to reform their proverbially unjust, absurd and vexatious fiscal system, or to open to the nation new productive resources, by breaking through the shackles of feudalism.

*New York Daily Tribune*, October 20, 1854

#### IV

ALREADY at the time of Philip V, Francisco Benito la Soledad had said: "All the evils of Spain are derived from the *abogados*" (lawyers). At the head of the mischievous magisterial hierarchy of Spain was placed the *Consejo Real* of Castile. Sprung up in the turbulent times of the Don Juans and the Enriques, strengthened by Philip II, who discovered in it a worthy complement of the *Sanio officio*, it had improved



by the calamities of times and the weakness of the later Kings to usurp and accumulate in its hands the most heterogeneous attributes, and to add to its functions of Highest Tribunal those of a legislator and of an administrative superintendent of all the kingdoms of Spain. Thus it surpassed in power even the French Parliament which it resembled in many points, except that it was never to be found on the side of the people. Having been the most powerful authority in ancient Spain, the *Consejo Real* was, of course, the most implacable foe to a new Spain, and to all the recent popular authorities threatening to eripple its supreme influence. Being the great dignitary of the order of the lawyers and the incarnate guarantee of all its abuses and privileges, the *Consejo* naturally disposed of all the numerous and influential interests vested in Spanish jurisprudence. It was therefore a power with which the revolution could enter into no compromise, but which had to be swept away unless it should be allowed to sweep away the revolution in its turn. As we have seen in a former article, the *Consejo* had prostituted itself before Napoleon, and by that act of treason had lost all hold upon the people. But on the day of their assumption of office the Central junta were foolish enough to communicate to the *Consejo* their Constitution, and to ask for its oath of fidelity, after having received which they declared they would dispatch the formula of the same oath to all the other authorities of the kingdom. By this inconsiderate step, loudly disapproved by all the revolutionary party, the *Consejo* became convinced that the Central junta wanted its support; it thus recovered from its despondency, and, after an affected hesitation of some days, tendered a malevolent submission to the junta, backing its oath by an expression of its own reactionary scruples exhibited in its advice to the junta to dissolve, by reducing its number to three or five members, according to Ley 3, Partida 2, Titulo 15; and to order the forcible extinction of the provincial juntas. After the French had returned to Madrid and dispersed the *Consejo Real*, the Central junta, not contented with their first blunder, had the fatuity to resuscitate the *Consejo* by creating the *Consejo Reunido*—a reunion of the *Consejo Real* with all the other wrecks of the ancient royal councils. Thus the junta spontaneously created for the counter-revolution a central power, which, rivaling their own power, never ceased to harass and counteract them with its intrigues and conspiracies, seeking to drive them to the most unpopular steps, and then, with a show of virtu-

ous indignation to denounce them to the impassioned contempt of the people. It hardly need be mentioned that, having first acknowledged and then re-established the *Consejo Real*, the Central junta was unable to reform anything, either in the organization of Spanish tribunals, or in their most vicious civil and criminal legislation.

That, notwithstanding the predominance in the Spanish rising of the national and religious elements, there existed, in the two first years, a most decided tendency to social and political reforms, is proved by all the manifestations of the provincial juntas of that time, which, though composed as they mostly were of the privileged classes, never neglected to denounce the ancient regime and to hold out promises of radical reform. The fact is further proved by the manifestoes of the Central junta. In their first address to the nation, dated November 8, 1808, they say :

A tyranny of twenty years, exercised by the most incapable hands, had brought them to the very brink of perdition; the nation was alienated from its Government by hatred and contest. A little time only has passed since, oppressed and degraded, ignorant of their own strength, and finding no protection against the Governmental evils, neither in the institutions nor in the laws, they had even regarded foreign dominion less hateful than the wasting tyranny which consumed them. The dominion of a will always capricious, and most often unjust, had lasted too long, their patience, their love of order, their generous loyalty had too long been abused, it was time that law founded on general utility should commence its reign. Reform, therefore, was necessary throughout all branches. The junta would form different committees, each entrusted with a particular department to whom all writings on matters of Government and Administration might be addressed.

In their address dated Seville, 28th October, 1809, they say :

An imbecile and decrepit despotism prepared the way for French tyranny. To leave the state sunk in old abuses would be a crime as enormous as to deliver you into the hands of Bonaparte.

There seems to have existed in the Central junta a most original division of labour—the Jovellanos party being allowed to proclaim and to protocol the revolutionary aspirations of the nation; and the Floridablanca party reserving to themselves the pleasure of giving them the lie direct, and of opposing to revolutionary fiction counter-revolutionary fact. For us, however, the important point is to prove from the very confessions

of the provincial juntas deposited with the Central, the often-denied fact of the existence of revolutionary aspirations at the epoch of the first Spanish rising.

The manner in which the Central junta made use of the opportunities for reforms afforded by the good will of the nation, the pressure of events, and the presence of immediate danger, may be inferred from the influence exercised by their Commissioners in the several provinces they were sent to: One Spanish author candidly tells us that the Central junta, not overflowing with capacities, took good care to retain the eminent members at the centre, and to dispatch those who were good for nothing to the circumference. These Commissioners were invested with the power of presiding over the provincial juntas, and of representing the Central in the plenitude of its attributes. To quote only some instances of their doings: General de la Romana, whom the Spanish soldiers used to call Marquis de las Romerías, from his perpetual marches and countermarches—fighting never taking place except when he happened to be out of the way—this de la Romana when beaten by Soult out of Galicia, entered Asturias, and as a Commissioner of the Central. His first business was to pick a quarrel with the provincial junta of Oviedo, whose energetic and revolutionary measures had drawn down upon them the hatred of the privileged classes. He went the length of dissolving and replacing it by persons of his own invention. General Ney, informed of these dissensions, in a province where the resistance against the French had been general and unanimous, instantly marched his forces into Asturias, expelled the Marquis de las Romerías, entered Oviedo and sacked it during three days. The French having evacuated Galicia at the end of 1809, our Marquis and Commissioner of the Central junta entered Coruna, united in his person all public authority, suppressed the district juntas, which had multiplied with the insurrection, and in their places appointing military governors, threatening the members of those juntas with persecution, actually persecuting the patriots, affecting a supreme benignity toward all who had embraced the cause of the invader, and proving in all other respects a mischievous, impotent, capricious blockhead. And what had been the shortcomings of the district and provincial juntas of Galicia? They had ordered a general recruitment without exemption of classes or persons; they had levied taxes upon the capitalists and proprietors; they had lowered the salaries of public functionaries; they

had commanded the ecclesiastical corporations to keep at their disposition the revenues existing in their chests. In one word, they had taken revolutionary measures. From the time of the glorious Marquis de las Romerías, Asturias and Galicia, the two provinces most distinguished by their general resistance to the French, withheld from partaking in the war of independence, whenever released from immediate danger of invasion.

In Valencia, where new prospects appeared to open as long as the people were left to themselves and to chiefs of their own choosing, the revolutionary spirit was broken down by the influence of the Central Government. Not contented to place that province under the generalship of one Don José Caro, the Central junta dispatched as "their own" Commissioner, the Baron Labazora. This Baron found fault with the provincial junta because it had resisted certain superior orders, and cancelled their decree by which the appointments to vacant canonship, ecclesiastical benefices, and commandries had been judiciously suspended and the revenues destined for the benefit of the military hospitals. Hence bitter contests between the Central junta and that of Valencia; hence, at a later epoch, the sleep of Valencia under the liberal administration of Marshal Suchet; hence its eagerness to proclaim Ferdinand VII on his return against the then revolutionary Government.

At Cadiz, the most revolutionary place in Spain at the epoch, the presence of a Commissioner of the Central junta, the stupid and conceited Marquis de Vittel, caused an insurrection to break out on the 22nd and 23rd of February, 1809, which, if not timely shifted to the war of independence, would have had the most disastrous consequences.

There exists no better sample of the discretion exhibited by the Central junta in the appointment of their own Commissioners, than that of the delegate to Wellington, Senor Lozano de Torres, who, while humbling himself in servile adulation before the English General, secretly informed the junta that the General's complaints on his want of provisions were altogether groundless. Wellington, having found out the double-tongued wretch, chased him ignominiously from his camp.

The Central junta were placed in the most fortunate circumstances for realizing what they had proclaimed in one of their addresses to the Spanish nation. "It has seemed good to Providence that in this terrible crisis you should not be

able to advance one step toward independence without advancing one likewise toward liberty." At the commencement of their reign the French had not yet obtained possession of one third of Spain. The ancient authorities they found either absent or prostrated by their connivance with the intruder, or dispersed at his bidding. There was no measure of social reform, transferring property and influence from the Church and the aristocracy to the middle class and the peasants, which the cause of defending the common country could not have enabled them to carry. They had the same good luck as the French *Comite du salut public*—that the convulsion within was backed by the necessities of defence against aggressions from without; moreover they had before them the example of the bold initiative which certain provinces had already been forced into by the pressure of circumstances. But not satisfied with hanging as a dead-weight on the Spanish revolution they actually worked in the sense of the counter-revolution, by re-establishing the ancient authorities, by forging anew the chains which had been broken, by stifling the revolutionary fire wherever it broke out, by themselves doing nothing and by preventing others from doing anything. During their stay at Seville, on July 20, 1809, even the English Tory Government thought necessary to address them a note strongly protesting against their counter-revolutionary course "apprehending that they were likely to suffocate the public enthusiasm." It has been remarked somewhere that Spain endured all the evils of revolution without acquiring revolutionary strength. If there be any truth in this remark, it is a sweeping condemnation passed upon the Central junta.

We have thought it the more necessary to dwell upon this point, as its decisive importance has never been understood by any European historian. Exclusively under the reign of the Central junta, it was possible to blend with the actualities and exigencies of national defence the transformation of Spanish society, and the emancipation of the native spirit, without which any political constitution must dissolve like a phantom at the slightest combat with real life. The Cortes were placed in quite opposite circumstances—they themselves driven back to an insulated spot of the Peninsula, cut off from the main body of the monarchy during two years by a besieging French army, and representing ideal Spain while real Spain was conquered or fighting. At the time of the Cortes, Spain was divided into two parts. At the Isla de Leon,

ideas without action—in the rest of Spain, action without ideas. At the time of the Central junta, on the contrary, particular weakness, incapacity and ill will were required on the part of the Supreme Government to draw a line of distinction between the Spanish war and the Spanish revolution. The Cortes, therefore, failed, not, as French and English writers assert, because they were revolutionists, but because their predecessors had been reactionists and had missed the proper season of revolutionary action. Modern Spanish writers, offended by the Anglo-French critics, have nevertheless proved unable to refute them, and still wince under the *bon mot* of the Abbe de Pradt: "The Spanish people resemble the wife of Sganarelle who wanted to be beaten."

*New York Daily Tribune, October 27, 1854.*

## V

THE Central junta failed in the defence of their country, because they failed in their revolutionary mission. Conscious of their own weakness, of the unstable tenor of their power, and of their extreme unpopularity, how could they have attempted to answer the rivalries, jealousies, and overbearing pretensions of their generals common to all revolutionary epochs, but by unworthy tricks and petty intrigues? Kept, as they were, in constant fear and suspicion of their own military chiefs, we may give full credit to Wellington when writing to his brother, the Marquis of Wellesley, on September 1, 1809:

I am much afraid, from what I have seen of the proceedings of the Central junta, that in the distribution of their forces, they did not consider military defence and military operations so much as they do political intrigue and the attainment of trifling political objects.

In revolutionary times, when all ties of subordination are loosened, military discipline can only be restored by civil discipline sternly weighing upon the generals. As the Central junta, from its incongruous complexion, never succeeded in controlling the generals, the generals always failed in controlling the soldiers, and to the end of the war the Spanish army never reached an average degree of discipline and subordination. This insubordination was kept up by the want of food, clothing, and all the other material requisites of an army—for the morale of an army, as Napoleon called it, de-

pend<sup>s</sup> altogether on its material condition. The Central junta<sup>s</sup> was unable regularly to provide for the army, because the poor poet Quintana's manifestoes would not do in this instance, and to add coercion to their decrees they must have resorted to the same revolutionary measures which they had condemned in the provinces. Even the general enlistment without respect to privilege and exemptions, and the facility granted to all Spaniards to obtain every grade in the army, was the work of the provincial juntas, and not of the Central junta. If the defeats of the Spanish armies were thus produced by the counter-revolutionary incapacities of the Central junta, these disasters in their turn still more depressed that Government, and by making it the object of popular contempt and suspicion, increased its dependence upon presumptuous but incapable military chiefs.

The Spanish standing army, if everywhere defeated, nevertheless presented itself at all points. More than twenty times dispersed, it was always ready again to show front to the enemy, and frequently reappeared with increased strength after a defeat. It was of no use to beat them, because, quick to flee, their loss in men was generally small, and as to the loss of the field they did not care about it. Retiring disorderly to the sierras, they were sure to reassemble and reappear when least expected, strengthened by new reinforcements, and able, if not to resist the French armies, at least to keep them in continual movement, and to oblige them to scatter their forces. More fortunate than the Russians, they did not even need to die in order to rise from the dead.

The disastrous battle at Ocana, November 19, 1809, was the last great pitched battle which the Spaniards fought; from that time they confined themselves to guerrilla warfare. The mere fact of the abandonment of regular warfare proves the disappearance of the national before the local centres of Government. When the disasters of the standing army became regular, the rising of the guerrillas became general, and the body of the people, hardly thinking of the national defeats, exulted in the local successes of their heroes. In this point at least the Central junta shared the popular delusion. "Fuller accounts were given in the *Gaceta* of an affair of guerrillas than of the battle of Ocana."

As Don Quixote had protested with his lance against gunpowder, so the guerrillas protested against Napoleon, only with different success. "These guerrillas," says the *Austrian Mili-*

*tary Journal*. (Vol. I, 1821), "carried their basis in themselves as it were, and every operation against them terminated in the disappearance of its object."

There are three periods to be distinguished in the history of the guerilla warfare. In the first period the population of whole provinces took up arms and made a partisan warfare, as in Galicia and Asturias. In the second period, guerrilla bands formed of the wrecks of the Spanish armies, of Spanish deserters from the French armies, of smugglers, etc., carried on the war as their own cause, independently of all foreign influence and agreeably to their immediate interest. Fortunate events and circumstances frequently brought whole districts under their colours. As long as the guerrillas were thus constituted, they made no formidable appearance as a body, but were nevertheless extremely dangerous to the French. They formed the basis of an actual armament of the people. As soon as an opportunity for a capture offered itself, or a combined enterprise was meditated, the most active and daring among the people came out and joined the guerrillas. They rushed with the utmost rapidity upon their booty, or placed themselves in order of battle, according to the object of their undertaking. It was not uncommon to see them standing out a whole day in sight of a vigilant enemy, in order to intercept a carrier or to capture supplies. It was in this way that the younger Mina captured the Viceroy of Navarra, appointed by Joseph Bonaparte, and that Julian made a prisoner of the Commandant of Cuidad Rodrigo. As soon as the enterprise was completed, everybody went his own way, and armed men were soon scattering in all directions; but the associated peasants quietly returned to their common occupation without "as much as their absence having been noticed." Thus the communication on all the roads was closed. Thousands of enemies were on the spot, though not one could be discovered. No courier could be dispatched without being taken, no supplies could set out without being intercepted; in short, no movement could be effected without being observed by a hundred eyes. At the same time, there existed no means of striking at the root of a combination of this kind. The French were obliged to be constantly armed against an enemy who continually flying, always reappeared, and was everywhere without being actually seen, the mountains serving as so many curtains. "It was," says the Abbe de Pradt, "neither battles nor engagements which exhausted the French forces, but the incessant



molestations of an invisible enemy, who, if pursued, became lost among the people, out of which he reappeared immediately afterward with renewed strength. The lion in the fable tormented to death by a gnat gives a true picture of the French army." In their third period, the guerrillas aped the regularity of the standing army, swelled their corps to the number of from 3,000 to 6,000 men, ceased to be the concern of whole districts, and fell into the hands of a few leaders, who made such use of them as best suited their own purposes. This change in the system of the guerrillas gave the French, in their contests with them, considerable advantage. Rendered incapable by their great numbers to conceal themselves, and to suddenly disappear without being forced into battle, as they had formerly done, the guerrilleros were now frequently overtaken, defeated, dispersed, and disabled for a length of time from offering any further molestation.

By comparing the three periods of guerrilla warfare with the political history of Spain, it is found that they represent the respective degrees into which the counter-revolutionary spirit of the Government had succeeded in cooling the spirit of the people. Beginning with the rise of whole populations, the partisan war was next carried on by guerrilla bands, of which whole districts formed the reserve and terminated in *corps francs* continually on the point of dwindling into banditti, or sinking down to the level of standing regiments.

Estrangement from the Supreme Government, relaxed discipline, continual disasters, constant formation, decomposition, and recomposition during six years of the *cadrez* must have necessarily stamped upon the body of the Spanish army the character of pretorianism, making them equally ready to become the tools or the scourges of their chiefs. The generals themselves had necessarily participated in, quarreled with, or conspired against the Central Government, and always thrown the weight of their sword into the political balance. Thus Cuesta, who afterwards seemed to win the confidence of the Central junta at the same rate that he lost the battles of the country, had begun by conspiring with the *Consejo Real* and by arresting the Leonese Deputies to the Central junta. General Morla himself, a member of the Central junta, went over into the Bonapartist camp, after he had surrendered Madrid to the French. The coxcombical Marquis de las Romerías, also a member of the junta, conspired with the vainglorious Francisco Palafox, the wretched Montijo,

and the turbulent junta of Seville against it. The Generals Castanos, Blake, La Bisbal (an O'Donnell) figured and intrigued successively at the times of the Cortes as Regents, and the Captain-General of Valencia, Don Xavier Elio surrendered Spain finally to the mercies of Ferdinand VII. The pretorian element was certainly more developed with the generals than with their troops.

On the other hand, the army and guerrilleros—which received during the war part of their chiefs, like Porlier, Lacy, Eroles and Villacampa, from the ranks of distinguished officers of the line, while the line in its turn afterward received guerrilla chiefs, like Mina, Empecinado, etc.—were the most revolutionized portion of Spanish society, recruited as they were from all ranks, including the whole of the fiery, aspiring and patriotic youth, inaccessible to the soporific influence of the Central Government; emancipated from the shackles of the ancient regime; part of them, like Riego, returning after some year's captivity in France. We are, then, not to be surprised at the influence exercised by the Spanish army in subsequent commotions; neither when taking the revolutionary initiative, nor when spoiling the revolution by pretorianism.

As to the guerrillas, it is evident that, having for some years figured upon the theatre of sanguinary contests, taken to roving habits, freely indulged all their passions of hatred, revenge, and love of plunder, they must, in times of peace, form a most dangerous mob, always ready at a nod in the name of any party or principle, to step forward for him who is able to give them good pay or to afford them a pretext for plundering excursions.

*New York Daily Tribune, October 30, 1854*

## VI

ON September 24, 1810, the Extraordinary Cortes assembled on the Isla de Leon, on February 20, 1811, they removed their sittings thence to Cadiz; on March 19, 1812, they promulgated the new Constitution; and on September 20, 1813, they closed their sittings, three years from the period of their opening.

The circumstances under which this Congress met are without parallel in history. While no legislative body had ever before gathered its members from such various parts of the globe, or pretended to control such immense territories

in Europe, America and Asia, such a diversity of races and such a complexity of interests—nearly the whole of Spain was occupied by the French and the Congress itself, actually cut off from Spain by hostile armies, and relegated to a small neck of land, had to legislate in the sight of a surrounding and besieging army. From the remote angle of the *Isla Gaditana* they undertook to lay the foundation of a new Spain, as their forefathers had done from the mountains of Covadonga and Sobrarbe. How are we to account for the curious phenomenon of the Constitution of 1812, afterward branded by the crowned heads of Europe, assembled at Verona, as the most incendiary invention of Jacobinism, having sprung up from the head of old monastic and absolutist Spain at the very epoch when she seemed totally absorbed in waging a holy war against the revolution? How, on the other hand, are we to account for the sudden disappearance of this same Constitution, vanishing like a shadow—like the “*sueno de sombra*,” say the Spanish historians—when brought into contact with a living Bourbon? If the birth of that Constitution is a riddle, its death is no less so. To solve the enigma, we propose to commence with a short review of this same Constitution of 1812, which the Spaniards tried again to realize at two subsequent epochs, first during the period from 1820-23, and then in 1836.

The Constitution of 1812 consists of 334 articles and comprehends the following 10 divisions: 1. On the Spanish nation and the Spaniards. 2. On the territory of Spain, its religion, government, and on Spanish citizens. 3. On the Cortes. 4. On the King. 5. On the tribunals and administration of justice in civil and criminal matters. 6. On the interior government of the provinces and communes. 7. On the taxes. 8. On the national military forces. 9. On public education. 10. On the observance of the Constitution, and mode of proceeding to make alterations therein.

Proceeding from the principle that “the sovereignty resides essentially in the nation, to which, therefore, alone belongs exclusively the right of establishing fundamental laws,” the Constitution, nevertheless, proclaims a division of powers, according to which “the legislative power is placed in the Cortes jointly with the King”; “the execution of the laws is confided to the King,” “the application of the laws in civil and criminal affairs belongs exclusively to the tribunals, neither the Cortes nor the King being in any case empowered to exercise judicial authority, advocate pending cases, or

command the revival of concluded judgment."

The basis of the national representation is mere population, one Deputy for every 70,000 souls. The Cortes consists of one house, viz the commons, the election of the Deputies being by universal suffrage. The elective franchise is enjoyed by all Spaniards, with the exception of menial servants, bankrupts and criminals. After the year 1830, no citizen can enjoy this right, who cannot read and write. The election is, however, indirect, having to pass through the three degrees of parochial, district and provincial elections. There is no defined property qualification for a Deputy. It is true that according to Art. 92, "it is necessary in order to be eligible as a Deputy to the Cortes, to possess a proportionate annual income, proceeding from real personal property," but Art. 93 suspends the preceding article, until the Cortes in their future meetings declare the period to have arrived in which it shall take effect. **The King has neither the right to dissolve nor prorogue the Cortes, who annually meet at the Capital on the first of March, without being convoked, and sit at least three months consecutively.**

A new Cortes is elected every second year, and no Deputy can sit in two Cortes consecutively, i.e., one can only be re-elected after an intervening Cortes of two years. No Deputy can ask or accept rewards, pensions, or honours from the King. The Secretaries of State, the Councilors of State, and those fulfilling offices of the royal household, are ineligible as Deputies to the Cortes. No public officer employed by Government shall be elected Deputy to the Cortes from the province in which he discharges his trust. To indemnify the Deputies for their expenses, the respective provinces shall contribute such daily allowances as the Cortes, in the second year of every General Deputation, shall point out for the Deputation that is to succeed it. The Cortes cannot deliberate in the presence of the King. In those cases where the Ministers have any communication to make to the Cortes in the name of the King, they may attend the debates when, and in such manner, as the Cortes may think fit, and may speak therein, but they cannot be present at a vote. The King, the Prince of Asturias, and the Regents have to swear to the Constitution before the Cortes, who determine any question of fact or right that may occur in the order of the succession to the Crown, and elect a Regency if necessary. **The Cortes are to approve, previous to ratification, all treaties of offensive**

alliances, or of subsidies and commerce, to permit or refuse the admission of foreign troops into the kingdom, to decree the creation and suppression of offices in the tribunals established by the Constitution, and also the creation or abolition of public offices, to determine every year, at the recommendation of the King, the land and sea forces in peace and in war, to issue ordinances to the army, the fleet, and the national militia, in all their branches; to fix the expenses of the public administration; to establish annually the taxes, to take property on loan, in cases of necessity, upon the credit of the public funds, to decide on all matters respecting money, weights and measures; to establish a general plan of public education, to protect the political liberty of the press, to render real and effective the responsibility of the Ministers, etc. The King enjoys only a suspensive veto, which he may exercise during two consecutive sessions, but if the same project of new law should be proposed a third time, and approved by the Cortes of the following year, the King is understood to have given his assent, and has actually to give it. Before the Cortes terminate a session, they appoint a permanent committee, consisting of seven of their members, sitting in the Capital until the meeting of the next Cortes, endowed with powers to watch over the strict observance of the Constitution and administration of the laws; reporting to the next Cortes any infraction it may have observed, and empowered to convoke an extraordinary Cortes in critical times. The King cannot quit the kingdom without the consent of the Cortes. He requires the consent of the Cortes for contracting a marriage. The Cortes fix the annual revenue of the King's household.

The only Privy Council of the King is the Council of State, in which the Ministers have no seat, and which consists of forty persons, four ecclesiastics, four grandees of Spain, and the rest formed by distinguished administrators, all of them chosen by the King from a list of one hundred and twenty persons nominated by the Cortes; but no actual Deputy can be a Councilor, and no Councilor can accept offices, honours, or employment from the King. The Councilors of State cannot be removed without sufficient reasons, proved before the Supreme Court of Justice. The Cortes fix the salary of these Councilors whose opinion the King will hear upon all important matters, and who nominate the candidates for ecclesiastical and judicial places. In the sections respecting the judicature, all the old *consejos* are abolished, a new organization of tri-

bunals is introduced, a Supreme Court of Justice is established to try the Ministers when impeached, to take cognizance of all cases of dismissal and suspension from office of Councilors of State, and the officers of Courts of Justice, etc. Without proof that reconciliation has been attempted, no law-suit can be commenced. Torture, compulsion, confiscation of property are suppressed. All exceptional tribunals are abolished but the military and ecclesiastic against the decisions of which appeals to the Supreme Court are however permitted.

For the interior government of towns and communes (communes, where they do not exist, to be formed from districts with a population of 1,000 souls), *Ayuntamientos* shall be formed of one or more magistrates, aldermen and public councilors, to be presided over by the chief of police (*corregidor*) and to be chosen by general election. No public officer actually employed and appointed by the King, can be eligible as a magistrate, alderman or public councilor. The municipal employments shall be public duty, from which no person can be exempt without lawful reason. The municipal corporations shall discharge all their duties under the inspection of the provincial deputation.

The political government of the provinces shall be placed in the Governor (*Jefe Politico*) appointed by the King. This Governor is connected with a deputation, over which he presides, and which is elected by the districts when assembled for the general election of the members for a new Cortes. These provincial deputations consist of seven members, assisted by a Secretary paid by the Cortes. These deputations shall hold sessions for ninety days at most in every year. From the powers and duties assigned to them, they may be considered as permanent committees of the Cortes. All members of the *Ayuntamientos* and provincial deputations, in entering office, swear fidelity to the Constitution. With regard to the taxes, all Spaniards are bound, without any distinction whatever, to contribute, in proportion to their means, to the expenses of the State. All custom-houses shall be suppressed, except in the seaports and on the frontier. All Spaniards are likewise bound to military service, and, beside the standing army, there shall be formed corps of national militia in each province, consisting of the inhabitants of the same, in proportion to its population and circumstances. Lastly, the Constitution of 1812 cannot be altered, augmented, or corrected in any of its details, until eight years have elapsed after its having been carried into practice.

When the Cortes drew up this new plan of the Spanish State, they were of course aware that such a modern political Constitution would be altogether incompatible with the old social system, and consequently, they promulgated a series of decrees, with a view to organic changes in civil society. Thus they abolished the Inquisition. They suppressed the seigniorial jurisdictions; with their exclusive, prohibitive, and private feudal privileges, i e, those of the chase, fishery, forests, mills, etc., excepting such as had been acquired on an onerous title, and which were to be reimbursed. They abolished the tithes throughout the monarchy, suspended the nominations to all ecclesiastic prebends not necessary for the performance of divine service, and took steps for the suppression of the monasteries and the sequestration of their property.

They intended to transform the immense wastelands, royal domains and commons of Spain into private property, by selling one half of them for the extinction of the public debt, distributing another part by lot as a patriotic remuneration for the disbanded soldiers of the war of independence and granting a third part, gratuitously, and also by lot, to the poor peasantry who should desire to possess but not be able to buy them. They allowed the inclosure of pastures and other real property, formerly forbidden. They repealed the absurd laws which prevented pastures from being converted into arable land or arable land converted into pasture, and generally freed agriculture from the old arbitrary and ridiculous rules. They revoked all feudal laws with respect to farming contracts, and the law according to which the successor of an entailed estate was not obliged to confirm the leases granted by his predecessor, the leases expiring with him who had granted them. They abolished the *Voto de Santiago*, under which name was understood an ancient tribute of a certain measure of the best bread and the best wine to be paid by the labourers of certain provinces principally for the maintenance of the Archbishop and Chapter of Santiago. They decreed the introduction of a large progressive tax, etc.

It being one of their principal aims to hold possession of the American colonies, which had already begun to revolt, they acknowledged the full political equality of the American and European Spaniards, proclaimed a general amnesty without any exception, issued decrees against the oppression weighing upon the original natives of America and Asia, cancelled the *mitas*, the *repartimientos*,\* etc., abolished the monopoly of

quicksilver, and took the lead of Europe in suppressing the slave-trade.

The Constitution of 1812 has been accused on the one hand—for instance, by Ferdinand VII himself (see his decree of May 4, 1814)—of being a mere imitation of the French Constitution of 1791, transplanted on the Spanish soil by visionaries, regardless of the historical traditions of Spain. On the other hand, it has been contended—for instance, by the Abbe de Pradt (*De la Revolution actuelle de l'Espagne*)—that the Cortes unreasonably clung to antiquated formulas, borrowed from the ancient *Fueros*,<sup>\*</sup> and belonging to feudal times, when the royal authority was checked by the exorbitant privileges of the *grandees*.

The truth is that the Constitution of 1812 is a reproduction of the ancient *Fueros*, but read in the light of the French Revolution, and adapted to the wants of modern society. The right of insurrection, for instance, is generally regarded as one of the boldest innovations of the Jacobin Constitution of 1793, but you meet this same right in the ancient *Fueros* of Sobrarbe, where it is called the *Privilegio de la Union*. You find it also in the ancient Constitution of Castile. According to the *Fueros* of Sobrarbe, the King cannot make peace nor declare war, nor conclude treaties, without the previous consent of the Cortes. The Permanent Committee, consisting of seven members of the Cortes, who are to watch over the strict observance of the Constitution during the prorogation of the legislative body, was of old established in Aragon, and was introduced into Castile at the time when the principal Cortes of the monarchy were united in one single body. To the period of the French invasion a similar institution still existed in the kingdom of Navarre. Touching the formation of a State Council from a list of 120 persons presented to the King by the Cortes and paid by them—this singular creation of the Constitution of 1812 was suggested by the remembrance of the fatal influence exercised by the *camarillas* at all epochs of the Spanish monarchy. The State Council was intended to supersede the *camarilla*. Besides, there existed analogous institu-

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\**Mita*: the assignment of Indians on "public works" by lottery. *Repartimiento*: the right of a white person to employ as many aliens on his land as he is able to feed.—Ed.

\*\**Fueros*: the rights and privileges which certain districts of Spain enjoyed under feudalism.—Ed.



tions in the past. At the time of Ferdinand IV, for instance, the King was always surrounded by twelve commoners, designated by the cities of Castile, to serve as his Privy Coun-  
cillors, and, in 1419, the Delegates of the cities complained that their Commissioners were no longer admitted into the King's Council. The exclusion of the highest functionaries and the members of the King's household from the Cortes, as well as the prohibition to the Deputies to accept honours or offices on the part of the King seems, at first view, to be borrowed from the Constitution of 1791, and naturally to flow from the modern division of powers, sanctioned by the Constitution of 1812. But, in fact, we meet not only in the ancient Constitution of Castile with precedents, but we know that the people, at different times, rose and assassinated the Deputies who had accepted honours or offices from the Crown. As to the right of the Cortes to appoint Regencies in case of minority, it had continually been exercised by the ancient Cortes of Castile during the long minorities of the fourteenth century.

It is true that the Cadiz Cortes deprived the King of the power he had always exercised of convoking, dissolving, or proroguing the Cortes, but as the Cortes had fallen into disuse by the very manner in which the Kings improved their privileges, there was nothing more evident than the necessity of cancelling it. The alleged facts may suffice to show that the anxious limitation of the royal power—the most striking feature of the Constitution of 1812—otherwise fully explained by the recent and revolting *souvenirs* of Godoy's contemptible despotism, derived its origin from the ancient Fueros of Spain. The Cadiz Cortes but transferred the control from the privileged *estates* to the national representation. How much the Spanish Kings stood in awe of the ancient Fueros may be seen from the fact that when a new collection of the Spanish laws had become necessary, in 1805, a royal ordinance ordered the removal from it of all the remains of feudalism contained in the last collection of laws, and belonging to a time when the weakness of the monarchy forced the Kings to enter with their vassals into compromises derogatory to the sovereign power.

If the election of the Deputies by general suffrage was an innovation, it must not be forgotten that the Cortes of 1812 were themselves elected by general suffrage, that all the juntas had been elected by it, that a limitation of it would, there-

fore, have been an infraction of a right already conquered by the people ; and, lastly, that a property qualification, at a time when almost all the real property of Spain was locked up in mortmain, would have excluded the greater part of the population.

The meeting of the Representatives in one single house was by no means copied from the French Constitution of 1791, as the morose English Tories will have it. Our readers know already that since Charles I (the Emperor Charles V) the aristocracy and the clergy had lost their seats in the Cortes of Castile. But even at the time when the Cortes were divided into *brazos* (arms, branches), representing the different estates, they assembled in one single hall, separated only by their seats, and voting in common. From the provinces, in which alone the Cortes still possessed real power at the epoch of the French invasion, Navarre continued the old custom of convoking the Cortes by *estate* ; but in the Vascongadas the altogether democratic assemblies admitted not even the clergy. Besides, if the clergy and aristocracy had saved their obnoxious privileges, they had long since ceased to form independent political bodies, the existence of which constituted the basis of the composition of the ancient Cortes.

The separation of the judiciary from the executive power, decreed by the Cadiz Cortes, was demanded as early as the eighteenth century, by the most enlightened statesmen of Spain, and the general odium which the *Consejo Real*, from the beginning of the revolution, had concentrated upon itself, made the necessity of reducing the tribunals to their proper sphere of action universally felt.

The section of the Constitution which refers to the municipal government of the communes, is a genuine Spanish offspring, as we have shown in a former article. The Cortes only re-established the old municipal system, while they stripped off its medieval character. As to the provincial deputations, invested with the same powers for the internal government of the provinces as the *Ayuntamientos* for the administration of the communes, the Cortes modeled them in imitation of similar institutions still existing at the time of the invasion in Navarre, Biscay and Asturias. In abolishing the exemptions from the military service, the Cortes sanctioned only what had become the general practice during the war of independence. The abolition of the Inquisition was also but the sanction of a fact, as the holy office, although

re-established by the Central junta, had not dared to resume its functions, its holy members being content with pocketing their salaries, and prudently waiting for better times. As to the suppression of feudal abuses, the Cortes went not even the length of the reforms insisted upon in the famous memorial of Jovellanos, presented in 1795 to the *Consejo Real* in the name of the economical society of Madrid.

The Ministers of the enlightened despotism of the latter part of the eighteenth century, Floridablanca and Campomanes, had already begun to take steps in this direction. Besides, it must not be forgotten that simultaneously with the Cortes, there sat a French Government at Madrid, which, in all the provinces overrun by the armies of Napoleon, had swept away from the soil all monastic and feudal institutions, and introduced the modern system of administration. The Bonapartist papers denounced the insurrection as entirely produced by the artifices and bribes of England, assisted by the monks and the Inquisition. How far the rivalry with the intruding Government must have exercised a salutary influence upon the decisions of the Cortes, may be inferred from the fact that the Central junta itself, in its decree dated September, 1809, wherein the convocation of the Cortes is announced, addressed the Spaniards in the following terms: "Our detractors say that we are fighting to defend old abuses and the inveterate vices of our corrupted Government. Let them know that your struggle is for the happiness as well as the independence of your country, that you will not depend henceforward on the uncertain will or the various temper of a single man," etc.

On the other hand, we may trace in the Constitution of 1812 symptoms not to be mistaken of a compromise entered into between the liberal ideas of the eighteenth century and the dark traditions of priestcraft. It suffices to quote Art. 12, according to which "the religion of the Spanish nation is and shall be perpetually Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman, the only true religion. The nation protects it by wise and just laws, and prohibits the exercise of any other whatever"; or Art. 173, ordering the King to take, on his accession to the throne, the following oath before the Cortes: "N., by the grace of God, and the Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, King of Spain, I swear by the Almighty and the Holy Evangelists, that I will defend and preserve the Catholic, Roman, and Apostolic religion, without tolerating any other in the kingdom."

On a closer analysis, then, of the Constitution of 1812, we

arrive at the conclusion that, so far from being a servile copy of the French Constitution of 1791, it was a genuine and original offspring of Spanish intellectual life, regenerating the ancient and national institutions, introducing the measures of reform loudly demanded by the most celebrated authors and statesmen of the eighteenth century, making inevitable concessions to popular prejudice.

*New York Daily Tribune*, November 24, 1854.

## VII

THERE were some circumstances favourable to the assembling at Cadiz of the most progressive men of Spain. When the elections took place, the movement had not yet subsided, and the very disfavour which the Central junta had incurred recommended its antagonists, who, to a great extent, belonged to the revolutionary minority of the nation. At the first meeting of the Cortes, the most democratic provinces, Catalonia and Galicia, were almost exclusively represented, the Deputies from Leon, Valencia, Murcia and the *Islas Baleares*, not arriving till three months later. The most reactionary provinces, those of the interior, were not allowed, except in some few localities, to proceed with the elections for the Cortes. For the different kingdoms, cities and towns of old Spain, which the French armies prevented from choosing Deputies, as well as for the ultramarine provinces of New Spain, whose Deputies could not arrive in due time, supplementary Representatives were elected from the many individuals whom the troubles of the war had driven from the provinces to Cadiz, and the numerous South Americans, merchants, natives and others, whose curiosity or the state of affairs had likewise assembled at that place. Thus it happened that those provinces were represented by men more fond of innovation, and more impregnated with the ideas of the eighteenth century, than would have been the case if they had been enabled to choose for themselves. Lastly, the circumstance of the Cortes meeting at Cadiz was of decisive influence, that city being then known as the most radical of the kingdom, more resembling an American than a Spanish town. Its population filled the galleries in the Hall of the Cortes and domineered the reactionists, when their opposition grew too obnoxious, by a system of intimidation and pressure from without.

It would, however, be a great mistake to suppose that the majority of the Cortes consisted of reformers. The Cortes were divided into three parties—the *Serviles*, the *Liberales* (these party denominations spread from Spain through the whole of Europe), and the *Americanos*, the latter voting alternately with the one or the other party, according to their particular interests. The *Serviles*, far superior in numbers, were carried away by the activity, zeal and enthusiasm of the Liberal minority. The ecclesiastic Deputies who formed the majority of the *Servile* party, were always ready to sacrifice the royal prerogative, partly from the remembrance of the antagonism of the Church to the State, partly with a view to courting popularity, in order thus to save the privileges and abuses of their caste. During the debates on the general suffrage, the one-chamber system, the no-property qualification and the suspensive veto the ecclesiastic party always combined with the more democratic part of the Liberals against the partisans of the English Constitution. One of them, the Canon Canedo, afterward Archbishop of Burgos, and an implacable persecutor of the Liberals, addressed Senor Munoz Torrero, also a Canon, but belonging to the Liberal party, in these terms: "You suffer the King to remain excessively powerful, but as a priest you ought to plead the cause of the Church rather than that of the King." Into these compromises with the Church party the Liberals were forced to enter, as we have already shown from some articles of the Constitution of 1812. When the liberty of the press was discussed, the parsons denounced it as "contrary to religion." After the most stormy debates, and after having declared that all persons were at liberty to publish their sentiments without special license, the Cortes unanimously admitted an amendment, which, by inserting the word *political*, curtailed this liberty of half its extent, and left all writings upon religious matters subject to the censure of the ecclesiastic authorities, according to the decrees of the Council of Trent. On August 18, 1817, after a decree passed against all who should conspire against the Constitution, another decree was passed, declaring that whoever should conspire to make the Spanish nation cease to profess the Catholic Roman religion should be prosecuted as a traitor, and suffer death. When the *Voto de Santiago* was abolished, a compensatory resolution was carried, declaring *Saint Teresa de Jesus* the patroness of Spain. The Liberals also took care not to propose and carry the decrees about the abolition of

the Inquisition, the tithes, the monasteries, etc., till after the Constitution had been proclaimed. But from that very moment the opposition of the Serviles within the Cortes, and the clergy without, became inexorable.

Having now explained the circumstances which account for the origin and the characteristic features of the Constitution of 1812, there still remains the problem to be solved of its sudden and resistless disappearance at the return of Ferdinand VII. A more humiliating spectacle has seldom been witnessed by the world. When Ferdinand entered Valencia, on April 16, 1814, "the joyous people yoked themselves to his carriage, and testified by every possible expression of word and deed, their desire of taking the old yoke upon themselves, shouting, 'Long live the absolute King!' 'Down with the Constitution!'" In all the large towns, the Plaza Mayor, or Great Square, had been named Plaza de la Constitucion, and a stone with these words engraved on it, erected there. In Valencia this stone was removed, and a "provisional" stone of wood set up in its place with the inscription: *Real Plaza de Fernando VII.* The populace of Seville deposed all the existing authorities, elected others in their stead to all the offices which had existed under the old regime, and then required those authorities to re-establish the Inquisition. From Aranjuez to Madrid Ferdinand's carriage was drawn by the people. When the King alighted, the mob took him up in their arms, triumphantly showed him to the immense concourse assembled in front of the palace, and in their arms conveyed him to his apartments. The word Liberty appeared in large bronze letters over the entrance of the Hall of the Cortes in Madrid; the rabble hurried thither to remove it; they set up ladders, forced out letter by letter from the stone, and as each was thrown into the street, the spectators renewed their shouts of exultation. They collected as many of the journals of the Cortes and of the papers and pamphlets of the Liberals as could be got together, formed a procession in which the religious fraternities and the clergy, regular and secular, took the lead, piled up these papers in one of the public squares, and sacrificed them there as a political *auto-da-fe*, after which high mass was performed and the Te Deum sung as a thanksgiving for their triumph. More important perhaps—since these shameless demonstrations of the town mob, partly paid for their performances, and like the Lazzaroni of Naples, preferring the wanton rule of kings and monks to

the sober regime of the middle classes—is the fact that the second general elections resulted in a decisive victory of the Serviles; the Constituent Cortes being replaced by the ordinary Cortes on September 20, 1813, who transferred their sittings from Cadiz to Madrid on January 15, 1814.

We have shown in former articles how the revolutionary party itself had participated in rousing and strengthening the old popular prejudices, with a view to turn them into so many weapons against Napoleon. We have then seen how the Central junta, at the only period when social changes were to be blended with measures of national defence, did all in their power to prevent them, and to suppress the revolutionary aspirations of the provinces. The Cadiz Cortes, on the contrary, cut off during the greater part of their existence from all connection with Spain, were not even enabled to make their Constitution and their organic decrees known, except as the French armies retired. The Cortes arrived, as it were *post factum*. They found society fatigued, exhausted, suffering; the necessary product of so protracted a war, entirely carried on upon the Spanish soil; a war in which the armies, being always on the move, the Government of today was seldom that of tomorrow, while bloodshed did not cease one single day during almost six years throughout the whole surface of Spain, from Cadiz to Pamplona, and from Granada to Salamanca. It was not to be expected that such a society should be very sensible of the abstract beauties of any political Constitution whatever. Nevertheless, when the Constitution was first proclaimed at Madrid, and the other provinces evacuated by the French, it was received with "exultant delight," the masses being generally expecting a sudden disappearance of their social sufferings from mere change of Government. When they discovered that the Constitution was not possessed of such miraculous powers, the very overstrained expectations which had welcomed it turned into disappointment, and with these passionate Southern peoples there is but one step from disappointment to hatred.

There were some particular circumstances which principally contributed to estrange the popular sympathies from the Constitutional regime. The Cortes had published the severest decree against the *Afrancesados* or the *Josephites*.<sup>\*</sup> The Cortes were partly driven to these decrees by the vin-

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<sup>\*</sup>*Josephites*: the supporters of Joseph Bonaparte.—Ed.

dictive clamour of the populace and the reactionists, who at once turned against the Cortes as soon as the decrees they had wrung from them were put to execution. Upwards of 10,000 families became thus exiled. A lot of petty tyrants let loose on the provinces, evacuated by the French, established their proconsular authority, and began by inquiries, prosecution, prison, inquisitorial proceedings against those compromised through adherence to the French, by having accepted offices from them, bought national property from them, etc. The Regency, instead of trying to effect the transition from the French to the national regime in a conciliatory and discreet way, did all in their power to aggravate the evils and exasperate the passions, inseparable from such changes of dominion. But why did they do so? In order to be able to ask from the Cortes a suspension of the Constitution of 1812, which, they told them, worked so very offensively. Be it remarked, *en passant*, that all the Regencies, these supreme executive authorities appointed by the Cortes, were regularly composed of the most decided enemies of the Cortes and their Constitution. This curious fact is simply explained by the Americans always combining with the Serviles in the appointment of the executive power, the weakening of which they considered necessary for the attainment of American independence from the mother country, since they were sure that an executive simply at variance with the sovereign Cortes would prove insufficient. The introduction by the Cortes of a single direct tax upon the rental of land, as well as upon industrial and commercial produce, excited also great discontent among the people, and still more so the absurd decrees forbidding the circulation of all Spanish specie coined by Joseph Bonaparte, and ordering its possessors to exchange it for national coin, simultaneously interdicting the circulation of French money, and proclaiming a tariff at which it was to be exchanged at the national mint. As this tariff greatly differed from that proclaimed by the French in 1808, for the relative value of French and Spanish coins, many private individuals were involved in great losses. This absurd measure also contributed to raise the price of the first necessities, already highly above the average rates.

The classes most interested in the overthrow of the Constitution of 1812, and the restoration of the old regime—the grandees, the clergy, the friars and the lawyers—did not fail to excite to the highest pitch the popular discontent created



by the unfortunate circumstances which had marked the introduction on the Spanish soil of the Constitutional regime. Hence the victory of the Serviles in the general elections of 1813.

Only on the part of the army could the King apprehend any serious resistance, but General Elio and his officers, breaking the oath they had sworn to the Constitution, proclaimed Ferdinand VII at Valencia, without mentioning the Constitution. Elio was soon followed by the other military chiefs.

In his decree, dated May 4, 1814, in which Ferdinand VII dissolved the Madrid Cortes and cancelled the Constitution of 1812, he simultaneously proclaimed his hatred of despotism, promised to convene the Cortes under the old legal forms, to establish a rational liberty of the press, etc. He redeemed his pledge in the only manner which the reception he had met on the part of the Spanish people deserved—by rescinding all the acts emanating from the Cortes, by restoring everything to its ancient footing, by re-establishing the Holy Inquisition, by recalling the Jesuits banished by his grandsire, by consigning the most prominent members of the juntas, the Cortes and their adherents to the galleys, African prisons, or to exile; and, finally, by ordering the most illustrious guerrilla chiefs, Porlier and de Lacy, to be shot.

*New York Daily Tribune*, December 1, 1854

## VIII

DURING the year 1819 an expeditionary army was assembled in the environs of Cadiz for the purpose of reconquering the revolted American colonies. Jose Enrique O'Donnell, Count de La Bisbal, the uncle of Leopoldo O'Donnell, the present Spanish Minister, was intrusted with the command. The former expeditions against Spanish America having swallowed up 14,000 men since 1814, and being carried out in the most disgusting and reckless manner, had grown most odious to the army, and were generally considered a malicious means of getting rid of the dissatisfied regiments. Several officers, among them Quiroga, Lopez Banos, San Miguel (the present Spanish Lafayette), O'Daly, and Arco Aguero, determined to improve the discontent of the soldiers, to shake off the yoke, and to proclaim the Constitution of 1812. La Bisbal, when initiated into the plot, promised to put himself at the head

of the movement. The chiefs of the conspiracy, in conjunction with him, fixed on July 9, 1819, as the day on which a general review of the expeditionary troops was to take place, in the midst of which act the grand blow was to be struck. At the hour of the review La Bisbal appeared, indeed, but instead of keeping his word, ordered the conspiring regiments to be disarmed, sent Quiroga and the other chiefs to prison, and dispatched a courier to Madrid, boasting that he had prevented the most alarming of catastrophes. He was rewarded with promotion and decorations, but the Court having obtained more accurate information, afterward deprived him of his command, and ordered him to withdraw to the capital. This is the same La Bisbal who, in 1814, at the time of the King's return to Spain, sent an officer of his staff with two letters to Ferdinand. Too great a distance from the spot rendering it impossible for him to observe the King's movements, and to regulate his conduct according to that of the monarch—in one letter La Bisbal made a pompous eulogy of the Constitution of 1812, on the supposition that the King would take the oath to support it. In the other, on the contrary, he represented the Constitutional system as a scheme of anarchy and confusion, congratulated Ferdinand on his exterminating it, and offered himself and his army to oppose the rebels, demagogues, and enemies of the throne and altar. The officer delivered this second dispatch, which was cordially received by the Bourbon.

Notwithstanding the symptoms of rebellion which had shown themselves among the expeditionary army, the Madrid Government, at the head of which was placed the Duke of San Fernando, then Foreign Minister and President of the Cabinet, persisted in a state of inexplicable apathy and inactivity, and did nothing to accelerate the expedition, or to scatter the army in different seaport towns. Meanwhile a simultaneous movement was agreed upon between Don Rafael de Riego, commanding the second battalion of Asturias, then stationed at Las Cabezas de San Juan, and Quiroga, San Miguel, and other military chiefs of the Isla de Leon, who had contrived to get out of prison. Riego's position was far the most difficult. The commune of Las Cabezas was in the centre of three of the headquarters of the expeditionary army—that of the cavalry at Utrera, the second division of infantry at Lebrija, and a battalion of guides at Arcos, where the commander-in-chief and the staff were established. He nevertheless succeeded, on January 1, 1820, in surprising and capturing the commander

and the staff, although the battalion cantoned at Arcos was double the strength of that of Asturias. On the same day he proclaimed in that very commune the Constitution of 1812, elected a provisional *alcalde*, and, not content with having executed the task devolved upon him, seduced the guides to his cause, surprised the battalion of Aragon lying at Bornos, marched from Bornos on Jerez, and from Jerez on Puerto Santa Maria, everywhere proclaiming the Constitution, till he reached the Isla de Leon, on the 7th January, where he deposited the military prisoners he had made in the fort of San Pedro. Contrary to their previous agreement, Quiroga and his followers had not possessed themselves by a *coup de main* of the bridge of Suazo, and then of the Isla de Leon, but remained tranquil to the 2nd of January, after Oltra, Riego's messenger, had conveyed to them official intelligence of the surprise of Arcos and the capture of the staff.

The whole forces of the revolutionary army, the supreme command of which was given to Quiroga, did not exceed 5,000 men, and their attacks upon the gates of Cadiz having been repulsed, they were themselves shut up in the Isla de Leon. "Our situation," says San Miguel, "was extraordinary; the revolution, stationary twenty-five days without losing or gaining an inch of ground, presented one of the most singular phenomena in politics." The provinces seemed rocked into lethargic slumber. During the whole month of January, at the end of which Riego, apprehending the flame of revolution might be extinguished in the Isla de Leon, formed, against the councils of Quiroga and the other chiefs, a movable column of 1,500 men, and marched over a part of Andalusia, in presence of and pursued by a ten times stronger force than his own, proclaiming the Constitution at Algeciras, Ronda, Malaga, Cordova, etc., everywhere received by the inhabitants in a friendly way, but nowhere provoking a serious pronunciamiento. Meanwhile his pursuers, consuming a whole month in fruitless marches and countermarches, seemed to desire nothing but to avoid, as much as possible, coming to close quarters with his little army. The conduct of the Government troops was altogether inexplicable. Riego's expedition, which began on January 27, 1820, terminated on March 11, he being then forced to disband the few men that still followed him. His small corps was not dispersed through a decisive battle, but disappeared from fatigue, from continual petty encounters with the enemy, from sickness and desertion.

Meanwhile the situation of the insurrectionists in the Isla was by no means promising. They continued to be blocked up by sea and land, and within the town of Cadiz every declaration for their cause was suppressed by the garrison. How, then, did it happen that, Riego having disbanded in the Sierra Morena the Constitutional troops on the 11th of March, Ferdinand VII was forced to swear to the Constitution, at Madrid, on the 9th of March, so that Riego really gained his end just two days before he finally despaired of his cause?

The march of Riego's column had riveted anew the general attention; the provinces were all expectation, and eagerly watched every movement. Men's minds, struck by the boldness of Riego's sally, the rapidity of his march, his vigorous repulses of the enemy, imagined triumphs never gained, and aggregations and reinforcements never obtained. When the tidings of Riego's enterprise reached the more distant provinces, they were magnified in no small degree, and those most remote from the spot were the first to declare themselves for the Constitution of 1812. So far was Spain matured for a revolution, that even false news sufficed to produce it. So, too, it was false news that produced the hurricane of 1848.

In Galicia, Valencia, Saragossa, Barcelona and Pamplona, successive insurrections broke out. Jose Enrique O'Donnell, alias the Count de La Bisbal, being summoned by the King to oppose the expedition of Riego, not only offered to take arms against him, but to annihilate his little army and seize on his person. He only demanded the command of the troops cantoned in the Province of La Mancha, and money for his personal necessities. The King himself gave him a purse of gold and the requisite orders for the troops of la Mancha. But on his arrival at Ocana, La Bisbal put himself at the head of the troops and proclaimed the Constitution of 1812. The news of this defection roused the public spirit of Madrid where the revolution burst forth immediately on the intelligence of this event. The Government began then to negotiate with the revolution. In a decree, dated March 6, the King offered to convoke the *ancient Cortes*, assembled in *Estamentos* (Estates), a decree suiting no party, neither that of the old monarchy nor that of the revolution. On his return from France, he had held out the same promise and failed to redeem his pledge. During the night of the 7th, revolutionary demonstrations having taken place in Madrid, the *Gaceta* of the 8th published a decree by which Ferdinand VII promised to swear

to the Constitution of 1812. "Let all of us," he said, in that decree, "and myself first, fairly enter upon the path of the Constitution." The people having got possession of the palace on the 9th, he saved himself only by re-establishing the Madrid *Ayuntamiento* of 1814, before which he swore to the Constitution. He, for his part, did not care for false oaths, having always at hand a confessor ready to grant him full remission of all possible sins. Simultaneously a constructive junta was established, the first decree of which set free the political prisoners and recalled the political refugees. The prisons, now opened, sent the first Constitutional Ministry to the royal palace. Castro, Herreros, and A. Arguelles—who formed the first Ministry—were martyrs of 1814, and Deputies of 1812. The true source of the enthusiasm which had appeared on the accession of Ferdinand to the throne, was joy at the removal of Charles IV, his father. And thus the source of the general exultation at the proclamation of the Constitution of 1812, was joy at the removal of Ferdinand VII. As to the Constitution itself, we know that, when finished, there were no territories in which to proclaim it. For the majority of the Spanish people, it was like the unknown god worshipped by the ancient Athenians.

In our day it has been affirmed by English writers, with an express allusion to the present Spanish revolution, on the one hand that the movement of 1820 was but a military conspiracy, and on the other that it was but a Russian intrigue. Both assertions are equally ridiculous. As to the military insurrection, we have seen that, notwithstanding its failure, the revolution proved victorious; and, besides, the riddle to be solved would not be the conspiracy of 5,000 soldiers, but the sanction of that conspiracy by an army of 35,000 men, and by a most loyal nation of twelve millions. That the revolution first acted through the ranks of the army is easily explained by the fact that, of all the bodies of the Spanish monarchy, the army was the only one thoroughly transformed and revolutionized during the war of independence. As to Russian intrigue, it is not to be denied that Russia had her hands in the business of the Spanish revolution; that, of all the European powers, Russia first acknowledged the Constitution of 1812, by the treaty concluded in Weleski Luki, on July 20, 1812; that she first kindled the revolution of 1820, first denounced it to Ferdinand VII, first lighted the torch of counter-revolution on several points of the Peninsula, first solemnly protested against

it before Europe, and finally forced France into an armed intervention against it. Monsieur de Tatischeff, the Russian Ambassador, was certainly the most prominent character at the Court of Madrid—the invisible head of the camarilla. He had succeeded in introducing Antonio Ugarte, a wretch of low station, at Court, and making him the head of the friars and footmen who, in their back-staircase council, swayed the scepter in the name of Ferdinand VII. By Tatischeff, Ugarte was made Director-General of the expeditions against South America, and by Ugarte the Duke of San Fernando was appointed Foreign Minister and President of the Cabinet. Ugarte effected from Russia the purchase of rotten ships, destined for the South American Expedition, for which the order of St. Ann was bestowed upon him. Ugarte prevented Ferdinand and his brother Don Carlos from presenting themselves to the army at the first moment of the crisis. He was the mysterious author of the Duke of San Fernando's unaccountable apathy, and of the measures which led a Spanish Liberal to say at Paris in 1836

“One can hardly resist the conviction that the Government was rendering itself the means for the overthrow of the existing order of things.” If we add the curious fact that the President of the United States praised Russia in his message for her having promised him not to suffer Spain to meddle with the South American colonies, there can remain but little doubt as to the part acted by Russia in the Spanish revolution. But what does all this prove? That Russia produced the revolution of 1820? By no means, but only that she prevented the Spanish Government from resisting it. That the revolution would have earlier or later overturned the absolute and monastic monarchy of Ferdinand VII is proved. 1. By the series of conspiracies which since 1814 had followed each other, 2. By the testimony of M. de Martignac, the French Commissary who accompanied the Duke of Angoulême at the time of the Legitimist invasion of Spain; 3. By testimony not to be rejected—that of Ferdinand himself.

In 1814 Mina intended a rising in Navarre, gave the first signal for resistance by an appeal to arms, entered the fortress of Pamplona, but distrusting his own followers, fled to France. In 1815 General Porlier, one of the most renowned guerrilleros of the war of independence, proclaimed the Constitution at Coruna. He was beheaded. In 1816, Richard intended capturing the King at Madrid. He was hanged. In 1817, Navarro, a lawyer, with four of his accomplices, expired on the scaffold.

at Valencia for having proclaimed the Constitution of 1812. In the same year the intrepid General Lacy was shot at Majorca for having committed the same crime. In 1818, Colonel Vidal, Captain Sola, and others, who had proclaimed the Constitution at Valencia, were defeated and put to the sword. The Isla de Leon conspiracy then was but the last link in a chain formed by the bloody heads of so many valiant men from 1808 to 1814.

M de Martignac who, in 1832, shortly before his death, published his work *L'Espagne et ses Revolutions*, makes the following statement :

Two years had passed away since Ferdinand VII had resumed his absolute power, and there continued still the proscriptions, proceeding from a camarilla recruited from the dregs of mankind. The whole State machinery was turned upside down, there reigned nothing but disorder, languor and confusion—taxes most unequally distributed—the state of the finances was abominable—there were loans without credit, impossibility of meeting the most urgent wants of the State, an army not paid, magistrates indemnifying themselves by bribery, a corrupt and do-nothing Administration, unable to ameliorate anything, or even to preserve anything Hence the general discontent of the people The new Constitutional system was received with enthusiasm by the great towns, the commercial and industrial classes, liberal professions, army and proletariat It was resisted by the monks, and it stupefied the country people.

Such are the confessions of a dying man who was mainly instrumental in subverting that new system Ferdinand VII, in his decrees of June 1, 1817, March 1, 1817, April 11, 1817, November 24, 1819, etc., literally confirms the assertions of M. de Martignac, and resumes his lamentations in these words. "The miseries that resound in the ears of our Majesty, on the part of the complaining people, overset one another." This shows that no Tatischeff was needed to bring about a Spanish revolution.

*New York Daily Tribune*, December 2, 1854.

PART TWO

ARTICLES AND NOTES FROM THE  
NEW YORK DAILY TRIBUNE (1854)

I

THE INSURRECTION IN MADRID

LONDON, July 4, 1854.

THE long-expected military insurrection at Madrid has at length been accomplished under the leadership of Generals O'Donnell and Dulce. The French Government journals hasten to inform us that, according to their dispatches, the Spanish Government has already overcome the danger and that the insurrection is suppressed. But the Madrid correspondent of *The Morning Chronicle*, who gives a detailed account of the rising and communicates the proclamation of the insurgents, says that they have only withdrawn from the capital in order to join the garrison of Alcala, and that in case of Madrid remaining passive they would have no difficulty in reaching Saragossa.

Should the movement be more successful than the last rebellion in that town, the consequences would be to cause a diversion in the military action of France, to afford a subject for dissent between France and England, and probably also to affect the pending complication between Spain and the United States Government.

*New York Daily Tribune*, July 19, 1854.



## NEWS OF THE MADRID INSURRECTION

LONDON, July 7, 1854.

THE news we receive of the military insurrection at Madrid continues to be of a very contradictory and fragmentary character. All the Madrid telegraphic dispatches are, of course, Government statements, and of the same questionable faith as the bulletins published in the *Gaceta*. A review of the scanty materials at hand is consequently all I can give you. It will be recollected that O'Donnell was one of the generals banished by the Queen in February; that he refused to obey, secreted himself in Madrid, and from his hiding place kept up secret correspondence with the garrison of Madrid, and particularly with General Dulce, the Inspector-General of the Cavalry. The Government were aware of his sojourn at Madrid, and on the 27th June, at night, General Blaser the Minister of War, and General Lara, the Captain-General of New Castile, received warnings of an intended outbreak under the leadership of General Dulce. Nothing, however, was done to prevent or stifle the insurrection in its germ. On the 28th, therefore, General Dulce found no difficulty in assembling about 2,000 cavalry under pretext of a review, and to march with them out of the town, accompanied by O'Donnell, with the intention of kidnapping the Queen, then staying at the Escorial. The design failed, however, and the Queen arrived at Madrid on the 29th, attended by Count San Luis, the President of the Council, and held a review, while the insurgents took up quarters in the environs of the capital. They were joined by Colonel Echague and 400 men of the Regiment "Prince," who brought along the regimental cashbag containing 1,000,000 francs. A column composed of seven battalions of infantry, one regiment of cavalry, one detachment of mounted *gendarmerie*, and two batteries of artillery left Madrid on the evening of the 29th inst, under command of General Lara, in order to meet the rebels quartered at the *Venta del Espiritu Santo* and the village of Vicalvaro. A battle took place on the 30th between the two armies, of which we have received three accounts—the official one addressed by General Lara to the Minister of War, published in the *Gaceta*; the second published by the *Messenger de Bayonne*, and the third report from the Madrid correspondent of the *Independence*

*Belge*, an eye-witness of the affair. The first-named report, which may be found in all the London papers, is easily disposed of, General Lara stating at one time that he attacked the insurgents, and at another that they charged him, making prisoners in one place and losing them in another, claiming the victory and returning to Madrid—*enfin*, leaving the insurgents masters of the field, but covering it with the dead of the “enemy,” while pretending himself to have only thirty wounded.

The following is the version of the *Messenger de Bayonne* :

On the 30th June, at 4 A.M., General Quesada left Madrid at the head of two brigades, in order to attack the rebel troops. The affair lasted but a short time, General Quesada being vigorously repulsed. General Blaser, the Minister of War, having assembled the whole garrison of Madrid—[which, by the way, consists of about 7,000 or 8,000 men]—made a *sortie*, in his turn at 7 o'clock in the evening. A combat immediately commenced, and lasted almost without interruption until evening. The infantry, threatened by the numerous cavalry of the insurgents, formed in squares Colonel Garrigo, at the head of some *escadrons*, charged one of these squares so vigorously as to break it through, but was received by the fire of a masked battery of five guns, the grape-shot of which dispersed his *escadrons*. Colonel Garrigo fell into the hands of the Queen's troops, but General O'Donnell lost not a moment in rallying his squadrons, and threw himself so vehemently on the infantry that he shook their ranks, delivered Colonel Garrigo, and seized the five pieces of artillery. The Queen's troops having suffered this check, retired to Madrid, where they arrived at 8 o'clock in the evening. One of their Generals, Mesina, was slightly wounded. There was a great number of dead and wounded on both sides in their murderous engagements.

We come now to the report of the *Independence*, dated Madrid, 1st July, which seems to be the most trustworthy :

The Venta del Espiritu Santo and Vicalvaro were the theatre of a murderous combat, in which the troops of the Queen were repulsed this side the *Fonda de la Alegria*. Three squares successively formed on different points, were spontaneously dissolved by order of the Minister of War. A fourth was formed beyond the *Retiro*. Ten squadrons of insurgents commanded by Generals O'Donnell and Dulce in person, attacked it in the centre(?) while guerrillas took it in the flank(?)—[It is difficult to conceive what this correspondent understands by *center*! and *flank*! attacks on a square.]—Twice the insurgents came to close fighting with the artillery but were repulsed by the grape-shot poured upon them. The insurrectionists evidently intended seizing some pieces of artillery placed in each

of the corners of the square. Night having approached in the meantime, the governmental forces retired in echelons on the gate of Alcalá, where a squadron of the cavalry that had remained faithful was suddenly surprised by a detachment of insurrectionist lancers who had concealed themselves behind the *Plaza de Toros*. In the midst of the confusion produced by this unexpected attack, the insurrectionists seized four pieces of artillery that had remained behind. The loss was nearly equal on both sides. The insurgent cavalry suffered much from the grape-shot, but their lances have almost exterminated the regiment de la Reina Gobernadora, and the mounted *gendarmerie*. Latest accounts inform us that the insurrectionists received reinforcements from Toledo and Valladolid. There is even a rumour afloat that General Narvaez is expected today at Vallecas where he is to be received by Generals Dulce, O'Donnell, Ros de Olano and Armero. Trenches have been opened at the gate of Atocha. Crowds of curious are thronging the railway station whence the advance posts of General O'Donnell may be perceived. All the gates of Madrid are, however, rigorously watched.

*Three O'Clock P.M. Same Day*—The insurgents occupy the place of Vallecas, three English miles from Madrid, in considerable force. The Government expected today the troops from the provinces, especially the battalion *del Rey*. If we are to believe the most recent information, this force had joined the insurgents.

*Four P.M.*—At this moment almost the whole garrison leaves Madrid, in the direction of Vallecas, in order to meet the insurgents who show the greatest confidence. The shops are closed. The Guard of the *Retiro* and generally of all Government officers have been armed in haste. I hear at this moment that some companies of the garrison yesterday joined the insurgents. The Madrid garrison is commanded by General Campuzano, who was falsely stated to have gone over to the insurgents, General Vista Hermosa, and Blaser, the Minister of War. Till now no reinforcements have come to the support of the Government, but the 4th Regiment of the line and the 1st Cavalry are said to have left Valladolid and to be marching in all haste upon Madrid. The same is assured with respect to the garrison of Burgos, commanded by General Turon. Lastly, General Rivero has left Saragossa with imposing forces. More bloody encounters are, therefore, to be expected.

Up to the 6th inst. no papers or letters had arrived from Madrid. The *Moniteur* alone has the following laconic dispatch, dated Madrid, the 4th of July:

Tranquillity continues to reign at Madrid and in the provinces.

A private dispatch states that the insurgents are at Aranjuez. If the battle anticipated for the 1st inst. by the corres-

pendent of the *Independance*, had resulted in a victory of the Government, there would be wanting neither letters, nor papers, nor bulletins. Notwithstanding that the state of siege had been proclaimed at Madrid, the *Clamor Publico*, 'the *Nacion*, the *Diario*, the *Espana*, and the *Epoca* had reappeared without previous notice to the Government, whose *fiscal* informed them of this dismal fact. Among the persons arrested at Madrid are named Messrs. Antonio Guillermo Moreno and Jose Manuel Collado, bankers. A warrant was issued against Seahor Servillano, Marquis de Fuentes de Duero, a particular friend of Marshal Narvaez. Messrs. Pidal y Mon are placed under *surveillance*.

It would be premature to form an opinion on the general character of this insurrection. I may say, however, that it does not seem to proceed from the Progresista party, as General San Miguel, their soldier, remains quiet at Madrid. From all the reports it seems, on the contrary, that Narvaez is at the bottom of it, and that Queen Cristina, whose influence had of late much decreased through the Queen's favourite Count San Luis, is not entirely a stranger to it.

There is perhaps no country, except Turkey, so little known to, and so falsely judged by Europe as Spain. The numberless local pronunciamientos and military rebellions have accustomed Europe to view it on a level with Imperial Rome at the era of the pretorians. This is quite as superficial an error as was committed in the case of Turkey, by those who fancied the life of the nation extinct because its official history for the last century consisted only of palace-revolution and Janissary *emeutes*. The secret of this fallacy lies in the simple fact for the last century consisted only of palace-revolutions and strength of these peoples in their provincial and local organization, have drawn at the source of their Court almanacs. The movements of what we are used to call the State, have so little affected the Spanish people, that they were quite content to leave that restricted domain to the alternative passions and petty intrigues of Court minions, soldiers, adventurers, and a few so-called statesmen, and they have had little cause to repent themselves of their indifference. The character of modern Spanish history deserving to receive a very different appreciation than it has until now experienced, I will take an opportunity to treat this subject in one of my next letters. This much I may yet remark in this place, that little surprise ought to be felt, if a general movement should now arise in

the Peninsula from a mere military rebellion, since the late financial decrees of the Government have converted the tax-gatherer into a most efficient revolutionary propagandist.

*New York Daily Tribune*, July 21, 1854

### III

#### PROCLAMATIONS OF DULCE AND O'DONNELL— SUCSESSES OF INSURGENTS

LONDON, July 18, 1854.

THE Spanish insurrection appears to assume a new aspect, as is evident from the proclamations of Dulce and O'Donnell, the former of whom is a partisan of Espartero, and the latter was a stout adherent of Narvaez and perhaps secretly of Queen Cristina. O'Donnell having convinced himself that the Spanish towns are not to be set in motion this time by a mere palace-revolution, suddenly exhibits liberal principles. His proclamation is dated from Manzanares, a borough of the Mancha, not far from Ciudad Real. It says that his aim is to preserve the throne, but to remove the camarilla; the rigorous observation of the fundamental laws; the amelioration of the election and press laws; the diminution of taxes; the advancement in the civil service according to merit; decentralization, and establishment of a national militia on a broad basis. It proposes provincial juntas and a general assembly of Cortes at Madrid, to be changed with the revision of the laws. The proclamation of General Dulce is even more energetic. He says:

There are no longer Progresistas and Moderados; all of us are Spaniards, and imitators of the men of July 7, 1822. Return to the Constitution of 1837, maintenance of Isabella II, perpetual exile of the Queen Mother; destitution of the present Ministry, re-establishment of peace in our country; such is the end we pursue at every cost, as we shall show on the field of honour to the traitors whom we shall punish for their culpable folly.

According to the *Journal des Debats*, papers and correspondence have been seized at Madrid which are said to prove beyond doubt that it is the secret aim of the insurgents to declare the throne vacant, to reunite the Iberian Peninsula into one State, and to offer the crown to Don Pedro V, Prince of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha. The tender interest taken by *The Times* in the Spanish insurrection, and the simultaneous presence of

the said Don Pedro in England, appears indeed to indicate that some new Coburg dodge is afloat. The Court is evidently very uneasy, as all possible Ministerial combinations have been tried, Isturiz and Martinez de la Rosa having been applied to in vain. The *Messenger de Bayonne* asserts that the Count de Montemolin left Naples as soon as he received news of the insurrection.

O'Donnell has entered Andalusia, having crossed the Sierra Morena in three columns, one marching by Carolina, the other by Pozo Blanco, and the third by Despenaperros. The *Gaceta* confesses that Colonel Buceta succeeded in surprising Cuenca, by the possession of which place the insurgents have secured their communications with Valencia. In the latter province the rising now comprises about four or five towns, besides Alora where the Government troops received a severe check.

It is stated also that a movement had broken out at Reus in Catalonia, and the *Messenger de Bayonne* adds that disturbances had taken place in Aragon.

*New York Daily Tribune*, August 3, 1854.

#### IV

### THE SPANISH REVOLUTION—STRUGGLE OF PARTIES— PRONUNCIAMENTOS OF SAN SEBASTIAN, BARCELONA, SARAGOSSA AND MADRID

LONDON, July 21, 1854.

"*Ne touchez pas a la Reine*" [Touch not the Queen] is an old Castilian maxim, but the adventurous Madame Munoz and her daughter Isabella have too long overstepped the rights of even Castilian Queens not to have outworn the loyal prejudices of the Spanish people.

The pronunciamentos of 1843 lasted three months; those of 1854 have scarcely lasted as many weeks. The Ministry is dissolved, Count San Luis has fled, Queen Cristina is trying to reach the French frontier, and at Madrid both troops and citizens have declared against the Government.

The revolutionary movements of Spain since the commencement of the century offer a remarkably uniform aspect, with the exception of the movements in favour of provincial and local privileges which periodically agitate the northern provinces, every palace-plot being attended by military insurrections, and these invariably dragging municipal pronuncia-

mentos in their train. There are two causes for this phenomenon. In the first place, we find that what we call the State in a modern sense has, from the exclusively provincial life of the people, no national embodiment in opposition to the Court, except in the army. In the second place, the peculiar position of Spain and the Peninsular war created conditions under which it was only in the army that everything vital in the Spanish nationality was permitted to concentrate. Thus it happens that the only national demonstrations (those of 1812 and of 1822) proceeded from the army, and thus the movable part of the nation has been accustomed to regard the army as the natural instrument of every national rising. During the troublesome epoch from 1830 to 1854, however, the cities of Spain came to know that the army, instead of continuing to uphold the cause of the nation, was changed into an instrument for the rivalries of the ambitious pretenders to the military guardianship of the Court. Consequently, we find the movement of 1854 very different even from that of 1843. The *emeute* of General O'Donnell was looked upon by the peoples as anything but a conspiracy against the leading influence at the Court, especially as it was supported by the ex-favourite Serrano. The towns and country accordingly demurred to giving any response to the appeal made by the cavalry of Madrid. It was thus that General O'Donnell was forced to alter entirely the character of his operations, in order not to remain isolated and exposed to failure. He was forced to insert in his proclamation three points equally opposed to the supremacy of the army—the convocation of the Cortes, an economical Government, and the formation of a national militia—the last demand originating in the desire of the towns to recover their independence of the army. It is a fact, then, that the military insurrection has obtained the support of a popular insurrection only by submitting to the conditions of the latter. It remains to be seen whether it will be constrained to adhere to them and to execute these promises.

With the exception of the Carlists, all parties have raised their cry—Progresistas, partisans of the Constitution of 1837, partisans of the Constitution of 1812, Unionists (demanding the annexation of Portugal), and Republicans. The news concerning the latter party is to be received with caution, since it has to pass the censure of the Paris police. Besides these party struggles, the rival pretensions of the military leaders are in full development. Espartero had no sooner heard of

the success of O'Donnell than he left his retreat at Leganes and declared himself the chief of the movement. But as soon as Caesar Narvaez learned of the appearance of his old Pompey in the field, he forthwith offered his services to the Queen, which were accepted, and he is to form a new Ministry. From the details I am about to give you, it will be seen that the military has by no means taken the initiative in all places, but that in some they have had to yield to the overpowering pressure of the population.

Besides the pronunciamientos in Valencia, reported in my last, there has been one at Alicante. In Andalusia, pronunciamientos have taken place at Granada, Seville and Jaen. In Old Castile, there has been a pronunciamiento at Burgos; in Leon, at Valladolid; in Biscay, at San Sebastian and Vitoria; in Navarre, at Tolosa, Pamplona and Guipuzcoa; in Aragon, at Saragossa; in Catalonia, at Barcelona, Tarragona, Lerida and Gerona; there is said, also, to have been a pronunciamiento in the Islas Baleares. In Murcia, pronunciamientos were expected to take place, according to a letter from Cartagena, dated July 12, which says:

In consequence of a *bando* published by the Military Governor of the place, all the inhabitants of Cartagena possessed of muskets and other arms, have been ordered to depose them with the civil authorities within twenty-four hours. On the demand of the Consul of France, the Government has allowed the French residents to depose their arms as in 1848, at the Consulate.

Of all these pronunciamientos, four only deserve particular mention, viz: those of San Sebastian in Biscay, Barcelona the capital of Catalonia, Saragossa the capital of Aragon, and Madrid.

In Biscay the pronunciamientos originated with the Municipalities, in Aragon with the military. The Municipality of San Sebastian was pronouncing in favour of the insurrection, when the demand for the armament of the people was raised. The city was immediately covered with arms. Not till the 17th could the two battalions garrisoning the town be induced to join. The fusion between the citizens and the military having been completed, 1,000 armed citizens accompanied by some troops set out for Pamplona, and organized the insurrection in Navarre. It was only the appearance of the armed citizens from San Sebastian which facilitated the rising of the Navarrese capital. General Zabala joined the movement after-



ward and went to Bayonne, inviting the soldiers and officers of the Cordova regiment, who had fled there upon their late defeat at Saragossa, immediately to return to their country and to meet him at San Sebastian. According to some reports he subsequently marched upon Madrid to place himself under the orders of Espartero, while other reports state that he was on the march to Saragossa to join the Aragonese insurgents. General Mazaredo, the commander of the Basque provinces, refusing to take part in the pronunciamiento of Vitoria, was obliged to retire to France. The troops under orders of General Zabala are two battalions of the regiment of Bourbon, a battalion of carabiniers, and a detachment of cavalry. Before dismissing the subject of the Basque provinces I may state as something characteristic, that the Brigadier Barcaiztegui, who has been named Governor of Guipuzcoa, is one of Espartero's former aides-de-camp.

At Barcelona the initiative was apparently taken by the military, but the spontaneity of their act becomes very doubtful from the additional information we have received. On the 13th of July, at 7 o'clock p.m., the soldiers occupying the barracks of San Pablo, and of the Buen Suceso, yielded to the demonstrations of the populace and declared their pronunciamiento, under the cry of *Viva la Reina*; *Viva la Constitucion*; death to the Ministers; away with Cristina! After having fraternized with the mass, and marched along with them over the Rambla, they halted at the Plaza of the Constitution. The cavalry, kept indoors at the Barceloneta for the previous six days, because of the distrust it inspired to the Captain-General, made a pronunciamiento in its turn. From this moment the whole garrison passed over to the people, and all resistance on the part of the authorities became impossible. At 10 o'clock General Marchesi, the Military Governor, yielded to the general pressure, and at midnight the Captain-General of Catalonia announced his resolution to side with the movement. He went to the place of the *Ayuntamiento* where he harangued the people, filling the place. On the 18th, a junta was formed, composed of the Captain-General and other eminent persons, with the cry of the Constitution, the Queen and Morality. Further news from Barcelona states that some workmen had been shot on the order of the new authorities, because they had destroyed machinery and violated property; also, that a Republican Committee convened in a neighbouring town, had been arrested; but it should be recol-

lected that this news passes through the hands of the Second of December whose special vocation it is to calumniate republicans and workmen.

At Saragossa it is said that the initiative proceeded from the military—a statement which becomes invalidated, however, by the additional remark that the formation of a militia corps was immediately resolved upon. So much is certain, and is confirmed by the Madrid *Gaceta* itself, that before the pronunciamiento of Saragossa 150 soldiers of the Montesa regiment (cavalry) on the march to Madrid and quartered at Torrejon (five leagues from Madrid) revolted and abandoned their chiefs, who arrived at Madrid on the evening of the 13th with the regimental chest. The soldiers, under command of Captain Baraban, mounted horse and took the road to Huete, being supposed to intend joining the force under Colonel Buceta at Cuenca. As for Madrid, against which Espartero is said to be marching with the “army of the centre,” and General Zabala, with the army of the north, it was natural that a town which subsists upon the Court should be the last to join in the insurrectionary movement. The *Gaceta* of the 15th inst still published a bulletin from the Minister of War asserting the factions to be in flight, and the enthusiastic loyalty of the troops increasing. Count San Luis, who seems to have very correctly judged of the situation at Madrid, announced to the workmen that General O'Donnell and the anarchists would deprive them of all employment, while if the Government succeeded, it would employ all workingmen on the public works for six reals (75 cents) a day. By this stratagem San Luis hoped to enroll the most excitable portion of the Madrilenos under his banner. His success, however, was like that of the party of the National at Paris in 1848. The allies he had thus gained soon became his most dangerous enemies—the funds for their support being exhausted on the sixth day. How much the Government dreaded a pronunciamiento in the capital is evident from General Lara's (the Governor's) proclamation forbidding the circulation of any news respecting the progress of the insurrection. It appears, further, that the tactics of General Blaser were restricted to the care of avoiding any contact with the insurgents, lest his troops should catch the infection. It is said that the first plan of General O'Donnell was to meet the Ministerial troops on the plains of La Mancha, so favourable to cavalry operations. This plan, however, was abandoned in consequence of the

arrival of ex-favourite Serrano, who was in connection with several of the principal towns of Andalusia. The Constitutional army thereupon determined, instead of remaining in La Mancha, to march upon Jaen and Sevilla.

It may be observed, *en passant*, that the *boletines* of General Blaser bear a wonderful resemblance to the orders of the day of the Spanish generals of the sixteenth century, which gave such occasion for hilarity to Francis I, and of the eighteenth century, which Frederick the Great turned into ridicule.

It is plain that this Spanish insurrection must become a source of dissension between the Governments of France and England, and the report given by a French paper that General O'Donnell was concealed previous to the outbreak, in the palace of the British Ambassador, is not likely to lessen the misgivings of Bonaparte on its account. There exists already some commencement of irritation between Bonaparte and Victoria; Bonaparte expected to meet the Queen at the embarkation of his troops from Calais, but her Majesty answered his desire by a visit to the ex-Queen Amelie on the same day. Again, the English Ministers when interpellated about the non-blockade of the White Sea, the Black Sea, and the sea of Azov, alleged as their excuse the alliance with France. Bonaparte retorted by an announcement of those very blockades in the *Moniteur*, without waiting for the formal consent of England. Lastly, a bad effect having been produced in France by the embarkation of French troops in British vessels only, Bonaparte published a list of French vessels destined for the same use and applied to it.

*New York Daily Tribune*, August 4, 1854.

## V

### ESPARTERO (Editorial)

IT IS one of the peculiarities of revolutions that just as the people seem about to take a great start and to open a new era, they suffer themselves to be ruled by the delusions of the past and surrender all the power and influence they have so dearly won into the hands of men who represent, or are supposed to represent, the popular movement of a by-gone epoch. Espartero is one of those traditional men whom the people are wont to take upon their backs at moments of social crises,

and whom, like the ill-natured old fellow that obstinately clasped his legs about the neck of Sinbad the sailor, they afterward find it difficult to get rid of. Ask a Spaniard of the so-called Progresista School what is the political value of Espartero, and he will promptly reply that "Espartero represents the unity of the great liberal party; Espartero is popular because he came from the people; his popularity works exclusively for the cause of the Progresistas." It is true that he is the son of an artisan, who has climbed up to be the Regent of Spain, and that, having entered the army as a common soldier, he left it as a Field-Marshal. But if he be the symbol of the unity of the great liberal party, it can only be that indifferent point of unity in which all extremes are neutralized. And as to the popularity of the Progresistas, we do not exaggerate in saying that it was lost from the moment it became transferred from the bulk of that party to this single individual.

We need no other proof of the ambiguous and exceptional character of Espartero's greatness, beyond the simple fact that, so far, nobody has been able to account for it. While his friends take refuge in allegoric generalities, his enemies, alluding to a strange feature of his private life, declare him but a lucky gambler. Both, then, friends and enemies, are at an equal loss to discover any logical connection between the man himself, and the fame and the name of the man.

Espartero's military merits are as much contested as his political shortcomings are incontestable. In a voluminous biography, published by Senor de Florez, much fuss is made about his military prowess and generalship as shown in the provinces of Charcas, Paz, Arequipa, Potosi and Cochabamba, where he fought under the orders of General Morillo, then charged with the reduction of the South American States under the authority of the Spanish Crown. But the general impression produced by his South American feats of arms upon the excitable mind of his native country is sufficiently characterized by his being designated as the chief of the *Ayacuchismo*, and his partisans as *Ayacuchos*, in allusion to the unfortunate battle at Ayacucho, in which Peru and South America were definitively lost for Spain. He is, at all events, a very extraordinary hero whose historical baptism dates from a defeat, instead of a success. In the seven years' war against the Carlists, he never signalized himself by one of those daring strokes by which Narvaez, his rival, became early known as an iron-nerved soldier. He had certainly the gift of making the best

of small successes, while it was mere luck that Maroto betrayed to him the last forces of the Pretender, Cabrera's rising in 1840 being only a posthumous attempt to galvanize the dry bones of Carlism. Senor de Marliani, himself one of Espartero's admirers, and the historian of modern Spain, cannot but own that the seven years' war is to be compared with nothing but the feuds waged in the tenth century between the petty lords of Gaul, when success was not the result of victory. It appears, by another mischance, that of all the Peninsular deeds of Espartero, that which made the liveliest impression upon the public memory was, if not exactly a defeat, at least a singularly strange performance in a hero of liberty. He became renowned as the bombardier of cities—of Barcelona and Seville. If the Spaniards, says a writer, should ever paint him as Mars, we should see the god figuring as a "wall-batterer."

When Cristina was forced, in 1840, to resign her Regency and to fly from Spain, Espartero assumed, against the wishes of a very large section of the Progresistas, the supreme authority within the limits of Parliamentary Government. He surrounded himself with a sort of camarilla, and affected the airs of a military dictator, without really elevating himself above the mediocrity of a Constitutional King. His favour extended to Moderados rather than to old Progresistas, who, with a few exceptions, were excluded from office. Without conciliating his enemies, he gradually estranged his friends. Without the courage to break through the shackles of the Parliamentary regime, he did not know how to accept it, how to manage it, or how to transform it into an instrument of action. During his three years' dictatorship, the revolutionary spirit was broken step by step, through endless compromises, and the dissensions within the Progresista party were allowed to reach such a pitch as to enable the Moderados to regain exclusive power by a *coup de main*. Thus Espartero became so divested of authority that his own Ambassador at Paris conspired against him with Cristina and Narvaez; and so poor in resources, that he found no means to ward off their miserable intrigues, or the petty tricks of Louis Philippe. So little did he understand his own position that he made an inconsiderate stand against public opinion when it simply wanted a pretext to break him to pieces.

In May, 1843, his popularity having long since faded away, he retained Seoane, Zurbano and the other members of his military camarilla, whose dismissal was loudly called for;

he dismissed. the Lopez Ministry, who commanded a large majority in the Chamber of Deputies, and he stubbornly refused an amnesty for the exiled Moderados, then claimed on all hands, by Parliament, by the people and by the army itself. This demand simply expressed the public disgust with his administration. Then, at once, a hurricane of pronunciamientos against the "tyrant Espartero" shook the Peninsula from one end to the other ; a movement to be compared only, from the rapidity of its spreading, to the present one. Moderados and Progresistas combined for the one object of getting rid of the Regent. The crisis took him quite unawares—the fatal hour found him unprepared.

Narvaez, accompanied by O'Donnell, Concha and Pezuela, landed with a handful of men at Valencia. On their side all was rapidity and action, considerate audacity, energetic decision. On the side of Espartero all was helpless hesitation, deadly delay, apathetic irresolution, indolent weakness. While Narvaez raised the siege of Teruel, and marched into Aragon, Espartero retired from Madrid, and consumed whole weeks in unaccountable inactivity at Albacete. When Narvaez had won over the corps of Seoane and Zurbano at Torrejon, and was marching on Madrid, Espartero at length effected a junction with Van Halen, for the useless and odious bombardment of Seville. He then fled from station to station, at every step of his retreat deserted by his troops, till at last he reached the coast. When he embarked at Cadiz, that town, the last where he retained a party, bade its hero farewell by also pronouncing against him. An Englishman who resided in Spain during the catastrophe, gives a graphic description of the sliding-scale of Espartero's greatness : "It was not the tremendous crash of an instant, after a well-fought field, but a little and bit by bit descent, after no fighting at all, from Madrid to Ciudad Real, from Ciudad Real to Albacete, from Albacete to Cordova, from Cordova to Seville, from Seville to Puerto Santa Maria, and thence to the wide ocean. He fell from idolatry to enthusiasm, from enthusiasm to attachment, from attachment to respect, from respect to indifference, from indifference to contempt, from contempt to hatred, and from hatred he fell into the sea."

How could Espartero have now again become the saviour of the country, and "Sword of the Revolution," as he is called ? This event would be quite incomprehensible were

it not for the ten years of reaction Spain has suffered under the brutal dictatorship of Narvaez, and the brooding yoke of the Queen's minions, who supplanted him. Extensive and violent epochs of reaction are wonderfully fitted for re-establishing the fallen men of revolutionary miscarriages. The greater the imaginative powers of a people—and where is imagination greater than in the south of Europe?—the more irresistible their impulse to oppose to individual incarnations of despotism individual incarnations of the revolution. As they cannot improvise them at once, they excavate the dead men of their previous movements. Was not Narvaez himself on the point of growing popular at the expense of Sartorius? The Espartero who, on the 29th of July, held his triumphant entrance into Madrid, was no real man, he was a ghost, a name, a reminiscence.

It is but due to justice to record that Espartero never professed to be anything but a constitutional monarchist; and if there had ever existed any doubt upon that point, it must have disappeared before the enthusiastic reception he met with during his exile, at Windsor Castle and from the governing classes of England. When he arrived in London the whole aristocracy flocked to his abode, the Duke of Wellington and Palmerston at their head. Aberdeen, in his quality of Foreign Minister, sent him an invitation to be presented to the Queen; the Lord Mayor and the Aldermen of the city entertained him with gastronomic homages at the Mansion House, and when it became known that the Spanish Cincinnatus passed his leisure hours in gardening, there was no Botanical, or Horticultural, or Agricultural Society which was not eager to present him with membership. He was quite the lion of that metropolis. At the end of 1847 an amnesty recalled the Spanish exiles, and the decree of Queen Isabella appointed him a Senator. He was, however, not allowed to leave England before Queen Victoria had invited him and his Duchess to her table, adding the extraordinary honour of offering them a night's lodging at Windsor Castle. It is true, we believe, that this halo thrown round his person was somewhat connected with the supposition that Espartero had been and still was the representative of British interests in Spain. It is no less true that the Espartero demonstration looked something like a demonstration against Louis Philippe.

On his return to Spain he received deputation upon deputation, congratulations upon congratulations, and the city of Barce-

Iona dispatched an express messenger to apologize for its bad behaviour in 1843. But has anybody ever heard his name mentioned during the fatal period from January, 1846, till the late events? Has he ever raised his voice during that dead silence of degraded Spain? Is there recorded one single act of patriotic resistance on his part? He quietly retires to his estate at Logrono, cultivating his cabbages and flowers, waiting his time. He did not go even to the revolution till the revolution came for him. He did more than Mahomet. He expected the mountain to come to him, and the mountain came. Still there is one exception to be mentioned. When the revolution of February burst out, followed by the general European earthquake, he caused to be published by Senor de Principe, and some other friends, a little pamphlet entitled *Espartero, his Past, his Present, his Future*, to remind Spain that it still harboured the man of the past, the present, and the future. The revolutionary movement soon subsiding in France, the man of the past, of the present, and of the future once more sank into oblivion.

Espartero was born at Granasula, in La Mancha and like his famous fellow countryman, he also has his fixed idea—the Constitution; and his Dulcinea del Toboso—Queen Isabella. On January 8, 1848, when he returned from his English exile to Madrid, he was received by the Queen and took leave of her with the following words: "I pray your Majesty to call me whenever you want an arm to defend, or a heart to love you." Her Majesty has now called and her knight-errant appears, smoothing the revolutionary waves, enervating the masses by a delusive calm, allowing Cristina, San Louis and the rest to hide themselves in the palace, and loudly professing his unbroken faith in the words of the innocent Isabella.

It is known that this very trustworthy Queen, whose features are said to assume year after year a more striking resemblance to those of Ferdinand VII, of infamous memory, had her majority proclaimed on November 15, 1843. She was then only thirteen years old on November 21 of the same year. Olozaga, whom Lopez had constituted her tutor for three months, formed a Ministry obnoxious to the camarilla and the Cortes newly elected under the impression of the first success of Narvaez. He wanted to dissolve the Cortes, and obtained a royal decree signed by the Queen giving him power to do so, but leaving the date of its promulgation blank. On the evening of the 28th, Olozaga had the decree delivered to



him from the hands of the Queen. On the evening of the 29th he had another interview with her; but he had hardly left her when an Under-Secretary of State came to his house, and informed him that he was dismissed, and demanded back the decree which he had forced the Queen to sign. Olozaga, a lawyer by profession, was too sharp a man to be ensnared in this way. He did not return the document till the following day, after having shown it to at least one hundred Deputies, in proof that the signature of the Queen was in her usual, regular handwriting. On December 13, Gonzalez Brabo, appointed as Premier, summoned the Presidents of the Chambers, the principal Madrid notables, Narvaez, the Marquis de la Santa Cruz, and others, to the Queen that she might make a declaration to them concerning what had passed between her and Olozaga on the evening of November 28. The innocent little Queen led them into the room where she had received Olozaga, and enacted in a very lively, but rather overdone manner, a little drama for their instruction. Thus had Olozaga bolted the door, thus seized her dress, thus obliged her to sit down, thus conducted her hand, thus forced her signature to the decree, in one word, thus had he violated her royal dignity. During this scene Gonzalez Brabo took note of these declarations, while the persons present saw the alleged decree which appeared to be signed in a blotted and tremulous hand. Thus, on the solemn declaration of the Queen, Olozaga was to be condemned for the crime of *laesa majestas*, to be torn in pieces by four horses, or at the best, to be banished for life to the Philippines. But, as we have seen, he had taken his measures of precaution. Then followed seventeen days' debate in the Cortes, creating a sensation greater even than that produced by the famous trial of Queen Caroline in England. Olozaga's defence in the Cortes contained among other things this passage: "If they tell us that the word of the Queen is to be believed without question, I answer, No! There is either a charge, or there is none. If there be, that word is a testimony, like any other, and to that testimony I oppose mine." In the balance of the Cortes the word of Olozaga was found to be heavier than that of the Queen. Afterwards he fled to Portugal to escape the assassins sent against him. This was Isabella's first *entrechat* on the political stage of Spain, and the first proof of her honesty. And this is the same little Queen whose words Espartero now exhorts the people to trust in, and to whom is offered, after eleven years' school for

scandal, the "defending arm," and the "loving heart" of the "Sword of the Revolution."\*

*New York Daily Tribune*, August 19, 1854.

## VI

### THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION AT WORK

LONDON, August 8, 1854.

THE barricades were scarcely removed at Madrid, at the request of Espartero, before the counter-revolution was busy at work. The first counter-revolutionary step was the impunity allowed to Queen Cristina, Sartorius, and their associates. Then followed the formation of the Ministry, with the Moderado O'Donnell as Minister of War, and the whole army placed at the disposal of this old friend of Narvaez. There are in the list the names of Pacheco, Lojan, Don Francisco Santa Cruz, all of them notorious partisans of Narvaez, and the first a member of the infamous Ministry of 1847. Another, Salazar, has been appointed on the sole merit of being a playfellow of Espartero. In remuneration for the bloody sacrifices of the people, on the barricades and in the public place, numberless decorations have been showered upon the Espartero generals on the one hand, and on the Moderado friends of O'Donnell on the other hand. In order to pave the way for an ultimate silencing of the press, the press law of 1837 has been reestablished. Instead of convoking a general Constituent Cortes, Espartero is said to intend convoking only the Chambers after the Constitution of 1837, and, as some say, even as modified by Narvaez. To secure as far as possible the success of all these measures and others that are to follow, large masses of troops are being concentrated near Madrid. If any consideration press itself especially on our attention in this affair, it is the suddenness with which the reaction has set in.

On the first instant the chiefs of the barricades called upon Espartero, in order to make to him some observations

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\* The *Tribune* added the following sentence at the close of the article—it was not written by Marx:

"Our readers can judge whether the Spanish Revolution is likely to have any useful result or not." (Cf. Letter of Marx to Engels, November 10, 1854, *Gesamtausgabe*, Dritte Abteilung Band 2, pp. 63-65)—Ed

on the choice of his Ministry. He entered into a long explanation on the difficulties with which he was beset, and endeavoured to defend his nominations. But the Deputies of the people seem to have been little satisfied with his explanation. "Very alarming" news arrives at the same time, about the movements of the republicans in Valencia, Catalonia, and Andalusia. The embarrassment of Espartero is visible from his decree sanctioning the continued activity of the provincial juntas. Nor has he yet dared to dissolve the junta of Madrid, though his Ministry is complete and installed in office.

*New York Daily Tribune*, August 21, 1854

## VII

### DEMANDS OF THE SPANISH PEOPLE

LONDON, August 11, 1854.

SOME days ago the *Charivari* published a caricature exhibiting the Spanish people engaged in battle and the two sabres—Espartero and O'Donnell—embracing each other over their heads. The *Charivari* mistook for the end of the revolution, what is only its commencement. The struggle has already commenced between O'Donnell and Espartero, and not only between them, but also between the military chiefs and the people. It has been of little avail to the Government to have appointed the toreador Pucheta as Superintendent of the slaughter-houses, to have nominated a committee for the reward of the barricade-combatants, and finally to have appointed two Frenchmen, Pujol and Delmas, as historiographers of the revolution. O'Donnell wants the Cortes to be elected according to the law of 1845, Espartero according to the Constitution of 1837, and the people by universal suffrage. The people refuse to lay down their arms before the publication of a Government programme, the programme of Manzanares no longer satisfying their views. The people demand the annulment of the Concordat of 1852, confiscation of the estates of the counter-revolutionists, an *expose* of the finances, cancelling of all contracts for railways and other swindling contracts for public works, and lastly the judgment of Cristina by a special Court. Two attempts at flight on the part of the latter have been foiled by the armed resistance of the people. *El Tribuno* makes the following account of restitutions to be

made by Cristina to the National Exchequer Twenty-four millions illegally received as Regent from 1834 to 1840 ; twelve millions received on her return from France after an absence of three years , and thirty-five millions received of the Treasury of Cuba. This account even is a generous one When Cristina left Spain in 1840, she carried off large sums and nearly all the jewels of the Spanish Crown.

*New York Daily Tribune*, August 25, 1854

## VIII

### THE SPANISH REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA—THE QUESTION OF COLONIES—CORRUPTION OF PUBLIC MEN— ANARCHY IN THE PROVINCES—THE MADRID PRESS

LONDON, August 15, 1854

SOME months before the outbreak of the present Spanish revolution, I told your readers that Russian influences were at work in bringing about a Peninsular commotion. For that Russia wanted no direct agents There was *The Times*, the advocate and friend of King Bomba, of the "young hope" of Austria, of Nicholas, of George IV, suddenly turned indignant at the gross immoralities of Queen Isabella and the Spanish Court. There were, besides, the diplomatic agents of the English Ministry, whom the Russian Minister Palmerston had no difficulty in bamboozling with visions of a Peninsular Coburg kingdom It is now ascertained that it was the British Ambassador who concealed O'Donnell at his palace, and induced the banker Collado, the present Minister of Finance, to advance the money required by O'Donnell and Dulce, to start their pronunciamiento. Should anybody doubt that Russia really had a hand in Peninsular affairs, let me remind him of the affair of the *Isla de Leon* Considerable bodies of troops were assembled at Cadiz, in 1820, destined for the South American colonies. All at once the army stationed on the Isle declared for the Constitution of 1812, and its example was followed by troops elsewhere Now, we know from Chateaubriand, the French Ambassador at the Congress of Verona, that Russia stimulated Spain to undertake the expedition into South America, and forced France to undertake the expedition into Spain We know, on the other hand, from the message of the United States President, that Russia promised him to prevent

the expedition against South America. It requires, then, but little judgment to infer as to the authorship of the insurrection of the Isla de Leon. But I will give you another instance of the tender interest taken by Russia in the commotions of the Spanish Peninsula. In his *Historia politica de la Espana moderna* (Barcelona, 1849), Senor de Marlhani, in order to prove that Russia had no reason to oppose the constitutional movement of Spain, makes the following statement

There were seen on the Neva Spanish soldiers swearing to the Constitution [of 1812] and receiving their banners from imperial hands. In his extraordinary expedition against Russia Napoleon formed from the Spanish prisoners in France a special legion, who, after the defeat of the French forces, deserted to the Russian camp. Alexander received them with marked condescension, and quartered them at Peterhoff, where the Empress frequently went to visit them. On a given day Alexander ordered them to assemble on the frozen Neva, and made them take the oath for the Spanish Constitution, presenting them at the same time with banners embroidered by the Empress herself. This corps, thenceforth named "Imperial Alexander," embarked at Kronstadt, and was landed at Cadiz. It proved true to the oath taken on the Neva, by rising, in 1821, at Ocana for the re-establishment of the Constitution.

While Russia is now intriguing in the Peninsula through the hands of England, it, at the same time, denounces England to France. Thus we read in the *New-Prussian Gazette* that England has made the Spanish revolution behind the back of France.

What interest has Russia in fomenting commotions in Spain? To create a diversion in the West, to provoke dissensions between France and England, and lastly to seduce France into an intervention. Already we are told by the Anglo-Russian papers that French insurrectionists of June constructed the barricades at Madrid. The same was said to Charles X. at the Congress of Verona.

The precedent set by the Spanish army had been followed by Portugal, spread to Naples, extended to Piedmont, and exhibited everywhere the dangerous example of armies meddling in measures of reform, and by force of arms dictating laws to their country. Immediately after the insurrection had taken place in Piedmont movements had occurred in France, at Lyons and in other places, directed to the same end. There was Berton's conspiracy at Rochelle in which 25 soldiers of the 45th regiment had taken part. Revolutionary Spain retransfused its hideous elements of discord into France, and both leagued their democratic factions against the monarchical system.

Do we say that the Spanish revolution has been made by the Anglo-Russians? By no means. Russia only supports factious movements at moments when it knows revolutionary crises to be at hand. The real popular movement, however, which then begins, is always found to be as much opposed to the intrigues of Russia as to the oppressive agency of the Government. Such was the fact in Wallachia in 1848—such is the fact in Spain in 1854

The perfidious conduct of England is exhibited at full length by the conduct of its Ambassador at Madrid, Lord Howden. Before setting out from England to return to his post, he assembled the Spanish bondholders, calling upon them to press the payment of their claims on the Government, and in case of refusal, to declare that they would refuse all credit to Spanish merchants. Thus he prepared difficulties for the new Government. As soon as he arrived at Madrid, he subscribed for the victims fallen at the barricades. Thus he provokes ovations from the Spanish people.

*The Times* charges Mr. Soule with having produced the Madrid insurrection in the interest of the present American Administration. At all events, Mr. Soule has not written *The Times's* articles against Isabella II, nor has the party inclined to Cuban annexation gained any benefit from the revolution. With regard to this question, the nomination of General de la Concha as Captain-General of the Island of Cuba is characteristic, he having been one of the seconds of the Duke of Alba in his duel with the son of Mr. Soule. It would be a mistake to suppose that the Spanish Liberals in any way partake in the views of the English Liberal, Mr. Cobden, in reference to the abandonment of the colonies. One great object of the Constitution of 1812 was to retain the empire over the Spanish colonies by the introduction of a united system of representation into the new code. In 1811 the Spaniards even equipped a large armament, consisting of several regiments from Galicia, the only province in Spain then not occupied by the French, in order to combine coercion with their South American policy. It was almost the chief principle of that Constitution not to abandon any of the colonies belonging to Spain, and the revolutionists of today share the same opinion.

No revolution has ever exhibited a more scandalous spectacle in the conduct of its public men than this undertaken in the interest of "morality." The coalition of the old parties forming the present Government of Spain (the partisans of

Espartero and the partisans of the Narvaez) has been occupied with nothing so much as the division of the spoils of office, of places, of salaries, of titles, and of decorations Dulce and Echague have arrived at Madrid, and Serrano has solicited permission to come, in order to secure their shares in the plunder. There is a great quarrel between Moderados and Progresistas, the former being charged with having named all the generals, the latter with having appointed all the political chiefs. To appease the jealousies of the "rabble," Buceta the toreador has been promoted from a director of the slaughter-houses to a director of police Even the *Clamor Publico*, a very moderate paper, gives vent to feelings of disappointment "The conduct of the generals and chiefs would have been more dignified if they had resigned promotion, giving a noble example of disinterestedness, and conforming themselves to the principles of morality proclaimed by the revolution" The shamelessness of the distribution of the spoils is marked by the division of the Ambassadors' places I do not speak of the appointment of Senor Olozaga for Paris, although being the Ambassador of Espartero at the same Court in 1843, he conspired with Louis Philippe, Cristina and Narvaez; nor of the appointment for Vienna of Alejandro Mon, the Finance Minister of Narvaez in 1844, nor of that of Rios Rosas for Lisbon, and Pastor Diaz for Turin, both Moderados of very indifferent capacity I speak of the nomination of Gonzalez Brabo for the Embassy of Constantinople He is the incarnation of Spanish corruption. In 1840 he published *El Guirigay* (Gibberish), a sort of Madrid Punch, in which he made the most furious attacks against Cristina Three years afterward his rage for office transformed him into a boisterous Moderado. Narvaez, who wanted a pliant tool, used him as Prime Minister of Spain, and then kicked him away as soon as he could dispense with him. Brabo, in the interval, appointed as his Minister of Finance one Carrasco, who plundered the Spanish treasury directly He made his father Under-Secretary of the Treasury, a man who had been expelled from his place as a subaltern in the Exchequer because of his malversation, and he transformed his brother-in-law, a hanger-on at the Principe Theatre, into a state-room to the Queen. When reproached with his apostacy and corruption, he answered "Is it not ridiculous to be always the same?" This man is the chosen Ambassador of the revolution of morality

It is somewhat refreshing to hear, in contrast with the official infamies branding the Spanish movement, that the people have forced these fellows at least to place Cristina at the disposal of the Cortes, and to consent to the convocation of a National Constituent Assembly, without a Senate, and consequently neither on the election law of 1837 nor that of 1845. The Government has not yet dared to prescribe an election law of their own, while the people are unanimously in favour of universal suffrage. At Madrid the elections for the National Guard have returned nothing but *Exaltados*.

In the provinces a wholesome anarchy prevails, juntas being constituted, and in action everywhere, and every junta issuing decrees in the interest of its locality—one abolishing the monopoly of tobacco, another the duty on salt. Contrabandists are operating on an enormous scale, and with the more efficiency, as they are the only force never disorganized in Spain. At Barcelona the soldiers are in collision, now among each other, and now with the workmen. This anarchical state of the provinces is of great advantage to the cause of the revolution, as it prevents its being confiscated at the capital.

The Madrid press is at this moment composed of the following papers: *Espana*, *Novedades*, *Nacion*, *Epoca*, *Clamor Publico*, *Diario Espanol*, *Tribuno*, *Esperanza*, *Iberia*, *Catolico*, *Miliciano*, *Independencia*, *Guarda Nacional*, *Esparterista*, *Union*, *Europa*, *Espectador*, *Liberal*, *Eco de la Revolucion*. The *Heraldo*, *Boletin del Pueblo*, and the *Mensajero*, have ceased to exist.

*New York Daily Tribune*, September 1, 1854

## IX

### CALLING OF THE CONSTITUENT CORTES—THE ELECTION LAW—DISORDERS IN TORTOSA—SECRET SOCIETIES—THE MINISTRY BUYS GUNS—SPANISH FINANCES

LONDON, August 21, 1854

THE "leaders" of the *Assemblée Nationale*, *Times*, and *Journal des Debats* prove that neither the pure Russian party, nor the Russo-Coburg party, nor the Constitutional party are satisfied with the course of the Spanish revolution. From this



it would appear that there is some chance for Spain, notwithstanding the contradiction of appearances.

On the 8th inst. a deputation from the Union Club waited on Espartero to present an address calling for the adoption of universal suffrage. Numerous petitions to the same effect were pouring in. Consequently, a long and animated debate took place at the Council of Ministers. But the partisans of universal suffrage, as well as the partisans of the election law of 1846, have been beaten. The *Madrid Gaceta* publishes a decree for the convocation of the Cortes on the 8th of November, preceded by an *expose* addressed to the Queen. At the elections, the law of 1837 will be followed, with slight modifications. The Cortes are to be one Constituent Assembly, the legislative functions of the Senate being suppressed. Two paragraphs of the law of 1846 have been preserved, viz.: the mode of forming the electoral *mesas* (boards receiving the votes and publishing the returns), and the number of Deputies; one Deputy to be elected for every 5,000 souls. The Assembly will thus be composed of from 420 to 430 members. According to a circular of Santa Cruz, the Minister of the Interior, the electors must be registered by the 6th of September. After the verification of the lists by the provincial deputations, the electoral lists will be closed on the 12th of September. The elections will take place on the 3rd of October, at the chief localities of the Electoral District. The scrutiny will be proceeded to on the 16th of October, in the capital of each province. In case of conflicting elections, the new proceedings which will thereby be necessitated, must be terminated by the 30th of October. The *expose* states expressly that "the Cortes of 1854, like those of 1837, will save the monarchy; they will be a new bond between the throne and the nation, objects which cannot be questioned or disputed." In other words, the Government forbids the discussion of the dynastic question; hence, *The Times* concludes the contrary, supposing that the question will now be between the present dynasty or no dynasty at all—an eventuality which, it is scarcely necessary to remark, infinitely displeases and disappoints the calculations of *The Times*.

The Electoral law of 1837 limits the franchise by the conditions of having a household, the payment of the *mayores cuotas* (the ship taxes levied by the State), and the age of twenty-five years. There are further entitled to a vote the members of the Spanish Academies of History and of the

Artes Nobles, doctors, licentiates in the faculties of Divinity, law, of medicine, members of ecclesiastical chapters, parochial curates and their assistant clergy, magistrates and advocates of two years' standing; officers of the army of a certain standing, whether on service or the retired list; physicians, surgeons, apothecaries of two years' standing; architects, painters and sculptors, honoured with the membership of an academy; professors and masters in any educational establishment, supported by the public funds. Disqualified for the vote by the same law are defaulters to the common pueblo-fund, or to local taxation, bankrupts, persons interdicted by the courts of law for moral or civil incapacity; lastly, all persons under sentence.

It is true that this decree does not proclaim universal suffrage, and that it removes the dynastic question from the forum of the Cortes. Still it is doubtful that even this Assembly will do. If the Spanish Cortes forbore from interfering with the Crown in 1812, it was because the Crown was only nominally represented—the King having been absent for years from the Spanish soil. If they forbore in 1837, it was because they had to settle with absolute monarchy before they could think of settling with the constitutional monarchy. With regard to the general situation, *The Times* has truly good reasons to deplore the absence of French centralization in Spain, and that consequently even a victory over revolution in the capital decides nothing with respect to the provinces, so long as that state of "anarchy" survives there without which no revolution can succeed.

There are, of course, some incidents in the Spanish revolution peculiarly belonging to them. For instance, the combination of robbery with revolutionary transactions—a connection which sprung up in the guerrilla wars against the French invasions, and which was continued by the "royalists" in 1823, and the Carlists since 1835. No surprise will therefore be felt at the information that great disorders have occurred at Tortosa, in Lower Catalonia. The *Junta Popular* of that city says, in its proclamation of 31st July: "A band of miserable assassins, availing themselves for pretext of the abolition of the indirect taxes, have seized the town, and trampled upon all laws of society. Plunder, assassination, incendiarism have marked their steps." Order, however, was soon restored by the junta—the citizens arming themselves and coming to the rescue of the feeble garrison of the place. A military com-

mission is sitting, charged with the pursuit and punishment of the authors of the catastrophe of July 30. This circumstance has, of course, given an occasion to the reactionary journals for virtuous declamation. How little they are warranted in this proceeding may be inferred from the remark of the *Messenger de Bayonne*, that the Carlists have raised their banner in the provinces of Catalonia, Aragon and Valencia, and precisely in the same contiguous mountains where they had their chief nest in the old Carlist wars. It was the Carlists who gave origin to the *ladrones facerosos*, that combination of robbery and pretended allegiance to an oppressed party in the State. The Spanish guerrillero of all times has had something of the robber since the time of Viriathus; but it is a novelty of Carlist invention that a pure robber should invest himself with the name of guerrillero. Then men of the Tortosa affair certainly belong to this class.

At Lerida, Saragossa and Barcelona matters are serious. The two former cities have refused to combine with Barcelona, because the military had the upper hand there. Still it appears that even there Concha is unable to master the storm, and General Dulce is to take his place, the recent popularity of that general being considered as offering more guarantees for a conciliation of the difficulties.

The secret societies have resumed their activity at Madrid, and govern the democratic party just as they did in 1823. The first demand which they have urged the people to make is that all Ministers since 1843 shall present their accounts.

The Ministry are purchasing back the arms which the people seized on the day of the barricades. In this way they have got possession of 2,500 muskets, formerly in the hands of insurgents. Don Manuel Zagasti, the Ayacucho *Jefe Politico* of Madrid of 1843, has been reinstated in his functions. He has addressed to the inhabitants and the national militia two proclamations, in which he announces his intention of energetically repressing all disorder. The removal of the creatures of Sartorius from the different offices proceeds rapidly. It is, perhaps, the only thing rapidly done in Spain. All parties show themselves equally quick in that line.

Salamanca is not imprisoned, as was asserted. He had been arrested at Aranjuez, but was soon released, and is now at Malaga.

The control of the Ministry by popular pressure is proved by the fact, that the Ministers of War, of the Interior, and of

Public Works, have effected large displacements and simplifications in their several departments, an event never known in Spanish history before.

The Unionist or Coburg-Braganza party is pitifully weak. For what other reason would they make such a noise about one single address sent from Portugal to the National Guard of Madrid? If we look nearer at it, it is even discovered that the address, (originating with the *Lisbon Journal de Progres*) is not of a dynastic nature at all, but simply of the fraternal kind so well known in the movements of 1848.

The chief cause of the Spanish revolution was the state of the finances, and particularly the decree of Sartorius, ordering the payment of six months' taxes in advance upon the year. All the public chests were empty when the revolution broke out, notwithstanding the circumstance that no branch of the public service had been paid; nor were the sums destined for any particular service applied to it during the whole of several months. Thus, for instance, the turnpike receipts were never appropriated to the use of keeping up the roads. The moneys set aside for public works shared the same destiny. When the chest of public works was subjected to revision, instead of receipts for executed works, receipts from court favourites were discovered. It is known that financiering has long been the most profitable business in Madrid. The Spanish budget for 1853 was as follows:

Civil List and Appanages	.	..	47,350,000	reals.
Legislation	..	.	1,331,685	reals.
Interest of Public Debt		.	213,271,423	reals.
President of Council	..		1,687,860	reals.
Foreign Office	.	.	3,919,083	reals.
Justice	.	.	39,001,233	reals.
War	.	..	273,646,284	reals.
Marine	.	..	85,165,000	reals.
Interior	..		43,957,940	reals.
Police	.	.	72,000,000	reals.
Finances	.	.	142,279,000	reals.
Pensions	.	..	143,400,586	reals.
<i>Cultus</i>	..	..	119,050,508	reals.
Extras	..	..	18,387,788	reals.
Total	..	..	1,204,448,390	reals.

Notwithstanding this budget, Spain is the least taxed country of Europe, and the economical question is nowhere so simple as there. The reduction and simplification of the bureaucratic machinery in Spain are the less difficult, as the Municipalities traditionally administer their own affairs; so is reform of the tariff and conscientious application of the *bienes nacionales* not yet alienated. The social question in the modern sense of the word has no foundation in a country with its resources yet undeveloped, and with such a scanty population as Spain—15,000,000 only.

*New York Daily Tribune*, September 4, 1854.

## X

### THE REACTION IN SPAIN—STATE OF FINANCES—CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL IBERIAN REPUBLIC.

LONDON, September 1, 1854.

THE entrance into Madrid of the "Vicalvaro" regiments has encouraged the Government to greater counter-revolutionary activity. The revival of the restrictive press-law of 1837, adorned with all the rigours of the supplementary law of 1842, has killed all the "incendiary" portion of the press which was unable to offer the required *cautionnement*. On the 24th the last number was given out of the *Clamor de las Barricadas* with the title of *Ultimas Barricadas*, the two editors having been arrested. Its place was taken on the same day by a new reactionary paper called *Las Cortes*. "His Excellency, the Captain-General, Don Evaristo San Miguel" says the programme of the last-mentioned paper, "who honours us with his friendship, has offered to this journal the favour of his collaboration. His articles will be signed with his initials. The men at the head of this enterprise will defend with energy that revolution which vanquished the abuses and excesses of a corrupt power, but it is in the *enceinte* of the Constituent Assembly that they will plant their banner. It is there that the great battle must be fought." The great battle is for Isabella II, and Espartero. You will remember that this same San Miguel, at the banquet of the press, declared that the press had no other corrective but itself, common sense and public education, that it was an institution which neither sword nor transportation, nor exile, nor any power in the

world could crush. On the very day on which he offers himself as a contributor to the press, he has not a word against the decree confiscating his beloved liberty of the press.

The suppression of the liberty of the press has been closely followed by the suppression of the right of meeting, also by royal decree. The clubs have been dissolved at Madrid, and in the provinces the juntas and committees of Public Safety, with the exception of those acknowledged by the Ministry as "deputations." The Club of the Union was shut up in consequence of a decree of the whole Ministry, notwithstanding that Espartero had only a few days previously accepted its honorary Presidency, a fact which *The London Times* vainly labours to deny. This club had sent a deputation to the Minister of the Interior, insisting on the dismissal of Senor Zagasti, the *Jefe Político* of Madrid, charging him with having violated the liberty of the press and the right of meeting. Senor Santa Cruz answered that he could not blame a public functionary for taking measures approved by the Council of Ministers. The consequence was that a serious trouble arose; but the *Plaza de la Constitucion* was occupied by the National Guard, and nothing further occurred. The petty journals had scarcely been suppressed when the greater ones that had hitherto granted their protection to Zagasti, found occasion to quarrel with him. In order to silence the *Clamor Público*, its chief editor, Senor Corradi, was appointed Minister. But this step will not be sufficient, as all editors cannot be attached to the Ministry.

The boldest stroke of the counter-revolution, however, was the permission for Queen Cristina's departure for Lisbon, after the Council of Ministers had engaged to keep her at the disposal of the Constituent Cortes—a breach of faith which they have tried to cover by an anticipated confiscation of Cristina's estates in Spain, notoriously the least considerable portion of her wealth. Thus Cristina had a cheap escape, and now we hear that San Luis, too, has safely arrived at Bayonne. The most curious part of the transaction is the manner in which the decree alluded to was obtained. On the 26th some patriots and National Guards assembled to consider the safety of the public cause, blaming the Government on account of its vacillation and half and half measures, and agreeing to send a deputation to the Ministry, calling upon them to remove Cristina from the Palace, where she was plotting liberticide projects. There was a very suspicious circumstance in the adhe-

sion of two aides-de-camp of Espartero with Zagasti himself, to this proposition. The result was that the Ministry met in Council, and the upshot of their meeting was the elopement of Cristina.

On the 25th the Queen appeared for the first time in public, on the promenade of the Prado, attended by what is called her husband, and by the Prince of Asturias. But her reception appears to have been extremely cold.

The committee appointed to report on the state of the finances at the epoch of the fall of the Sartorius Ministry has published its report in the *Gaceta*, where it is preceded by an *expose* by Senator Collado, the Minister of Finance. According to this the floating debt of Spain now amounts to \$33,000,000, and the total deficit to \$50,000,000. It appears that even the extraordinary resources of the Government were anticipated for years and squandered. The revenues of Havana and the Phillippines were anticipated for two years and a half. The yield of the forced loan had disappeared without leaving a trace. The Almaden quick-silver mines were engaged for years. The balance in hand due to the *Caja* of deposits did not exist. Nor did the fund for military substitution. 7,485,692 reals were due for the purchase of tobacco obtained, but not paid for. Ditto 5,505,000 reals for bills on account of public works. According to the statement of Senor Collado the amount of obligations of the most pressing nature is 252,980,253 reals. The measures proposed by him for the covering of this deficit are those of a true banker, viz.: to return to quiet and order, to continue to levy all the old taxes, and to contract new loans. In compliance with this advice Espartero has obtained from the principal Madrid bankers \$2,500,000 on a promise of a pure *Moderado* policy. How willing he is to keep this promise is proved by his last measures.

It must not be imagined that these reactionary measures have remained altogether unresisted by the people. When the departure of Cristina became known, on the 28th August, barricades were erected again; but, if we are to believe a telegraphic dispatch from Bayonne, published by the French *Moniteur*, "the troops, united to the National Guard carried the barricades and put down the movement."

This is the *cercle vicieux* in which abortive revolutionary Governments are condemned to move. They recognize the debts contracted by their counter-revolutionary predecessors as national obligations. In order to be able to pay them they

must continue their old taxes and contract new debts. To be able to contract new loans they must give guaranties of "order," that is, take counter-revolutionary measures themselves. Thus the new popular Government is at once transformed into the handmaid of the great capitalists, and an oppressor of the people. In exactly the same manner was the Provincial Government of France in 1848 driven to the notorious measure of the 45 centimes, and the confiscation of the savings banks' funds in order to pay their interests to the capitalists. "The revolutionary governments of Spain," says the English author of the *Revelations on Spain*, "are at least not sunk so deep as to adopt the infamous doctrine of repudiation as practised in the United States." The fact is that if any former Spanish revolution had once practised repudiation, the infamous Government of San Luis would not have found any banker willing to oblige it with advances. But perhaps our author holds the view that it is the privilege of the counter-revolution to contract, as it is the privilege of revolution to pay debts.

It appears that Saragossa, Valencia and Algeciras do not concur in this view, as they have abrogated all taxes obnoxious to them.

Not content with sending Bravo Murillo as Ambassador to Constantinople, the Government has dispatched Gonzalez Brabo in the same capacity to Vienna.

On Sunday, 27th August, the electoral reunions of the District of Madrid assembled in order to appoint, by general suffrage, the Commissioners charged with the superintendence of the election at the capital. There exist two Electoral Committees at Madrid—the Union Liberal, and the Union del Comercio.

The symptoms of reaction above collected appear less formidable to persons acquainted with the history of Spanish revolutions than they must to the superficial observer—since Spanish revolutions generally only date from the meeting of the Cortes, usually the signal for the dissolution of Government. At Madrid, besides, there are only a few troops, and at the highest 20,000 National Guards. But of the latter only about one half are properly armed, while the people are known to have disobeyed the call to deliver up their arms.

Notwithstanding the tears of the Queen, O'Donnell has dissolved her bodyguard, the regular army being jealous of the privileges of this corps, from whose ranks a Godoy, noticed as



a good player upon the guitar and a singer of *setguidillas graciosas y picantes*, could raise himself to become the husband of the King's niece, and a Munoz, only known for his private advantages, become the husband of a Queen Mother.

At Madrid a portion of the republicans have circulated the following *Constitution of a Federal Iberian Republic* :

#### TITULO I. *Organization of the Federal Iberian Republic.*

Art. 1. Spain and its isles and Portugal will be united and form the Federal Iberian Republic. The colours of the banner will be a union of the two actual banners of Spain and Portugal. Its device will be Liberty, Equality, Fraternity.

Art. 2. The sovereignty resides in the universality of the citizens. It is inalienable and imprescriptible. No individual, no fraction of the people can usurp its exercise.

Art. 3. The law is the expression of the national will. The judges are appointed by the people through universal suffrage.

Art. 4. All citizens of 21 years of age and enjoying their civil rights to be electors.

Art 5. The punishment of death is abolished ; both for political and common crimes. The jury is to judge in all cases.

Art. 6. Property is sacred. The estates taken from political emigrants are restored to them.

Art. 7. The contributions will be paid in proportion to incomes. There will be one tax only, direct and general. All indirect contributions, *octroi*, and on consumption are abolished. Likewise abolished are the Government monopolies of salt and tobacco, the stamps, the patent dues, and the conscription.

Art. 8. The liberty of the press, of meeting, of association, of domicile, of education, of commerce, and of conscience, is granted. *Every religion will have to pay for its own ministers.*

Art. 13. The administration of the republic is to be federal, provincial and municipal.

#### TITULO II. *Federal Administration*

Art. 14. It will be intrusted to an Executive Council appointed and revokable by the Central Federal Congress.

Art. 15 The international and commercial relations, the uniformity of measures, weights and coins, the Post-Office,

and the armed force are the domain of the Federal Administration.

Art. 16. The Central Federal Congress will be composed of nine Deputies for every province, elected by universal suffrage and bound by their instructions.

Art. 17. The Central Federal Congress is in permanency.

Art. 20. Whenever a law is to be enacted, the Administration thinking it necessary will bring the project under the cognizance of the confederation six months before if it be for the Congress, and three months if it be for the Provincial Legislation.

Art. 21. Any Deputy of the people failing to adhere to his instructions is handed over to justice.

Art. 3, TITULO III, refers to the Provincial and Municipal Administration, and confirms similar principles. The last article of this chapter says : *There are to be no longer any colonies ; they will be changed into provinces and administered on provincial principles. Slavery shall be abolished.*

#### TITULO IV.—*The Army*

Art. 34. The whole people will be armed and organized in a National Guard, one portion to be *mobile* and the other *sedentary*.

Art. 35. The mobile guard to consist of the *celibaterios* between the ages of 21 and 35; their officers to be chosen in the military schools by election.

Art. 36. The sedentary militia consists of all citizens between 35 and 56 years ; officers to be appointed by election. Their service is the defence of the communities.

Art 38. The corps of artillery and engineers are recruited by voluntary enlistment, permanent, and garrisoning the fortresses on the coast of the frontiers. No fortresses shall be suffered in the interior.

Art. 39, alluding to the marine, contains similar provisions.

Art. 40. The staffs of the provinces and captain-generalcies are suppressed.

Art. 42. The Iberian Republic renounces all wars of conquest, and will submit its quarrels to the arbitration of Governments disinterested in the question.

Art. 43. There shall be no standing armies

*New York Daily Tribune, September 16, 1854.*

## XI

### LATE MEASURES OF THE GOVERNMENT—THE REACTIONARY PRESS ON SPANISH AFFAIRS—SUPER-INCUMBRANCE OF GENERALS

LONDON, September 12, 1854.

THE reactionary press is not yet satisfied with the late measures of the Spanish Government; they grumble at the fact that a new compromise had been entered into with the revolution. Thus we read in the *Journal des Debats*:

It was only on the 7th August, when Espartero declared "that in conformity with the wishes of the people of Madrid, the Duchess of Riansares should not leave the Capital, either by day or night, or in any furtive manner." It is only on the 28th August that Queen Cristina, after a detention of twenty-one days, is allowed to depart in broad day, with a sort of ostentation. But the Government has been weak enough to order, simultaneously, the confiscation of her estates.

The *Debats* now hopes that this order will be cancelled. But the hopes of the *Debats* are, perhaps, in this instance, even more doomed to disappointment than when it uttered faint hopes that the confiscation of the Orleans estates would be carried out by Bonaparte. The *Jefe Politico* of Oviedo has already proceeded to sequester the coal mines possessed by Cristina in the Province of Asturias. The directors of the mines of Siero, Langreo, and Piero Corril have received orders to make a statement and to place their administration under the Government.

With regard to the "broad day" in which the *Debats* effects the departure of Cristina, they are very wrongly informed. Queen Cristina on leaving her apartments, crossed the corridors in dead silence—everybody being studiously kept out of the way. The National Guard occupying the barracks in the court of the Palace were not aware of her departure. So secretly was the whole plan arranged that even Garrigo, who was to have charge of her escort, only received his orders on the moment of starting. The escort only learned the mission with which they were intrusted at a distance of twelve miles from Madrid, when Garrigo had all sorts of difficulties in preventing his men from either insulting Cristina or returning direct to Madrid. The chiefs of the National Guard did not learn anything of the affair until two hours after the

departure of Mme. Munoz. According to the statement of the *Espana* she reached the Portuguese frontier on the morning of the 3rd September. She is said to have been in very good spirits on the journey, but her Duke was somewhat *triste*. The relations of Cristina and this same Munoz can only be understood from the answer given by Don Quixote to Sancho Panza's question why he was in love with such a low country wench as his Dulcinea, when he could have princesses at his feet: "A lady," answered the worthy knight, "surrounded by a host of high-bred, rich, and witty followers, was asked why she took for her lover a simple peasant. 'You must know,' said the lady, 'that for the office I use him he possesses more philosophy than Aristotle himself'."

The view taken by the reactionary press in general on Spanish affairs may be judged of by some extracts from the *Kölnische Zeitung* and the *Independence Belge*:

According to a well-informed and trustworthy correspondent, himself an adherent of O'Donnell and the Moderado party, [says the former] the position of affairs is grievous, a deep conflict continuing to exist among parties. The working classes are in a state of permanent excitement, being worked upon by the agitators.

The future of the Spanish monarchy [says the *Independence*] is exposed to great dangers. All true Spanish patriots are unanimous on the necessity of putting down the revolutionary orgies. The rage of the libelers and of the constructors of barricades is let loose against Espartero and his Government with the same vehemence as against San Luis and the banker, Salamanca. But, in truth, this chivalrous nation cannot be held responsible for such excesses. The people of Madrid must not be confounded with the mob that vociferated "Death to Cristina," nor for the infamous libels launched among the population, under the title of "Robberies of San Luis, Cristina and the Acolytes." The 1,800 barricades of Madrid and the ultra Communist manifestations of Barcelona bespeak the inter-meddling of foreign Democracy with the Spanish Saturnalia. So much is certain, that a great number of the refugees of France, Germany and Italy have participated in the deplorable events now agitating the Peninsula. So much is certain, that Spain is on the brink of a social conflagration; the more immediate consequences will be the loss of the Pearl of the Antilles, the rich Island of Cuba, because it places Spain in the impossibility to combat American ambition, or the patriotism of a Soule or Sanders. It is time that Spain should open her eyes, and that all honest men of civilized Europe should combine in giving the alarm.

It certainly requires no intervention of foreign democracy to stir up the population of Madrid when they see their Gov-

ernment break on the 28th the word given on the 7th; suspend the right of freely assembling, and restore the press-law of 1837, requiring a *cautionnement* of 40,000 reals and 300 reals of direct taxes on the part of every editor. If the provinces remain agitated by uncertain and undecided movements, what other reason are we to find for this fact, but the absence of a centre for revolutionary action? Not a single decree beneficent to the provinces has appeared since the so-called revolutionary government fell into the hands of Espartero. The provinces behold it surrounded by the same sycophancy, intrigues, and place hunting that had subsisted under San Luis. The same swarm hangs about the Government—the plague which has infested Spain since the age of the Philips.

Let us just cast a glance at the last number of the Madrid *Gaceta* of the 6th September. There is a report of O'Donnell announcing a superabundance of military places and honours to such a degree that out of every three generals only one can be employed on active service. It is the very evil which has cursed Spain since 1823—this superincumbrance of generals. One would fancy that a decree was to follow abating the nuisance. Nothing of the sort. The decree following the report convokes a consultative junta of war, composed of a certain number of generals, appointed by the Government from out the generals holding at present no commission in the army. Besides their ordinary pay these men are to receive: each Lieutenant-General 5,000 reals, and each Marechal-de-Camp 6,000 reals. General Manuel de la Concha has been named President of his military sinecurist junta. The same number of the *Gaceta* presents another harvest of decorations, appointments, etc., as if the first great distribution had failed to do its work. San Miguel and Dulce have received the grand-cross of the order of Charles III; all the recompenses and provisional honours decreed by the junta of Saragossa are confirmed and enlarged. But the most remarkable portion of this number of the *Gaceta* is the announcement that the payment of the public creditors will be resumed on the 11th inst. Incredible folly of the Spanish people not to be satisfied with these achievements of their revolutionary Government!

*New York Daily Tribune*, September 30, 1854

## PART THREE

## REVOLUTION IN SPAIN (1856)

## I

THE news brought by the Asia yesterday, though later by three days than our previous advices, contains nothing to indicate a speedy conclusion of the civil war in Spain. O'Donnell's *coup d'état*, although victorious at Madrid, cannot yet be said to have finally succeeded. The French *Moniteur*, which at first put down the insurrection at Barcelona as a mere riot, is now obliged to confess that the conflict there was very keen, but that the success of the Queen's troops may be considered as secured.

According to the version of that official journal the combat at Barcelona lasted from 5 o'clock in the afternoon of July 18 till the same hour on the 21st—exactly three days—when the “insurgents” are said to have been dislodged from their quarters, and fled into the country, pursued by cavalry. It is, however, averred that the insurgents still hold several towns in Catalonia, including Gerona, Junquera, and some smaller places. It also appears that Murcia, Valencia and Seville have made their *pronunciamientos* against the *coup d'état*; that a battalion of the garrison of Pamplona, directed by the Governor of that town on Soria, had pronounced against the Government on the road, and marched to join the insurrection at Saragossa; and lastly that at Saragossa, from the beginning the acknowledged centre of resistance, General Falcon had passed in review 16,000 soldiers of the line, reinforced by 15,000 militia and peasants from the environs.

At all events, the French Government considers the “insurrection” in Spain as not quelled, and Bonaparte, far from contenting himself with the sending of a batch of battalions to line the frontier, has ordered one brigade to advance to the Bidasoa, which brigade is being completed to a division by reinforcements from Montpellier and Toulouse. It seems, also, that a second division has been detached immediately from the army of Lyons, according to orders sent direct from Plom-

bieres on the 23rd ultimo, and is now marching towards the Pyrenees, where, by this time, there is assembled a full *corps d'observation* of 25,000 men. Should the resistance to the O'Donnell Government be able to hold its ground; should it prove formidable enough to inveigle Bonaparte into an armed invasion of the Peninsula, then the *coup d'etat* of Madrid may have given the signal for the downfall of the *coup d'etat* of Paris.

If we consider the general plot and the *dramatis personae*, this Spanish conspiracy of 1856 appears as the simple revival of the similar attempt of 1843, with some slight alterations of course. Then, as now, Isabella at Madrid and Cristina at Paris; Louis Philippe, instead of Louis Bonaparte, directing the movement from the Tuileries; on the one side, Espartero and his *Ayacuchos*; on the other, O'Donnell, Serrano, Concha, with Narvaez then in the proscenium, now in the background. In 1843, Louis Philippe sent two millions of gold by land and Narvaez and his friends by sea, the compact of the Spanish marriages being settled between himself and Madame Munoz. The complicity of Bonaparte in the Spanish *coup d'etat*—who has, perhaps, settled the marriage of his cousin Prince Napoleon with a Mdlle. Munoz, or who, at all events, must continue his mission of mimicking his uncle—that complicity is not only indicated by the denunciations hurled by the *Moniteur* for the last two months at the Communist conspiracies in Castile and Navarre, by the behaviour before, during and after the *coup d'etat* of M. de Turgot, the French Ambassador at Madrid, the same man who was the Foreign Minister of Bonaparte during his own *coup d'etat*, by the Duke of Alba, Bonaparte's brother-in-law, turning up as the President of the new *Ayuntamiento* at Madrid, immediately after the victory of O'Donnell; by Ros de Olano, an old member of the French party, being the first man offered a place in O'Donnell's Ministry; and by Narvaez being dispatched to Bayonne by Bonaparte as soon as the first news of the affair reached Paris. That complicity was suggested beforehand by the forwarding of large quantities of ammunition from Bordeaux to Bayonne a fortnight in advance of the actual crisis at Madrid. Above all, it is suggested by the plan of operations followed by O'Donnell in his *razzia* against the people of that city. At the very outset he announced that he would not shrink from blowing up Madrid, and during the fighting he acted up to his word. Now, although a daring fellow, O'Donnell has never ventured upon a bold step without securing a safe retreat. Like his notorious

uncle, the hero of treason, he never burnt the bridge when he passed the Rubicon. The organ of combativeness is singularly checked in the O'Donnells by the organs of cautiousness and secretiveness. It is plain that any general who should hold forth the threat of laying the capital in ashes, and fail in his attempt, would forfeit his head. How then did O'Donnell venture upon such delicate ground? The secret is betrayed by the *Journal des Debats*, the special organ of Queen Cristina. "O'Donnell expected a great battle, and at the most a victory hotly disputed. Into his previsions there entered the possibility of defeat. If such a misfortune had happened, the Marshal would have abandoned Madrid with the rest of his army escorting the Queen, and turning toward the northern provinces, with a view to approach the French frontier." Does not all this look as if he had laid his plan with Bonaparte? Exactly the same plan had been settled between Louis Philippe and Narvaez in 1843, which, again, was copied from the secret convention between Louis XVIII and Ferdinand VII, in 1823.

This plausible parallel between the Spanish conspiracies of 1843 and 1856 once admitted, there are still sufficiently distinct features in the two movements to indicate the immense strides made by the Spanish people within so brief an epoch. These features are the political character of the last struggle at Madrid; its military importance; and finally, the respective position of Espartero and O'Donnell in 1856, compared with those of Espartero and Narvaez in 1843. In 1843 all parties had become tired of Espartero. To get rid of him a powerful coalition was formed between the Moderados and Progresistas. Revolutionary juntas springing up like mushrooms in all the towns, paved the way for Narvaez and his retainers. In 1856 we have not only the Court and army on the one side against the people on the other, but within the ranks of the people we have the same divisions as in the rest of Western Europe. On the 13th of July the Ministry of Espartero offered its forced resignation; in the night of the 13th and 14th the Cabinet of O'Donnell was constituted; on the morning of the 14th the rumour spread that O'Donnell, charged with the formation of a Cabinet, had invited Rios Rosas, the ill-omened Minister of the bloody days of July, 1854, to join him. At 11 a.m. the *Gaceta* confirmed the rumour. Then the Cortes assembled, 93 Deputies being present. According to the rules of that body, 20 members suffice to call a meeting,



and 50 to form a quorum. Besides, the Cortes had not been formally prorogued. General Infante, the President, could not but comply with the universal wish to hold a regular sitting. A proposition was submitted to the effect that the new Cabinet did not enjoy the confidence of the Cortes, and that her Majesty should be informed of this resolution. At the same time, the Cortes summoned the National Guard to be ready for action. Their committee, bearing the resolution of want of confidence, went to the Queen, escorted by a detachment of National Militia. While endeavouring to enter the palace they were driven back by the troops of the line, who fired upon them and their escort. This incident gave the signal for the insurrection. The order to commence the building of barricades was given at 7 in the evening by the Cortes, whose meeting was dispersed immediately afterward by the troops of O'Donnell. The battle commenced the same night, only one battalion of the National Militia joining the royal troops. It should be noted that as early as the morning of the 13th, Senor Escosura, the Esparterist Minister of the Interior, had telegraphed to Barcelona and Saragossa that a *coup d'etat* was at hand, and that they must prepare to resist it. At the head of the Madrid insurgents were Senor Madoz and General Valdes, the brother of Escosura. In short, there can be no doubt that the resistance to the *coup d'etat* originated with the Esparterists, the citizens and Liberals in general. While they, with the militia, engaged the line across Madrid from east to west, the workmen under Pucheta occupied the south and part of the north side of the town.

On the morning of the 15th, O'Donnell took the initiative. Even by the partial testimony of the *Debats*, O'Donnell obtained no marked advantage during the first half of the day. Suddenly, at about 1 o'clock, without any perceptible reason, the ranks of the National Militia were broken; at 2 o'clock they were still more thinned, and at 6 o'clock they had completely disappeared from the scene of action, leaving the whole brunt of the battle to be borne by the workmen, who fought it out till 4 in the afternoon of the 16th. Thus there were, in these three days of carnage, two distinct battles—the one of the Liberal Militia of the middle class, supported by the workmen against the army, and the other of the army against the workmen deserted by the militia. As Heine has it: "It is an old story, but is always news." Espartero deserts the Cortes; the Cortes desert the leaders of the National Guard; the leaders

desert their men, and the men desert the people. On the 15th, however, the Cortes assembled again, when Espartero appeared for a moment. He was reminded by Senor Asensio and other members of his reiterated protestations to draw his grand sword of Luchana on the first day when the liberty of the country should be endangered. Espartero called Heaven to witness his unswerving patriotism, and when he left, it was fully expected that he would soon be seen at the head of the insurrection. Instead of this, he went to the house of General Gurrea, where he buried himself in a bomb-proof cellar, a la Palafox, and was heard of no more. The commandants of the militia, who, on the evening before, had employed every means to excite the militiamen to take up arms, now proved as eager to retire to their private houses. At 2-30 p.m. General Valdes, who for some hours had usurped the command of the militia, convoked the soldiers under his direct command on the Plaza Mayor, and told them that the man who naturally ought to be at their head would not come forward, and that consequently everybody was at liberty to withdraw. Hereupon the National Guards rushed to their homes and hastened to get rid of their uniform and hide their arms. Such is the substance of the account furnished by one well-informed authority. Another gives as the reason for this sudden act of submission to the conspiracy, that it was considered that the triumph of the National Guard was likely to entail the ruin of the throne and the absolute preponderance of the Republican Democracy. The *Presse* of Paris also gives us to understand that Marshal Espartero, seeing the turn given to things in the Congress by the Democrats, did not wish to sacrifice the throne, or launch into the hazards of anarchy and civil war, and in consequence did all he could to produce submission to O'Donnell.

It is true that the details as to the time, circumstances, and break-down of the resistance to the *coup d'etat*, are given differently by different writers; but all agree on the one principal point, that Espartero deserted the Cortes, the Cortes the leaders, the leaders the middle class, and that class the people. This furnishes a new illustration of the character of most of the European struggles of 1848-49, and of those hereafter to take place in the Western portion of that continent. On the one hand there are modern industry and trade, the natural chiefs of which, the middle classes, are averse to military despotism; on the other hand, when they begin the battle against this same despotism, in step the workmen them-

selves, the product of the modern organization of labour, to claim their due share of the result of victory. Frightened by the consequences of an alliance thus imposed on their unwilling shoulders, the middle classes shrink back again under the protecting batteries of the hated despotism. This is the secret of the standing armies of Europe, which otherwise will be incomprehensible to the future historian. The middle classes of Europe are thus made to understand that they must either surrender to a political power which they detest, and renounce the advantages of modern industry and trade, and the social relations based upon them, or forego the privileges which the modern organization of the productive powers of society, in its primary phase, has vested in an exclusive class. That this lesson should be taught even from Spain is something equally striking and unexpected.

*New York Daily Tribune*, August 8, 1856.

## II

SARAGOSSA surrendered on August 1, at 1-30 p.m., and thus vanished the last centre of resistance to the Spanish counter-revolution. There was, in a military point of view, little chance of success after the defeats at Madrid and Barcelona, the feebleness of the insurrectionary diversion in Andalusia, and the converging advance of overwhelming forces from the Basque provinces, Navarre, Catalonia, Valencia and Castile. Whatever chance there might be was paralyzed by the circumstance that it was Espartero's old aide-de-camp, General Falcon, who directed the forces of resistance; that "Espartero and Liberty" was given as the battlecry; and that the population of Saragossa had become aware of Espartero's incomparably ridiculous fiasco at Madrid. Besides, there were direct orders from Espartero's headquarters to his bottle-holders at Saragossa, that they were to put an end to all resistance, as will be seen from the following extract from the *Journal de Madrid* of July 29:

One of the Esparterist ex-Ministers took part in the negotiations going on between General Dulce and the authorities of Saragossa, and the Esparterist member of the Cortes, Juan Alonso Martinez, accepted the mission of informing the insurgent leaders that the Queen, her Ministers and her generals, were animated by a most conciliatory spirit.

The revolutionary movement was pretty generally spread over the whole of Spain. Madrid and La Mancha in Castile; Granada, Seville, Malaga, Cadiz, Jaen, etc., in Andalusia; Murcia and Cartagena in Murcia; Valencia, Alicante, Alcira, etc., in Valencia; Barcelona, Reus, Figueras, Gerona, in Catalonia; Saragossa, Teruel, Huesca, Jaca, etc., in Aragon; Oviedo in Asturias; and Coruna in Galicia.

There were no moves in Estremadura, Leon and old Castile, where the revolutionary party had been put down two months ago, under the joint auspices of Espartero and O'Donnell—the Basque provinces and Navarre also remaining quiet. The sympathies of the latter provinces, however, were with the revolutionary cause, although they might not manifest themselves in sight of the French army of observation. This is the more remarkable if it be considered that twenty years ago these very provinces formed the stronghold of Carlism—then backed by the peasantry of Aragon and Catalonia, but who, this time, were most passionately siding with the revolution, and who would have proved a most formidable element of resistance, had not the imbecility of the leaders at Barcelona and Saragossa prevented their energies from being turned to account. Even *The London Morning Herald*, the orthodox champion of Protestantism, which broke lances for the Quixote of the *auto-da-fe*, Don Carlos, some twenty years ago, has stumbled over that fact, which it is fair enough to acknowledge. This is one of the many symptoms of progress revealed by the last revolution in Spain, a progress the slowness of which will astonish only those not acquainted with the peculiar customs and manners of a country, where “a la manana” is the watchword of every day's life, and where everybody is ready to tell you that “our forefathers needed eight hundred years to drive out the Moors.”

Notwithstanding the general spread of *pronunciamientos*, the revolution in Spain was limited only to Madrid and Barcelona. In the south it was broken by the cholera morbus, in the north by the Espartero murrain. From a military point of view, the insurrections at Madrid and Barcelona offer few interesting and scarcely any novel features. On the one side—the army—everything was prepared beforehand; on the other everything was extemporized; the offensive never for a moment changed sides. On the one hand, a well-equipped army, moving easily in the strings of its commanding generals; on the other, leaders reluctantly pushed forward by the impetus

of an imperfectly-armed people. At Madrid the revolutionists from the outset committed the mistake of blocking themselves up in the internal parts of the town, on the line connecting the eastern and western extremities—extremities commanded by O'Donnell and Concha, who communicated with each other and the cavalry of Dulce through the external boulevards. Thus the people were cutting off and exposing themselves to the concentric attack preconceived by O'Donnell and his accomplices. O'Donnell and Concha had only to effect their junction and the revolutionary forces were dispersed into the north and south quarters of the town, and deprived of all further cohesion. It was a distinct feature of the Madrid insurrection that barricades were used sparingly and only at prominent street corners, while the houses were made the centres of resistance; and—what is unheard of in street warfare—bayonet attacks met the assailing columns of the army. But, if the insurgents profited by the experience of the Paris and Dresden insurrections, the soldiers had learned no less by them. The walls of the houses were broken through one by one, and the insurgents were taken in the flank and rear, while the exits into the streets were swept by cannon-shot. Another distinguished feature in this battle of Madrid was that Pucheta, after the junction of Concha and O'Donnell, when he was pushed into the southern (Toledo) quarter of the town, transplanted the guerrilla warfare from the mountains of Spain into the streets of Madrid. The insurrection, dispersed, faced about under some arch of a church, in some narrow lane, on the staircase of a house, and there defended itself to the death.

At Barcelona the fighting was still more intense, there being no leadership at all. Militarily, this insurrection, like all previous risings in Barcelona, perished by the fact of the citadel, Fort Montjuich, remaining in the hands of the army. The violence of the struggle is characterized by the burning of 150 soldiers in their barracks at Gracia, a suburb which the insurgents hotly contested, after being already dislodged from Barcelona. It deserves mention that, while at Madrid, as we have shown in a previous article, the proletarians were betrayed and deserted by the bourgeoisie, the weavers of Barcelona declared at the very outset that they would have nothing to do with a movement set on foot by Esparterists, and insisted on the declaration of the Republic. This being refused, they, with the exception of some who could not resist the smell of powder, remained passive spectators of the battle, which

was thus lost—all insurrections at Barcelona being decided by its 20,000 weavers.

The Spanish revolution of 1856 is distinguished from all its predecessors by the loss of all dynastic character. It is known that the movement from 1804 to 1815 was national and dynastic. Although the Cortes in 1824 proclaimed an almost republican Constitution, they did it in the name of Ferdinand VII. The movement of 1820-23, timidly republican, was altogether premature and had against it the masses to whose support it appealed, those masses being bound altogether to the Church and the Crown. So deeply rooted was royalty in Spain, that the struggle between old and modern society, to become serious, needed a testament of Ferdinand VII, and the incarnation of the antagonistic principles in two dynastic branches, the Carlist and Cristina ones. Even to combat for a new principle the Spaniard wanted a time-honoured standard. Under these banners the struggle was fought out, from 1831 to 1843. Then there was an end of revolution, and the new dynasty was allowed its trial from 1843 to 1854. In the revolution of July, 1854, there was thus necessarily implied an attack on the new dynasty; but innocent Isabel was covered by the hatred concentrated on her mother, and the people revelled not only in their own emancipation but also in that of Isabel from her mother, and the camarilla.

In 1856 the cloak had fallen and Isabel herself confronted the people by the *coup d'état* that fomented the revolution. She proved the worthy, coolly cruel, and cowardly hypocrite daughter of Ferdinand VII, who was so much given to lying that notwithstanding his bigotry he could never convince himself, even with the aid of the Holy Inquisition, that such exalted personages as Jesus Christ and his Apostles had spoken truth. Even Murat's massacre of the Madrilenos in 1808 dwindles into an insignificant riot by the side of the butcheries of the 14-16th July, smiled upon by the innocent Isabel. Those days sounded the death-knell of royalty in Spain. There are only the imbecile legitimists of Europe imagining that Isabel having fallen, Don Carlos may rise. They are forever thinking that when the last manifestation of a principle dies away, it is only to give its primitive manifestation another turn.

In 1856, the Spanish revolution has lost not only its dynastic, but also its military character. Why the army played such a prominent part in Spanish revolutions, may be told in a very few words. The old institution of the Captain-General-

ships, which made the captains the *pashas* of their respective provinces; the war of independence against France, which not only made the army the principal instrument of national defence, but also the first revolutionary organization and the centre of revolutionary action in Spain; the conspiracies of 1815-18, all emanating from the army; the dynastic war of 1831-41, depending on the armies of both sides; the isolation of the liberal bourgeoisie forcing them to employ the bayonets of the army against clergy and peasantry in the country, the necessity for Cristina and the camarilla to employ bayonets against the Liberals, as the Liberals had employed bayonets against the peasants; the tradition growing out of all these precedents; these were the causes which impressed on revolution in Spain a military, and on the army a pretorian character. Till 1854, revolution always originated with the army, and its different manifestations up to that time offered no external sign of difference beyond the grade in the army whence they originated.

Even in 1854 the first impulse still proceeded from the army, but there is the Manzanares manifesto of O'Donnell to attest how slender the base of the military preponderance in the Spanish revolution had become. Under what conditions was O'Donnell finally allowed to stay his scarcely equivocal promenade from Vicalvaro to the Portuguese frontiers, and to bring back the army to Madrid? Only on the promise to immediately reduce it, to replace it by the National Guard, and not to allow the fruits of the revolution to be shared by the generals. If the revolution of 1854 confined itself thus to the expression of its distrust, only two years later, it finds itself openly and directly attacked by that army—an army that has now worthily entered the lists by the side of the Croats of Radetzky, the Africans of Bonaparte, and the Pomeranians of Wrangel. How far the glories of its new position are appreciated by the Spanish army, is proved by the rebellion of a regiment at Madrid, on the 29th of July, which, not being satisfied with the mere *cigarros* of Isabel, struck for the five franc pieces, and sausages of Bonaparte, and got them, too.

This time, then, the army has been all against the people, or, indeed, it has only fought against them, and the National Guards. In short, there is an end of the revolutionary mission of the Spanish army. The man in whom centred the military, the dynastic, and the bourgeois liberal character of the Spanish revolution—Espartero—has now sunk even lower than the

common law of fate would have enabled his most intimate *connoisseurs* to anticipate. If, as is generally rumoured, and is very probable, the Esparterists are about to rally under O'Donnell, they will have confirmed their suicide by an official act of their own. They will not save him.

The next European revolution will find Spain matured for co-operation with it. The years 1854 and 1856 were phases of transition she had to pass through to arrive at that maturity.

*New York Daily Tribune*, August 18, 1856.



PART FOUR  
ARTICLES FROM  
PUTNAM'S MAGAZINE  
AND THE  
NEW AMERICAN CYCLOPEDIA

I

THE SPANISH ARMY

OF all European armies, that of Spain is from peculiar circumstances, most a matter of interest to the United States. We give, therefore, in concluding this survey of the military establishments of Europe,\* a more detailed account of this army than its importance, compared with that of its neighbours on the other side of the Atlantic, might seem to warrant.

The Spanish military force consists of the army of the interior, and of the colonial armies.

That of the interior counts one regiment of grenadiers, forty-five regiments of the line, of three battalions each, two regiments of two battalions each in Ceuta, and eighteen battalions of cazadores or rifles. The whole of these 160 battalions formed, in 1852, an effective force of 72,670 men, costing the state 82,692,651 reals, or \$10,336,581, a year. The cavalry comprises sixteen regiments of carbineers, or dragoons and lancers, of four squadrons each, with eleven squadrons of cazadores, or light horse, in 1851; in all 12,000 men, costing 17,549,562 reals, or \$2,193,695.

The artillery numbers five regiments of foot artillery, of three brigades each, one for each division of the monarchy, beside five brigades of heavy, three of horse, and three of mountain artillery, making a total of twenty-six brigades, or, as they are now called, battalions. The battalion has in the horse artillery two, in the mountain and foot artillery four batteries; in all ninety-two foot and six horse batteries, or 588 field guns.

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\*This was a section of an article which Engels wrote on "The Armies of Europe."—*Ed.*

The sappers and miners form one regiment of 1,240 men.

The reserve consists of one battalion (No. 4) for every infantry regiment, and a depot-squadron for each cavalry regiment.

The total force—on paper—in 1851 was 103,000 men; in 1843, when Espartero was upset, it amounted to 50,000 only; but at one time Narvaez raised it to above 100,000. On an average 90,000 men under arms will be the utmost.

The colonial armies are as follows:

1 The army of Cuba; sixteen regiments of veteran infantry, four companies of volunteers, two regiments of cavalry, two battalions of four batteries foot, and one battalion of four batteries of mountain artillery, one battalion of horse artillery with two batteries, and one battalion of sappers and miners. Besides these troops of the line, there is a *milicia disciplinada* of four battalions and four squadrons, and a *milicia urbana* of eight squadrons, making a total of thirty-seven battalions, twenty squadrons and eighty-four guns. During the last few years this standing Cuban army has been reinforced by numerous troops from Spain, and if we take its original strength at 16,000 or 18,000 men, there will now be, perhaps, 25,000 or 28,000 men in Cuba. But this is a mere approximation.

2. The army of Porto Rico; three battalions of veteran infantry, seven battalions of disciplined militia, two battalions of native volunteers, one squadron of the same, and four batteries of foot artillery. The neglected state of most of the Spanish colonies does not allow any estimate of the strength of this corps.

3 The Philippine Islands have five regiments of infantry, of eight companies each; one regiment of chasseurs of Luzon; nine foot, one horse, one mountain battery. Nine corps of five battalions of native infantry, and other provincial corps, previously existing, were dissolved in 1851.

The army is recruited by ballot, and substitutes are allowed. Every year a contingent of 25,000 men is levied; but, in 1848, three contingents, or 75,000 men, were called out.

The Spanish army owes its present organization principally to Narvaez, though the regulations of Charles III, of 1768, still form the groundwork of it. Narvaez had actually to take away from the regiments their old provincial colours, different in each, and to introduce the Spanish flag into the army! In the same manner he had to destroy the old provincial organization, and to centralize and restore unity. Too well aware,

by experience, that money was the principal moving lever in an army which had almost never been paid and seldom even clad or fed, he also tried to introduce a greater regularity in the payments and the financial administration of the army. Whether he succeeded to the full extent of his wishes, is unknown ; but any amelioration introduced by him, in this respect, speedily disappeared during the administration of Sartorius and his successors. The normal state of "no pay, no food, no clothing," was re-established in its full glory, and while the superior and general officers strut about in coats resplendent with gold and silver lace, or even don fancy uniforms, unknown to any regulations, the soldiers are ragged and without shoes. What the state of this army was ten or twelve years ago, an English author thus describes.

The appearance of the Spanish troops is, to the last degree, unsoldierly. The sentry strolls to and fro on his beat, his shako almost falling off the back of his head, his gun slouched on his shoulders, singing outright a lively *seguidilla* with the most *sans facon* air in the world. He is, not unfrequently, destitute of portions of his uniform ; or his regimental coat and lower continuations are in such hopeless rags, that, even in the sultry summer, the slate-coloured great-coat is worn as a slut-cover ; the shoes, in one case out of three, are broken to pieces, disclosing the naked toes of the men—such in Spain are the glories of the *vida militar*.

A regulation, issued by Serrano, on September 9, 1843, prescribes that :

All officers and chiefs of the army have in future to present themselves in public in the uniform of their regiment, and with the regulation sword, whenever they do not appear in plain clothes, and all officers are also to wear the exact distinctive marks of their rank, and no other, as prescribed, without displaying any more of those arbitrary ornaments and ridiculous trimmings by which some of them have thought proper to distinguish themselves.

So much for the officers. Now for the soldiers :

Brigadier General Cordoba has opened a subscription in Cadiz, heading it with his name, in order to procure funds for presenting one pair of cloth trousers to each of the valiant soldiers of the regiment of Asturias !

This financial disorder explains how it has been possible for the Spanish army to continue, ever since 1808, in a state of almost uninterrupted rebellion. But the real causes lie deeper. The long continued war with Napoleon, in which the different armies and their chiefs gained real political influence, first gave it a pretorian turn. Many energetic men, from the

revolutionary times, remained in the army; the incorporation of the guerrillas in the regular force even increased this element. Thus, while the chiefs retained their pretorian pretensions, the soldiers and lower ranks altogether remained inspired with revolutionary traditions. In this way the insurrection of 1819-23 was regularly prepared, and later on, in 1833-43, the civil war again thrust the army and its chiefs into the foreground. Having been used by all parties as an instrument, no wonder that the Spanish army should, for a time, take the government into its own hands.

"The Spaniards are a warlike but not a soldier-like people," said the Abbe de Pradt. They certainly have, of all European nations, the greatest antipathy to military discipline. Nevertheless, it is possible that the nation, which for more than a hundred years was celebrated for its infantry, may yet again have an army of which it can be proud. But, to attain this end, not only the military system, but civil life, still more, requires to be reformed.

*Putnam's Magazine, December, 1855.*

## II

### BADAJOS

BADAJOS, a town and fortress of Spain, the capital of Estremadura, on the river Guadiana, 82 miles N. N. W. of Seville, 49 S. of Alcantara, population about 15,000. It is especially celebrated for its events during the Peninsular war. The first of these was the fearful massacre of May, 1808, on the breaking out of the general insurrection against the French. The Governor, who wished to suppress the riot, was dragged out of his house, and murdered by the mob. On February 5, 1811, when Massena was in full retreat, before Wellington, from the impregnable lines of Torres Vedras, Soult took up his position before the walls of Badajoz, defended by the veteran, Menacho. Wellington made every effort to enable Mendizabal, the Spanish general, in the field, to raise the siege, and sent to him for that purpose, all the Spanish divisions of his own army, which rendered the Spaniards in the field, without taking the garrison into consideration, fully equal to the French force outside of the fortress. However Mendizabal, the Spanish commander, suffered himself to be surprised and cut to pieces with the loss of 8,000 men and all his artillery, a few escaping

with their general. into Elvas, while 3,000 threw themselves into Badajoz, which now had 9,000 men within the walls, and 170 guns. Unfortunately, however, Menacho was killed during a sally on the evening of March 2, the ramparts were partially breached, and although the breaches were impracticable while the French had but 6 guns in battery, one of which was dismounted, and while it was known that Beresford was on the march to relieve the garrison at the head of 12,000 men. Imaz, who had succeeded to the command of the place, shamefully surrendered it. This disaster, which the Duke of Wellington described as in his opinion, by far the greatest misfortune which had befallen the allies since the commencement of the Peninsular war, occurred March 10, 1811, and immediately, as soon as the retreat of Massena was fully developed Wellington determined to retake the stronghold of Badajoz. It was accordingly invested, May 5, 1811, and though there was not then in the British army a single corps of sappers and miners, nor a solitary private who knew how to conduct approaches under fire the siege was begun with great alacrity. But before much had been accomplished, Soult came up from Seville, and the battle of Albuera was fought. After this battle, Wellington who had come up in person, renewed the siege with the utmost vigour. On June 6, the breach was declared practicable but on that day and on June 9, the British troops were repulsed in two severe attacks, with prodigious loss, and Marmont and Soult coming up with vastly superior numbers, Wellington was reluctantly compelled to raise the siege, and retire into Portugal.—On the morning of January 8, Wellington crossed the Agueda, and resumed the offensive, while the enemy were far aloof. After the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo, by storm, January 18, 1812, Wellington turned his attention towards Badajoz, which he resolved to take by a similar *coup de main*. With great skill and subtlety, he contrived to deceive Napoleon himself to whom all the details of the war were referred by telegraph, so completely that no steps were taken for the relief of the place, until the English siege artillery was actually before the walls. On March 15, the pontoons were thrown across the Guadiana, and on the 17th the investment of the fortress was completed. It was a place of great strength, most ably defended by Philippon, who by his former successful defence had become thoroughly acquainted with all its strength and weakness, and was admirably seconded in his defence, by a picked garrison of 5,000 men, the flower of the French armies, and

whose resistance, although unsuccessful, crowned him with undying honour. On the 24th, as it was known that Soult was energetically striving to raise means for the relief of the place, the advanced post, called the Picurina, though not breached, was stormed and taken, with a loss of 350 men in the assault, which lasted but one hour, although Philippon was confident of making the fort good for 4 or 5 days, and delaying by so long the fall of the place. On the morning of April 6, the walls of the town itself were breached in 3 places, and the breaches were declared practicable, although the counter-scarp remained entire, and prodigious efforts had been made to retrench the breaches, and to fortify the summit of the runs, which were rendered impassable by huge beams bristling with sword blades, while the whole ascent was strewn with live shells, and honeycombed with mines, ready to explode under the feet of the assailants—At 10 o'clock at night the assault commenced, by the most of 2 divisions, in all 10,000 strong, preceded by storming parties each of 500 men, with ladders and axes, led by their respective forlorn hopes, against the 3 breaches, while Picton, with a third division, was destined to storm the castle in the rear, during the progress of the main assaults. Nothing like the loss and carnage of that hideous midnight attack has been recorded in the history of war. The breaches were carried, amid the explosion of mines, the bursting of shells, the roar of ordnance, and the roll of musketry; but when the top was won, the retrenchments could not be freed, although the men confronted death in every form, and fought hand to hand with the French grenadiers across the barrier. After 2 hours of desperate fighting, in which 2,000 men had fallen within the space of a few hundred square feet—by Wellington's orders, the troops were ordered to retire, and reform for a second attack. But in the meantime, Picton, though he had been once repulsed, scaled the castle, which had not been breached at all, and which, even after it was in the hands of the enemy, Philippon could not believe to have been taken; while Walker, with a brigade of Portuguese, intended only to make a diversion by a false attack, scaled the bastion of Vicente, and, at the very moment when all was in confusion, disaster, and retreat, at the breaches, the English bugles, answering each other from the castle and the great square of the town, announced that the place was lost and won.—The breaches were abandoned; the garrison retreated across the Guadiana, into the adjoining fortress of San Cristobal,

where they surrendered at discretion the next morning ; the assailants, now unresisted, poured in by the breaches, by the gates, over the ramparts, and, maddened by their losses, and drunk with blood and the furious hour of battle, did deeds that night which might well make the angels weep, and which obscured, if they could not efface, the glory of their wonderful achievement.—Thus in 11 days of open trenches, and 19 of siege, the strongest place in Spain, with 120 heavy guns, and all its garrison of 3,800 men, with their governor, 1,500 having fallen during the siege, was taken, contrary to all the probabilities and chances of warlike fortune—The conquerors lost 5,000 men and officers, including 700 Portuguese, during the siege ; no less than 3,500 of whom (800 of them dead) were stricken down in the last assault. Still, fearful as was the price, it was not too dearly paid ; since by the taking of Badajoz, the path was opened into the very heart of Spain, and the career of victory commenced, which only ended when the allied armies defiled through the streets of the French metropolis.

*New American Cyclopaedia*, Vol. II., 1858.,

### III

#### BIDASOA

BIDASOA, a small river of the Basque provinces of Spain, noted for the battles fought upon its banks, between the French under Soult and the English, Spaniards, and Portuguese, under Wellington. After the defeat of Vitoria in 1813, Soult collected his troops in a position, the right of which rested on the sea opposite Fuenterrabia, having the Bidasoa in front, while the centre and left extended across several ridges of hills toward St Jean de Luz. From this position he once attempted to relieve the blockade garrison of Pamplona, but was repulsed. San Sebastian, besieged by Wellington, was now hard pressed, and Soult resolved to raise the siege. From his position of the lower Bidasoa it was but 9 miles to Oyarzun, a village on the road to San Sebastian, and if he could reach that village the siege must be raised. Accordingly, toward the end of August, 1813, he concentrated 2 columns on the Bidasoa. The one on the left, under General Clausel, consisting of 20,000 men and 29 guns, took a position on a ridge

of hills opposite Vera (a place beyond which the upper course of the river was in the hands of the allies), while General Reille with 18,000 men, and a reserve of 7,000 under Foy took his station lower down, near the road from Bayonne to Irun. The French intrenched camp to the rear was held by D'Erlon with 2 divisions, to ward off any turning movement of the allied right. Wellington had been informed of Soult's plan, and had taken every precaution. The extreme left of his position, sheltered in front by the tidal estuary of the Bidasoa, was well intrenched, though but slightly occupied; the centre, formed by the extremely strong and rugged ridges of San Marcial, was strengthened with field-works, and held by Freire's Spaniards, the 1st British division standing as a reserve on their left rear near the Irun road. The right wing, on the rocky descents of the Pena de Haya mountain, was held by Longa's Spaniards and the 4th Anglo-Portuguese division, Inglis's brigade of the 7th division connecting it with the light division at Vera, and with the troops detached still further to the right among the hills. Soult's plan was that Reille should take San Marcial (which he intended forming into a bridge-head for ulterior operations), and drive the allies toward their right, into the ravines of Pena de Haya, thus clearing the highroad for Foy, who was to advance along it straight on Oyarzun, while Clausel, after leaving a division to observe Vera, should pass the Bidasoa a little below that place, and drive whatever troops opposed him up the Pena de Haya, thus seconding and flanking Reille's attacks. On the morning of August 31, Reille's troops forded the river in several columns, carried the first ridge of San Marcial with a rush, and advanced toward the higher and commanding ridges of that group of hills. But on this difficult ground his troops, imperfectly managed, got into disorder; skirmishers and supports became mingled, and in some places crowded together in disordered groups, when the Spanish columns rushed down the hill and drove them back to the river. A second attack was at first more successful, and brought the French up to the Spanish position; but then its force was spent, and another advance of the Spaniards drove them back into the Bidasoa in great disorder. Soult having learned in the meantime that Clausel had made good his attack, slowly conquering ground on Pena de Haya, and driving Portuguese, Spaniards and British before him, was just forming columns out of Reille's reserves and Foy's troops for a third and final attack, when news came that



D'Erlon had been attacked in his camp by strong forces Wellington, as soon as the concentration of the French on the lower Bidasoa left no longer any doubt of the real point of attack, had ordered all troops in the hills on his extreme right to attack whatever was before them. This attack, though repulsed, was very serious, and might possibly be renewed. At the same time, a portion of the British light division was drawn up on the left bank of the Bidasoa so as to flank Clausel's advance. Soult now gave up the intended attack, and drew Reille's troops back across the Bidasoa. Those of Clausel were not extricated till late in the night, and after a severe struggle to force the bridge at Vera, the fords having become impassable by a heavy fall of rain on the same day, the allies took San Sebastian, except the citadel, by storm, and this latter post surrendered on September 9.—The second battle of the Bidasoa took place October 7, when Wellington forced the passage of that river. Soult's position was about the same as before, Foy held the intrenched camp of St. Jean de Luz, D'Erlon held Urdax and the camp of Ainhoa, Clausel was posted on a ridge connecting Urdax with the lower Bidasoa, and Reille stood along that river from Clausel's right down to the sea. The whole front was intrenched, and the French were still employed in strengthening their works. The British right stood opposed to Foy and D'Erlon, the centre, composed of Giron's Spaniards and the light division, with Longa's Spaniards and the 4th division in reserve, in all 20,000 men, faced Clausel, while on the lower Bidasoa Freire's Spaniards, the 1st and 5th Anglo-Portuguese divisions, and the unattached brigade of Aylmer and Wilson, in all 24,000 men, were ready to attack Reille. Wellington prepared everything for a surprise. His troops were drawn up well sheltered from the view of the enemy during the night before October 7, and the tents of his camp were not struck. Besides, he had been informed by smugglers of the locality of 3 fords in the tidal estuary of the Bidasoa, all passable at low water, and unknown to the French, who considered themselves perfectly safe on that side. On the morning of the 7th, while the French reserves were encamped far to the rear, and of the one division placed in the 1st line many men were told off to work at the redoubts, the 5th British division and Aylmer's brigade forded the tidal estuary, and marched toward the intrenched camp called *les Sansculottes*. As soon as they had passed to the other side, the guns from San Marcial opened, and 5 more columns

advanced to ford the river. They had formed on the right bank before the French could offer any resistance; in fact, the surprise completely succeeded; the French battalions, as they arrived singly and irregularly, were defeated, and the whole line, including the key of the position, the hill of Croix des Bouquets, was taken before any reserves could arrive. The camp of Biriatu and Bildox, connecting Reille with Clausel, was turned by Freire's taking the Mandale hill, and abandoned. Reille's troops retreated in disorder until they were stopped at Urogne by Soult, who arrived in haste with the reserves from Espelette. While still there, he was informed of an attack on Urdax; but he was not a moment in doubt about the real point of attack, and marched on the lower Bidasoa, where he arrived too late to restore the battle. The British centre, in the meantime, had attacked Clausel, and gradually forced his positions by both front and flank attacks. Toward evening he was confined to the highest point of the ridge, the Grande Rhune, and that hill he abandoned next day. The loss of the French was about 1,400, that of the allies about 1,600 killed and wounded. The surprise was so well managed that the real defence of the French positions had to be made by 10,000 men only, who, on being vigorously attacked by 33,000 allies, were driven from them before any reserves could come to their support.

*New American Cyclopedia*, Vol. III, 1858.

#### IV

#### BOLIVAR Y PONTE

BOLIVAR Y PONTE, Simon, the "liberator" of Colombia, born at Caracas, July 24, 1783, died at San Pedro, near Santa Marta, December 17, 1830. He was the son of one of the *familias Mantuanas*, which, at the time of the Spanish supremacy, constituted the creole nobility in Venezuela. In compliance with the custom of wealthy Americans of those times, at the early age of 14 he was sent to Europe. From Spain he passed to France, and resided for some years in Paris. In 1802 he married in Madrid, and returned to Venezuela, where his wife died suddenly of yellow fever. After this he visited Europe a second time, and was present at Napoleon's coronation as Emperor, in 1804, and at his assumption of the iron

crown of Lombardy, in 1805. In 1809 he returned home, and despite the importunities of Jose Felix Rivas, his cousin, he declined to join in the revolution which broke out at Caracas, April 19, 1810, but, after the event, he accepted a mission to London to purchase arms and solicit the protection of the British Government. Apparently well received by the Marquis of Wellesley, then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, he obtained nothing beyond the liberty to export arms for ready cash with the payment of heavy duties upon them. On his return from London, he again withdrew to private life, until, September 1811, he was prevailed upon by General Miranda, then commander-in-chief of the insurgent land and sea forces, to accept the rank of lieutenant-colonel in the staff, and the command of Puerto Cabello, the strongest fortress of Venezuela. The Spanish prisoners of war, whom Miranda used regularly to send to Puerto Cabello, to be confined in the citadel, having succeeded in overcoming their guards by surprise, and in seizing the citadel, Bolivar, although they were unarmed, while he had a numerous garrison and large magazines, embarked precipitately in the night, with 8 of his officers, without giving notice to his own troops, arrived at daybreak at La Guayra, and retired to his estate at San Mateo. On becoming aware of their commanders flight, the garrison retired in good order from the place, which was immediately occupied by the Spaniards under Monteverde. This event turned the scale in favour of Spain, and obliged Miranda, on the authority of the congress, to sign the treaty of Vitoria, July 26, 1812, which restored Venezuela to the Spanish rule. On July 30 Miranda arrived at La Guayra, where he intended to embark on board an English vessel. On his visit to the commander of the place, Colonel Manuel Maria Casas, he met with a numerous company among whom were Don Miguel Pena and Simon Bolivar, who persuaded him to stay, for one night at least, in Casas's house. At 2 o'clock in the morning, when Miranda was soundly sleeping Casas Pena and Bolivar entered his room, with 4 armed soldiers, cautiously seized his sword and pistol, then awakened him, abruptly told him to rise and dress himself, put him into irons, and had him finally surrendered to Monteverde, who dispatched him to Cadiz, where, after some years' captivity, he died in irons. This act, committed on the pretext that Miranda had betrayed his country by the capitulation of Vitoria, procured for Bolivar Monteverde's peculiar favour, so that when

he demanded his passport, Monteverde declared "Colonel Bolivar's request should be complied with, as a reward for his having served the King of Spain by delivering up Miranda." He was thus allowed to sail for Curacao, where he spent 6 weeks, and proceeded, in company with his cousin Rivas, to the little republic of Cartagena. Previous to their arrival, a great number of soldiers, who had served under General Miranda, had fled to Cartagena. Rivas proposed to them to undertake an expedition against the Spaniards in Venezuela, and to accept Bolivar as their commander-in-chief. The former proposition they embraced eagerly, to the latter they demurred, but at last yielded, on the condition of Rivas being the second in command. Manuel Rodriguez Torrices, the president of the republic of Cartagena, added to the 300 soldiers thus enlisted under Bolivar, 500 men under the command of his cousin, Manuel Castillo. The expedition started in the beginning of January, 1813. Dissensions as to the supreme command breaking out between Bolivar and Castillo, the latter suddenly decamped with his grenadiers. Bolivar, on his part, proposed to follow Castillo's example, and return to Cartagena, but Rivas persuaded him at length to pursue his course at least as far as Bogota, at that time the seat of the congress of New Granada. They were well received, supported in every way, and were both made generals by the congress, and, after having divided their little army into 2 columns, they marched by different routes upon Caracas. The further they advanced, the stronger grew their resources, the cruel excesses of the Spanish acting everywhere as the recruiting sergeants for the army of independence. The power of resistance on the part of the Spaniards was broken, partly by the circumstance of three-quarters of their army being composed of natives, who bolted on every encounter to the opposite ranks, partly by the cowardice of such generals as Tiscar, Cagigal, and Fierro, who, on every occasion, deserted their own troops. Thus it happened that Santiago Marino, an ignorant youth, had contrived to dislodge Spaniards from the provinces of Cumana and Barcelona, at the very time that Bolivar was advancing through the western provinces. The only serious resistance, on the part of the Spaniards, was directed against the column of Rivas, who, however, routed General Monteverde at Los-taguanes, and forced him to shut himself up in Puerto Cabello with the remainder of his troops. On hearing of Bolivar's approach, General Fierro, the governor of Caracas, sent

deputies to propose a capitulation, which was concluded at Vitoria; but Fierro, struck by a sudden panic, and not expecting the return of his own emissaries, secretly decamped in the night, leaving more than 1,500 Spaniards at the discretion of the enemy. Bolivar was now honoured with a public triumph. Standing in a triumphal car, drawn by 12 young ladies, dressed in white, adorned with the national colours, and all selected from the first families of Caracas, Bolivar, bareheaded, in full uniform, and wielding a small baton in his hands, was in about half an hour, dragged from the entrance of the city to his residence. Having proclaimed himself "dictator and liberator of the western provinces of Venezuela"—Marino had assumed the title of "dictator of the eastern provinces"—he created "the order of the liberator," established a choice corps of troops under the name of his bodyguard, and surrounded himself with the show of a court. But, like most of his countrymen, he was averse to any prolonged exertion, and his dictatorship soon proved a military anarchy, leaving the most important affairs in the hands of favourites, who squandered the finances of the country, and then resorted to odious means in order to restore them. The new enthusiasm of the people was thus turned to dissatisfaction, and the scattered forces of the enemy were allowed to recover. While, in the beginning of August, 1813, Monteverde was shut up in the fortress of Puerto Cabello, and the Spanish army reduced to the possession of a small strip of land in the northwestern part of Venezuela, 3 months later, in December, the liberator's prestige was gone, and Caracas itself threatened, by the sudden appearance in its neighbourhood of the victorious Spaniards under Boves. To strengthen his tottering power, Bolivar assembled, January 1, 1814, a junta of the most influential inhabitants of Caracas, declaring himself to be unwilling any longer to bear the burden of dictatorship. Hurtado Mendoza, on the other hand, argued, in a long oration, "the necessity of leaving the supreme power in the hands of General Bolivar, until the Congress of New Granada could meet, and Venezuela be united under one government." This proposal was accepted, and the dictatorship was thus invested with some sort of legal sanction. The war with the Spaniards was, for some time, carried on in a series of small actions, with no decisive advantage to either of the contending parties. In June 1814, Boves marched with his united forces from Calabozo on La Puerta, where the two dictators, Bolivar and Marino, had formed a junction, met them,

and ordered an immediate attack. After some resistance, Bolivar fled toward Caracas, while Marino disappeared in the direction of Cumana. Puerto Cabello and Valencia fell into the hands of Boves, who then detached 2 columns (1 of them under the command of Colonel Gonzalez), by different roads, upon Caracas. Rivas tried in vain to oppose the advance of Gonzalez. On the surrender of Caracas to Gonzalez, July 17, 1814, Bolivar evacuated La Guayra, ordered the vessels lying in the harbour of that town to sail for Canada, and retreated with the remainder of his troops upon Barcelona. After a defeat inflicted on the insurgents by Boves, August 8, 1814, at Angaita, Bolivar left his troops the same night secretly to hasten, through by-roads, to Cumana, where, despite the angry protests of Rivas, he at once embarked on board the *Blanca*, together with Marino and some other officers. If Rivas, Paez, and other generals had followed the dictators in their flight, everything would have been lost. Treated by General Arismendi, on their arrival at Juan Griego, in the island of Margarita, as deserters, and ordered to depart, they sailed for Carupano, whence, meeting with a similar reception on the part of Colonel Bermudez, they steered toward Cartagena. There, to palliate their flight, they published a justificatory memoir, in high-sounding phraseology. Having joined a plot for the overthrow of the government of Cartagena, Bolivar had to leave that little republic, and proceeded to Tunja, where the congress of the federalist republic of New Granada was sitting. At that time the province of Cundinamarca stood at the head of the independent provinces which refused to adopt the Granadian federal compact, while Quito, Pasto, Santa Marta, and other provinces, still remained in the power of the Spaniards. Bolivar, who arrived at Tunja November 22, 1814, was created by the congress commander-in-chief of the federalist forces, and received the double mission of forcing the president of the province of Cundinamarca to acknowledge the authority of the congress, and of then marching against Santa Marta, the only fortified seaport the Spaniards still retained in New Granada. The first point was easily carried, Bogota, the capital of the disaffected province, being a defenceless town. In spite of its capitulation, Bolivar allowed it to be sacked during 48 hours by his troops. At Santa Marta, the Spanish General Montalvo, having a feeble garrison of less than 200 men, and a fortress in a miserable state of defence, had already bespoken a French vessel, in

order to secure his own flight, while the inhabitants of the town sent word to Bolivar that on his appearance they would open the gates and drive out the garrison. But instead of marching, as he was ordered by the congress, against the Spaniards at Santa Marta, he indulged his rancour against Castillo, the commander of Cartagena, took upon himself to lead his troops against the latter town, which constituted an integral part of the federal republic. Beaten back, he encamped upon La Papa, a large hill, about gun-shot distance from Cartagena, and established a single small cannon as a battery against a place provided with about 80 guns. He afterwards converted the siege into a blockade, which lasted till the beginning of May without any other result than that of reducing his army, by desertion and malady, from 2,400 men to about 700. Meanwhile a great Spanish expedition from Cadiz had arrived, March 25, 1815, under General Morillo, at the island of Margarita, and had been able to throw powerful reinforcements into Santa Marta and soon after to take Cartagena itself. Previously, however, Bolivar had embarked for Jamaica, May 10, 1815 with about a dozen of his officers, on an armed English brig. Having arrived at the place of refuge, he again published a proclamation, representing himself as the victim of some secret enemy or faction, and defending his flight before the approaching Spaniards as a resignation of command out of deference for the public peace. During his 8 months' stay at Kingston the generals he had left in Venezuela, and General Arismendi in the island of Margarita, staunchly held their ground against the Spanish arms. But Rivas, from whom Bolivar had derived his reputation having been shot by the Spaniards after the capture of Maturin, there appeared in his stead another man on the stage, of still greater abilities, who, being as a foreigner unable to play an independent part in the South American revolution, finally resolved to act under Bolivar. This was Luis Brion. To bring aid to the revolutionists, he had sailed from London for Cartagena with a corvette of 24 guns, equipped in great part at his own expense, with 14,000 stand of arms and a great quantity of military stores. Arriving too late to be useful in that quarter, he re-embarked for Cayes, in Haiti, whither many emigrant patriots had repaired after the surrender of Cartagena. Bolivar, meanwhile, had also departed from Kingston to Port au Prince, where on his promise of emancipating the slaves, Petion, the president of Haiti, offered him large supplies for a new expedition against the Spaniards.

in Venezuela. At Cayes he met Brion and the other emigrants, and in a general meeting proposed himself as the chief of the new expedition, on the condition of uniting the civil and military power in his person until the assembling of a general congress. The majority accepting his terms, the expedition sailed April 16, 1816, with him as its commander and Brion as its admiral. At Margarita the former succeeded in winning over Arismendi, the commander of the island, in which he had reduced the Spaniards to the single spot of Pampatar. On Bolivar's formal promise to convoke a national congress at Venezuela, as soon as he should be master of the country, Arismendi summoned a junta in the cathedral of La Villa del Norte, and publicly proclaimed him the commander-in-chief of the republics of Venezuela and New Granada. On May 31, 1816, Bolivar landed at Carupano, but did not dare prevent Marino and Piar from separating from him, and carrying on a war against Cumana under their own auspices. Weakened by this separation, he set sail, on Brion's advice, for Ocumare, where he arrived July 3, 1816, with 13 vessels, of which 7 only were armed. His army mustered but 650 men, swelled, by the enrollment of Negroes whose emancipation he had proclaimed, to about 800. At Ocumare he again issued a proclamation, promising "to exterminate the tyrants" and to "convoke the people to name their deputies to congress." On his advance in the direction of Valencia he met, not far from Ocumare, the Spanish general Morales at the head of about 200 soldiers and 100 militiamen. The skirmishers of Morales having dispersed his advanced guard, he lost, as an eye-witness records, "all presence of mind, spoke not a word, turned his horse quickly round, and fled in full speed toward Ocumare, passed the village at full gallop, arrived at the neighbouring bay, jumped from his horse, got into a boat, and embarked on the *Diana*, ordering the whole squadron to follow him to the little island of Buen Aire, and leaving all his companions without any means of assistance." On Brion's rebukes and admonitions, he again joined the other commanders on the coast of Cumana, but being harshly received, and threatened by Piar with trial before a court-martial as a deserter and a coward, he quickly retraced his steps to Cayes. After months of exertion, Brion at length succeeded in persuading a majority of the Venezuelan military chiefs, who felt the want of at least a nominal centre, to recall Bolivar as their general-in-chief, upon the express condition that he should assemble a



congress, and not meddle with the civil administration. December 31, 1816, he arrived at Barcelona with the arms, munitions of war, and provisions supplied by Petion. Joined, January 2, 1817, by Arismendi, he proclaimed on the 4th martial law and the union of all powers in his single person; but 5 days later, when Arismendi had fallen into an ambush laid by the Spaniards, the dictator fled to Barcelona. The troops rallied at the latter place, whither Brion sent him also guns and reinforcements, so that he soon mustered a new corps of 1,100 men. April 15, the Spaniards took possession of the town of Barcelona, and the patriot troops retreated toward the charity-house, a building isolated from Barcelona, and intrenched on Bolivar's order, but unfit to shelter a garrison of 1,000 men from a serious attack. He left the post in the night of April 5, informing Colonel Freites, to whom he transferred his command, that he was going in search of more troops, and would soon return. Trusting this promise, Freites declined the offer of a capitulation, and, after the assault, was slaughtered with the whole garrison by the Spaniards. Piar, a man of colour and native of Curacao, conceived and executed the conquest of the provinces of Guiana, Admiral Brion supporting that enterprise with his gunboats. July 20, the whole of the provinces being evacuated by the Spaniards, Piar, Brion, Zea, Marino, Arismendi, and others, assembled a provincial congress at Angostura, and put at the head of the executive a triumvirate, of which Brion, hating Piar and deeply interested in Bolivar, in whose success he had embarked his large private fortune, contrived that the latter should be appointed a member, notwithstanding his absence. On these tidings Bolivar left his retreat for Angostura, where, emboldened by Brion, he dissolved the congress and the triumvirate, to replace them by a "supreme council of the nation," with himself as the chief, Brion and Antonio Francisco Zea as the directors, the former of the military, the latter of the political section. However, Piar, the conqueror of Guiana, who once before had threatened to try him before a court-martial as a deserter, was not sparing of his sarcasms against the "Napoleon of the retreat," and Bolivar consequently accepted a plan for getting rid of him. On the false accusation of having conspired against the whites, plotted against Bolivar's life, and aspired to the supreme power, Piar was arraigned before a war council under the presidency of Brion, convicted, condemned to death, and shot, October 16, 1817. His death struck

Marino with terror. Fully aware of his own nothingness when deprived of Piar, he, in a most abject letter, publicly calumniated his murdered friend, deprecated his own attempts at rivalry with the liberator, and threw himself upon Bolivar's inexhaustible fund of magnanimity. The conquest by Piar of Guiana had completely changed the situation in favour of the patriots; that single province affording them more resources than all the other 7 provinces of Venezuela together. A new campaign, announced by Bolivar through a new proclamation, was, therefore, generally expected to result in the final expulsion of the Spaniards. This first bulletin, which described some small Spanish foraging parties withdrawing from Calabozo as "armies flying before our victorious troops," was not calculated to damp these hopes. Against about 4,000 Spaniards, whose junction had not yet been effected by Morillo, he mustered more than 9,000 men, well armed, equipped, and amply furnished with all the necessaries of war. Nevertheless, toward the end of May, 1818, he had lost about a dozen battles and all the provinces lying on the northern side of the Orinoco. Scattering as he did his superior forces, they were always beaten in detail. Leaving the conduct of the war to Paez and his other subordinates, he retired to Angostura. Defection followed upon defection, and everything seemed to be drifting to utter ruin. At this most critical moment, a new combination of fortunate accidents again changed the face of affairs. At Angostura he met with Santander, a native of New Granada, who begged for the means of invading that territory, where the population were prepared for a general rise against the Spaniards. This request, to some extent, he complied with, while powerful succours in men, vessels, and munitions of war poured in from England, and English, French, German, and Polish officers flocked to Angostura. Lastly, Dr. German Roscio, dismayed at the declining fortune of the South American revolution, stepped forward, laid hold of Bolivar's mind, and induced him to convene, February 15, 1819, a national congress, the mere name of which proved powerful enough to create a new army of about 14,000 men, so that Bolivar found himself enabled to resume the offensive. The foreign officers suggested to him the plan of making a display of an intention to attack Caracas, and free Venezuela from the Spanish yoke, and thus inducing Morillo to weaken New Granada and concentrate his forces upon Venezuela, while he (Bolivar) should suddenly turn to the west, unite with Santander's guerrillas,

and march upon Bogota. To execute this plan, he left Angostura February 24, 1819, after having nominated Zea president of the congress and vice-president of the republic during his absence. By the manoeuvres of Paez, Morillo and La Torre were routed at Achaguas, and would have been destroyed if Bolivar had effected a junction between his own troops and those of Paez and Marino. At all events, the victories of Paez led to the occupation of the province of Barima, which opened to Bolivar the way into New Granada. Everything being here prepared by Santander, the foreign troops, consisting mainly of Englishmen, decided the fate of New Granada by the successive victories won July 1 and 23, and August 7, in the province of Tunja. August 12, Bolivar made a triumphal entry into Bogota, while the Spaniards, all the Granadian provinces having risen against them, shut themselves up in the fortified town of Mompox. Having regulated the Granadian congress at Bogota, and installed General Santander as commander-in-chief, Bolivar marched toward Pamplona, where he spent about 2 months in festivals and balls. November 3, he arrived at Montecal, in Venezuela, whither he had directed the patriotic chieftains of that territory to assemble with their troops. With a treasury of about \$2,000,000, raised from the inhabitants of New Granada by forced contributions, and with a disposable force of about 9,000 men, the third part of whom consisted of well disciplined English, Irish, Hanoverians, and other foreigners, he had now to encounter an enemy stripped of all resources and reduced to a nominal force of about 4,500 men, two-thirds of whom were natives, and, therefore, not to be relied upon by the Spaniards. Morillo withdrawing from San Fernando de Apure to San Carlos, Bolivar followed him up to Calabozo, so that the hostile headquarters were only 2 days' march from each other. If Bolivar had boldly advanced, the Spaniards would have been crushed by his European troops alone, but he preferred protracting the war for 5 years longer. In October, 1819, the congress of Angostura had forced Zea, his nominee, to resign his office, and chosen Arismendi in his place. On receiving this news, Bolivar suddenly marched his foreign legion toward Angostura, surprised Arismendi, who had 600 natives only, exiled him to the island of Margarita, and restored Zea to his dignities. Dr. Roscio, fascinating him with the prospects of centralized power, led him to proclaim the "republic of Colombia," comprising New Granada and Venezuela, to publish a fundamental law for the new state,

drawn up by Roscio, and to consent to the establishment of a common congress for both provinces. On January 20, 1820, he had again returned to San Fernando de Apure. His sudden withdrawal of the foreign legion, which was more dreaded by the Spaniards than 10 times the number of Colombians, had given Morillo a new opportunity to collect reinforcements, while the tidings of a formidable expedition to start from Spain under O'Donnell raised the sinking spirits of the Spanish party. Notwithstanding his vastly superior forces, Bolivar contrived to accomplish nothing during the campaign of 1820. Meanwhile the news arrived from Europe that the revolution in the Isla de Leon had put a forcible end to O'Donnell's intended expedition. In New Granada 15 provinces out of 22 had joined the government of Colombia, and the Spaniards now held there only the fortresses of Cartagena and the isthmus of Panama. In Venezuela 6 provinces out of 8 obeyed the laws of Colombia. Such was the state of things when Bolivar allowed himself to be inveigled by Morillo into negotiations resulting November 25, 1820, in the conclusion at Trujillo of a truce for 6 months. In the truce no mention was made of the republic of Colombia, although the congress had expressly forbidden any treaty to be concluded with the Spanish commander before the acknowledgment on his part of the independence of the republic. December 17, Morillo, anxious to play his part in Spain, embarked at Puerto Cabello, leaving the command-in-chief to Miguel de La Torre, and on March 10, 1821, Bolivar notified La Torre, by letter, that hostilities should recommence at the expiration of 30 days. The Spaniards had taken a strong position at Carabobo, a village situated about half-way between San Carlos and Valencia; but La Torre, instead of uniting there all his forces, had concentrated only his 1st division, 2,500 infantry and about 1,500 cavalry, while Bolivar had about 6,000 infantry, among them the British legion, mustering 1,100 men, and 3,000 llaneros on horseback, under Paez. The enemy's position seemed so formidable to Bolivar, that he proposed to his council of war to make a new armistice, which, however, was rejected by his subalterns. At the head of a column mainly consisting of the British legion, Paez turned through a footpath the right wing of the enemy, after the successful execution of which manoeuvre, La Torre was the first of the Spaniards to run away, taking no rest till he reached Puerto Cabello, where he shut himself up with the remainder of his troops. Puerto Cabello itself must have

surrendered on a quick advance of the victorious army, but Bolivar lost his time in exhibiting himself at Valencia and Caracas. September 21, 1821, the strong fortress of Cartagena capitulated to Santander. The last feats of arms in Venezuela, the naval action at Maracaibo, in August, 1823, and the forced surrender of Puerto Cabello, July, 1824, were both the work of Padilla. The revolution of the Isla de Leon, which prevented O'Donnell's expedition from starting, and the assistance of the British legion, had evidently turned the scale in favour of the Colombians—The Colombian congress opened its sittings in January, 1821, at Cucuta, published, August 30, a new constitution, and after Bolivar had again pretended to resign, renewed his powers. Having signed the new constitution, he obtained leave to undertake the campaign of Quito (1822), to which province the Spaniards had retired after their ejection by a general rising of the people from the isthmus of Panama. This campaign, ending in the incorporation of Quito, Pasto, and Guayaquil into Colombia, was nominally led by Bolivar and General Sucre, but the few successes of the corps were entirely owed to British officers, such as Colonel Sands. During the campaigns of 1823-24, against the Spaniards in upper and lower Peru, he no longer thought it necessary to keep up the appearance of generalship, but leaving the whole military task to General Sucre, limited himself to triumphal entries, manifestoes, and the proclamation of constitutions. Through his Colombian bodyguard, he swayed the votes of the congress of Lima, which, February 10, 1823, transferred to him the dictatorship, while he secured his re-election as president of Colombia by a new tender of resignation. His position had meanwhile become strengthened, what with the formal recognition of the new state on the part of England, what with Sucre's conquest of the provinces of upper Peru, which the latter united into an independent republic, under the name of Bolivia. Here, where Sucre's bayonets were supreme, Bolivar gave full scope to his propensities for arbitrary power, by introducing the "Bolivian Code," an imitation of the *Code Napoleon*. It was his plan to transplant that code from Bolivia to Peru, and from Peru to Colombia—to keep the former states in check by Colombian troops, and the latter by the foreign legion and Peruvian soldiers. By force, mingled with intrigue, he succeeded indeed, for some weeks at least, in fastening his code upon Peru. The president and liberator of Colombia, the protector and dictator of Peru, and the godfather of Bolivia,

he had now reached the climax of his renown. But a serious antagonism had broken out in Colombia, between the centralists or Bolivarists and the federalists, under which latter name the enemies of military anarchy had coalesced with his military rivals. The Colombian congress having, at his instigation, proposed an act of accusation against Paez, the vice-president of Venezuela, the latter broke out into open revolt, secretly sustained and pushed on by Bolivar himself, who wanted insurrections, to furnish him a pretext for overthrowing the constitution and reassuming the dictatorship. Beside his bodyguard, he led, on his return from Peru, 1,800 Peruvians, ostensibly against the federalist rebels. At Puerto Cabello, however, where he met Paez, he not only confirmed him in his command of Venezuela, and issued a proclamation of amnesty to all the rebels, but openly took their part and rebuked the friends of the constitution; and by decree at Bogota, November 23, 1826, he assumed dictatorial powers. In the year 1827, from which the decline of his power dates, he contrived to assemble a congress at Panama, with the ostensible object of establishing a new democratic international code. Plenipotentiaries came from Colombia, Brazil, La Plata, Bolivia, Mexico, Guatemala, etc. What he really aimed at was the erection of the whole of South America into one federative republic, with himself as its dictator. While thus giving full scope to his dreams of attaching half a world to his name, his real power was rapidly slipping from his grasp. The Colombian troops in Peru, informed of his making arrangements for the introduction of the Bolivian code, promoted a violent insurrection. The Peruvians elected General Lamar as the president of their republic, assisted the Bolivians in driving out the Colombian troops, and even waged a victorious war against Colombia, which ended in a treaty reducing the latter to its primitive limits, stipulating the equality of the two countries, and separating their debts. The congress of Ocana, convoked by Bolivar, with a view to modify the constitution in favour of his arbitrary power, was opened March 2, 1828, by an elaborate address, insisting on the necessity of new privileges for the executive. When, however, it became evident that the amended project of the constitution would come out of the convention quite different from its original form, his friends vacated their seats, by which proceeding the body was left without a quorum, and thus became extinct. From a country-seat, some miles distant from Ocana,

to which he had retreated, he published another manifesto, pretending to be incensed at the step taken by his own friends, but at the same time attacking the convention, calling on the provinces to recur to extraordinary measures, and declaring that he was ready to submit to any load of power which might be heaped upon him. Under the pressure of his bayonets, popular assemblies at Caracas, Cartagena, and Bogota, to which latter place he had repaired, anew invested him with dictatorial power. An attempt to assassinate him in his sleeping room at Bogota, which he escaped only by leaping in the dark from the balcony of the window, and lying concealed under a bridge, allowed him for some time to introduce a sort of military terrorism. He did not, however, lay hands on Santander, although he had participated in the conspiracy, while he put to death General Padilla, whose guilt was not proved at all, but who, as a man of colour, was not able to resist. Violent factions disturbing the republic in 1829, in a new appeal to the citizens, Bolivar invited them to frankly express their wishes as to the modifications to be introduced into the constitution. An assembly of notables at Caracas answered by denouncing his ambition, laying bare the weakness of his administration, declaring the separation of Venezuela from Colombia, and placing Paez at the head of that republic. The senate of Colombia stood by Bolivar, but other insurrections broke out at different points. Having resigned for the fifth time, January, 1830, he again accepted the presidency, and left Bogota to wage war on Paez in the name of the Colombian congress. Toward the end of March, 1830, he advanced at the head of 8,000 men, took Caracuta, which had revolted, and then turned upon the province of Maracaibo, where Paez awaited him with 12,000 men, in a strong position. As soon as he became aware that Paez meant serious fighting, his courage collapsed. For a moment he even thought to subject himself to Paez, and declare against the congress; but the influence of his partisans at the congress vanished, and he was forced to tender his resignation, notice being given to him that he must now stand by it, and that an annual pension would be granted to him on the condition of his departure for foreign countries. He accordingly sent his resignation to the congress, April 27, 1830. But hoping to regain power by the influence of his partisans, and a reaction setting in against Joaquin Mosquera, the new president of Colombia, he effected his retreat from Bogota in a very slow manner, and contrived,

under a variety of pretexts, to prolong his sojourn at San Pedro, until the end of 1830, when he suddenly died. The following is the portrait given of him by Ducoudrey-Holstein : " Simon Bolivar is 5 feet 4 inches in height, his visage is long, his cheeks hollow, his complexion livid brown ; his eyes are of a middle size, and sunk deep in his head, which is covered thinly with hair. His mustaches give him a dark and wild aspect, particularly when he is in a passion. His whole body is thin and meagre. He has the appearance of a man 65 years old. In walking, his arms are in continual motion. He cannot walk long, but becomes soon fatigued. He likes his hammock, where he sits or lolls. He gives way to sudden gusts of resentment, and becomes in a moment a madman, throws himself into his hammock, and utters curses and imprecations upon all around him. He likes to indulge in sarcasms upon absent persons, reads only light French literature, is a bold rider, and passionately fond of waltzing. He is fond of hearing himself talk and giving toasts. In adversity, and destitute of aid from without, he is perfectly free from passion and violence of temper. He then becomes mild, patient, docile, and even submissive. In a great measure he conceals his faults under the politeness of a man educated in the so-called *beau monde*, possesses an almost Asiatic talent for dissimulation, and understands mankind better than the mass of his countrymen " By decree of the congress of New Granada, his remains were removed in 1842 to Caracas, and a monument erected there in his honour—See *Histoire de Bolivar*, par General Ducoudrey-Holstein, continuee jusqu'a sa mort, par Alphonse Viollot (Paris, 1831) ; *Memoirs of General John Miller (in the service of the Republic of Peru)* ; Colonel Hippiusley, *Account of his Journey to the Orinoco* (London, 1819).

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## PART FIVE

## THE MOORISH WAR (1859-1860)

## I

WE have long been waiting for some decided move on the part of the Spanish army in Morocco, which might bring to a close the first or preparatory period of the war. But in vain. Marshal O'Donnell seems to be in no hurry to leave his camp on the heights of Serrallo, and so we are compelled to review his operations while they have hardly yet begun.

On November 13, the first division of the Spanish active army, under General Echague, embarked at Algeciras, and a few days after was landed at Ceuta. On the 17th it marched out of the town and occupied the Serrallo or White House, a large building about a mile and a half in front of the lines of Ceuta. The ground in that vicinity is very rugged and broken, and very favourable for skirmishing and irregular fighting. The Moors, after an unsuccessful attempt, on the same night, to reconquer the Serrallo, retired and the Spaniards began to construct an intrenched camp to serve as a base for future operations.

On the 22nd, the Serrallo was attacked by the Anjerites, the Moorish tribe occupying the country near the Ceuta. This engagement opened a series of fruitless fights which fill up the whole of the campaign to the present moment, and of which every one is exactly like all the rest. The Moors attack the Spanish lines in greater or lesser force, and try by surprise or feint, to get possession of part of them. According to the Moorish reports, they generally succeed in this, but abandon the redoubts because they have no artillery. According to the Spaniards, no Moor ever saw the inside of a Spanish redoubt, and all their attacks have proved utterly unsuccessful. On the first attack the Anjerites counted no more than 1,600 men. They received the next day a reinforcement of 4,000 men, and at once returned to the attack. The 22nd and 23rd were filled up with skirmishing, but on the 25th, the Moors advanced with all their forces, and a severe combat took place, in which General Echague was wounded in the hand. This attack by

the Moors was so serious that it spurred a little the sleepiness with which *Çid Campeador* O'Donnell had so far carried on the war. He ordered at once that the second division, under General Zabala, and the reserve division, under General Prim, should be embarked, and left himself for Ceuta. On the night of the 27th, the whole Spanish active army was concentrated before that place. On the 29th, there was another attack by the Moors, repeated on the 30th. After this, the Spaniards began to think of their confined position; the object of their first move was to be Tetuan, about 20 miles south of Ceuta, and four miles from the sea. They commenced making a road toward this town; the Moors offered no opposition till December 9. On the morning of that day they surprised the garrisons of the two principal redoubts, but as usual, abandoned them later in the day. On the 12th, another engagement took place in front of the Spanish camp, about four miles from Ceuta, and on the 20th O'Donnell telegraphs that the Moors had again attacked the two redoubts, but were, as usual, gloriously defeated. Thus, on December 20, matters had not advanced one jot further than on November 20. The Spaniards were still on the defensive, and, in spite of announcements made a fortnight or three weeks before, there were no symptoms of an advance.

The Spaniards, with all the reinforcements received up to the 8th December, were from 35,000 to 40,000 strong, and 30,000 men might be available for offensive operations. With such a force, the conquest of Tetuan ought to be easy. There are certainly no good roads, and the provisions of the army must all be carried from Ceuta. But how did the French manage in Algiers, or the English in India? Besides, Spanish mules and cart-horses are not so spoiled by good roads in their own country as to refuse to march on Moorish ground. No matter what O'Donnell may say by way of apology, there can be no excuse for this continued inactivity. The Spaniards are as strong now as they can reasonably expect to be at any time in the campaign, unless unexpected reverses should bring on extraordinary exertions. The Moors, on the contrary, are daily getting stronger. The camp at Tetuan, under Hadj Abd Saleem, which furnished the bodies attacking the Spanish line on December 3, had been swelled to 10,000 already, beside the garrison of the town. Another camp, under Mulay Abbas, was at Tangiers, and reinforcements were arriving constantly from the interior. This consideration alone ought to have

induced O'Donnell to advance as soon as the weather permitted it. He has had good weather, but he has not advanced. There can be no doubt that this is a sign of sheer irresolution, and that he has found the Moors less despicable enemies than he expected. There is no question that the latter have fought uncommonly well, and the great complaints arising from the Spanish camp of the advantages the ground in front of Ceuta gives to the Moors is a proof of it.

The Spaniards say that in brushwood and ravines the Moors are very formidable, and, besides, they know every inch of the ground, but that, as soon as they get into the plains, the solidity of the Spanish infantry will soon compel the Moorish irregulars to face about and run. This is a rather doubtful way of arguing in an epoch where three-fourths of the time spent in every battle is devoted to skirmishing in broken ground. If the Spaniards, after halting six weeks before Ceuta, do not know the ground as well as the Moors, so much the worse for them. That broken ground is more favourable to irregulars than a level plain, is clear enough. But even in broken ground, regular infantry ought to be vastly superior to irregulars. The modern system of skirmishing, with the supports and reserves behind the extended chain, the regularity of the movements, the possibility of keeping the troops well in hand, and making them support each other and act all toward one common end—all this gives such superiority to regular troops over irregular bands, that in the ground best adapted for skirmishing, no irregulars ought to be able to stand against them, even if two to one. But here at Ceuta the proposition is reversed. The Spaniards have the superiority of numbers, and yet they dare not advance. The only conclusion is that the Spanish army do not understand skirmishing at all, and that thus their individual inferiority in this mode of fighting balances the advantages which their discipline and regular training ought to give them. In fact, there seems to be an uncommonly great deal of hand-to-hand fighting with yataghan and bayonet. The Moors, when the Spaniards are close enough, stop firing and rush upon them, sword in hand, in the same way as the Turks used to do, and this is certainly not very pleasant for young troops like the Spaniards. But the many engagements that have occurred ought to have made them familiar with the peculiarities of Moorish fighting and the proper mode to meet it; and when we see the commander still hesitate and remain in his defen-

sive position; we cannot form a very high estimate of his army.

The Spanish plan of campaign as it is shadowed forth by the facts appears to start with Ceuta as the base of operations, and Tetuan as the first object of attack. That part of Morocco immediately opposite the Spanish coast forms a kind of peninsula, some 30 or 40 miles broad by 30 long. Tangiers, Ceuta, Tetuan, and Lárache (El-Araish) are the four principal towns on this peninsula. By occupying these four towns, of which Ceuta already is in the hands of the Spaniards, this peninsula might be easily subjected, and made a base of further operations against Fez and Mequinez. The conquest of this peninsula, therefore, appears to be the object of the Spaniards, and taking of Tetuan the first step towards it. This plan seems sensible enough, it confines operations to a narrow region, bounded on three sides by the sea and by two rivers (Tetuan and Tucus) on the fourth, and, therefore, far more easy to take than the country further south. It also obviates the necessity of going into the desert, which would be unavoidable if Mogador or Rabat had been taken for the base of operations; and it brings the field of action close to the frontiers of Spain, there being only the Straits of Gibraltar between them. But whatever may be the advantages of this plan, they are all of no use unless the plan be carried out, and if O'Donnell goes on as he has done hitherto, he will cover himself and the reputation of the Spanish army with disgrace, in spite of the high-sounding language of his bulletins.

*New York Daily Tribune*, January 19, 1860.

## II

THE campaign in Morocco has at last fairly begun, and with this beginning disappear all the romantic hues in which the Spanish press and Spanish popular enthusiasm had dressed out O'Donnell, who sinks down into a passable average general; instead of the chivalry of Castile and Leon, we have the Princessa Hussars, and instead of Toledo blades, rifled cannon and cylindro-conoidal shot do the work.

About the 20th of December the Spaniards began to construct a road, practicable for artillery and carriages, which was to lead across the hilly ground south of the camp before Ceuta. The Moors never attempted to destroy the road; they attacked, sometimes, General Prim, whose division covered

the working parties, sometimes the camp: but always without success. None of these engagements rose beyond the dimensions of skirmishes of the advanced guard, and in the most serious of them, on December 27, the Spanish loss did not exceed 6 killed and 30 wounded. Before the close of the year the road, itself not more than two miles long, was completed, but a fresh onset of storms and rain prevented the army from moving. In the meantime as if it was meant to give the Moorish camp notice of the impending movement of the army a Spanish squadron of one sailing vessel of the line, 3 screw frigates, 3 paddle steamers, in all 246 guns ran up to the mouth of the Tetuan River, and bombarded, on the 29th December, the forts at its mouth. They were silenced, and the earthworks destroyed in about three hours; it is not to be forgotten that they were the same forts which the French had bombarded about a month before with a far inferior force.

The weather having become fair on the 29th, the Spanish army at last began to move on the 1st of January. The First Corps of two divisions under Echague, which had been the first to land in Africa, remained in the lines in front of Ceuta. Although it had suffered much by disease in the first weeks, it was now pretty well acclimatized and, with reinforcements received since, numbered 10 000 men, considerably more than either the Second or the Third Corps. These two corps, commanded, the Second by Zabala, and the Third by Ros de Olano, together with Prim's reserve division, in all 21,000 to 22,000 men, marched out on the first day of the new year. Every man carried six days' rations, while a million of rations, or one month's provisions for the army were shipped on board transports to accompany the army. With Prim for an advance guard, supported by Zabala, and Ros de Olano bringing up the rear, the high ground south of Ceuta was passed. The new road led down toward the Mediterranean within two miles from the camp. There a semi-circular plain extended for some distance, the chord being formed by the sea, and the periphery by broken ground rising gradually into rugged mountains. No sooner had Prim's division fairly debouched from the camp than the skirmishing began. The Spanish Light Infantry easily drove back the Moors into the plain, and thence into the hills and brushwood, which flanked their line of march. Here it was that by some misunderstanding two weak squadrons of Princesa Hussars were led to charge and did so with such a spirit that they passed right through the Moorish line into

their camp; but getting everywhere into broken ground, and finding nowhere either cavalry or infantry in practicable ground at which they could charge, they had to turn back with a loss of seven or nearly all of their officers, beside privates. So far, the fight had been carried on principally by the infantry in skirmishing order, and a battery or two of mountain artillery, supported here and there by the effect—more moral than physical—of the fire of a few gunboats and steamers. It appears that O'Donnell intended to halt in the plain, without occupying permanently, as yet, the ridge forming the boundary of this plain to the south. In order, however, to secure his position for the night, he ordered Prim to dislodge the Moorish skirmishers from the northern slope of the ridge and then to fall back about dusk. Prim, however, who is the greatest fighting man in the Spanish army, engaged in a serious encounter, which ended in his taking possession of the whole top of the ridge, though not without severe loss. His advanced guard encamped on the ridge and threw up field-works on its front. The Spanish loss amounted, that day, to 73 killed and 481 wounded.

The position gained that day was the one known by the name of Castillejos, from two white buildings, the one on the inner slope near the plain, and the other on the ridge conquered, in the afternoon, by Prim. The official designation of this camp, however, appears to be *Campamento de la Condesa*. On the same day, the Moors had attempted a slight diversion against the camp before Ceuta, by attacking both the extreme right redoubt and the interval between the two extreme left redoubts. They were, however, easily repulsed by Echague's infantry and artillery fire.

The active army remained three days in the Camp de la Condesa. The field artillery and a rocket battery, as well as the remainder of the cavalry (the whole cavalry brigade consists of eight squadrons of hussars, four of cuirassiers without cuirasses, and four of lances, in all 1,200 men), arrived in the camp. The siege train alone (among which was a battery of rifled 12-pounders) were still behind. On the 3rd, O'Donnell reconnoitered toward Monte Negro, the next range of mountains to the South. The weather continued fine, hot at noon, with very heavy dews at night. Cholera was still rife among one or two divisions, and some corps had suffered severely from sickness. The two battalions of engineers, for instance, who had been very severely worked, were reduced

from 135 men to 90 men per company

So far we have detailed accounts ; for what follows, we are reduced to meagre and not quite consistent telegrams. On the 14th the division of General Rios, ten battalions "to the north of the Negro valley having traversed the passes without opposition" Whether this means that the Monte Negro Ridge had been passed, and the army was encamping on its southern slope is very uncertain. On the 9th, the army was, we are told, one league from Tetuan, and an attack of the Moors had been repulsed. On the 13th, the whole of the positions of Cabo Negro were carried, a complete victory was obtained, and the army was before Tetuan ; so soon as the artillery could be brought up, the town would be attacked. On the 14th, the division of General Rios, ten battalions strong, which had been concentrated at Malaga landed at the mouth of the Tetuan River, and occupied the forts destroyed by the fleet a fortnight before. On the 16th, we are informed that the army was on the point of passing the river and attacking Tetuan.

To explain this, we may state that there are four distinct ridges of hills to be passed between Ceuta and Tetuan. The first immediately south of the camp and leading to the plain of Castillejos, the second closing that plain to the south. These two were taken by the Spaniards on the 1st. Still further south, and running perpendicular to the Mediterranean shore, is the ridge of Monte Negro, and parallel to this range ending on the coast, in the Cape called Cabo Negro, south of which flows the Tetuan River. The Moors, after hanging on the flanks of the invading army during the 1st, changed their tactics, removed further south, and attempted to bar the road to Tetuan in front. It was expected that the decisive fight for the possession of this road was to come off in the passes of the last or Cabo Negro Ridge, and such seems to have been the case on the 13th.

The tactical arrangements of these combats do not appear very creditable to either party. From the Moors we cannot expect anything but irregular fighting, carried on with the bravery and cunning of semi-savages. But, even in this they appear deficient. They do not seem to show that fanaticism which the Kabyles of the Algerian coast-ridges, and even of the Riff, have opposed to the French ; the long, unsuccessful skirmishing in front of the redoubts near Ceuta seem to have broken the first ardour and energy of most of the tribes. Again,

in their strategic arrangements, they do not come up to the example of the Algerians. After the first day, they abandon their proper plan, which was to harass the flank and rear of the advancing column, and to interrupt or menace its communication with Ceuta; instead of this, they work hard to gain a march upon the Spaniards, and to bar their road to Tetuan in front, thus provoking what they ought to avoid—a pitched battle. Perhaps they may yet learn that with such men, and in such a country as they have, petty warfare is the proper way to wear out an enemy who, whatever his superiority in discipline and armament, is hampered in all his movements by immense *impedimenta*, unknown to them, and which it is no easy matter to move in a roadless and inhospitable country.

The Spaniards have gone on as they commenced. After lying idle two months at Ceuta, they have marched twenty-one miles in sixteen days, advancing at the rate of five miles in four days! With all due allowance for difficulties of roads, this is still a degree of slowness unheard of in modern warfare. The habit of handling large bodies of troops, of preparing extensive operations, of marching an army which, after all, scarcely equals in strength one of the French army corps in the last Italian campaign, seems to have become quite lost with Spanish generals. Otherwise how could such delays arise? On the 2nd of January O'Donnell had all his artillery at Castillejos, with the exception of the siege train, but still he waited two days longer, and only advanced on the 5th. The march of the column itself appears to be pretty well arranged, but with such short marches this could scarcely be otherwise. When under fire the Spaniards appear to fight with that contempt of their enemy which superior discipline and a series of successful combats cannot fail to give; but it remains to be seen whether this certainty of victory will hold good when the climate and the fatigues of a campaign, which is sure to end in harassing, petty warfare, will have reduced both the *morale* and the *physique* of the army. As to the leadership, we can, so far, say very little, the details of all but the first engagement in the field being still deficient. This first fight, however, exhibits two conspicuous blunders—the charge of the cavalry, and the advance of General Prim beyond his order; and if these things should turn out to be regular features of the Spanish army, so much the worse for them.



The defence of Tetuan will very likely be a short but an obstinate one. The works are no doubt bad, but the Moors are capital soldiers behind ramparts, as has been proved in Constantine and many other Algerian towns. The next mail may bring us the news that it has been stormed. If so, we may expect a lull in the campaign, for the Spaniards will require time to improve the road between Tetuan and Ceuta, to form Tetuan into a second base of operations, and to await reinforcements. Thence, the next move will be upon Larache or Tangier.

*New York Daily Tribune*, February 8, 1860

### III

AS the first, and possibly at the same time the last act of the Spanish war in Morocco has now been brought to a close, and as all the detailed official reports have arrived, we may once more return to the subject.

On the 1st of January the Spanish army left the lines of Ceuta, in order to advance upon Tetuan, which is only 21 miles distant. Though never at any time seriously attacked, or stopped by the enemy, it took Marshal O'Donnell not less than a month to bring his troops to within sight of that town. The absence of roads, and the necessary caution are not sufficient motives for this unparalleled slowness of march, and it is plain that the command of the sea possessed by the Spaniards was not utilized to the full extent. Nor is it an excuse that a road had to be made for heavy guns and provisions. Both should have been principally carried by the ships, while the army, provided with a week's provision, and no other guns than the mountain artillery (carried on the backs of mules) could have reached the heights above Tetuan in five days at the utmost, and waited with the Rios division, which then, as well as three weeks afterward, could not be prevented from landing at the mouth of the Wahad el Jehu. The battle of the 4th of February might have been fought, and probably under still more favourable aspects for the Spaniards, on the 6th or 7th of January; thus thousands of men lost through sickness would have been spared, and by the 8th of January Tetuan might have been taken.

This seems a bold assertion. Surely, O'Donnell was as eager to get to Tetuan as any of his soldiers, he has shown

bravery, circumspection, coolness, and other soldierly qualities. If it took him a month to arrive before it, how could he have done the same thing in a week? O'Donnell had two ways before him to bring up his troops. First, he might rely chiefly on the communication by land, and use the ships merely as auxiliaries. This is what he did. He organized a regular land transport for his provisions and ammunition, and took with the army a numerous field-artillery of 12-pounders. His army was to be entirely independent of the ships, in case of need; the ships were to serve merely as a second line of communication with Ceuta, useful, but anything but indispensable. This plan, of course, entailed the organization of an immense train of carriages, and this train necessitated the construction of a road. Thus a week was lost until the road from the lines to the beach had been constructed; and almost at every step, the whole column, army, train and all, was halted, until another piece of road had been made for the next day's advance. Thus, the duration of the march was measured by the miles of road which the Spanish engineers could construct from day to day; and this appears to have been done at the rate of about half a mile per day. Thus the very means selected to transport the provisions necessitated an immense increase of the train, for the longer the army remained on the road, the more, of course, it must consume. Still when about the 18th January, a gale drove the steamers from the coast, the army was starving, and that within sight of their depot at Ceuta; another stormy day, and one-third of the army would have had to march back to fetch provision for the other two. Thus it was that Marshal O'Donnell managed to promenade 18,000 Spaniards along the coast of Africa for a whole month at the rate of two-thirds of a mile a day. This system of provisioning the army once adopted, no power in the world could have very materially shortened the length of this unparalleled march; but was it not a mistake to adopt it at all?

If Tetuan had been an inland town, situated twenty-one miles from the coast instead of four miles, no doubt there would have been no other choice. The French in those expeditions to the interior of Algeria found the same difficulties and overcame them in the same way, though with greater energy and quickness. The English in India and Afghanistan were saved this trouble by the comparative facility of finding beasts of burden and provender for them in those countries; their

artillery was light, and required no good roads, as the campaigns were carried on in the dry season only, when armies can march straight across the country. But it was left to the Spaniards and to Marshal O'Donnell to march an army along the sea-shore for a whole month, and to accomplish in this time the immense distance of twenty-one miles.

It is evident from this that both appliances and ideas in the Spanish army are of a very old-fashioned character. With a fleet of steamers and sailing transports always within sight, this march is perfectly ridiculous, and the men disabled during it by cholera and dysentery, were sacrificed to prejudice and incapacity. The road built by the engineers was no real communication with Ceuta, for it belonged to the Spaniards nowhere except where they happened to encamp. To the rear, the Moors might any day render it impracticable. To carry a message, or escort a convoy back to Ceuta, a division of 5,000 men at least was required. During the whole of the march, the communication with that place was carried on by the steamers alone. And with all that, the provisions accompanying the army were so insufficient that before twenty days had passed the army was on the point of starvation, and saved only by the stores from the fleet. Why, then, build the road at all? For the artillery? The Spaniards must have known for certain that the Moors had no field-artillery, and that their own rifled mountain guns were superior to anything the enemy could bring against them. Why, then, trail all this artillery along with them, if the whole of it could be carried by sea from Ceuta to San Martín (at the mouth of the Wahad el Jehu Tetuan River), in a couple of hours? For any extremity, a single battery of field-guns might have accompanied the army, and the Spanish artillery must be very clumsy, if they could not march it over any ground in the world at the rate of five miles a day.

The Spaniards had shipping to carry at least one division at a time, as the landing of the Rios division at San Martín proved. Had the attack been made by English or French troops, there is no doubt that this division would have been landed at once at San Martín, after a few demonstrations from Ceuta to attract the Moors to that place. Such a division of 5,000 men, entrenched by slight field-works, such as might be thrown up in a single night, could have fearlessly awaited the attack of any number of Moors. But a division could have been landed every day, if the weather was favourable, and thus the

army could have been concentrated within sight of Tetuan in six or eight days. We may, however, doubt whether O'Donnell would have liked to expose one of his divisions to an isolated attack for possibly three or four days—his troops were young, and not accustomed to war. He cannot be blamed for not having adopted this course.

But this he might undoubtedly have done. With every man carrying a week's provisions, with all his mountain guns—perhaps a battery of field guns, and as many stores as he could carry, on the backs of his mules and horses, he might have marched off from Ceuta, and approached Tetuan as quickly as possible. Take all difficulties into consideration, eight miles a day is certainly little enough. But say five; this would give four days marching. Say two days for engagements, although they must be poor victories that do not imply a gain of five miles of ground. This would give six days in all, and would include all delays caused by the weather, for an army without a train can certainly do four or five miles a day in any weather almost. Thus the army would arrive in the plain of Tetuan before the provisions it carried were consumed; in case of need, the steamers were there to land fresh supplies during the march, as they actually did. Morocco is no worse country for ground or weather than Algeria, and the French have done far more there in the midst of winter, and far away in the hills, too, without any steamers to support and supply them. Once arrived on the heights of the Montes Negros, and master of the pass to Tetuan, the communication with the fleet in the roads to San Martin was safe, and the sea formed the base of operations. Thus, with a little boldness, the period during which the army had no base of operations but itself, would have been shortened from a month to a week, and the bolder plan was therefore the safer of the two; for the more formidable the Moors were, the more the slow march of O'Donnell became dangerous. And if the Army had been defeated on the road to Tetuan, its retreat was far easier than if it had been encumbered with baggage and field artillery.

O'Donnell's progress from the Montes Negros, which he passed almost without opposition, was quite in keeping with his former slowness. There was again a throwing up and a strengthening of redoubts, as if the best organized army had been opposed to him. A week was thus wasted, although against such opponents, simple field-works would have

sufficed; he could not expect to be attacked by any artillery equal to six of his mountain guns, and for the construction of such a camp one or two days ought to have been sufficient. At last, on the 4th, he attacked the intrenched camp of his opponents. The Spaniards appear to have behaved very well during this action; of the merits of the tactical arrangements we are unable to judge, the few correspondents in the Spanish camp dropping all the dry military details in favour of good painting and exaggerated enthusiasm. As the correspondent of *The London Times* says, what is the use of my describing to you a piece of ground which you ought to see, in order to judge of its nature! The Moors were completely routed, and the following day Tetuan surrendered.

This closes the first act of the campaign, and if the Emperor of Morocco is not too obstinate, it will very likely close the whole war. Still, the difficulties incurred hitherto by the Spaniards—difficulties increased by the system on which they have conducted the war—show that if Morocco holds out, Spain will find it a very severe piece of work. It is not the actual resistance of the Moorish irregulars—that never will defeat disciplined troops so long as they hold together and can be fed; it is the uncultivated nature of the country, the impossibility of conquering anything but the towns, and to draw supplies even from them; it is the necessity of dispersing the army in a great many small posts, which, after all, cannot suffice to keep open a regular communication between the conquered towns, and which cannot be victualed unless the greater part of the force be sent to escort the convoys of stores over roadless country, and across constantly reappearing clouds of Moorish skirmishers. It is well known what it was for the French, during the five or six years of their African conquest, to re-victual even Blidah and Medeah, not to speak of stations further from the coast. With the rapid wear and tear of European armies in that climate, six or twelve months of such a war will be no joke for a country like Spain.

The first object of attack, if the war be continued, will naturally be Tangier. The road from Tetuan to Tangier lies across a mountain pass, and then down the valley of a river. It is all inland work—no steamers near to furnish stores and no roads. The distance is about 26 miles. How long will it take Marshal O'Donnell to do this distance and how many men will he have to leave in Tetuan? He is reported to have said that it will take 20,000 men to hold it; but this is evi-

dently much 'exaggerated. With 10,000 men in the town, and a local brigade in an entrenched camp at San Martin, the place should be safe enough ; such a force might always take the field in sufficient strength to disperse any Moorish attack. Tangier might be taken by bombardment from the sea, and the garrison brought thither by sea also. It would be the same with Larache, Sale, Mogador. But if the Spaniards intended to act in this way, why the long march to Tetuan ? This much is certain : the Spaniards have much to learn yet in warfare before they can compel Morocco to peace, if Morocco holds out for a year.

*New York Daily Tribune, March 17, 1860.*

PART SIX

THE BAKUNINISTS AT WORK

*Notes on the Spanish Uprising  
in the Summer of 1873*

*Introductory Note.* In order to facilitate the understanding of the following notes, we mention a few chronological facts

On February 9, 1873, King Amadeo got tired of his Spanish crown; the first King to go on strike, he abdicated. The republic was proclaimed on the 12th; soon after, a new Carlist uprising flared up in the Basque provinces.

On April 10 a Constituent Assembly was elected, which met at the beginning of June and proclaimed the federative republic on June 8. On June 11 a new ministry, headed by Pi y Margall, was formed. At the same time a commission was elected to draft the new constitution, although the extreme Republicans, the so-called Intransigents, were excluded from it. When, on July 3, this new constitution was proclaimed, the Intransigents found that it did not go far enough along the line of breaking up Spain into "independent cantons." In view of this, the Intransigents immediately started uprisings in the provinces; in Seville, Cordoba, Granada, Malaga, Cadiz, Alcoy, Murcia, Cartagena, Valencia and other places; everywhere, from the 5th to the 11th of July, they got the upper hand and formed in each of these cities an independent cantonal government. On July Pi y Margall resigned, and was replaced by Salmeron, who immediately dispatched troops against the rebels. After resisting weakly, the rebels were defeated within a few days: as early as July 26, as a result of the fall of Cadiz, the power of the government was restored throughout Andalusia; Murcia and Valencia were subjugated about the same time: only Valencia displayed some energy in the struggle.

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\* This introductory note, as well as the sub-title of the entire article, was added by Engels in 1894, when the article was republished in the collection, *International Items from the Volkstaat*—Ed.

Cartagena alone held out. This major Spanish naval base, which fell into the hands of the rebels together with the fleet, was defended from the land by thirteen individual forts, in addition to continuous ramparts, and hence was difficult to capture. And as the government was careful not to destroy the place of anchorage of its own fleet, the "sovereign canton of Cartagena" continued to exist until January 11, 1874, when it finally capitulated, because it was incapable of anything else.

In this whole ignominious uprising we are interested here only in the even more ignominious acts of the Bakuninist Anarchists; only these deeds are described in some detail, as a lesson to the rest of the world.

## I

THE newly-published report of the Hague Commission on Michael Bakunin's secret Alliance\* has revealed to the working-class world the secret doings, the villainies and empty phrase-mongering by means of which the proletarian movement was made to serve the puffed-up ambition and selfish purposes of a few neglected geniuses. Meanwhile these would-be great men have given us in Spain an opportunity to become acquainted also with their practical revolutionary activity. Let us see how they carry out in life their ultra-revolutionary phrases about anarchy and autonomy, about the abolition of all authority, particularly that of the state, and about the immediate and complete emancipation of the workers. At last we are in a position to do so, inasmuch as we now have before us, in addition to the newspaper reports on events in Spain, also the report sent by the New Madrid Federation of the International to the Geneva Congress.†

It is known that in Spain, at the time of the split of the International, the members of the secret Alliance maintained the upper hand, by far the greater majority of the Spanish workers adhered to them. So when in February of this year

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\*The report of the commission elected at the Hague Congress of the First International (held during September, 1872) was published under the title, *L'Alliance de la Démocratie Socialiste* (London, 1873). The German edition was entitled *Ein Komplott gegen die Internationale*.—Ed.

†The Geneva Congress of the First International was held in September, 1873.—Ed.



[1873] the republic was proclaimed, the Spanish Alliancists found themselves in a precarious position. Spain is so backward a country industrially, that *immediate*, complete emancipation of the working class is still entirely out of the question. Before it gets that far, Spain must pass through various preliminary stages of development and clear away quite a number of obstacles. The republic offered an opportunity to compress the course of these preliminary stages into the shortest possible period of time, and to rapidly eliminate these obstacles. But this opportunity could be made use of only through the active *political* intervention of the Spanish working class. The mass of the workers felt this; everywhere they pressed for participation in the events, insisting that the opportunity be utilized to take action, instead of leaving the field free to the action and intrigues of the possessing classes, as heretofore.

The government called for elections to the Constituent Cortes; what position was the International to take? The leaders of the Bakuninists were in the greatest predicament. Continued political inactivity daily appeared more and more ridiculous and impossible; the workers wanted to see "action." On the other hand, the Alliancists had been preaching for years that no one ought to participate in any revolution that did not pursue the aim of the immediate and complete emancipation of the working class; that to undertake any political action involved recognition of the state, this principle of evil; and that therefore participation in any election was an offence meriting death. How they got out of this dilemma we learn from the Madrid report previously mentioned:

These same people who rejected the Hague decision on the political attitude of the workers, trampled the statutes of the Association underfoot and thus introduced dissension, conflict and disorder into the Spanish section of the International, these same people who had the impudence to represent us in the eyes of the workers as ambitious office-hunters who, on the pretext of wanting to lead the workers to power, wanted to secure power for themselves; these same people who call themselves autonomous, Anarchist revolutionists, etc., on this occasion zealously set out to engage in politics, and in the very worst—in bourgeois politics. They did not work to secure political power for the working class—on the contrary they abhor this idea—but to help a fraction of the bourgeoisie get at the helm, a fraction consisting of adventurers, ambitious people and office hunters who call themselves Intransigent (uncompromising) Republicans.

Already, on the eve of the general elections for the constituent Cortes, the workers of Barcelona, Alcoy and other

localities wanted to know what policy the workers were to pursue in the parliamentary as well as in every other struggle. For that purpose, two big meetings were held, one in Barcelona, the other in Alcoy; at both meetings the Alliancists were opposed with might and main to fixing the political stand which the International (theirs, be it noted) was to take. It was therefore decided that the International as an association was not to engage in any political activity whatever, but that the members of the International, each for himself, might act as they chose and could affiliate with any party they thought fit, by virtue of their famous "autonomy"! And what was the result of the application of so preposterous a doctrine? That the great mass of the members of the International, including the Anarchists, participated in the elections without a programme, without a flag, without candidates of their own, and thus were instrumental in having almost exclusively bourgeois Republicans elected. Only two or three workers got into the Chamber, people who represent absolutely nothing, who did not raise their voices even once in defence of the interests of our class and who quite complacently voted for all the reactionary proposals submitted by the majority.

This is the result of the Bakunist "abstention from politics." In peaceful times, when the proletariat knows beforehand that at most it can get but a few representatives into parliament, and that it is absolutely deprived of securing a parliamentary majority, one may succeed here and there in making the workers believe that it is a great revolutionary feat to stay home during elections; and anyway, instead of attacking the state in which one lives and by which one is oppressed, to attack the state as such, the state in general, which does not exist anywhere and which therefore cannot defend itself. This in particular is a splendid way of acting revolutionary for people whose hearts readily go down into their boots; and that the leaders of the Spanish Alliancists belong very much to that sort is proved in detail by the publication on the Alliance previously cited.

But as soon as events themselves force the proletariat into the foreground, abstention becomes palpable nonsense and active intervention of the working class an inevitable necessity. Such was the case in Spain. Amadeo's abdication had deprived the radical Monarchists of power and of the possibility of an early return to power; the Alfonsists were, for the time being, still more impossible; the Carlists, as almost always, preferred civil war to an election campaign. All these parties abstained, as is customary in Spain; only the federal Republicans, split into two wings, and the mass

of the workers participated in the elections.

In view of the powerful charm that the name of the International still cast at that time over the Spanish workers, in view of the excellent organization of the Spanish branch still existing at this time, at least in practice—it was certain that in the Catalonian factory districts, in Valencia, in the Andalusian cities, etc., every candidate put up and supported by the International would come through in splendid fashion, and that a minority, strong enough to hold the balance between the two wings of the Republicans every time a vote was taken, would get into the Cortes. The workers felt this, they felt that now the time had come to set their organization, still powerful at this time, in motion. But Messrs. the leaders of the school of Bakunin had been preaching the gospel of unconditional abstention for so long that they could not suddenly about face; and so they invented that pitiful way out of letting the International as a whole abstain but letting its members as individuals vote *as they chose*. The result of this declaration of political bankruptcy was that the workers, as always in such cases, voted for the people who posed as the most radical—for the Intransigents—and thus considered themselves more or less responsible for the steps taken later by those they had elected, and became involved in these actions.

## II

IT was impossible for the Allhancists to remain in the ridiculous position in which they had been placed through their crafty election policy; otherwise their rule over the Spanish International, which had lasted so far, would come to an end. They had to act, at least for appearance's sake. What was supposed to come to their rescue was—the general strike.

In the Bakuninist programme, the general strike is the lever that must be applied for the inauguration of the social revolution. One fine morning, all workers of all trades in some country, or even all over the the world, down tools and thus, in at most four weeks, force the possessing classes either to eat humble pie or to let loose their violence against the workers, so that the latter then have the right to defend themselves, and while doing so bring down the whole of the old society. This proposal is far from new; since 1848 French and, after them, Belgian Socialists have often paraded on this horse, which originally, however, was of English breed. During the

rapid and violent development of Chartism among the English workers, which followed upon the crisis of 1837, a "holy month"—stoppage of work on a national scale—was preached as early as 1839,\* and met with such response that in July, 1842, the factory workers of Northern England attempted to put the matter into practice. The general strike also played an important part at the Geneva Congress of the Alliancists, held on September 1 of this year [1873] but it was admitted by everyone that for this purpose a complete reorganization of the working class and a full treasury were required. And therein lies the rub.

On the one hand, the governments, especially if encouraged by political abstention, will never let the organizations or the treasury of the workers get that far; and on the other hand, political events and the excesses of the ruling classes will effect the liberation of the workers long before the proletariat gets to acquiring these ideal organizations and this immense reserve fund. Moreover, if it had them it would not need the circuitous path of the general strike to achieve its aims

No one at all familiar with the secret machinery of the Alliance can entertain the slightest doubt that the proposal to apply this excellent remedy originated with the Swiss Centre. Suffice it to say that the Spanish leaders here found an excuse for doing something without directly becoming "political," and gladly availed themselves of the opportunity. The miraculous effects of a general strike were being preached everywhere, and preparations were being made to start one in Barcelona and Alcoy.

Meanwhile political conditions came ever nearer to a crisis. The old blusterers among the federal Republicans, Castelar and his ilk, became frightened by the movement which was growing beyond their control; they had to yield power to Pi y Margall, who attempted a compromise with the Intransigents. Pi was the only Socialist among the official Republicans, the only one who realized the necessity of basing the republic on the support of the workers. He forthwith submitted a programme of measures of a social nature possible of immediate execution, measures which were not only bound to be of direct advantage to the workers but were also bound to lend impetus to further steps and thus at least get the

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\*See Engels' *The Condition of the Working Class in England*, p. 279, German edition

social revolution started. But the Bakuninist members of the International, whose duty it is to reject even the most revolutionary measures if initiated by the "state," would rather support the most reckless swindlers among the Intransigents than a minister. Pi's negotiations with the Intransigents were long drawn out, the Intransigents became impatient and the greatest hotheads among them began to prepare for a cantonal uprising in Andalusia. Now the leaders of the Alliance also had to start action if they were not to remain in the wake of the Intransigent bourgeois. Thus a general strike was ordered.

In Barcelona, among other things, the following poster was issued :

Workers! We are conducting a general strike to show the abhorrence we feel when we see how the government is using the army to fight against our fellow workers, and at the same time neglecting the war against the Carlists ...

Thus the workers of Barcelona, the greatest factory town of Spain, the history of which records more barricade fighting than any other city in the world, were called upon to oppose the armed power of the government, not with arms in their own hands but—by a general stoppage of work, a measure which directly affects only individual bourgeois but not their collective representative, the state power! In the passive days of peace the Barcelona workers could listen to the violent phrases of such tame people as Alerini, Farga-Pellicer and Vinas, but when the time for action came, when Alerini, Farga-Pellicer and Vinas first issued their celebrated election programme, then constantly resorted to deterring tactics and finally, instead of calling to arms, declared a general strike, they became nothing short of contemptible in the eyes of the workers. The weakest Intransigent still showed more energy than the strongest Alliancist. The Alliance, and the International which it led by the nose, lost all influence; and when these gentlemen proclaimed the general strike on the pretext of thus paralyzing the government, the workers simply laughed at them. But the activity of the bogus International at least accomplished this much, that Barcelona was kept from taking part in the cantonal uprising; and Barcelona was the only city whose entrance into the movement could lend the working-class elements, everywhere strongly represented in it, a strong backing and could thus hold out the prospect of mastering the entire movement in the long run. And furthermore, with the entry of Barcelona, victory was as good as won. But

Barcelona did not move a finger ; the Barcelona workers, once clear in their minds about the Intransigents, and hoodwinked by the Alliancists, remained inactive and thus insured the final victory of the Madrid government. All this, however, did not keep the Alliancists, Alerini and Brousse (details concerning them are contained in the report on the Alliance), from stating in their sheet, the *Solidarite Revolutionnaire* :

The revolutionary movement is spreading like wildfire across the entire peninsula. In Barcelona *nothing has happened as yet, but there is permanent revolution on so important a spot as the public square* !

But it was the revolution of the Alliancists, which consists in the sounding of trumpets, and for this very reason is "permanently" unable to move from the "spot."

At the same time, in Alcoy the general strike had been put on the order of the day. Alcoy is a factory town of recent date, having now approximately 30,000 inhabitants, to which the International, in Bakuninist form, gained entrance only a year ago and has made rapid progress. Socialism was welcomed in every form by these workers, who hitherto had been wholly alien to the movement, just as repeatedly happens in backward localities here and there in Germany, where the General German Labour Association suddenly gains a great momentary following. Alcoy was therefore chosen as the seat of the Bakuninist Federal Commission for Spain, and it is this Federal Commission that we shall here see at work.

On July 7, a meeting of workers decides upon a general strike and the next day sends a delegation to the *alcalde* (mayor) calling upon him to assemble the factory owners within twenty-four hours and to present to them the demands of the workers. The *alcalde*, Albors, a bourgeois Republican, puts off the workers, orders troops from Alicante and advises the manufacturers not to give in, but to barricade themselves in their houses. He himself would remain at his post. After holding a meeting with the manufacturers—we follow here the official report of the Alliancist Federal Commission dated July 14, 1873—the mayor, who at first had promised neutrality to the workers, issues a proclamation in which he "insults and slanders the workers, takes the side of the manufacturers, and thus destroys the rights and liberties of the strikers and challenges them to combat"

How the pious wishes of a mayor can destroy the rights and liberties of the strikers remains, of course, unclear. How-

ever this may be, the workers led by the Alliance explained to the City Council, through a committee, that if it did not intend to maintain the promised neutrality during the strike, it had better resign to avoid a conflict. The committee was sent about its business and, as it left the City Hall, policemen fired on the people, who were standing peaceably and unarmed on the square. This was the beginning of the struggle, according to the report of the Alliancists. The people armed themselves, the struggle began and, it is claimed, lasted "twenty hours." On the one side the workers, whose number the *Solidarite Revolutionnaire* put at 5,000, on the other side, 32 gendarmes in the City Hall and a few armed people in four or five houses at the market place, which houses the people, in plain English, burned down. At last, when the gendarmes had spent all their ammunition, they had to capitulate. "There would be fewer casualties to lament," states the report of the Alliancist commission, "if Albors, the *alcalde*, had not deceived the people by pretending to surrender, and then in cowardly manner murdering those who, relying upon his word, had penetrated into the City Hall; and this selfsame *alcalde* would not have been killed by the justly indignant population if he had not fired his revolver at very short range into the people who were arresting him."

And what were the victims of this struggle?

Even if we cannot calculate exactly the number of killed and wounded (on the side of the people), we can state that they were *not less than ten*. Those who provoked the conflict count not less than *fifteen* killed and wounded.

This was the first street battle of the Alliance. For twenty hours they fought against 32 gendarmes and a few armed bourgeois, defeated them after they had exhausted their ammunition and lost altogether *ten men*. The Alliance might well drill into the heads of its initiated Falstaff's maxim that "discretion is the better part of valour."

It goes without saying that all the tales of horror contained in the bourgeois newspaper reports about useless firing of factories, mass shooting of gendarmes, people soaked with kerosene and afire are pure fiction. The victorious workers, even when led by Alliancists, whose motto is, "Everything must be set topsy turvy," always deal much too generously with their defeated opponents, for which reason the latter falsely ascribe to them all the outrages which they themselves never fail to commit when they win.

So victory was achieved. "In Alcoy," jubilantly declares *Solidarite Revolutionnaire*, "our friends, numbering 5,000, have become masters of the situation." And what did these "masters" make out of their "situation"?

Here the Allhancist report and Allhancist journal completely leave us in the lurch; we must have recourse to the usual newspaper reports. From these we learn that now there has been established in Alcoy a "Welfare Committee," i.e., a revolutionary government. Now the Allhancists had decided, at their congress in St. Imier, Switzerland, held on September 15, 1872, that "every organization of a political, so-called provisional or revolutionary power, could only be a new fraud and would be as dangerous to the proletariat as all now-existing governments." The members of the Spanish Federal Commission sitting at Alcoy had also done their best to have the congress of the Spanish International endorse this decision. In spite of all this, we find that Severino Albarracin, member of this commission and, according to some reports, also Francisco Tomas, its secretary, were members of this provisional and revolutionary state power, the Alcoy Welfare Committee!

And what did this Welfare Committee do? What were its measures for securing "the immediate complete emancipation of the workers"? It forbade all men to leave the city, while women were allowed to do so if they had *passports*! The opponents of authority reintroduce passports! As for the rest: absolute muddleheadedness, inertness and helplessness.

Meanwhile General Velarde was approaching with troops from Alicante. The government had every incentive for settling the local uprisings in the provinces quietly. And the Alcoy "masters of the situation" had every incentive for getting out of a situation which they did not know how to handle. Deputy Cervera, who acted as go-between, thus had an easy job of it. The Welfare Committee resigned, the troops entered on July 12 without resistance, and the only counter-promise given to the Welfare Committee was—complete amnesty. The Allhancist "masters of the situation" were once more, luckily, out of their predicament. Thus ended the Alcoy adventure.

We are told by the Allhancist report that in San Lucar de Barrameda near Cadiz,



the *alcalde* closes the premises of the International, and by his threats and incessant attacks on the personal rights of the citizens provokes the wrath of the workers. A commission demands of the minister that he recognize the law and that the arbitrarily closed premises be reopened. Mr. Pi agrees to this in principle....but in reality refuses to do so; the workers find that the government is bent on systematically outlawing their association; they remove the local authorities and designate others in their stead who reopen the premises of the Association

"In San Lucar...the people are in command of the situation!" triumphantly exclaims the *Solidarte Revolutionnaire*. Here, too, the Alliancists, who wholly against their Anarchist principles, had formed a revolutionary government, did not know what to do with their dominion. They lost time in empty debate and paper resolutions, and after General Pavia had taken Seville and Cadiz, he sent a few companies of the Soria Brigade to San Lucar on August 5, and met with —no resistance.

These are the heroic exploits of the Alliance where it appeared upon the scene without meeting any competition.

### III

IMMEDIATELY after the street fighting in Alcoy, the Intransigents rose in Andalusia. Pi y Margall was still at the helm, constantly negotiating with the heads of this party for the purpose of forming a cabinet composed of them; why, then, strike any blow before the negotiations had broken down? The reason for this haste has never become quite clear; this much, however, is certain, that Messrs. Intransigents wanted above all the practical establishment of a federal republic as quickly as possible, so as to gain power and come into possession of the numerous government posts to be newly created in the several cantons. The Cortes in Madrid delayed too long the dismemberment of Spain; it therefore became necessary to take a hand themselves and proclaim sovereign cantons everywhere. The position taken hitherto by the (Bakunist) Internationalists, who were deeply involved in the quarrels of the Intransigents ever since the elections, allowed one to believe that they would co-operate; for had they not just now taken violent possession of Alcoy and were thus engaged in open combat with the government! To this must be added the fact that the Bakunists for years had

been propagating the idea that all revolutionary action from above downward was pernicious, and that everything must be organized and carried out from below upward. And now an opportunity presented itself to carry through the celebrated principle of autonomy, at least for the individual cities, from below upward! It could not possibly be otherwise: the Bakuninist workers walked into the trap and fetched the chestnuts out of the fire for the Intransigents, only to be treated by their allies, as usual, with kicks and bullets.

What, then, was the position of the Bakuninist members of the International in this entire movement? They helped to lend it the character of federalist disunion, they had, as far as was possible, realized their ideal of anarchy. The same Bakuninists, who in Cordova a few months before had declared that the establishment of revolutionary governments was treason and deception of the workers, now occupied seats in all the revolutionary city governments of Andalusia—but were everywhere in the minority, so that the Intransigents could do as they pleased. While the latter retained the political and military leadership, the workers were dismissed with pompous phrases or with resolutions of alleged social reform of the crudest and most nonsensical description which, besides, existed on paper only. As soon as the Bakuninist leaders demanded real concessions, they were scornfully rebuffed. Before the English newspaper correspondents, the Intransigent leaders of the movement had nothing more important to do than disavow any connection with these so-called Internationalists and repudiate all responsibility for them, and to declare that they were keeping their leaders, as well as all Paris Commune refugees living there, under the strictest police surveillance. Finally, as we shall see, in Seville the Intransigents, while fighting against the government troops, fired also upon their Bakuninist allies.\*

Thus it came about that in a few days all Andalusia was in the hands of the armed Intransigents. Seville, Malaga, Granada, Cadiz, etc., fell into their hands almost without resistance. Each city declared itself a sovereign canton and set up a revolutionary government committee (*junta*). Mur-

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\*The following three paragraphs, in the *Volkstaat* (No. 106, November 2, 1873), appeared at the end of the third section of this article, when Engels reprinted the article in 1894, he replaced the paragraphs in the sequence followed here.—*Ed.*

cia, Cartagena and Valencia followed suit. In Salamanca a similar attempt, but of a more peaceful nature, was made. Thus most of the big cities of Spain were in possession of the insurgents, with the exception of the capital, Madrid, a city of mere luxury which almost never takes decisive action, and of Barcelona. If Barcelona had struck, final victory would have been almost certain, and at the same time the working-class elements in the movement would have been assured a powerful support. But we have seen that the Intransigents in Barcelona were fairly powerless, while the Bakuninist members of the International, who at that time were still very influential there, took the general strike as a pretext for practising their policy of deterrent. Thus Barcelona this time was not on the job.

Nevertheless, the uprising, even if begun in a brainless way, would have had a good chance to succeed, if it had only been conducted with some intelligence, say in the manner of Spanish military revolts, in which the garrison of one town rises, marches on to the next, sweeps along with it the town's garrison that had been tampered with beforehand and, growing into an avalanche, presses on to the capital, until a fortunate engagement or the coming over to their side of the troops sent against them decides the victory. This method was particularly practicable at this time. The insurgents had been organized everywhere into volunteer battalions whose discipline, while wretched, was surely not more wretched than that of the remnants of the old, and in the main disintegrated, Spanish army. The only dependable government troops were the gendarmes (Civil Guards), and these were scattered all over the country. It was primarily a question of preventing a concentration of the gendarmes, and this could only be brought about by assuming the offensive and the hazard of open battle; this did not involve much danger, as the government could oppose to the volunteers only troops as undisciplined as they were themselves. For any one who sought victory, there was no other means.

But no. The federalism of the Intransigents and their Bakuninist satellites consisted precisely in this: that every town acted on its own, declaring that the main thing was not collaboration with the other towns but separation from them, thus precluding all possibility of a general offensive. What had been an unavoidable evil in the Peasant War in Germany and in the German uprisings of May, 1849—the splitting up

and isolation of the revolutionary forces, which permitted the same government troops to quell one uprising after another—was here proclaimed a principle of supreme revolutionary wisdom. Bakunin lived long enough to have this satisfaction. As early as September, 1870, he had declared (in *Lettres a un Français*) that the sole means of throwing the Prussians out of France by revolutionary struggle consisted in abolishing all central leadership and leaving it to each town, each village, each community, to wage war on its own. If the Prussian army, under its single command, was thus confronted with the unleashing of the revolutionary passions, victory would be assured. Faced with the French people's collective intelligence at last, once again left to its own resources, the individual intelligence of Moltke must naturally vanish. The French at that time were unwilling to comprehend this, but, in Spain Bakunin achieved a splendid triumph as we have seen and shall see further on.

Meanwhile this uprising, which came without any excuse, like a bolt out of the clear sky, had made it impossible for Pi y Margall to continue negotiations with the Intransigents. He had to hand in his resignation; in his place the pure Republicans of the stamp of Castelar took hold of the helm of state. Bourgeois without disguise, their primary aim was to deal a death blow to the labour movement, which they had formerly made use of but which now had become only a hindrance. One division under General Pavia was concentrated against Andalusia, a second division under Martinez Campos, against Valencia and Cartagena. The nucleus of these troops was formed by the gendarmes who had been assembled from all over Spain, all old soldiers whose discipline was still unshaken. Just as in the offensives of the Versailles army against Paris, so here too the gendarmes were to give stamina to the demoralized troops of the line and to constitute everywhere the spearhead of the columns of attack, a task which they discharged in both instances to the best of their ability. Besides them, the divisions were also given several regiments of the line that had melted down considerably so that each of them numbered about 3,000 men. That was all that the government was able to muster against the insurgents.

General Pavia began to move about the 20th of July. On the 24th, Cordova was occupied by a detachment of gendarmes and troops of the line under Ripoll. On the 29th, Pavia attacked Seville, which fell into his hands on the 30th or 31st—the

telegrams often leave these dates in doubt. He left behind a flying column for the subjugation of the vicinity, and marched on Cadiz. Only the approach to the city was defended and even that but feebly, and on the 4th of August the defenders permitted themselves to be disarmed without offering any resistance. During the days that followed he disarmed, likewise without incurring resistance, San Lucar de Barrameda, San Roque, Tarifa, Algeciras and numerous other small towns, each of which had constituted itself a sovereign canton. At the same time he sent columns against Malaga, which capitulated on the 3rd, and Granada which capitulated on the 8th of August, both without resistance, so that by the 10th of August, after a lapse of not quite two weeks, all Andalusia had been subjugated almost without a fight.

On July 26, Martinez Campos launched his offensive against Valencia. Here the uprising had its origin among the workers. When the Spanish International split, the real Internationalists had a majority in Valencia, and the new Spanish Federal Council was removed to that city. Soon after the republic was proclaimed, when revolutionary struggles were in prospect, the Bakuninist workers in Valencia, distrusting the Barcelona leaders' policy of determent, cloaked in ultra-revolutionary phrases, proposed to make common cause with the real Internationalists in all local movements. When the cantonal movement arose, both groups, making use of the Intransigents immediately started action and drove off the troops.

It is not known how the Valencia junta was composed, but it may be gathered from the reports of the English newspaper correspondents that there, as well as among the volunteers of Valencia, the workers were decidedly predominant. These same correspondents spoke of the Valencia insurgents with a respect they are far from bestowing upon the other, predominantly Intransigent, insurgents. They praised the discipline of the men, the order prevailing in the city and prophesied lengthy resistance and hard fighting. They were not mistaken. Valencia, an open city, withstood the attacks of Campos' division from July 26 to August 8, that is longer than all of Andalusia put together.

In the province of Murcia, the capital of the same name was occupied without resistance. After the fall of Valencia, Campos marched on Cartagena, one of the most powerful strongholds of Spain, protected on the land side by a conti-

nuous rampart and outworks on the commanding heights. Without any siege guns, the government troops, 3,000 strong, were, of course, powerless with their light field guns against the heavy artillery of the advanced forts, and had to confine themselves to a siege by land; this however meant little as long as the Cartagenians dominated the sea with the navy they had captured in the harbour.

The insurgents, preoccupied only with themselves, while there was fighting in Valencia and Andalusia, never gave the outside world a thought until the other uprisings had been suppressed, when their own money and food supplies were becoming exhausted. Only then did they make an attempt to move on Madrid, which is at least 270 miles off, more than twice as far as Valencia or Granada for instance! The expedition came to a miserable end not far from Cartagena; the siege barred all further sallies by land; recourse was therefore had to sallies with the fleet. And what sallies! A new insurrection of the recently-subjugated maritime cities, brought about by the Cartagena warships, was out of the question. Thus the fleet of the sovereign canton of Cartagena confined itself to threatening the bombardment of the other maritime cities from Valencia to Malaga—likewise sovereign according to Cartagena theory—and, in case of necessity, to actually bombarding the same if they did not bring on board the food supplies demanded, as well as a war contribution in hard cash. As long as these cities, as sovereign cantons were up in arms against the government, Cartagena was ruled by the principle of "everybody for himself" As soon as they were conquered, the principle of "all for Cartagena" was to prevail. This is the way the Intransigents of Cartagena and their Bakuninist accomplices understood the federalism of the sovereign cantons.

In order to strengthen the ranks of the fighters for liberation, the government of Cartagena released its convicts, about 1,800 in number, who had been incarcerated in the *bagno* of the city—the worst robbers and murderers of Spain. After the revelations in the report of the "Alliance," there can be no doubt but that this revolutionary measure had been inspired by the Bakuninists. It is there shown that Bakunin raves about the "unleashing of all evil passions" and takes the Russian robber as the model for all true revolutionists. Sauce for the Russian goose is sauce for the Spanish gander. So if the Cartagena government unleashed the "evil passions" of

its 1,800 cutthroats behind bars, and thus brought demoralization among its troops to a head, it acted wholly in the spirit of Bakunin. And when the Spanish government, instead of shooting its own fortifications to bits expects Cartagena to be subjugated as a result of the internal disorganization of the defenders themselves, it pursues a quite correct policy

#### IV

LET us hear now the report of the New Madrid Federation on this entire movement :

On the second Sunday in August, a congress was to take place in Valencia for the purpose among other things, of fixing the position which the Spanish International Federation had to adopt on the important political events that had occurred in Spain since February 11, the day on which the republic was proclaimed. But the senseless (*descabellada*, literally : dishevelled) cantonal uprising, which failed so miserably and in which the members of the International of almost all insurgent provinces had zealously taken part, not only has paralyzed the activity of the federal council by scattering the majority of its members, but also almost completely disorganized the local federations, and, what is worse, has caused its members to incur all the hatred and all the persecution that ensue upon every popular uprising which started and failed disgracefully ...

When the cantonal uprising broke out, when the juntas i.e., the governments of the cantons, were established, those people (the Bakuninists) who had so violently inveighed against political power, who had accused us of authoritarianism, rushed to enter these governments. In important cities such as Seville, Cadiz, San Lucar de Barrameda, Granada and Valencia, many of the members of the International who call themselves anti-authoritarians sat in cantonal juntas without any other programme than the autonomy of the province or canton. This has been officially established through the proclamations and other documents published by these juntas, in which figure the names of well-known members of the International of this sort.

So glaring a contradiction between theory and practice, between propaganda and action, would mean little if any advantage could have accrued from it to our Association, or any progress for the organization of our forces, any approach to the accomplishment of our main task the emancipation of the working class. Just the contrary happened as could not have been otherwise. The fundamental prerequisite was lacking, active co-operation among the Spanish proletariat, which was so easily to be gained as soon as action was taken in the name of the International. Agreement among the local federations was lacking ; the movement was abandoned to indi-

vidual or local initiative, without any leadership (except such as the mysterious Alliance might possibly have been able to foist upon it, and this Alliance, be it said to our disgrace, still dominates the Spanish International); without any programme except that of our natural enemies, the bourgeois Republicans.

And thus the cantonal movement succumbed in the most disgraceful manner, almost without resistance; but in its downfall it swept along with it the prestige and the organization of the International in Spain. There are no excesses, no crimes, no deeds of violence that the Republicans today do not lay at the door of the members of the International; it has even happened, we are assumed, that in Seville during the struggle the Intransigents fired upon their allies, the (Bakuninist) members of the International. The reaction, skilfully taking advantage of our follies, incited the Republicans to persecute us and slander us in the eyes of the great indifferent masses; what was impossible of achievement for it in the days of Zagasti it now seems bound to achieve: to bring the name of "International" into ill-repute among the great masses of the Spanish workers.

In Barcelona a great number of workers' sections have withdrawn from the International, protesting loudly against the people of the periodical *La Federacion* (chief organ of the Bakuninists) and their inexplicable attitude. In Jerez, Puerto de Santa Maria and other localities, the federations decided to dissolve. In Loja (province of Granada) the few members of the International living there were driven out by the population. In Madrid, where the greatest liberty is still enjoyed, the old (Bakuninist) federation does not give the least sign of life, while ours is forced to remain inactive and silent if it does not want to see the guilt of others imputed to it. In the cities of the North the Carlist war, waged more bitterly every day, prevents all activity on our part. Finally in Valencia, where the government has remained victorious after a fifteen-day struggle, the members of the International that have not taken to flight must go into hiding, and the Federal Council is completely dissolved.

So much for the Madrid report. As may be seen, it tallies completely with the foregoing narrative.

What, then, is the result of our whole investigation?

I The Bakuninists were forced, as soon as they were confronted with a serious revolutionary situation, to throw their entire former programme overboard. First they sacrificed the doctrine of the duty of political and especially electoral abstention. Then followed anarchy, the abolition of the state, instead of abolishing the state they endeavoured to construct a number of new small states. Then they dropped the principle that the workers should not take part in any revolution that did not aim at the immediate complete emancipation of the proletariat, and took part in an admittedly purely bour-



geois movement. Finally, they repudiated the dogma which they had just proclaimed : that the establishment of a revolutionary government was only a new deception and a new betrayal of the working class—by figuring quite complacently on the government committees of the various cities, and at that almost everywhere as an impotent minority out-voted by the bourgeois and politically exploited

2 But this repudiation of the principles preached heretofore took place in the most cowardly and mendacious manner, and under the pressure of a bad conscience, so that neither the Bakuninists themselves nor the masses led by them entered the movement with any programme or knew at all what they wanted. What was the natural consequence? That the Bakuninists either prevented every movement, as in Barcelona ; or that they were driven into isolated, planless and idiotic uprisings, as in Alcoy and San Lucar de Barrameda , or that the leadership of the uprising fell into the hands of the Intransigent bourgeois, as in almost all of the uprisings. The ultra-revolutionary clamour of the Bakuninists thus became concretized, as soon as the time for action arrived, either in determent or in uprisings doomed to failure in advance, or in affiliating with a bourgeois party which subjected the workers to most disgraceful political exploitation and kicked them about in the bargain.

3 Of the "great" principles of anarchy, the free federation of independent groups, etc , nothing remains but a dissipation of the means of revolutionary struggle without measure or reason, which permitted the government with a handful of troops to subdue one city after another almost without resistance

4. The end of the tale was not only that the well-organized and numerous Spanish International—the false as well as the true—became entangled in the collapse of the Intransigents and is today actually dissolved, but also that there are scored up against it the innumerable fictitious excesses without which the philistines of all countries simply cannot conceive of an uprising of the workers ; and that thus the international reorganization of the Spanish proletariat has perhaps been rendered impossible for years to come.

5 In a word, the Bakuninists in Spain have given us an unsurpassable example of how *not* to make a revolution.

*Der Volkstaat*, October 31, November 2, 5, 1873.

## THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES

### EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

THE struggle between revolution and counter-revolution which agitated the American scene from 1861 to 1865 was followed with great interest by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. Their appraisal of the "first grand war of contemporaneous history," contained within the present volume in the form of newspaper articles and extracts from a voluminous correspondence, clearly shows the progressive and revolutionary character of the American conflict.

The articles appeared originally in the New York *Daily Tribune* and the Vienna *Presse* in 1861 and 1862. Though essentially the work of Marx, they were written in close collaboration with Engels. Marx's connection with the *Daily Tribune* dates back to the close of 1851 when Charles Dana, hoping to recruit new readers, especially from the ranks of the German immigrant element, invited Marx to write a series of articles on conditions in Germany. Marx eagerly accepted the offer for two reasons. In the first place, the New York newspaper with its 200,000 readers was one of the most influential periodicals in America and as such, could be used as an excellent medium for the dissemination of his views. Secondly, the American journal offered the German revolutionary emigre the prospect of a steady source of income, a prospect especially pleasing because Marx at that time was in such dire financial straits that he did not have enough money to meet the expenses entailed in the running of a household.

It was therefore with high hopes that Marx began to work for the *Daily Tribune*. Yet, if he expected to gain economic security in his new position, he was quickly disillusioned. Paid as he was for each article accepted, the editors of the New York newspaper were not remiss to throw out whole columns whose tone they did not approve or to use those which they liked as leading editorials. It is interesting to note in passing that when Marx first began to write for the American periodical, he turned to Engels for help. The latter, knowing that his friend was at the time finding it diffi-

cult to write English easily and in addition was busily engaged in other matters, responded by writing a number of articles which were later collected into a separate volume called *Germany's Revolution and Counter-revolution*. This work though written by Engels, was for a long time attributed to Marx. However, ideologically it represented the combined expression of their views.

For over a decade Marx kept the *Daily Tribune* readers informed of European developments, especially as they affected the United States. Consequently when the Civil War broke out, Marx continued his past work and wrote a series of articles on that momentous conflict. Designed for American consumption, his contributions emphasized the attitude of Europe in general and England in particular to the Union cause. Subjects such as the cotton crisis in Great Britain, the threatened invasion of Mexico, the Trent case and British public opinion were discussed. Finally, in the early part of 1862, all connections between the American paper and Marx were severed. In April of that year, Dana informed the latter that the English correspondence would have to be discontinued because the internal American situation took up all the room there was in the paper.

In the meantime, Marx became the English correspondent of *Die Presse*, one of the leading newspapers in Vienna. He was promised a pound for every article accepted and ten shillings for every report. Unfortunately for Marx many of his articles were given "the honours of the waste-paper basket" because Max Friedlander, a cousin of Lassalle and the editor of *Die Presse*, felt that they were not in harmony with the tastes of his readers. On January 7, 1862, Friedlander wrote to Marx asking him 'to take into account an Austrian bourgeois public'. Yet, in spite of these obstacles, Marx's Vienna *Presse* contributions stand as testimonials to his ability to anticipate future events. For example, as early as November 7, 1861, Marx wrote that American developments were driving the North to promulgate the decisive slogan, "*the emancipation of the slaves*". On August 9 1862, he informed his readers that 'Negro slavery [would] not long outlive the Civil War.'

Unlike the articles, the correspondence between Marx and Engels, contained in the present volume, goes beyond the year 1862 and consequently treats not only of the constitutional but also of the revolutionary phase of the struggle. Of particular

interest to American readers will be those letters dealing with the relative advantages enjoyed by the North over the South, the character of the Secessionist movement, the significance of the Northwest in bringing matters to a head, the estimate of Lincoln, the military collapse of the Confederacy, and the reconstruction plans of Johnson. After the Civil War, Marx and Engels continued to correspond with each other, as well as with American friends of theirs, on conditions in the United States.

From the articles and letters included herein a panoramic picture of the Civil War is unfolded and its significance clearly shown. The clashing interests of divergent social systems, the inevitable recourse to arms, the offensive taken by the slave power, and the *coup d'état* spirit of the Secessionist conspiracy are graphically developed. Similarly, the relationship of the West to the question of slavery is indicated. Some thirty years before Turner, Marx informed Engels that the more he studied this "American business," the more he became convinced that the struggle "was brought to a head by the weight thrown into the scales by the extraordinary development of the Northwestern States"

In a like fashion, Marx practically anticipated by half a century the "discovery" of Schmidt and other bourgeois historians that Northern wheat played an important role in shaping Anglo-American relations during the Civil War. In his articles Marx made frequent references to England's growing need of American wheat, a need which he recognized as a factor of prime importance in preventing the British ruling classes from intervening on behalf of the Confederacy. The ever-present implication behind these references is that if Great Britain was ever forced to choose between a cotton and a wheat shortage, she would risk her future on the former rather than on the latter.\*

Marx's power of acute observation is further displayed in his dismissal of the theory that the question of a high protective tariff was responsible for the outbreak of the Civil

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\*On this point compare Marx with L. B. Schmidt. See the latter's article on "The Influence of Wheat and Cotton on Anglo-American Relations during the Civil War" in *Iowa Journal of History and Politics*, vol. xvi., no. 3 (July, 1918), pp. 400-439. See also E. D. Fite, *Social and Industrial Conditions in the North during the Civil War* (New York, 1910), p. 21.

War He clearly demonstrated that secession "did not take place because the Morrill tariff had gone through Congress, but at most the Morrill tariff went through Congress because secession had taken place"

Marx and Engels followed the military aspects of the American conflict with great interest. No pacifist illusions caused them to shut their eyes to the historical importance of war, especially in respect to revolution and counter-revolution. Engels, a keen student of military science, helped Marx considerably in the latter's evaluation of the campaigns in America. The interest of Engels in military matters was not purely theoretical, it arose out of the concrete events of 1849 in Germany when he participated as an adjutant in the unsuccessful Baden insurrection. From that time on, he devoted himself to the study of military science on the assumption that if the working class was to overcome the bourgeoisie, it would first have to master the art and strategy of war. By 1861, Engels was thoroughly versed in military science, and was thus in an excellent position to help Marx evaluate military developments in America. Marx very often incorporated into his articles whole portions of the letters of Engels, especially those dealing with the military situation in the United States. The result is an admirable military appraisal of the American conflict. Especially praiseworthy are those articles dealing with a criticism of the Confederate defence of Kentucky and of McClellan's "Anaconda" plan. It is interesting to note that two years before the Union high command decided to conquer Georgia and thereby cut the Confederacy in two, this plan was suggested in the *Vienna Presse*. On March 27, 1862, after a careful analysis of the military situation, such a procedure was advanced on the ground that Georgia was "*the key to Secession*"

During the early part of the Civil War, Engels entertained reasonable doubts as to a Northern victory. Discouraged by the blunders of the Union generals and disgusted by the hesitancy of the North to wage a revolutionary war, Engels asked Marx on September 9, 1862 whether he still believed that "the gentlemen in the North [would] crush the rebellion." Marx, taking into account the economic and social advantages enjoyed by the North, answered in the affirmative and then went on to chide his friend for allowing himself to be "swayed a little too much by the military aspect of things." As the war progressed, Engels became less

pessimistic and finally agreed fully with Marx as to the ultimate outcome of the struggle

Marx and Engels were essentially interested in the revolutionary implications of the Civil War. From the very beginning of the conflict, they clearly perceived that the objective purpose of the struggle was the destruction of the slave power and with it the South's "peculiar institution." They therefore urged the bourgeois republic to wage a revolutionary war to arm the Negroes and to abolish slavery. Consequently, they greeted with satisfaction the efforts of the Union government during the last two years of the war to smash the counter-revolution and to free the slaves.

It was evident to Marx that the eventual emancipation of the American working class depended upon the preliminary destruction of Negro slavery. "Labour cannot emancipate itself in the white skin," wrote Marx in *Capital*, "where in the black it is branded." Moreover, he justly observed that the development of any sort of "independent movement of the workers" would be greatly hindered "so long as slavery disfigured a part of the Republic." The validity of this observation is obvious once the devastating effects of chattel labour are realized. So far as the South was concerned, slavery definitely impeded the development of a militant labour movement by throwing into disrepute the dignity of manual work and by hindering the growth of manufacturing. The rise of the latter was inconceivable so long as ante-bellum planters preferred to invest their surplus capital in chattels and lands, rather than in factories and railroads. Under these conditions the emergence of a strong independent labour movement in the South was practically impossible. Slavery likewise threatened the rise of a vigorous proletarian movement in the North by menacing the industrial expansion of that section through limiting its market possibilities in the South, impeding its opportunities for exploitation in the West, and preventing the passage of favourable legislation at Washington.

Convinced that the germ of the future revolution lay in the North, Marx supported the bourgeois republic in its struggle against the slave oligarchy. In this respect he had the wholehearted aid of the British proletariat. When in the latter part of 1861, the reactionary Palmerston government attempted to use the *Trent* affair as a pretext for a war against the North, English workers held protest meetings in Brighton

and elsewhere. These demonstrations were called in spite of the fact that the British ruling classes did everything in their power to make the workers believe that an alliance with the Confederacy would result in the breaking of the Northern blockade of Southern ports, which in turn, would mean the importation of greater quantities of cotton with consequent re-employment and prosperity. Yet, the British workers could not be so easily fooled; despite widespread misery and starvation, they showed their "indestructible excellence" by opposing the war-mongers and by demanding peace. \* Their pro-Union demonstrations forced the Palmerston government to adopt a more conciliatory tone throughout the entire *Trent* affair. Marx, in reporting these meetings to his American readers, requested them never to forget that "at least the *working classes* of England" were on their side.

Similarly, the international proletariat supported the American Republic against the slave power. In 1864, Marx, carrying out the instructions of the First International, sent a message to the people of the United States congratulating them upon the re-election of Lincoln. In this address (to be found in the Appendix of the present volume), Marx pointed out that from the beginning of the struggle European workers had made the Northern cause their own and that "the fanatic partisanship of the upper classes for the Confederate gentry had given its dismal warning, that the slaveholders' rebellion was to sound the tocsin for the general holy crusade of property against labour . " In conclusion, Marx asserted that just as the "American War of Independence initiated a new era of ascendancy for the middle class, so the American anti-slavery war will for the working classes."

From the foregoing, it is obvious that the articles and letters, included herein, come as a refreshing antidote to much that has been written on the Civil War. On the whole, the American conflict has been analyzed in such simple and idealistic terms that historical actualities have been sacrificed for preconceived notions based on fantastic premises.

Among these the most unrealistic is the one propounded by Alexander H. Stephens and Jefferson Davis, leading exponents of the Southern Bourbon school. Faced by "the brutal fact of defeat," these two politicians sought to defend the "lost cause" and at the same time to obscure the historic problem of Negro slavery by discovering the cause of the conflict in the convenient American doctrine of states' rights.

In his *Constitutional View of the Late War between the States* (1868-70), Stephens set forth the thesis that the civil strife was occasioned by "opposing ideas as to the nature of what is known as the General Government. The contest was between those who held it to be strictly Federal in character and those who maintained it to be thoroughly National." To the former Vice-President of the Confederacy, slavery was merely the spark that brought these "antagonistic principles" in actual collision "on the field of battle." Jefferson Davis, President of the Confederate States, put it even more simply. "The question of slavery," he wrote in his *Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government* (1881) "served as an occasion, it was far from being the cause of the conflict." Moreover, Stephens and Davis both agreed that the Civil War was inevitable. To them it was inconceivable to imagine the North and South living peacefully side by side so long as one accepted the Hamiltonian concept of government and the other the Jeffersonian

The traditional Northern thesis was formulated by James F. Rhodes, a retired business man and brother-in-law of Mark Hanna, the Republican leader who helped "make" McKinley president. In his seven-volume *History of the United States* (1893-1906), he set forth the theory that the Civil War was the result of clashing ideas as to the moral justification of slavery. Throughout his work, Rhodes adopted a tolerant attitude toward the South and was of course in entire sympathy with the prevalent Northern disposition to let bygones be bygones.

At present most historians reject the traditional Northern and Southern thesis as to the cause of the Civil War. Even such conservatives of the South as George F. Milton have so modified the time-honoured Stephens-Davis apology that it can hardly be recognized. In his *Eve of the Conflict* (1934), Milton, repudiating the old Southern theory of the inevitability of the struggle, holds that the civil strife was a "needless war." He maintains that the conflict could have been avoided if the people had followed the dictates of reason and intelligence exemplified in the attitude of Douglas and had repudiated the promptings of emotion and passion aroused by "inflamed minorities." In essence the Civil War was a "battle between rational and mystic democracy. . . "

Unlike Milton, Edward Channing, late professor of history at Harvard, does not belittle the force of Northern anti-slavery



sentiment, nor does he deny the fact that the anti-slavery struggle, especially as it affected the territories, was tangible and material. Moreover, his designation of the Civil War as the War for Southern Independence is a step in the right direction and is distinctly superior to the old title of the War between the States, a title used by Stephens and other reactionaries to establish the legitimacy of the Secessionist conspiracy.

Probably the best description of the Civil War is the one given by Charles A. Beard in his *Rise of American Civilization* (1927). His title, the Second American Revolution, conceals nothing and suggests a great deal. In his discussion, the leader of the liberal bourgeois school shows that the conflict was a struggle between two divergent economic and social systems, one a mono-agricultural order based upon slavery and the other a diversified system of agrarian and industrial productivity built upon free labour. He shows how the Civil War was the inevitable outcome of these clashing forces and how it represented a revolutionary occurrence of prime importance. A similar position is taken by Arthur C. Cole whose *Irrepressible Conflict* (1934) is a more complete study of the period.

The work of Beard and Cole, though containing much useful material, suffers from certain limitations inherent in the liberal bourgeois approach. These restrictions become evident when examined in the light of the articles and letters contained in the present volume. Failing to appreciate fully the class dynamics of historical development, liberal bourgeois historians do not clearly distinguish between the class forces at work. This leads them to ignore some of the most significant revolutionary phenomena of the period. Not least is the part played by the American working class in bringing the Civil War to a successful conclusion. This subject, worthy of extended treatment, is either completely disregarded or quickly disposed of.

On the eve of the Civil War, the American working class, fully cognizant of the dangers inherent in the Secessionist movement, vigorously declared itself for the preservation of the Union. Labour organizations in the South joined with those in the North in passing resolutions favouring the unity

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<sup>1</sup>E Channing, *History of the United States* (New York, 1952), vol. vi.

of the American Republic. These resolutions, though fundamentally directed against the Secessionist movement, were nevertheless for the most part animated by a desire to prevent war if that was at all possible. As such, they reflected the attitude of a number of prominent labour leaders whose pacifistic tendencies and political immaturity blinded them to the full significance of the impending conflict. Among these leaders was William H. Sylvis, head of the Iron Moulders Union, who was later to distinguish himself as the guiding spirit behind the National Labour Union and as a friend of the First International. The desire of Sylvis to avert the coming struggle did not prevent him from standing in strong opposition to the Secessionist movement, an opposition amply demonstrated by his activities prior to and during the war. On February 12, 1861, Sylvis, writing in a workingman's newspaper, the *Mechanics' Own*, proposed that the wage-earners of the country hold demonstrations in which the unity of the Republic should be made the dominant note. When hostilities actually broke out, Sylvis recruited a detachment of iron moulders which helped protect Washington from Lee's threatened invasion.

A considerable number of unorganized workers adopted a pacifistic attitude on the eve of the Civil War. Their outlook, however, was largely manufactured by powerful pro-slavery interests located in such large Eastern mercantile centres as Boston, New York and Philadelphia. These elements, connected with the slave barons of the South in the capacity of financiers, merchants and politicians, played upon the working-class fear of unemployment to such an extent that they were able to stampede many unorganized wage-earners into the anti-war camp.

However, once "the irrepressible conflict" began, the working class as a whole came to the defence of the Union and workers "vied with farmers in furnishing [the Lincoln administration] with volunteers." Writing many years later, Powderly, head of the Knights of Labour, stated, "It is true that men in other walks of life enlisted and did good service in the Union cause, but the great bulk of the army was made up of working men." In the front rank of those who volunteered were trade union officials who actively recruited military companies in the factories where they worked. In some cases labour organizations joined the army in a body; for instance, one in Philadelphia passed the follow-

ing resolution: 'It having been resolved to enlist with Uncle Sam for the war, this union stands adjourned until either the Union is saved or we are whipped.'

An even more advanced position than this was taken by some German-American working-class leaders, such as, for instance Joseph Weydemeyer, loyal friend of Karl Marx. This Socialist fighter, along with many other leaders fought on the side of the North not only to preserve the Union, but also to abolish slavery. The eradication of the latter was held essential to the ultimate emancipation of the proletariat. As the war progressed American wage-earners began to exhibit a similar orientation. Their desire "to secure freedom for all the inhabitants of the United States" gave them, as Powderly puts it, "renewed zeal in the work of emancipation."

The working class of America did yeoman service not only at the front but behind the lines. Here in the factories of the nation wage-earners toiled unceasingly to produce the sinews of war. While capitalists were reaping millions as a result of fat war contracts, the labouring classes were working at pitifully inadequate wages. Yet they worked on and on in order to bring the war to a successful conclusion. Their devotion to the Union government is well illustrated in a testimonial drawn up by the sewing women of Cincinnati on February 20, 1865 and addressed to Lincoln. In this memorial, these "wives, widows sisters and friends of the soldiers in the army of the United States" contrasted their wretched conditions with those of the war-profiters "who fatten on their contracts by grinding immense profits out of the labour of their operatives." Yet, despite this example of upper class selfishness, these women assured Lincoln of their sympathy with and loyalty to the government a government they were still "desirous of aiding."

With the war won and the Southern slavocracy crushed, the wage-earners of America served notice on the ruling classes that they intended to secure in the very near future a more equitable distribution of wealth and a more equal share in those democratic institutions which they had defended with their blood. On November 2, 1865, Ira Steward, prominent leader of the eight-hour-day movement, proposed a number of resolutions at a mass meeting of Boston workers held at Faneuil Hall. Among those adopted was the following

We rejoice that the rebel aristocracy of the South has

been crushed, that beneath the glorious shadow of our victorious flag men of every clime, lineage and colour are recognized as free But while we will bear with patient endurance the burden of the public debt, we yet want it to be known that the workingmen of America will demand in future a more equal share in the wealth their industry creates and a more equal participation in the privileges and blessings of those free institutions, defended by their manhood on many a bloody field of battle

Within a short time after the passage of this resolution, an eight-hour-day movement was running, as Marx so aptly put it, "with express speed from the Atlantic to the Pacific," and a national federation of labour—the National Labour Union—was being launched.

Thus, the American working class played a significant role in the winning of the Civil War. Its splendid response to Lincoln's continuous plea for troops together with the heroic sacrifices of the British proletariat and the magnificent work of Marx and the First International form one of the most inspiring chapters in the history of the working-class movement.

Liberal historians likewise ignore or at best gloss over the part played by the Negro people in helping the North win the Civil War. The arming of Negroes (the necessity of which Marx realized and the revolutionary implications of which he was cognizant) is given scant notice despite the fact that, according to official figures, 186,017 coloured troops served in the Northern armies during the struggle Of these 123,156 were still in service on July 16, 1865 Drawn from working-class and petty bourgeois circles in the North and from free Negro and fugitive slave elements in the South, Negro soldiers participated in 198 battles and skirmishes and lost some 68,178 men These statistics tell only part of the story; they do not disclose the heroism exhibited by Union Negro troops in battle nor their calibre as fighting men These can be appreciated only through an examination of testimonials still available For instance, there is the communication of Colonel Thomas Wentworth Higginson who commanded a Federal detachment of Negroes in Florida. "It would have been madness," he wrote in February, 1863, "to attempt with the bravest white troops what [I] successfully accomplished with black ones" The excellence of the Negro as a soldier was matched only by his eagerness to enlist and fight for freedom. Despite petty discriminations of all kinds (for example,

coloured troops received less pay in the Union' army than white ones), Negroes flocked to the colours; pay or no pay, they did not hesitate to volunteer. Negroes served in the Northern armies not only as privates but as officers. Without previous military experience and solely on the basis of ability, Negro fighters rose from the ranks to become commissioned officers, some even attaining the rank of Major and Lt-Colonel.

In addition to officers and soldiers, the Negro people furnished the Union armies with servants, helpers and labourers. These were mainly drawn from the ranks of fugitive slaves who deserted their plantations in ever-increasing numbers as the war went on. Serving within the Federal lines, these runaway Negroes helped build roads and fortifications which, in turn, permitted tens of thousands of white troops to take up their guns and return to the ranks, thereby increasing the military strength and efficiency of the Northern armies.

The present volume serves not only to disclose the limitations inherent in the liberal bourgeois approach to the Civil War and the shallowness of the traditional idealistic interpretations of the subject, but also preserves the revolutionary traditions of that struggle from reactionary and conservative distortions. The years 1861-65 marked the defeat of the armed insurrection of the slave power and the unleashing of a revolutionary movement of vast potentialities. In its Civil War phase, the revolution abolished chattel slavery and destroyed the old plantocracy. At the same time it insured the continuance of democracy, freedom and progress by putting an end to the rule of an oligarchy, by preventing the further suppression of civil liberties in the interests of chattel slavery and by paving the way for the forward movement of American labour. The revolution during the Civil War was essentially the work of a broad and progressive coalition of wage-earners and farmers who after four years of bitter struggle crushed the counter-revolution and brushed aside an antiquated social order. In their fight for freedom, the workers and farmers of the nation were aided, as were their forefathers during the first American Revolution and their spiritual descendants in Spain today, by European revolutionaries. Particularly conspicuous in this connection were the German refugees of 1848-49, bourgeois liberals like Schurz and Kapp and working-class radicals like Weydemeyer and Anneke. The revolutionary character of the American conflict was fully appreciated by

contemporary observers. On December 30, 1860, one of these, a militant abolitionist connected with the *Chicago Tribune*, Horace White by name, wrote, "We live in revolutionary times and I say God bless the revolution!" Some fifty-eight years later, Lenin in his *Letter to American Workers* reminded the people of the United States that their revolutionary tradition went back to "the war of liberation against the English in the 18th and the Civil War in the 19th century" The latter he described as "world-historic, progressive and revolutionary "

Today, ultra-reactionary political groups, professional patriots and big business Bourbons are attempting to exploit this great revolutionary democratic heritage of the people for the purpose of maintaining and increasing their stranglehold upon the nation. Using the same tactics as the slavocracy did on the eve of the second American revolution, these present-day reactionary elements vigorously defend the Supreme Court as "the bulwark of the nation's liberties," assiduously advance states' rights arguments for the purpose of thwarting the will of a national majority and hypocritically profess a devotion to Jeffersonian democracy (as in the case of the Liberty League). But, as in the 'sixties, so now the progressive forces of the nation will not be deceived into perpetuating a corrupt and decadent social order. Led by the working class, they will accept the challenge of the present by repeating the only true and genuine tradition of American history—the revolutionary solution of deep-seated social antagonisms.

The present volume consists of a text, appendix, explanatory notes and biographical index. The text, composed of newspaper articles and correspondence, contains footnotes designed for the purpose of explaining foreign expressions and in some cases literary allusions and historic events. It should be noted in passing that all titles appearing at the head of newspaper articles are similar to those in the original and are therefore in the first instance the work of the editors of the periodicals involved. The appendix is made up of the Addresses of the First International to Abraham Lincoln and Andrew Johnson, and the reply of the former through the American Legation in London. In addition to the above-mentioned source material, the present work includes explanatory notes intended to acquaint the reader with important events and legislative acts as well as biographical sketches dealing with most of the figures referred to in the text.

RICHARD ENMALE.

PART ONE  
ARTICLES FROM  
THE NEW YORK DAILY TRIBUNE (1861-1862)

I

THE AMERICAN QUESTION IN ENGLAND

London, September 18, 1861.

MRS Beecher Stowe's letter to Lord Shaftesbury, whatever its intrinsic merit may be, has done a great deal of good by forcing the anti-Northern organs of the London press to speak out and lay before the general public ostensible reasons for their hostile tone against the North and their ill-concealed sympathies with the South, which looks rather strange on the part of people affecting an utter horror of slavery. Their first main grievance is that the present American war is "not one for the abolition of slavery," and that, therefore, the high-minded Britisher, used to undertake wars of his own and interest himself in other people's wars only on the basis of "broad humanitarian principles," cannot be expected to feel any sympathy with his Northern cousins. "In the first place," says *The Economist*, "the assumption that the quarrel between the North and South is a quarrel between Negro freedom on the one side and Negro slavery on the other is as impudent as it is untrue" "The North," says *The Saturday Review*, "does not proclaim Abolition, and never pretended to fight for anti-slavery. The North has not hoisted for its oriflamme the sacred symbol of justice to the Negro; its *cri de guerre*\* is not unconditional abolition" "If," says *The Examiner*, "we have been deceived about the real significance of the sublime movement, who but the Federalists themselves have to answer for the deception?"

Now, in the first instance, the premise must be conceded. The war has not been undertaken with a view to put down slavery, and the United States authorities themselves have taken the greatest pains to protest against any such idea. But then, it ought to be remembered that it was not the North,

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\* War cry —Ed

but the South, which undertook this war, the former acting only on the defence. If it be true, that the North, after long hesitations, and an exhibition of forbearance unknown in the annals of European history, drew at last the sword, not for crushing slavery, but for saving the Union, the South, on its part, inaugurated the war by loudly proclaiming "the peculiar institution" as the only and main end of the rebellion. It confessed to fight for the liberty of enslaving other people, a liberty which, despite the Northern protests, it asserted to be put in danger by the victory of the Republican Party and the election of Mr Lincoln to the Presidential chair. The Confederate Congress boasted that its new-fangled Constitution, as distinguished from the Constitution of the Washingtons, Jeffersons and Adamsses, had recognized for the first time slavery as a thing good in itself, a bulwark of civilization, and a divine institution. If the North professed to fight but for the Union, the South gloried in rebellion for the supremacy of slavery. If anti-slavery and idealistic England felt not attracted by the profession of the North, how came it to pass that it was not violently repulsed by the cynical confessions of the South?

*The Saturday Review* helps itself out of this ugly dilemma by disbelieving the declarations of the seceders themselves. It sees deeper than this, and discovers "that slavery had very little to do with secession," the declarations of Jeff[erson] Davis and company to the contrary being mere "conventionalisms" with "about as much meaning as the conventionalisms about violated altars and desecrated hearths, which always occur in such proclamations."

The staple of argument on the part of the anti-Northern papers is very scanty, and throughout all of them we find almost the same sentences recurring, like the formulas of a mathematical series, at certain intervals, with very little art of variation or combination. "Why," exclaims *The Economist*, "it is only yesterday, when the secession movement first gained serious head, on the first announcement of Mr Lincoln's election, that the Northerners offered to the South, if they would remain in the Union, every conceivable security for the performance and inviolability of the obnoxious institution—that they disavowed in the most solemn manner all intention of interfering with it—that their leaders proposed compromise after compromise in Congress, all based upon the concession that slavery should not be meddled with." "How happens



it," says *The Examiner*, "that the North was <sup>7</sup>ready to compromise matters by the largest concessions to the South as to slavery?" How was it that a certain geographical line was proposed in Congress within which slavery was to be recognized as an essential institution? The Southern states were not content with this"

What *The Economist* and *The Examiner* had to ask was not only why the Crittenden and other compromise measures were proposed in Congress, but why they were not passed.<sup>1</sup> They affect to consider those compromise proposals as accepted by the North and rejected by the South, while, in point of fact, they were baffled by the Northern party that had carried the Lincoln election. Proposals never matured into resolutions, but always remaining in the embryo of *pia desideria*; the South had of course, never any occasion either of rejecting or acquiescing. We come nearer to the pith of the question by the following remark of *The Examiner*

Mrs. Stowe says, "The slave party, finding they could no longer use the Union for their purposes, resolved to destroy it." There is here an admission that up to that time the slave party had used the Union for their purposes, and it would have been well if Mrs. Stowe could have distinctly shown where it was that the North began to make its stand against slavery

One might suppose that *The Examiner* and the other oracles of public opinion in England had made themselves sufficiently familiar with contemporaneous history to not need Mrs. Stowe's information on such all-important points. The progressive abuse of the Union by the slave power, working through its alliance with the Northern Democratic Party, is, so to say, the general formula of United States history since the beginning of this century. The successive compromise measures mark the successive degrees of the encroachment by which the Union became more and more transformed into the slave of the slaveowner. Each of these compromises denotes a new encroachment of the South, a new concession of the North. At the same time none of the successive victories of the South was carried but after a hot contest with an antagonistic force in the North, appearing under different party names with different watchwords and under different colours. If the positive and final result of each single contest told in

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<sup>1</sup> Pious wishes —Ed.

favour of the South, the attentive observer of history could not but see that every new advance of the slave power was a step forward to its ultimate defeat. Even at the time of the Missouri Compromise the contending forces were so evenly balanced that Jefferson, as we see from his memoirs, apprehended the Union to be in danger of splitting on that deadly antagonism<sup>2</sup>. The encroachments of the slaveholding power reached their maximum point, when, by the Kansas-Nebraska Bill,<sup>3</sup> for the first time in the history of the United States, as Mr. Douglas himself confessed, every legal barrier to the diffusion of slavery within the United States territories was broken down, when afterward, a Northern candidate<sup>4</sup> bought his presidential nomination by pledging the Union to conquer or purchase in Cuba a new field of dominion for the slaveholder; when later on, by the Dred Scott decision,<sup>5</sup> diffusion of slavery by the Federal power was proclaimed as the law of the American Constitution, and lastly, when the African slave trade<sup>6</sup> was *de facto* reopened on a larger scale than during the times of its legal existence. But, concurrently with this climax of Southern encroachments, carried by the connivance of the Northern Democratic Party, there were unmistakable signs of Northern antagonistic agencies having gathered such strength as must soon turn the balance of power. The Kansas war,<sup>7</sup> the formation of the Republican Party,<sup>8</sup> and the large vote cast for Mr. Fremont during the presidential election of 1856,<sup>9</sup> were so many palpable proofs that the North had accumulated sufficient energies to rectify the aberrations which United States history, under the slaveowners' pressure, had undergone, for half a century, and to make it return to the true principles of its development. Apart from those political phenomena, there was one broad statistical and economical fact indicating that the abuse of the Federal Union by the slave interest had approached the point from which it would have to recede forcibly, or *de bonne grace*.<sup>\*</sup> That fact was the growth of the Northwest, the immense strides its population had made from 1850 to 1860,<sup>10</sup> and the new and reinvigorating influence it could not but bear on the destinies of the United States.

Now, was all this a secret chapter of history? Was "the admission" of Mrs. Beecher Stowe wanted to reveal to *The Examiner* and the other political *illuminati* of the London

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<sup>\*</sup>With good grace.—*Ed.*

press the carefully hidden truth that "up to that time the slave party had used the Union for their purposes"? Is it the fault of the American North that the English pressmen were taken quite unawares by the violent clash of the antagonistic forces, the friction of which was the moving power of its history for half a century? Is it the fault of the Americans that the English press mistake for the fanciful crotchet hatched in a single day what was in the reality the matured result of long years of struggle? The very fact that the formation and the progress of the Republican Party in America have hardly been noticed by the London press, speaks volumes as to the hollowness of its anti-slavery tirades. Take, for instance, the two antipodes of the London press, the *London Times* and *Reynold's Weekly Newspaper*, the one the great organ of the respectable classes, and the other the only remaining organ of the working class. The former, not long before Mr. Buchanan's career drew to an end, published an elaborate apology for his administration and a defamatory libel against the Republican movement. Reynolds, on his part, was, during Mr. Buchanan's stay at London,<sup>11</sup> one of his minions, and since that time never missed an occasion to write him up and to write his adversaries down. How did it come to pass that the Republican Party, whose platform was drawn up on the avowed antagonism to the encroachments of the slavocracy and the abuse of the Union by the slave interest, carried the day in the North? How, in the second instance, did it come to pass that the great bulk of the Northern Democratic Party, flinging aside its old connections with the leaders of slavocracy, setting at naught its traditions of a century, sacrificing great commercial interests and greater political prejudices, rushed to the support of the present Republican administration and offered it men and money with an unsparing hand?

Instead of answering these questions *The Economist* exclaims:

Can we forget that Abolitionists have habitually been as ferociously persecuted and maltreated in the North and West as in the South? Can it be denied that the testiness and half-heartedness, not to say insincerity, of the government at Washington have for years supplied the chief impediment which has thwarted our efforts for the effectual suppression of the slave trade on the coast of Africa, while a vast proportion of the clippers actually engaged in that trade have been built with Northern capital, owned by Northern merchants

and manned by Northern seamen ?

This is, in fact, a masterly piece of logic. Anti-slavery England cannot sympathize with the North breaking down the withering influence of slavocracy, because she cannot forget that the North, while bound by that influence, supported the slave trade, mobbed the Abolitionists and had its democratic institutions tainted by the slavedriver's prejudices. She cannot sympathize with Mr Lincoln's administration, because she had to find fault with Mr Buchanan's administration. She must needs sullenly cavil at the present movement of the Northern resurrection, cheer up the Northern sympathizers with the slave trade, branded in the Republican platform<sup>12</sup>, and coquet with the Southern slavocracy, setting up an empire of its own, because she cannot forget that the North of yesterday was not the North of today. The necessity of justifying its attitude by such pettifogging Old Bailey\* pleas proves more than anything else that the anti-Northern part of the English press is instigated by hidden motives, too mean and dastardly to be openly avowed.

As it is one of its pet manoeuvres to taunt the present Republican administration with the doings of its pro-slavery predecessors, so it tries hard to persuade the English people that *The New York Herald* ought to be considered the only authentic expositor of Northern opinion. The *London Times* having given out the cue in this direction the *servum pecus*† of the other anti-Northern organs, great and small, persist in beating the same bush. So says *The Economist*: "In the light of the strife, New York papers and New York politicians were not wanting who exhorted the combatants now that they had large armies in the field, to employ them, not against each other, but against Great Britain—to compromise the internal quarrel, the slave question included, and invade the British territory without notice and with overwhelming force." *The Economist* knows perfectly well that *The New York Herald's* efforts, which were eagerly supported by the *London Times*, at embroiling the United States into a war with England, only intended securing the success of secession and thwarting the movement of Northern regeneration.

Still there is one concession made by the anti-Northern English press. *The Saturday [Review]* snob tells us: "What

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\*Seat of the Central Criminal Court in London.—Ed.

†Slavish herd.—Ed.

was at issue in Lincoln's election, and what has precipitated the convulsion, was merely the limitation of the institution of slavery to states where that institution already exists." And *The Economist* remarks: "It is true enough that it was the aim of the Republican Party which elected Mr. Lincoln to prevent slavery from spreading into the unsettled Territories.... It may be true that the success of the North, if complete and unconditional, would enable them to confine slavery within the fifteen states which have already adopted it, and might thus lead to its eventual extinction—though this is rather probable than certain."

In 1859, on the occasion of John Brown's Harper's Ferry expeditions,<sup>13</sup> the very same *Economist* published a series of elaborate articles with a view to prove that, by dint of an *economical law*, American slavery was doomed to gradual extinction from the moment it should be deprived of its power of expansion. That "economical law" was perfectly understood by the slavocracy. "In 15 years more," said Toombs, "without a great increase in slave territory, either the slaves must be permitted to flee from the whites, or the whites must flee from the slaves." The limitation of slavery to its constitutional area, as proclaimed by the Republicans, was the distinct ground upon which the menace of secession was first uttered in the House of Representatives on December 19, 1859. Mr. Singleton (Mississippi) having asked Mr. Curtis (Iowa), if the Republican Party would never let the South have another foot of slave territory while it remained in the Union, and Mr. Curtis having responded in the affirmative, Mr. Singleton said *this would dissolve the Union*. His advice to Mississippi was the sooner it got out of the Union the better—"gentlemen should recollect that Jefferson Davis led our forces in Mexico, and still he lives, perhaps to lead the Southern army."\* Quite apart from the *economical law* which makes the diffusion of slavery a vital condition for its maintenance within its constitutional areas, the leaders of the South had never deceived themselves as to the necessity for keeping up their political sway over the United States. John Calhoun, in the defence of his propositions to the Senate, stated distinctly on February 19, 1847, "that the Senate was the

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\*For Singleton's speech of December 19, 1859, see Appendix to the *Congressional Globe, First Session 36th Congress, Part IV* (Washington, 1860), pp. 47-54.—Ed.

only balance of power left to the South in the government," and that the creation of new slave states had become necessary "for the retention of the equipoise of power in the Senate."<sup>14</sup> Moreover, the oligarchy of the 300,000 slaveowners could not even maintain their sway at home save by constantly throwing out to their white plebeians the bait of prospective conquests within and without the frontiers of the United States. If, then, according to the oracles of the English press, the North had arrived at the fixed resolution of circumscribing slavery within its present limits, and of thus extinguishing it in a constitutional way, was this not sufficient to enlist the sympathies of anti-slavery England?

But the English Puritans seem indeed not to be contented save by an explicit Abolitionist war. "This," says *The Economist*, "therefore, not being a war for the emancipation of the Negro race, on what other ground can we be fairly called upon to sympathize so warmly with the Federal cause?" "There was a time," says *The Examiner*, "when our sympathies were with the North, thinking that it was really in earnest in making a stand against the encroachments of the slave states, and in adopting emancipation as a measure of justice to the black race."

However, in the very same number in which these papers tell us that they cannot sympathize with the North because its war is no Abolitionist war, we are informed that "the desperate expedient" of proclaiming Negro emancipation and summoning the slaves to a general insurrection, is a thing "the mere conception of which is repulsive and dreadful," and that "a compromise" would be "far preferable to success purchased at such a cost and stained by such a crime."

Thus the English eagerness for the Abolitionist war is all cant. The cloven foot peeps out in the following sentences: "Lastly," says *The Economist*, "is the Morrill tariff a title to our gratitude and to our sympathy, or is the certainty that in case of Northern triumph, that tariff should be extended over the whole republic, a reason why we ought to be clamorously anxious for their success?" "The North Americans," says *The Examiner*, "are in earnest about nothing but a selfish protective tariff . . . The Southern states were tired of being robbed of the fruits of their slave labour by the protective tariff of the North."

*The Examiner* and *The Economist* complement each other. The latter is honest enough to confess at last that with it and

its followers sympathy is a mere question of tariff, while the former reduces the war between North and South to a tariff war, to a war between protection and free trade. *The Examiner* is perhaps not aware that even the South Carolina Nullifiers of 1832, as General Jackson testified, used protection only as a pretext for secession;<sup>15</sup> but even *The Examiner* ought to know that the present rebellion did not wait upon the passing of the Morrill tariff for breaking out.<sup>16</sup> In point of fact, the Southerners could not have been tired of being robbed of the fruits of their slave labour by the protective tariff of the North, considering that from 1846-1861 a free trade tariff had obtained.

*The Spectator* characterizes in its last number the secret thought of some of the anti-Northern organs in the following striking manner:

What, then, do the anti-Northern organs really profess to think desirable, under the justification of this plea of deferring to the inexorable logic of facts? They argue that disunion is desirable, just because, as we have said, it is the only possible step to a conclusion of this "causeless and fratricidal strife", and next, of course, only as an afterthought, and as an humble apology for Providence and "justification of the ways of God to man," now that the inevitable necessity stands revealed—for further reasons discovered as beautiful adaptations to the moral exigencies of the country, when once the issue is discerned. It is discovered that it will be very much for the advantage of the states to be dissolved into rival groups. They will mutually check each other's ambition; they will neutralize each other's power, and if ever England should get into a dispute with one or more of them, mere jealousy will bring the antagonistic groups to our aid. This will be, it is urged, a very wholesome state of things, for it will relieve us from anxiety and it will encourage political "competition," that great safeguard of honesty and purity, among the states themselves.

Such is the case—very gravely urged—of the numerous class of Southern sympathizers now springing up among us. Translated into English—and we grieve that an English argument on such a subject should be of a nature that requires translating it—it means that we deplore the present great scale of this "fratricidal" war, because it may concentrate in one fearful spasm a series of chronic petty wars and passions and

jealousies among groups of rival states in times to come. The real truth is, and this very un-English feeling distinctly discerns this truth, though it cloaks it in decent phrases, that rival groups of American states could not live together in peace or harmony. The chronic condition would be one of malignant hostility rising out of the very causes which have produced the present contest. It is asserted that the different groups of states have different tariff interests. These different tariff interests would be sources of constant petty wars if the states were once dissolved, and slavery, the root of all the strife, would be the spring of innumerable animosities, discords and campaigns. No stable equilibrium could ever again be established among the rival states. And yet it is maintained that this long future of incessant strife is the providential solution of the great question now at issue, the only real reason why it is looked upon favourably being this, that whereas the present great-scale conflict may issue in a restored and stronger political unity, the alternative of infinitely multiplied small-scale quarrels will issue in a weak and divided continent, that England cannot fear.

Now we do not deny that the Americans themselves sowed the seeds of this petty and contemptible state of feeling by the unfriendly and bullying attitude they have so often manifested to England, but we do say that the state of feeling on our part is petty and contemptible. We see that in a deferred issue there is no hope of a deep and enduring tranquillity for America, that it means a decline and fall of the American nation into quarrelsome clans and tribes, and yet hold up our hands in horror at the present "fratricidal" strife because it holds out hopes of finality. We exhort them to look favourably on the indefinite future of small strifes, equally fratricidal and probably far more demoralizing, because the latter would draw out of our side the thorn of American rivalry.

*New York Daily Tribune*, October 11, 1861.



## THE BRITISH COTTON TRADE

London, September 21, 1861.

THE continual rise in the price of raw cotton begins at last to seriously react upon the cotton factories, their consumption of cotton being now 25 per cent less than the full consumption. This result has been brought about by a daily lessening rate of production, many mills working only four or three days per week, part of the machinery being stopped, both in those establishments where short time has been commenced and in those which are still running full time, and some ~~mills~~ being temporarily altogether closed.

In some places, as at Blackburn, for instance, short time has been coupled with a reduction of wages. However, the short-time movement is only in its incipient state and we may predict with perfect security that some weeks later the trade will have generally resorted to three days' working per week, concurrently with a large stoppage of machinery in most establishments. On the whole, English manufacturers and merchants were extremely slow and reluctant in acknowledging the awkward position of their cotton supplies. "The whole of the last American crop," they said, "has long since been forwarded to Europe. The picking of the new crop has barely commenced. Not a bale of cotton could have reached us more than has reached us, even if the war and the blockade had never been heard of. The shipping season does not commence till far in November, and it is usually the end of December before any large exportations take place. Till then, it is of little consequence whether the cotton is retained on the plantations or is forwarded to the ports as fast as it is bagged. If the blockade ceases any time *before the end of this year*, the probability is that by March or April we shall have received just as full a supply of cotton as if the blockade had never been declared."

In the innermost recesses of the mercantile mind the notion was cherished that the whole American crisis, and, consequently the blockade, would have ceased before the end of the year, or that Lord Palmerston would forcibly break through the blockade. The latter idea has been altogether

abandoned, since, beside all other circumstances, Manchester\* became aware that two vast interests, the monetary interest having sunk an immense capital in the industrial enterprises of Northern America, and the corn trade, relying on Northern America as its principal source of supply, would combine to check any unprovoked aggression on the part of the British government. The hopes of the blockade being raised in due time, for the requirements of Liverpool† or Manchester, or the American war being wound up by a compromise with the secessionists, have given way before a feature hitherto unknown in the English cotton market, *viz.*, American operations in cotton at Liverpool, partly on speculation, partly for reshipment to America. Consequently, for the last two weeks the Liverpool cotton market has been feverishly excited, the speculative investments in cotton on the part of the Liverpool merchants being backed by speculative investments on the part of the Manchester and other manufacturers eager to provide themselves with stocks of raw material for the winter. The extent of the latter transactions is sufficiently shown by the fact that a considerable portion of the spare warehouse room in Manchester is already occupied by such stocks, and that throughout the week beginning with September 15 and ending with September 22, Middling Americans† had increased  $\frac{3}{8}$ d. per lb., and fair ones  $\frac{5}{8}$ d.

From the outbreak of the American war the prices of cotton were steadily rising, but the ruinous disproportion between the prices of the raw material and the prices of yarns and cloth was not declared until the last weeks of August. Till then, any serious decline in the prices of cotton manufactures, which might have been anticipated from the considerable decrease of the American demand, had been balanced by an accumulation of stocks in first hands, and by speculative consignments to China and India. Those Asiatic markets, however, were soon overdone. "Stocks," says *The Calcutta Price Current* of August 7, 1861, "are accumulating, the arrivals since our last being no less than 24,000,000 yards of plain cottons. Home advices show a continuation of shipments in excess of our requirements, and so long as this is the case, improvement cannot be looked for.. "

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\* The centre of the textile industry in England — *Ed.*

† The centre of the cotton trade — *Ed.*

‡ A quality of cotton — *Ed.*

The Bombay market, also, has been greatly over-supplied. Some other circumstances contributed to contract the Indian market. The late famine in the north-western provinces has been succeeded by the ravages of the cholera, while throughout Lower Bengal an excessive fall of rain, laying the country under water, seriously damaged the rice crops. In letters from Calcutta, which reached England last week, sales were reported giving a net return of  $9\frac{1}{4}$ d. per pound for 40s twist, which cannot be bought at Manchester for less than  $11\frac{3}{8}$ d., while sales of 4C-inch shirtings, compared with present rates at Manchester, yield losses at  $7\frac{1}{2}$ d., 9d and 12d. per piece. In the China market, prices were also forced down by the accumulation of the stocks imported. Under these circumstances, the demand for the British cotton manufactures decreasing their prices can, of course, not keep pace with the progressive rise in the price of the raw materials, but, on the contrary, the spinning, weaving, and printing of cotton must, in many instances, cease to pay the costs of production. Take, as an example, the following case, stated by one of the greatest Manchester manufacturers, in reference to coarse spinning :

			<i>Cost of Spinning</i>
<i>Sept 17, 1860</i>	<i>Per lb</i>	<i>Margin</i>	<i>per lb.</i>
Cost of cotton	$6\frac{1}{4}$ d.	4d	3d.
16s warp sold for	$10\frac{1}{4}$ d.	—	—
Profit, 1d per lb.			
 <i>Sept 17, 1861</i>			
Cost of cotton	9d.	2d.	$3\frac{1}{2}$ d.
16s warp sold for	11d.	—	—
Loss, $1\frac{1}{2}$ d. per lb.			

The consumption of Indian cotton is rapidly growing, and with a further rise in prices, the Indian supply will come forward at increasing ratios; but still it remains impossible to change, at a few months' notice, all the conditions of production and turn the current of commerce. England pays now, in fact, the penalty for her protracted misrule of that vast Indian empire. The two main obstacles she has now to grapple with in her attempts at supplanting American cotton by Indian cotton are the want of means of communication and transport throughout India, and the miserable state of the Indian peasant, disabling him from improving favourable cir-

circumstances. Both these difficulties the English have themselves to thank for. English modern industry, in general, relied upon two pivots equally monstrous. The one was the potato as the only means of feeding Ireland and a great part of the English working class. This pivot was swept away by the potato disease and the subsequent Irish catastrophe.<sup>17</sup> A larger basis for the reproduction and maintenance of the toiling millions had then to be adopted. The second pivot of English industry was the slave-grown cotton of the United States. The present American crisis forces them to enlarge their field of supply and emancipate cotton from slave-breeding and slave-consuming oligarchies. As long as the English cotton manufacturers depended on slave-grown cotton, it could be truthfully asserted that they rested on a twofold slavery, the indirect slavery of the white man in England and the direct slavery of the black man on the other side of the Atlantic.

*New York Daily Tribune*, October 14, 1861.

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#### THE LONDON TIMES ON THE ORLEANS PRINCES IN AMERICA

London, October 12, 1861

ON the occasion of the King of Prussia's visit at Compiegne,<sup>18</sup> the London *Times* published some racy articles, giving great offence on the other side of the Channel. The *Pays*, *Journal de l'Empire*, in its turn characterized *The Times* writers as people whose heads were poisoned by gin, and whose pens were dipped into mud. Such occasional exchanges of invective are only intended to mislead public opinion as to the intimate relations connecting Printing House Square to the Tuileries.\* There exists beyond the French frontiers no greater sycophant of the Man of December† than the London *Times*,

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\*Editorial offices of *The Times* situated in Printing House Square and Napoleon III whose residence was the Palace of the Tuileries in Paris.—Ed.

†Napoleon III, Louis Bonaparte.—Ed.

and its services are the more invaluable, the more that paper now and then assumes the tone and the air of a Cato censor towards its Caesar.\*

*The Times* had for months heaped insult upon Prussia. Improving the miserable MacDonald affair, it had told Prussia that England would feel glad to see a transfer of the Rhenish provinces from the barbarous sway of the Hohenzollern to the enlightened despotism of a Bonaparte. It had not only exasperated the Prussian dynasty, but the Prussian people. It had written down the idea of an Anglo-Prussian alliance in case of a Prussian conflict with France. It had strained all its powers to convince Prussia that she had nothing to hope from England, and that the next best thing she could do would be to come to some understanding with France. When at last the weak and trimming monarch of Prussia resolved upon the visit at Compiègne, *The Times* could proudly exclaim: "*quorum magna pars fui*,"\*\* but now the time had also arrived for obliterating from the memory of the British the fact that *The Times* had been the pathfinder of the Prussian monarch. Hence the roar of its theatrical thunders. Hence the counter roars of the *Pays*, *Journal de l'Empire*.

*The Times* had now recovered its position of the deadly antagonist of Bonapartism, and, therefore, the power of lending its aid to the Man of December. An occasion soon offered. Louis Bonaparte is, of course, most touchy whenever the renown of rival pretenders to the French crown is concerned. He had covered himself with ridicule in the affair of the Duc d'Aumale's pamphlet against Plon-Plon,<sup>19</sup> and, by his proceedings, had done more in furtherance of the Orleanist cause than all the Orleanist partisans combined. Again, in these latter days, the French people were called upon to draw a parallel between Plon-Plon and the Orleans princes. When Plon-Plon set out for America, there were caricatures circulated in the Faubourg St. Antoine† representing him as a fat man in search of a crown, but professing at the same time to be a most in-offensive traveller, with a peculiar aversion to the smell of

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\*The adoption of a critically moralistic tone towards the ruler of a state. The phrase is based on the historical character of Cato the Censor (234-149 B.C.), a Roman noted for the severity of his manners and for his supervision of public morals.—Ed.

\*\*In which I had a large share.—Ed.

†A district in Paris.—Ed.

powder. While Plon-Plon is returning to France with no more laurels than he gathered in the Crimea and in Italy, the Princes of Orleans cross the Atlantic to take service in the ranks of the national army.<sup>20</sup> Hence a great stir in the Bonapartist camp. It would not do to give vent to Bonapartist anger through the venal press of Paris. The imperialist fears would thus only be betrayed, the pamphlet scandal renewed, and obvious comparisons provoked between exiled princes who fight under the republican banner against the enslavers of working millions, with another exiled prince, who had himself sworn in as an English special constable to share in the glory of putting down an English workingmen's movement.<sup>21</sup>

Who should extricate the Man of December out of this dilemma? Who but the *London Times*? If the same *London Times*, which on the 6th, 8th and 9th of October, 1861, had roused the furies of the *Pays*, *Journal de l'Empire*, by its rather cynical strictures on the visit at Compiègne—if that very same paper should come out on the 12th of October, with a merciless onslaught on the Orleans princes, because of their enlistment in the ranks of the national army of the United States, would Louis Bonaparte not have proved his case against the Orleans princes? Would *The Times* article not be done into French, commented upon by the Paris papers, sent by the *Préfet de Police*\* to all the journals of all the departments,† and circulated throughout the whole of France, as the impartial sentence passed by the *London Times*, the personal foe of Louis Bonaparte, upon the last proceedings of the Orleans princes? Consequently, *The Times* of to-day has come out with a most scurrilous onslaught on these princes.

Louis Bonaparte is, of course, too much of a business man to share the judicial blindness in regard to the American war of the official public opinion-mongers. He knows that the true people of England, of France, of Germany, of Europe, consider the cause of the United States as their own cause, as the cause of liberty, and that, despite all paid sophistry, they consider the soil of the United States as the free soil of the landless millions of Europe, as their land of promise, now to be defended sword in hand, from the sordid grasp of the slaveholder. Louis Napoleon knows, moreover, that in France the

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\* Chief of Police.—Ed

†Provinces.—Ed.

masses connect the fight for the maintenance of the Union with the fight of their forefathers for the foundation of American independence, and that with them every Frenchman drawing his sword for the national government appears only to execute the bequest of Lafayette. Bonaparte, therefore, knows that if anything is able to win the Orleans princes good opinions from the French people, it will be their enlistment in the ranks of the national army of the United States. He shudders at this very notion, and consequently the London *Times*, his censorious sycophant, today tells the Orleans princes that "they will derive no increase of popularity with the French nation from stooping to serve on this *ignoble field of action*." Louis Napoleon knows that all the wars waged in Europe between hostile nations since his *coup d'etat*,<sup>1</sup> have been mock wars, groundless, wanton, and carried on on false pretences. The Russian war,<sup>†</sup> and the Italian war [1859], not to speak of the piratical expeditions against China, Cochín-China,<sup>22</sup> and so forth, never enlisted the sympathies of the French people, instinctively aware that both wars were carried on only with the view to strengthening the chains forged by the *coup d'etat*. The first grand war of contemporaneous history is *the American war*.

The people of Europe know that the Southern slavocracy commenced that war with the declaration that the continuance of slavocracy was no longer compatible with the continuance of the Union. Consequently, the people of Europe know that a fight for the continuance of the Union is a fight against the continuance of the slavocracy—that in this contest the highest form of popular self-government till now realized is giving battle to the meanest and most shameless form of man's enslaving recorded in the annals of history.

Louis Bonaparte feels, of course, extremely sorry that the Orleans princes should embark in just such a war, so distinguished, by the vastness of its dimensions and the grandeur of its ends, from the groundless, wanton and diminutive wars Europe has passed through since 1849. Consequently, the London *Times* must needs declare: "To overlook the difference between a war waged by hostile nations, and this most groundless and wanton civil conflict of which history gives us

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<sup>1</sup>That is, since December 2, 1851. By a *coup d'etat* is meant a sudden decisive blow in politics—*Ed.*

<sup>†</sup>Crimean War, 1853-56.—*Ed.*

any account, is a species of offence against public morals."

*The Times* is, of course, bound to wind up its onslaught on the Orleans princes because of their "stooping to serve on such an ignoble field of action," with a deep bow before the victor of Sebastopol and Solferino. "It is unwise," says the *London Times*, "to challenge a comparison between such actions as Springfield and Manassas,"<sup>23</sup> and the exploits of Sebastopol and Solferino."<sup>24</sup> The next mail will testify to the pre-meditated use made of *The Times* article by the imperialist organs. A friend in times of need is proverbially worth a thousand friends in times of prosperity, and the secret ally of the *London Times* is just now very badly off.

A dearth of cotton, backed by a dearth of grain; a commercial crisis coupled with an agricultural distress, and both of them combined with a reduction of customs revenues and a monetary embarrassment compelling the Bank of France to screw its rate of discount to six per cent, to enter into transactions with Rothschilds and Baring for a loan of two millions sterling on the London market, to pawn abroad French government stock, and with all that to show but a reserve of 12,000,000 against liabilities amounting to more than 40,000,000. Such a state of economical affairs prepares just the situation for rival pretenders to stake double. Already there have been bread-riots in the Faubourg St Antoine, and this of all times is therefore the most inappropriate time for allowing Orleans princes to catch popularity. Hence the fierce forward rush of the *London Times*.

*New York Daily Tribune*, November 7, 1861.

#### 4.

### THE INTERVENTION IN MEXICO

London, November 8, 1861.

THE contemplated intervention in Mexico by England, France and Spain, is, in my opinion, one of the most monstrous enterprises ever chronicled in the annals of international history. It is a contrivance of the true Palmerston make, astounding the uninitiated by an insanity of purpose and imbecility of



the means employed which appear quite incompatible with the known capacity of the old schemer.

It is probable that, among the many irons which, to amuse the French public, Louis Bonaparte is compelled to always keep in the fire, a Mexican expedition may have figured. It is sure that Spain, whose never overstrong head has been quite turned by her recent cheap successes in Morocco and St. Domingo,<sup>28</sup> dreams of a restoration in Mexico, but nevertheless, it is certain that the French plan was far from being matured, and that both France and Spain strove hard against a joint expedition to Mexico under English leadership.

On September 24, Palmerston's private *Moniteur*,\* the London *Morning Post*, first announced in detail the scheme for the joint intervention, according to the terms of a treaty just concluded, as it said, between England, France, and Spain. This statement had hardly crossed the channel, when the French government, through the columns of the *Paris Patrie* gave it the direct lie. On September 27, the London *Times*, Palmerston's national organ, first broke its silence on the scheme in a leader† contradicting, but not quoting, the *Patrie*. The *Times* even stated that Earl Russell had communicated to the French government the resolution arrived at on the part of England of interfering in Mexico, and that M. de Thouvenel replied that the Emperor of the French had come to a similar conclusion. Now it was the turn of Spain. A semi-official paper of Madrid, while affirming Spain's intention to meddle with Mexico, repudiated at the same time the idea of a joint intervention with England. The *dementis*‡ were not yet exhausted. The *Times* had categorically asserted that "the full assent of the American President had been given to the expedition." All the American papers taking notice of The *Times* article, have long since contradicted its assertion.

It is, therefore, certain, and has even been expressly admitted by The *Times*, that the joint intervention in its present form is of English—i.e., Palmerstonian—make. Spain was cowed into adherence by the pressure of France; and France was brought round by concessions made to her in the field of

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\*"Moniteur" is used by Marx to designate the *Morning Post* as the official paper of Palmerston, comparing its function to that of *Le Moniteur Universel*, which was the official organ of the French government from 1789 to 1868.—Ed.

†Chief editorial article of a newspaper.—Ed.

‡Official denials.—Ed.

European policy In this respect, it is a significant coincidence that *The Times* of November 6, in the very number in which it announces the conclusion at Paris of a convention for the joint interference in Mexico, simultaneously published a leader pooh-poohing and treating with exquisite contumely the protest of Switzerland against the recent invasion of her territory—viz., the Dappenthal by a French military force. In return for his fellowship in the Mexican expedition, Louis Bonaparte had obtained *carte blanche*\* for his contemplated encroachments on Switzerland, and, perhaps, on other parts of the European continent. The transactions on these points between England and France have lasted throughout the whole of the months of September and October.

There exist in England no people desirous of an intervention in Mexico save the Mexican bondholders, who, however, had never to boast the least sway over the national mind. Hence the difficulty of breaking to the public the Palmerstonian scheme. The next best means was to bewilder the British elephant by contradictory statements, proceeding from the same laboratory, compounded of the same materials but varying in the doses administered to the animal.

The *Morning Post*, in its print of September 24, announced there would be "no territorial war in Mexico," that the only point at issue was the monetary claims on the Mexican exchequer; that "it would be impossible to deal with Mexico as an organized and established government," and that, consequently, "the principal Mexican ports would be temporarily occupied and their customs revenues sequestered."

The *Times* of September 27 declared, on the contrary, that "to dishonesty, to repudiation, to the legal and irremediable plunder of our countrymen by the default of a bankrupt community, we were steeled by long endurance," and that, consequently, "the private robbery of the English bondholders" lay not, as the [*Morning*] *Post* had it, at the bottom of the intervention. While remarking, *en passant*,\*\* that "the City of Mexico was sufficiently healthy, should it be necessary to penetrate so far," *The Times* hoped, however, that "the mere presence of a combined squadron in the Gulf,

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\* A free hand.—Ed.

\*\*In passing.—Ed.

and the seizure of certain ports, will urge the Mexican government to new exertions in keeping the peace, and will convince the malcontents that they must confine themselves to some form of opposition more constitutional than brigandage." If, then according to the [*Morning*] *Post*, the expedition was to start because there "exists no government in Mexico," it was, according to *The Times*, only intended as encouraging and supporting the existing Mexican government. To be sure! The oddest means ever hit upon for the consolidation of a government consists in the seizure of its territory and the sequestration of its revenue.

*The Times* and the *Morning Post*, having once given out the cue, John Bull was then handed over to the minor ministerial oracles, systematically belabouring him in the same contradictory style for four weeks, until public opinion had at last become sufficiently trained to the idea of a joint intervention in Mexico, although kept in deliberate ignorance of the aim and purpose of that intervention. At last, the transactions with France had drawn to an end; the *Moniteur* announced that the convention between the three interfering powers had been concluded on October 31; and the *Journal des Debats*, one of whose co-proprietors is appointed to the command of one of the vessels of the French squadron, informed the world that no permanent territorial conquest was intended; that Vera Cruz and other points on the coast were to be seized, an advance to the capital being agreed upon in case of non-compliance by the constituted authorities in Mexico with the demands of the intervention; that, moreover, a strong government was to be imported into the republic.

*The Times*, which ever since its first announcement on September 27, seemed to have forgotten the very existence of Mexico, had now again to step forward. Everybody ignorant of its connection with Palmerston, and the original introduction in its columns of his scheme, would be induced to consider the today's leader of *The Times* as the most cutting and merciless satire on the whole adventure. It sets out by stating that "the expedition is a very remarkable one (later on it says a curious one). Three States are combining to coerce a fourth into good behaviour, not so much by way of war as by authoritative interference in behalf of order."

Authoritative interference in behalf of order! This is literally the holy Alliance<sup>20</sup> slang, and sounds very remarkable indeed on the part of England, glorying in the non-inter-

vention principle! And why is "the way of war, and of declaration of war, and all other behests of international law," supplanted by "an authoritative interference in behalf of order"? Because, says *The Times*, there "exists no government in Mexico." And what is the professed aim of the expedition? "To address demands to the constituted authorities at Mexico."

The only grievances complained of by the intervening Powers, the only causes which might give to their hostile procedure the slightest shade of justification, are easily to be summed up. They are the monetary claims of the bondholders and a series of personal outrages said to have been committed upon subjects of England, France and Spain. These were also the reasons of the intervention as originally put forth by the *Morning Post*, and as some time ago officially endorsed by Lord John Russell in an interview with some representatives of the Mexican bondholders in England. Today's *Times* states. "England, France and Spain have concerted an expedition to bring Mexico to the performance of her specific engagements and to give protection to the subjects of the respective crowns." However, in the progress of its article, *The Times* veers round, and exclaims :

We shall, no doubt, succeed in obtaining at least a recognition of our pecuniary claims, in fact, a single British frigate could have obtained that amount of satisfaction at any moment. We may trust, too, that the more scandalous of the outrages committed will be expiated by more immediate and substantial atonements; but it is clear that, if only this much was to be brought about we need not have resorted to such extremities as are now proposed

*The Times*, then, confesses in so many words that the reasons originally given out for the expedition are shallow pretexts; that for the attainment of redress nothing like the present procedure was needed; and that, in point of fact, the "recognition of monetary claims, and the protection of European subjects" have nothing at all to do with the present joint intervention in Mexico. What, then, is its real aim and purpose?

Before following *The Times* in its further explanations, we will, *en passant*, note some more "curiosities" which it has taken good care not to touch upon. In the first instance, it is a real "curiosity" to see Spain—Spain out of all other countries—turn crusaders for the sanctity of foreign debts!

Last Sunday's *Courrier des Dimanches* already summons the French government to improve the opportunity, and compel Spain, "into the eternally delayed performance of her old standing engagements to French bondholders."

The second still greater "curiosity" is, that the very same Palmerston who, according to Lord John Russell's recent declaration, is about invading Mexico "to make its government pay the English bondholders, has himself, voluntarily, and despite the Mexican government, sacrificed the treaty rights of England and the security mortgaged by Mexico to her British creditors

By the treaty concluded with England in 1826, Mexico became bound to not allow the establishment of slavery in any of the territories constituting her then empire. By another clause of the same treaty, she tendered England, as a security for the loans obtained from British capitalists, the mortgage of 45,000,000 acres of the public lands in Texas. It was Palmerston who, ten or twelve years later, interfered as the mediator for Texas against Mexico. In the treaty then concluded by him with Texas, he sacrificed not only the *anti-slavery cause*, but also the *mortgage on the public lands*, thus robbing the English bondholders of the security. The Mexican government protested at the time, but meanwhile, later on Secretary John C. Calhoun could permit himself the jest of informing the Cabinet of St James\* that its desire "of seeing slavery abolished in Texas would be" best realised by annexing Texas to the United States. The English bondholders lost, in fact, any claim upon Mexico, by the voluntary sacrifice on the part of Palmerston of the mortgage secured to them in the treaty of 1826.

But, since the London *Times* avows that the present intervention has nothing to do either with monetary claims or with personal outrages, what, then, in all the world, is its real or pretended aim?

"An *authoritative interference in behalf of order*." England, France and Spain, planning a new Holy Alliance, and having formed themselves into an armed areopagus for the restoration of order all over the world. "Mexico," says *The Times*, "*must be rescued from anarchy*, and put in the way of self-government and peace. A strong and stable government must be established" there by the invaders, and that

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\*St James Palace is the King's residence in London.—*Ed.*

government is to be extracted from "some Mexican party."

Now, does any one imagine that Palmerston and his mouthpiece, *The Times*, really consider the joint intervention as a means to the professed end, viz. the extinction of anarchy, and the establishment in Mexico of a strong and stable government? So far from cherishing any such chimerical creed, *The Times* states expressly in its first leader of September 27: "The only point on which there may possibly be a difference between ourselves and our allies, regards the government of the Republic. England will be content to see it remain in the hands of the *Liberal Party which is now in power*, while France and Spain are suspected of a partiality for the ecclesiastical rule which has recently been overthrown." It would, indeed, be strange, if France were, in both the old and new world, to make herself the protector of priests and bandits. In today's leader, *The Times* goes on reasoning in the same strain, and resumes its scruples in the sentence: "It is hard to suppose that the intervening powers could all concur in the absolute preference of either of the two parties between which Mexico is divided, and equally hard to imagine that a compromise would be found practicable between enemies so determined."

Palmerston and *The Times*, then, are fully aware that there "exists a government in Mexico", that the Liberal Party, "ostensibly favoured by England, is now in power"; that "the ecclesiastical rule has been overthrown", that Spanish intervention was the last forlorn hope of the priests and bandits; and finally, that Mexican anarchy was dying away. They know, then, that the joint intervention, with no other avowed end save the rescue of Mexico from anarchy, will produce just the opposite effect, weaken the constitutional government, strengthen the priestly party by a supply of French and Spanish bayonets, rekindle the embers of civil war, and, instead of extinguishing, restore anarchy to its bloom.

The inference *The Times* itself draws from those premises is really "remarkable" and "curious." "Although," it says, "the considerations may induce us to look with some anxiety to the results of the expedition, they do not militate against the expediency of the expedition itself."

It does, consequently, not militate against the expediency of the expedition itself, that the expedition militates against the only ostensible purpose. It does not militate against the means that it baffles its own avowed end.

The greatest "curiosity" pointed out by *The Times*, I have, however, still kept *in petto*\* "If," says it, "President Lincoln should accept the invitation, which is provided for by the convention, to participate in the approaching operations, *the character of the work would become more curious still.*"

It would, indeed, be the greatest "curiosity" of all if the United States, living in amity with Mexico, should associate with the European order-mongers, and, by participating in their acts, sanction the interference of a European armed areopagi with the internal affairs of American states. The first scheme of such a transplantation of the Holy Alliance to the other side of the Atlantic was, at the time of the restoration, drawn up for the French and Spanish Bourbons by Chateaubriand. The attempt was baffled by an English Minister, Mr. Canning, and an American President, Mr. Monroe. The present convulsion in the United States appeared to Palmerston an opportune moment for taking up the old project in a modified form. Since the United States, for the present, must allow no foreign complication to interfere with ~~their~~ war for the Union, all they can do is to protest. Their best well-wishers in Europe hope that they will protest, and thus, before the eyes of the world, firmly repudiate any complicity in one of the most nefarious schemes.

This military expedition of Palmerston's carried out by a coalition with two other European powers, is started during the prorogation, without the sanction, and against the will of the British Parliament. The first extra-parliamentary war of Palmerston's was the Afghan war, softened and justified by the production of *forged papers*. Another war of that [kind] was his Persian war of 1857-1858. He defended it at the time on the plea that "the principle of the previous sanction of the House did not apply to *Asiatic* wars." It seems that neither does it apply to *American* wars. With the control of the foreign wars, Parliament will lose all control over the national exchequer, and parliamentary government turn to a mere farce.

*New York Daily Tribune*, November 23, 1861.

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\*Secret.—Ed.

## THE NEWS AND ITS EFFECT IN LONDON

London, November 30, 1861.

SINCE the declaration of war against Russia I never witnessed an excitement throughout all the strata of English society equal to that produced by the news of the *Trent* affair,<sup>28</sup> conveyed to Southampton by the *La Plata* on the 27th inst. At about 2 o'clock p.m., by means of the electric telegraph, the announcement of the "untoward event" was posted in the newsrooms of all the British exchanges. All commercial securities went down, while the price of saltpetre went up. Consols\* declined three-quarters of one per cent, while at Lloyd's<sup>29</sup> war risks of five guineas were demanded on vessels from New York. Late in the evening the wildest rumours circulated in London, to the effect that the American Minister† had forthwith been sent his passports, that orders had been issued for the immediate seizure of all American ships in the ports of the United Kingdom, and so forth. The cotton friends of secession at Liverpool improved the opportunity for holding, at ten minutes' notice, in the cotton salesroom of the Stock Exchange, an indignation meeting, under the presidency of Mr Spence, the author of some obscure pamphlet in the interest of the Southern Confederacy<sup>30</sup> Commodore Williams, the Admiralty Agent on board the *Trent*, who had arrived with the *La Plata*, was at once summoned to London.

On the following day, the 28th of November, the London press exhibited, on the whole, a tone of moderation strangely contrasting with the tremendous political and mercantile excitement of the previous evening. The Palmerston papers, *The Times*, *Morning Post*, *Daily Telegraph*, *Morning Advertiser*, and *Sun*, had received orders to calm down rather than to exasperate. *The Daily News*, by its strictures on the conduct of the *San Jacinto*, evidently aimed less at hitting the Federal government than clearing itself of the suspicion of "Yankee prejudices," while *The Morning Star*, John Bright's organ, without passing any judgment on the policy and wisdom of the "act," pleaded its lawfulness. There were only two ex-

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\*A contraction for "consolidated annuities," a British governmental security.—*Ed.*

†Charles F. Adams. See biographical notes.—*Ed.*



ceptions to the general tenor of the London press. The Tory-scribblers of *The Morning Herald* and *The Standard*, forming in fact one paper under different names, gave full vent to their savage satisfaction of having at last caught the "republicans" in a trap, and finding a *casus belli*,<sup>\*</sup> ready cut out. They were supported by but one other journal, *The Morning Chronicle*, which for years had tried to prolong its checkered existence by alternately selling itself to the poisoner Palmer<sup>†</sup> and the Tuileries. The excitement of the Exchange greatly subsided in consequence of the pacific tone of the leading London papers. On the same 28th of November, Commander Williams attended at the Admiralty, and reported the circumstances of the occurrence in the old Bahama Channel. His report, together with the written depositions of the officers on board the *Trent*, were at once submitted to the law officers of the Crown,<sup>‡</sup> whose opinion, late in the evening, was officially brought to the notice of Lord Palmerston, Earl Russell and other members of the government.

On the 29th of November there was to be remarked some slight change in the tone of the ministerial press. It became known that the law officers of the Crown, on a technical ground, had declared the proceedings of the frigate *San Jacinto* illegal, and that later in the day, the Cabinet summoned to a general council, had decided to send by next steamer to Lord Lyons instructions to conform to the opinion of the English law officers. Hence the excitement in the principal places of business, such as the Stock Exchange, Lloyd's, the Jerusalem, the Baltic, etc., set in with redoubled force, and was further stimulated by the news, that the projected shipments to America of saltpetre had been stopped on the previous day, and that on the 29th a general order was received at the Customs House prohibiting the exportation of this article to any country except under certain stringent conditions. The English funds further fell three-quarters, and at one time a real panic prevailed in all the stock markets, it having become impossible to transact any business in some securities, while in all descriptions a severe depression of prices occurred. In the afternoon a recovery in the stock market was due to several rumours, but principally to the report that Mr. Adams

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<sup>\*</sup>A cause justifying a war—*Ed*

<sup>†</sup>William Palmer (1824-56) poisoned his wife and brother in order to inherit their property, defended by the *Morning Chronicle* as "being of unsound mind"—*Ed*.

had expressed his opinion, that the act of the *San Jacinto* would be disavowed by the Washington Cabinet.

On the 30th November (today) all the London papers, with the single exception of *The Morning Star*, put the alternative of reparation by the Washington Cabinet or—war.

Having summed up the history of the events from the arrival of the *La Plata* to the present day, I shall now proceed to recording opinions. There were, of course, two points to be considered—on the one hand the law, on the other hand the policy of the seizure of the Southern Commissioners on board an English mail steamer.

As to the legal aspect of the affair, the first difficulty mooted by the Tory press and *The Morning Chronicle* was that the United States had never recognized the Southern secessionists as belligerents and consequently, could not claim belligerent rights in regard to them.

This quibble was at once disposed of by the Ministerial press itself. "We," said *The Times*, "have already recognized these Confederate States as a belligerent power, and we shall, when the time comes, recognize their government. Therefore we have imposed on ourselves all the duties and inconveniences of a power neutral between two belligerents." Hence whether or not the United States recognize the Confederates as belligerents, they have the right to insist upon England submitting to all the duties and inconveniences of a neutral in maritime warfare.

Consequently, with the exceptions mentioned, the whole London press acknowledges the right of the *San Jacinto* to overhaul, visit, and search the *Trent*, in order to ascertain whether she carried goods or persons belonging to the category of "contraband of war." *The Times* insinuation that the English law of decisions "was given under circumstances very different from those which now occur"; that "steamers did not then exist, and mail vessels, carrying letters wherein all the nations of the world have immediate interest, were unknown"; that "we (the English) were fighting for existence, and did in those days what we should not allow others to do," was not seriously thrown out. Palmerston's private *Moniteur*, the *Morning Post*, declared on the same day that mail steamers were simple merchantmen, not sharing the exemption from the right of search of men-of-war and transports. The right of search, on the part of the *San Jacinto*, was in point of fact conceded by the London press as well as

the law officers of the Crown. The objection that the *Trent*, instead of sailing from a belligerent to a belligerent port, was, on the contrary, bound from a neutral to a neutral port, fell to the ground by Lord Stowell's decision that the right of search is intended to ascertain the destination of a ship.

In the second instance, the question arose whether by firing a round shot across the bows of the *Trent*, and subsequently throwing a shell, bursting close to her, the *San Jacinto* had not violated the usage and courtesies appurtenant to the exercise of the right of visitation and search. It was generally conceded by the London press that since the details of the event have till now been only ascertained by the depositions of one of the parties concerned, no such minor question could influence the decision to be arrived at by the British government.

The right of search exercised by the *San Jacinto*, thus being conceded, what had she to look for? For *contraband of war* presumed to be conveyed by the *Trent*. What is *contraband of war*? Are the *dispatches* of the belligerent government *contraband of war*? Are the persons carrying those *dispatches* *contraband of war*? And, both questions being answered in the affirmative, do those *dispatches* and the bearers of them continue to be *contraband of war*, if found on a merchant ship bound from a neutral port to a neutral port? The London press admits that the decisions of the highest legal authorities on both sides of the Atlantic are so contradictory, and may be claimed with such appearance of justice for both the affirmative and the negative, that, at all events, a *prima facie* case is made out for the *San Jacinto*.

Concurrently with this prevalent opinion of the English press, the English Crown lawyers have altogether dropped the material question, and only taken up the formal question. They assert that the law of nations was not violated in *substance* but in *form* only. They have arrived at the conclusion that the *San Jacinto* failed in seizing on her own responsibility, the Southern Commissioners, instead of taking the *Trent* to a Federal port and submitting the question to a Federal Prize Court, no armed cruiser having a right to make itself a judge at sea. A violation in the *procedure* of the *San Jacinto* is,

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<sup>4</sup>A case established by evidence sufficient to raise a presumption of fact or to establish the fact in question unless successfully opposed—Ed

therefore, all that is imputed to her by the English Crown lawyers, who, in my opinion, are right in their conclusion. It might be easy to unearth precedents, showing England to have similarly trespassed on the formalities of maritime law, but violations of law can never be allowed to supplant the law itself.

The question may now be mooted, whether the reparation demanded by the English government—that is, the restitution of the Southern Commissioners—be warranted by an injury which the English themselves avow to be of *form* rather than of *substance*? A lawyer of the Temple,<sup>1</sup> in today's *Times*, remarks, in respect to this point:

If the case is not so clearly in our favour as that a decision in the American Court condemning the vessel would have been liable to be questioned by us as manifestly contrary to the laws of nations, then the irregularity of the American captain in allowing the *Trent* to proceed to Southampton, clearly redounded to the advantage of the British owners and the British passengers. Could we in such case find a ground of international quarrel in an error of procedure which in effect told in our own favour?

Still, if the American government must concede, as it seems to me, that Captain Wilkes has committed a violation of maritime law, whether formal or material, their fair fame and their interest ought alike to prevent them from nibbling at the terms of the satisfaction to be given to the injured party. They ought to remember that they do the work of the secessionists in embroiling the United States in a war with England, that such a war would be a godsend to Louis Bonaparte in his present difficulties, and would, consequently, be supported by all the official weight of France; and, lastly, that, what with the actual force under the command of the British on the North American and West Indian stations, what with the forces of the Mexican expedition, the English government would have at its disposal an overwhelming maritime power.<sup>2</sup>

As to the policy of the seizure in the Bahama Channel, the voice not only of the English, but of the European press is unanimous in expressions of bewilderment at the strange conduct of the American government, provoking such tremen-

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<sup>1</sup>A building in London formerly the dwelling of the Knights Templars now used for two groups of buildings consisting of two Inns of Court which have the right of calling persons to the degree of barrister—*Ed.*

dous international dangers, for gaining the bodies of Messrs Mason, Slidell & Co, while Messrs Yancey and Mann are strutting in London. *The Times* is certainly right in saying "Even Mr. Seward himself must know that the voices of these Southern Commissioners, sounding from their captivity, are a thousand times more eloquent in London and in Paris than they would have been if they had been heard at St. James and the Tuileries." The people of the United States, having magnanimously submitted to a curtailment of their own liberties in order to save their country, will certainly be no less ready to turn the tide of popular opinion in England by openly avowing, and carefully making up for, an international blunder the vindication of which might realize the boldest hopes of the rebels.

*New York Daily Tribune*, December 19, 1861.

## 6.

### PROGRESS OF FEELING IN ENGLAND

London, December 7, 1861.

THE friends of the United States on this side of the Atlantic anxiously hope that conciliatory steps will be taken by the Federal government. They do so not from a concurrence in the frantic crowing of the British press over a war incident, which, according to the English Crown lawyers themselves, resolves itself into a mere error of procedure, and may be summed up in the words that there has been a breach of international law, because Captain Wilkes, instead of taking the *Trent*, her cargo, her passengers and the Commissioners, did only take the Commissioners. Nor springs the anxiety of the well-wishers of the Great Republic from an apprehension lest, in the long run, it should not prove able to cope with England, although backed by the civil war; and, least of all, do they expect the United States to abdicate, even for a moment, and in a dark hour of trial, the proud position held by them in the council of nations. The motives that prompt them are of quite a different nature.

In the first instance, the business next in hand for the United States is to crush the rebellion and to restore the Union. The wish uppermost in the minds of the slavocracy and their

Northern tools was always to plunge the United States into a war with England. The first step of England as soon as hostilities broke out would be to recognize the Southern Confederacy, and the second to terminate the blockade. Secondly, no general, if not forced, will accept battle at the time and under the conditions chosen by his enemy. "A war with America," says *The Economist*, a paper deeply in Palmerston's confidence, "must always be one of the most lamentable incidents in the history of England, but if it is to happen, *the present is certainly the period at which it will do us the minimum of harm, and the only moment in our joint annals at which it would confer on us an incidental and partial compensation*" The very reason accounting for the eagerness of England to seize upon any decent pretext for war at this "only moment" ought to withhold the United States from forwarding such a pretext at this "only moment." You go not to war with the aim to do your enemy "*the minimum of harm,*" and, even to confer upon him by the war, "*an incidental and partial compensation*" The opportunity of the moment would all be on one side, on the side of your foe.

Is there any great strain of reasoning wanted to prove that an internal war raging in a state is the least opportune time for entering upon a foreign war? At every other moment the mercantile classes of Great Britain would have looked upon the war against the United States with the utmost horror. Now, on the contrary, a large and influential party of the mercantile community has for months been urging on the government to violently break the blockade, and thus provide the main branch of British industry with its raw material. The fear of a curtailment of the English export trade to the United States has lost its sting by the curtailment of that trade having already actually occurred. "They" (the Northern States), says *The Economist*, "are wretched customers, instead of good ones" The vast credit usually given by English commerce to the United States, principally by the acceptance of bills drawn from China and India, has been already reduced to scarcely a fifth of what it was in 1857. Last, not least, Decembrist France,\* bankrupt, paralyzed at home, beset with difficulty abroad, pounces upon an Anglo-

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\*The France of Napoleon III, derived from date, December 2, 1851, on which Louis Napoleon carried through a successful *coup d'état*.—Ed.

American war as a real godsend, and, in order to buy English support in Europe, will strain all her power to support "Perfidious Albion"† on the other side of the Atlantic. Read only the French newspapers. The pitch of indignation to which they have wrought themselves in their tender care for the "honour of England," their fierce diatribes as to the necessity on the part of England to revenge the outrage on the Union Jack, their vile denunciations of everything American, would be truly appalling, if they were not ridiculous and disgusting at the same time. Lastly, if the United States give way in this instance, they will not derogate one iota of their dignity. England has reduced her complaint to a mere *error of procedure*, a *technical blunder* of which she has made herself systematically guilty in all her maritime wars, but against which the United States have never ceased to protest, and which President Madison, in his message inaugurating the war of 1812, expatiated upon as one of the most shocking breaches of international law." If the United States may be defended in paying England with her own coin, will they be accused for magnanimously disavowing, on the part of a single American captain, acting on his own responsibility, what they always denounced as a systematic usurpation on the part of the British Navy? In point of fact, the gam of such a procedure would be all on the American side. England, on the one hand, would have acknowledged the right of the United States to capture and bring to adjudication before an American prize court every English ship employed in the service of the Confederacy. On the other hand, she would, once for all, before the eyes of the whole world, have practically resigned a claim which she was not brought to desist from either in the Peace of Ghent in 1814," or the transactions carried on between Lord Ashburton and Secretary Webster in 1842." The question then comes to this: Do you prefer to turn the "untoward event" to your own account, or, blinded by the passions of the moment, turn it to the account of your foes at home and abroad?

Since this day week, when I sent you my last letter, British consols have again lowered, the decline, compared with last Friday, amounting to two per cent, the present prices being 89¾ to ⅞ for money and to 90 to 1½ for the new account on the 9th of January. This quotation corresponds

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†Treacherous England.—Ed.

to the quotation of the British consols during the first two years of the Anglo-Russian War. This decline is altogether due to the warlike interpretation put upon the American papers conveyed by the last mail, to the exacerbating tone of the London press, whose moderation of two days' standing was but a feint, ordered by Palmerston, to the dispatch of troops for Canada, to the proclamation forbidding the export of arms and materials for gunpowder, and lastly, to the daily ostentatious statements concerning the formidable preparations for war in the docks and maritime arsenals.

Of one thing you may be sure, Palmerston wants a legal pretext for a war with the United States, but meets in the Cabinet councils with a most determinate opposition on the part of Messrs. Gladstone and Milner-Gibson, and, to a less degree, of Sir Cornwall Lewis. "The noble viscount" is backed by Russell, an abject tool in his hands, and the whole Whig coterie. If the Washington Cabinet should furnish the desired pretext, the present Cabinet will be sprung, to be supplanted by a Tory administration. The preliminary steps for such a change of scenery have been already settled between Palmerston and Disraeli. Hence the furious war-cry of *The Morning Herald* and *The Standard*, those hungry wolves howling at the prospect of the long missed crumbs from the public almoner.

Palmerston's designs may be shown up by calling into memory a few facts. It was he who insisted upon the proclamation, acknowledging the secessionists as belligerents, on the morning of the 14th of May, after he had been informed by telegraph from Liverpool that Mr Adams would arrive at London on the night of the 13th May. He, after a severe struggle with his colleagues, dispatched 3,000 men to Canada, an army ridiculous, if intended to cover a frontier of 1,500 miles, but a clever sleight-of-hand if the rebellion was to be cheered, and the Union to be irritated. He, many weeks ago, urged Bonaparte to propose a joint armed intervention "in the internecine struggle," supported that project in the Cabinet council, and failed only in carrying it by the resistance of his colleagues. He and Bonaparte then resorted to the Mexican intervention as a *pis aller*. That operation served two purposes, by provoking just resentment on the part of the Americans, and by simultaneously furnishing a pretext for

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\*Last resource.—*Ed.*



the dispatch of a squadron, ready, as the *Morning Post* has it, "to perform whatever duty the hostile conduct of the government of Washington may require us to perform in the waters of the Northern Atlantic."

At the time when that expedition was started, the *Morning Post*, together with *The Times* and the smaller fry of Palmerston's press slaves, said that it was a very fine thing, and a philanthropic thing into the bargain, because it would expose the slaveholding Confederacy to two fires—the anti-slavery North and the anti-slavery force of England and France. And what says the very same *Morning Post*, this curious compound of Jenkins<sup>+</sup> and Rodomonte,<sup>†</sup> of plush and swash, in its today's issue, on occasion of Jefferson Davis's address? "Hearken to the Palmerston oracle :

We must took to this intervention as one that may be in-  
operative during a considerable period of time, and while the Northern government is too distant to admit of its attitude entering materially into this question, the Southern Confederacy, on the other hand, stretches for a great distance along the frontier of Mexico, so as to render its friendly disposition to the authors of the insurrection of no slight consequence. The Northern government has invariably railed at our neutrality, but the Southern with statesmanship and moderation has recognised in it all that we could do for either party; and whether with a view to our transactions in Mexico, or to our relations with the Cabinet at Washington, the friendly forbearance of the Southern Confederacy is an important point in our favour.

I may remark that the *Nord* of December 3—a Russian paper, and consequently a paper initiated into Palmerston's designs—insinuates that the Mexican expedition was from the first set on foot, not for its ostensible purpose, but for a war against the United States.

Gen. Scott's letter<sup>33</sup> had produced such a beneficent reaction in public opinion, and even on the London Stock Exchange, that the conspirators of Downing Street‡ and the Tuileries found it necessary to let loose the *Patrie*, stating with all the airs of knowledge derived from official sources, that the seizure of the Southern Commissioners from the *Trent* was directly authorized by the Washington Cabinet.

*New York Daily Tribune*, December 25, 1861

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<sup>33</sup>Popular name for a liveried footman or manservant.—*Ed.*

<sup>†</sup>King of Algiers, a character in the poem *Orlando Furioso* of Ariosto, a personification of boastfulness.—*Ed.*

<sup>‡</sup>The street on which the residence of the Prime Minister is situated.—*Ed.*

## ENGLISH PUBLIC OPINION

London, January 11, 1862.

THE news of the pacific solution of the Trent conflict was, by the bulk of the English people, saluted with an exultation proving unmistakably the unpopularity of the apprehended war and the dread of its consequences. It ought never to be forgotten in the United States that at least the *working classes* of England, from the commencement to the termination of the difficulty, have never forsaken them. To them it was due to that, despite the poisonous stimulants daily administered by a venal and reckless press, not one single public war meeting could be held in the United Kingdom during all the period that peace trembled in the balance. The only war meeting convened on the arrival of the *La Plata*, in the cotton salesroom of the Liverpool Stock Exchange, was a corner meeting where the cotton jobbers had it all to themselves. Even at Manchester, the temper of the working classes was so well understood that an isolated attempt at the convocation of a war meeting was almost as soon abandoned as thought of.

Wherever public meetings took place in England, Scotland or Ireland,<sup>27</sup> they protested against the rabid war-cries of the press, against the sinister designs of the government, and declared for a pacific settlement of the pending question. In this regard, the two last meetings held, the one at Paddington, London, the other at Newcastle-upon-Tyne, are characteristic. The former meeting applauded Mr Washington Wilkes' argumentation that England was not warranted in finding fault with the seizure of the Southern Commissioners; while the Newcastle meeting almost unanimously carried the resolution—firstly, that the Americans had only made themselves guilty of a *lawful* exercise of the right of search and seizure; secondly, that the captain of the *Trent* ought to be punished for his violation of English neutrality, as proclaimed by the Queen. In ordinary circumstances, the conduct of the British workingmen might have been anticipated from the natural sympathy the popular classes all over the world ought to feel for the only popular government in the world.

Under the present circumstances, however, when a great

portion of the British working classes directly and severely suffers under the consequences of the Southern blockade;<sup>4</sup> when another part is indirectly smitten by the curtailment of the American commerce, owing, as they are told to the selfish "protective policy" of the Republicans; when the only remaining democratic weekly, Reynolds' paper,<sup>5</sup> has sold itself to Messrs. Yancey and Mann, and week after week exhausts its horse-powers of foul language in appeals to the working classes to urge the government, for their own interests, to war with the Union—under such circumstances, simple justice requires to pay a tribute to the sound attitude of the British working classes, the more so when contrasted with the hypocritical, bullying, cowardly, and stupid conduct of the official and well-to-do John Bull

What a difference in this attitude of the people from what it had assumed at the time of the Russian complication! Then *The Times*, the [*Morning*] *Post*, and the other yellow plushes of the London press, whined for peace, to be rebuked by tremendous war meetings all over the country. Now they have howled for war, to be answered by peace meetings denouncing the liberticide schemes and the pro-slavery sympathy of the government. The grimaces cut by the augurs of public opinion at the news of the pacific solution of the *Trent* case are really amusing.

In the first place, they must needs congratulate themselves upon the dignity, commonsense, goodwill, and moderation, daily displayed by them for the whole interval of a month. They were moderate for the first two days after the arrival of the *La Plata*, when Palmerston felt uneasy whether any legal pretext for a quarrel was to be picked. But hardly had the crown lawyers hit upon a legal quibble, when they opened a chaivari unheard of since the anti-Jacobin war.<sup>10</sup> The dispatches of the English government left Queenstown in the beginning of December. No official answer from Washington could possibly be looked for before the commencement of January. The new incidents arising in the interval told all in favour of the Americans. The tone of the trans-Atlantic press, although the *Nashville* affair<sup>10</sup> might have roused its passions, was calm. All facts ascertained concurred to show that Captain Wilkes had acted on his own

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<sup>5</sup>Reynold's Weekly Newspaper.—Ed

hook The position of the Washington government was delicate. If it resisted the English demands, it would complicate the civil war by a foreign war. If it gave way, it might damage its popularity at home, and appear to cede to pressure from abroad. And the government thus placed, carried, 'at the same time, a war which must enlist the warmest sympathies of every man, 'not a confessed ruffian, on its side.

Common prudence, conventional decency, ought, therefore, to have dictated to the London press, at least for the time separating the English demand from the American reply, to abstain anxiously from every word calculated to heat passion, breed ill-will, complicate the difficulty. But no! That "irrepressibly mean and grovelling" press, as William Cobbett, and he was a *connoisseur*, calls it, really boasted of having, when in fear of the compact power of the United States, humbly submitted to the accumulated slights and insults of pro-slavery administration for almost half a century, while now, with the savage exultation of cowards, they panted for taking their revenge on the Republican administration, distracted by a civil war. The record of mankind chronicles no self-avowed infamy like this.

One of the yellow-plushes, Palmerston's private *Moniteur*—the *Morning Post*—finds itself arraigned on a most ugly charge from the American papers. John Bull has never been informed—on information carefully withheld from him by the oligarchs that lord it over him—that Mr. Seward, without awaiting Russell's dispatch, had disavowed any participation of the Washington Cabinet in the act of Captain Wilkes. Mr. Seward's dispatch arrived at London on December 19. On the 20th December, the rumour of this "secret" spread on the Stock Exchange. On the 21st, the yellow-plush of the *Morning Post* stepped forward to herald gravely that "the dispatch in question does not in any way whatever refer to the outrage on our mail packet."

In *The Daily News*, *The Morning Star*, and other London journals, you will find yellow-plush pretty sharply handled, but you will not learn from them what people out of door say. They say that the *Morning Post* and *The Times*, like the *Patrie* and the *Pays*, dupe the public not only to mislead them politically, but to fleece them in the monetary line on the Stock Exchange, in the interest of their patrons.

The brazen *Times*, fully aware that during the whole crisis it had compromised nobody but itself, and given another

proof of the hollowness of its pretensions of influencing the real people of England, plays today a trick which here, at London, only works upon the laughing muscles, but on the other side of the Atlantic might be misinterpreted 'The "popular classes" of London, the "mob," as the yellow-plush call them, have given unmistakable signs—have even hinted in newspapers—that they should consider it an exceedingly seasonable joke to treat Mason (by the by, a distant relative of Palmerston,—since the original Mason had married a daughter of Sir W Temple), Slidell & Co. with the same demonstrations Hainau received on his visit at Barclay's brewery.\* *The Times* stands aghast at the mere idea of such a shocking incident, and how does it try to parry it? It admonishes the people of England not to overwhelm Mason, Slidell & Co with any sort of public ovation. *The Times* knows that its article of today will form the laughing-stock of all the tap-rooms of London. But never mind! People on the other side of the Atlantic may, perhaps, fancy that the magnanimity of *The Times* has saved them from the affront of public ovation to Mason, Slidell & Co., while in point of fact, *The Times* only intends saving those gentlemen from public insult!

So long as the *Treat* affair was undecided, *The Times*, the [Morning] Post, The [Morning] Herald, The Economist, The Saturday Review, in fact the whole of the fashionable, hireling press of London, had tried its utmost to persuade John Bull that the Washington government, even if it willed, would prove unable to keep the peace, because the Yankee mob would not allow it, and because the Federal government was a mob government. Facts have now given them the lie direct. Do they now atone for their malignant slanders against the American people? Do they at least confess the error which yellow-plush, in presuming to judge of the acts of a free people, could not but commit? By no means. They now unanimously discover that the American government, in not anticipating England's demands, and not surrendering the Southern traitors as soon as they were caught, missed a great occasion, and deprive its present concession of all merit. Indeed, yellow-plush! Mr. Seward disavowed the act of Wilkes

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In 1850, Hainau, the reactionary Austrian general, visited Barclay's factory and was given a flogging by the angry London workers—Ed

before the arrival of the English demands, and at once declared himself willing to enter upon a conciliatory course; and what did you do on similar occasions? When, on the pretext of impressing English sailors on board American ships—a pretext not at all connected with maritime belligerent rights, but a downright, monstrous usurpation against all international law—the *Leopard* fired its broadside at the *Chesapeake*, killed six, wounded twenty-one of her sailors, and seized the pretended Englishmen on board the *Chesapeake*, what did the English government do? That outrage was perpetrated on the 22nd of June, 1807. The real satisfaction, the surrender of the sailors, etc., was only offered on November 8, 1812, five years later. The British government, it is true, disavowed at once the act of Admiral Berkeley, as Mr. Seward did in regard to Captain Wilkes; but, to punish the Admiral, it removed him from an inferior to a superior rank. England, in proclaiming her Orders in Council,<sup>4</sup> distinctly confessed that they were outrages on the rights of neutrals in general, and of the United States in particular; that they were forced upon her as measures of retaliation against Napoleon, and that she would feel but too glad to revoke them whenever Napoleon should revoke his encroachments on neutral rights. Napoleon did revoke them, as far as the United States were concerned, in the Spring of 1810. England persisted in her avowed outrage on the maritime rights of America. Her resistance lasted from 1806 to 23rd of June, 1812—after, on the 18th of June, the United States had declared war against England. England abstained, consequently, in this case for six years, not from atoning for a confessed outrage, but from discounting it. 'And this people talk of the magnificent occasion missed by the American government! Whether in the wrong or in the right, it was a cowardly act on the part of the British government to back a complaint grounded on pretended technical blunder, and a mere error of procedure by an ultimatum, by a demand for the surrender of the prisoners. The American government might have reasons to accede to that demand, it could have none to anticipate it.

By the present settlement of the *Trent* collision, the question underlying the whole dispute, and likely to again occur—belligerent rights of a maritime power against neutrals—has not been settled. I shall, with your permission, try to survey the whole question in a subsequent letter. For the present, allow me to add that, in my opinion, Messrs Mason and Shdell

have done great service to the Federal government. There was an influential war party in England, which, what for commercial, what for political reasons, showed itself eager for a fray with the United States. The *Trent* affair put that party to the test. It has failed. The war passion has been discontented on a minor issue, the steam has been let off, the vociferous fury of the oligarchy has raised the suspicions of English democracy, the large British interests connected with the United States have made a stand, the true character of the Civil War has been brought home to the working classes, and last, not least, the dangerous period when Palmerston rules single-handed without being checked by Parliament, is rapidly drawing to an end. That was the only time in which an English war for the slavocrats might have been hazarded. It is now out of question.

*New York Daily Tribune*, February 1, 1862.

# KARL MARX AND FREDERICK ENGELS

## PART TWO

### ARTICLES FROM THE VIENNA PRESSE (1861-1862)

#### 1.

#### THE NORTH AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

*The war, of which the great North American Republic has been the seat for more than half a year, already begins to react on Europe. France, which loses a market for her commodities through these troubles, and England, whose industry is threatened with partial ruin through stagnation in the export of cotton from the slave states, follow the development of the Civil War in the United States with feverish intensity. Whilst up to the most recent date Europe, indeed, the Americas themselves, still did not despair of the possibility of a peaceful solution, the war assumes ever greater dimensions, spreads more and more over the vast territories of North America and threatens, the longer it lasts, this part of the world, too, with a crisis. First England and France will be seized and shaken thereby, and the panic on the English and French markets will in like manner react on the rest of the European markets. Apart from the historical aspect, we have, therefore, a very positive interest in getting our bearings in regard to the causes, the significance and the import of the trans-Atlantic events. From London we have received a first communication on the North American Civil War from one of the most significant German publicists, who knows Anglo-American relations from long years of observation. In the measure that events on the other side of the ocean develop, we shall be in a position to present communications, deriving from the same competent pen, which will fix the events in their main points.\**

London, October 20, 1861

FOR MONTHS the leading weekly and daily papers of the London press have reiterated the same litany on the American Civil War. While they insult the free states of the North, they anxiously defend themselves against the suspicion of sympathizing with the slave states of the South. In fact, they

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The introductory note is written by the editor of *Die Presse*—Ed



continually write two articles: one article, in which they attack the North, and another article, in which they excuse their attacks on the North. *Qui s'excuse s'accuse*.\*

In essence the extenuating arguments read: The war between the North and South is a tariff war. The war is, further, not for any principle, does not touch the question of slavery and in fact turns on Northern lust for sovereignty. Finally, even if justice is on the side of the North, does it not remain a vain endeavour to want to subjugate eight million Anglo-Saxons by force? Would not the separation of the South release the North from all connection with Negro slavery and assure to it, with its twenty million inhabitants and its vast territory, a higher, hitherto scarcely dreamt of, development? Accordingly must not the North welcome secession as a happy event, instead of wanting to put it down by a bloody and futile civil war?

Point by point we will probe the *plaidoyer*† of the English press.

The war between North and South—so runs the first excuse—is a mere tariff war, a war between a protection system and a free trade system, and England naturally stands on the side of free trade. Shall the slaveowner enjoy the fruits of slave labour in their entirety or shall he be cheated of a portion of these by the protectionists of the North? That is the question which is at issue in this war. It was reserved for *The Times* to make this brilliant discovery. *The Economist*, *The Examiner*, *The Saturday Review* and *tutti quanti*‡ expounded the theme further. It is characteristic of this discovery that it was made not in Charleston, but in London. Naturally, in America every one knew that from 1846 to 1861 a free trade system prevailed, and that Representative Morrill carried his protectionist tariff in Congress only in 1861, after the rebellion had already broken out. Secession, therefore, did not take place because the Morrill tariff had gone through Congress, but, at most, the Morrill tariff went through Congress because secession had taken place. When South Carolina had her first attack of secession in 1831, the protectionist tariff of 1828 served her, to be sure, as a pretext, but also only as a pretext, as is known from a statement of General

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\*He who excuses himself accuses himself.—*Ed*

†Address of counsel for the defence, i.e., plea.—*Ed*.

‡All such.—*Ed*.

Jackson. This time, however, the old pretext has in fact not been repeated. In the Secession Congress at Montgomery all reference to the tariff question was avoided, because the cultivation of sugar in Louisiana, one of the most influential Southern States, depends entirely on protection.

But, the London press pleads further, the war of the United States is nothing but a war for the maintenance of the Union by force. The Yankees cannot make up their minds to strike fifteen stars from their standard. They want to cut a colossal figure on the world stage. Yes, it would be different, if the war was waged for the abolition of slavery! The question of slavery, however, as, among others, *The Saturday Review* categorically declares, has absolutely nothing to do with this war.

It is above all to be remembered that the war did not emanate from the North, but from the South. The North finds itself on the defensive. For months it had quietly looked on, while the secessionists appropriated to themselves the Union's forts, arsenals, shipyards, customs houses, pay offices, ships and supplies of arms, insulted its flag and took prisoner bodies of its troops. Finally the secessionists resolved to force the Union government out of its passive attitude by a sensational act of war, and *solely for this reason* proceeded to the bombardment of Fort Sumter near Charleston. On April 11 (1861) their General Beauregard and learnt in a parley with Major Anderson, the commander of Fort Sumter, that the fort was only supplied with provisions for three days more and accordingly must be peacefully surrendered after this period. In order to forestall this peaceful surrender, the secessionists opened the bombardment early on the following morning (April 12), which brought about the fall of the place in a few hours. News of this had hardly been telegraphed to Montgomery, the seat of the Secession Congress, when War Minister Walter publicly declared in the name of the new Confederacy: "No man can say where *the war opened today* will end" At the same time he prophesied "that before the first of May the flag of the Southern Confederacy would wave from the dome of the old Capitol in Washington and within a short time perhaps also from the Faneuil Hall in Boston."<sup>48</sup> Only now ensued the proclamation in which Lincoln summoned 75,000 men to the protection of the Union. The bombardment of Fort Sumter cut off the only possible constitutional way out, namely, the summoning of a general conven-

tion of the American people, as Lincoln had proposed in his inaugural address." For Lincoln there now remained only the choice of fleeing from Washington, evacuating Maryland and Delaware and surrendering Kentucky, Missouri and Virginia, or of answering war with war

The question of the principle of the American Civil War is answered by the battle slogan with which the South broke the peace. Stephens, the Vice-President of the Southern Confederacy, declared in the Secession Congress, that what essentially distinguished the Constitution newly hatched at Montgomery from the Constitution of the Washingtons and Jeffersons was that now for the first time slavery was recognized as an institution good in itself, and as the foundation of the whole state edifice, whereas the revolutionary fathers, men steeped in the prejudices of the eighteenth century, had treated slavery as an evil imported from England and to be eliminated in the course of time. Another matador of the South, Mr. Spratt, cried out: "For us it is a question of the foundation of a great slave republic" If, therefore, it was indeed only in defence of the Union that the North drew the sword, had not the South already declared that the continuance of slavery was no longer compatible with the continuance of the Union?

Just as the bombardment of Fort Sumter gave the signal for the opening of the war, the election victory of the Republican Party of the North, the election of Lincoln as President, gave the signal for secession. On November 6, 1860, Lincoln was elected. On November 8, 1860, it was telegraphed from South Carolina: "Secession regarded here as an accomplished fact", on November 10 the legislature of Georgia occupied itself with secession plans, and on November 15 a special session of the legislature of Mississippi was fixed to take secession into consideration. But Lincoln's victory was itself only the result of a split in the *Democratic* camp. During the election struggle the Democrats of the North concentrated their votes on Douglas, the Democrats of the South concentrated their votes on Breckinridge, and to this splitting of the Democratic votes the Republican Party owed its victory.<sup>43</sup> Whence came, on the one hand, the preponderance of the Republican Party in the North? Whence came, on the other hand, the disunion *within* the Democratic Party, whose members, North and South, had operated in conjunction for more than half a century?

Under the presidency of Buchanan the sway that the South

had gradually usurped over the Union through its alliance with the Northern Democrats, attained its zenith. The last Continental Congress of 1787 and the first Constitutional Congress of 1789-1790 had legally excluded slavery from all Territories of the republic northwest of the Ohio. (Territories, as is known, is the name given to the colonies lying within the United States themselves that have not yet attained the level of population constitutionally prescribed for the formation of autonomous states.) The so-called Missouri Compromise, (1820),<sup>46</sup> in consequence of which Missouri entered the ranks of the United States as a slave state, excluded slavery from every remaining Territory north of 36 degrees 30 minutes latitude and west of Missouri. By this compromise the slavery area was advanced several degrees of longitude, whilst, on the other hand, a geographical line setting bounds to future propaganda for it seemed quite definitely drawn. This geographical barrier, in its turn, was thrown down in 1854 by the so-called Kansas-Nebraska Bill,<sup>47</sup> the originator of which was St[eph]en A. Douglas, then leader of the Northern Democrats. The Bill, which passed both Houses of Congress, repealed the Missouri Compromise, placed slavery and freedom on the same footing, commanded the Union government to treat them both with equal indifference and left it to the sovereignty of the people, that is, the majority of the settlers, to decide whether or not slavery was to be introduced in a Territory. Thus, for the first time in the history of the United States, every geographical and legal limit to the extension of slavery in the Territories was removed. Under this new legislation the hitherto free Territory of New Mexico, a Territory five times larger than the State of New York, was transformed into a slave Territory, and the area of slavery was extended from the border of the Mexican Republic to 38 degrees north latitude. In 1859 New Mexico received a slave code that vies with the statute-books of Texas and Alabama in barbarity. Nevertheless, as the census of 1860 proves, among some hundred thousand inhabitants New Mexico does not yet number half a hundred slaves. It had therefore sufficed for the South to send some adventurers with a few slaves over the border, and then with the help of the central government, its officials and contractors to drum together a sham popular representation in New Mexico, which imposed slavery on the Territory and with it the rule of the slaveholders.

However, this convenient method did not prove applicable

an other Territories. The South accordingly went a step further and appealed from Congress to the Supreme Court of the United States. This Supreme Court, which numbers nine judges, five of whom belong to the South, had been long the most willing tool of the slaveholders. It decided in 1857, in the notorious *Dred Scott* case,<sup>48</sup> that every American citizen possesses the right to take with him into any Territory any property recognized by the Constitution. The Constitution recognizes slaves as property and obliges the Union government to protect this property. Consequently, on the basis of the Constitution, slaves could be forced to labour in the Territories by their owners, and so every individual slaveholder is entitled to introduce slavery into hitherto free Territories against the will of the majority of the settlers. The right to exclude slavery was taken from the Territorial legislatures and the duty to protect pioneers of the slave system was imposed on Congress and the Union government.

If the Missouri Compromise of 1820 had extended the geographical boundary-line of slavery in the Territories, if the Kansas-Nebraska Bill of 1854 had wiped out every geographical boundary-line and set up a political barrier instead, the will of the majority of the settlers, then the Supreme Court of the United States, by its decision of 1857, tore down even this political barrier and transformed all the Territories of the republic, present and future, from places for the cultivation of free states into places for the cultivation of slavery.

At the same time, under Buchanan's government the severer law on the surrendering of fugitive slaves enacted in 1850<sup>49</sup> was ruthlessly carried out in the states of the North. To play the part of slave-catchers for the Southern slaveholders appeared to be the constitutional calling of the North. On the other hand, in order as far as possible to hinder the colonization of the Territories by free settlers, the slaveholders' party frustrated all the so-called free-soil measures, *i e.*, measures which were to secure to the settlers a definite amount of uncultivated state land free of charge.<sup>50</sup>

In the foreign, as in the domestic, policy of the United States, the interest of the slaveholders served as the guiding star. Buchanan had in fact purchased the office of President through the issue of the Ostend Manifesto in which the acquisition of Cuba, whether by robbery or by force of arms, is proclaimed as the great task of national politics.<sup>51</sup> Under

his government northern Mexico was already divided among American land speculators, who impatiently awaited the signal to fall on Chihuahua, Coahuila and Sonora.<sup>53</sup> The restless, piratical expeditions of the filibusters against the states of Central America<sup>54</sup> were directed no less from the White House at Washington. In the closest connection with this foreign policy, whose manifest purpose was conquest of new territory for the extension of slavery and the rule of the slaveholders, stood the *reopening of the slave trade*,<sup>55</sup> secretly supported by the Union government. St[ephens] A Douglas himself declared in 1859: During the last year more Negroes have been indentured from Africa than ever before in any single year, even at the time when the slave trade was still legal. The number of slaves imported in the last year has amounted to fifteen thousand.

Armed propaganda of slavery abroad was the avowed aim of the national policy; the Union had in fact become the slave of the three hundred thousand slaveholders who held sway over the South. A series of compromises, which the South owed to its alliance with the Northern Democrats, had led to this result. On this alliance all the attempts, periodically repeated since 1817, at resistance to the ever increasing encroachments of the slaveholders had hitherto suffered shipwreck. At length here came a turning point.

For hardly had the Kansas-Nebraska Bill gone through, which wiped out the geographical boundary-line of slavery and made its introduction into new Territories subject to the will of the majority of the settlers, when armed emissaries of the slaveholders, border rabble from Missouri and Arkansas, with bowie-knife in one hand and revolver in the other, fell upon Kansas and by the most unheard-of atrocities sought to dislodge her settlers from the Territory colonized by them. These raids were supported by the central government at Washington. Hence a tremendous reaction. Throughout the North, but particularly in the Northwest, a relief organization was formed to support Kansas with men, arms and money. Out of this relief organization arose the Republican Party, which therefore owes its origin to the struggle for Kansas. After the attempt to transform Kansas into a *slave Territory* by force of arms had failed, the South sought to achieve the same result by way of political intrigues. Buchanan's government, in particular, exerted its utmost efforts to relegate Kansas into the ranks of the United States as a *slave state*

with a slavery constitution imposed on it. Hence renewed struggle, this time mainly conducted in Congress at Washington. Even St[ephen] A. Douglas, the chief of the Northern Democrats, now (1857-1858) entered the lists against the government and its allies of the South, because imposition of a slave constitution would contradict the principle of sovereignty of the settlers passed in the Nebraska Bill of 1854. Douglas, Senator for Illinois, a northwestern state, would naturally have lost all his influence if he wanted to concede to the South the right to steal by force of arms or through acts of Congress Territories colonized by the North<sup>55</sup> As the struggle for Kansas, therefore, called the *Republican Party* into being, it occasioned at the same time the first split within the *Democratic Party* itself.

The Republican Party put forward its first platform for the presidential election in 1856. Although its candidate, John Fremont, was not victorious, the huge number of votes that were cast for him at any rate proved the rapid growth of the Party, particularly in the Northwest.<sup>56</sup> In their second National Convention for the presidential election (May 17, 1860), the Republicans repeated their platform of 1856, only enriched by some additions. Its principle contents were the following: Not a foot of fresh territory is further conceded to slavery. The filibustering policy abroad must cease. The reopening of the slave trade is stigmatized. Finally, free-soil laws are to be enacted for the furtherance of free colonization.

The vitally important point in this platform was that not a foot of fresh terrain was conceded to slavery; rather it was to remain once and for all confined to the limits of the states where it already legally existed.<sup>57</sup> Slavery was thus to be formally interned, but continual expansion of territory and continual extension of slavery beyond their old limits is a law of life for the slave states of the Union.

The cultivation of the Southern export articles, cotton, tobacco, sugar etc, carried on by slaves, is only remunerative as long as it is conducted with large gangs of slaves, on a mass scale and on wide expanses of a naturally fertile soil, that requires only simple labour. Intensive cultivation, which depends less on fertility of the soil than on investment of capital, intelligence and energy of labour, is contrary to the nature of slavery. Hence the rapid transformation of states like Maryland and Virginia, which formerly employed slaves on the production of export articles, into states which raised

slaves in order to export these slaves into the deep South. Even in South Carolina, where the slaves form four-sevenths of the population, the cultivation of cotton has for years been almost completely stationary in consequence of the exhaustion of the soil. Indeed, by force of circumstances South Carolina is already transformed in part into a slave-raising state, since it already sells slaves to the states of the extreme South and Southwest for four million dollars yearly. As soon as this point is reached, the acquisition of new Territories becomes necessary, in order that one section of the slaveholders may equip new, fertile landed estates with slaves and in order that by this means a new market for slave-raising, therefore for the sale of slaves, may be created for the section left behind it. It is, for example, indubitable that without the acquisition of Louisiana, Missouri and Arkansas by the United States, slavery in Virginia and Maryland would long ago have been wiped out. In the Secessionist Congress at Montgomery, Senator Toombs, one of the spokesmen of the South, has strikingly formulated the economic law that commands the constant expansion of the territory of slavery. "In fifteen years more," said he, "without a great increase in slave territory, either the slaves must be permitted to flee from the whites, or the whites must flee from the slaves."

As is known, the representation of the individual states in Congress depends, for the House of Representatives, on the number of persons constituting their respective populations. As the populations of the free states grow far more quickly than those of the slave states, the number of the Northern Representatives was bound very rapidly to overtake that of the Southern. The real seat of the political power of the South is accordingly transferred more and more to the American Senate, where every state, be its population great or small, is represented by two Senators. In order to maintain its influence in the Senate and, through the Senate, its hegemony over the United States, the South therefore required a continual formation of new slave states. This, however, was only possible through conquest of foreign lands, as in the case of Texas, or through the transformation of the Territories belonging to the United States first into slave Territories and later into slave states, as in the case of Missouri, Arkansas, etc. John Calhoun, whom the slaveholders admire as their statesman *par excellence*,\* stated as early as February 19,

\*Pre-eminent.—Ed



1847, in the Senate, that the Senate alone put a balance of power into the hands of the South, that extension of the slave territory was necessary to preserve this equilibrium between South and North in the Senate, and that the attempts of the South at the creation of new slave states by force were accordingly justified.

Finally, the number of actual slaveholders in the South of the Union does not amount to more than three hundred thousand, a narrow oligarchy that is confronted with many millions of so-called poor whites, whose number constantly grew through concentration of landed property and whose condition is only to be compared with that of the Roman plebeians in the period of Rome's extreme decline. Only by acquisition and the prospect of acquisition of new Territories, as well as by filibustering expeditions, is it possible to square the interests of these "poor whites" with those of the slaveholders, to give their turbulent longings for deeds a harmless direction and to tame them with the prospect of one day becoming slaveholders themselves.

A strict confinement of slavery within its old terrain, therefore, was bound according to economic law to lead to its gradual effacement, in the political sphere to annihilate the hegemony that the slave states exercised through the Senate, and finally to expose the slaveholding oligarchy within its own states to threatening peril from the side of the "poor whites." With the principle that any further extension of slave Territories was to be prohibited by law, the Republicans therefore attacked the rule of the slaveholders at its root. The Republican election victory was accordingly bound to lead to the open struggle between North and South. Meanwhile, this election victory, as already mentioned, was itself conditioned by the split in the Democratic camp.

The Kansas struggle had already called forth a split between the slave party and the Democrats of the North allied to it. With the presidential election of 1860, the same strife now broke out again in a more general form. The Democrats of the North, with Douglas as their candidate, made the introduction of slavery into Territories dependent on the will of the majority of the settlers. The slaveholders' party, with Breckinridge as their candidate, maintained that the Constitution of the United States, as the Supreme Court had also declared, brought slavery legally in its train: and by itself slavery was already legal in all Territories and re-

quired no spécial naturalization. Whilst, therefore, the Republicans prohibited any increase of slave Territories, the Southern party laid claim to all Territories of the republic as legally warranted domains. What they had attempted by way of example with regard to Kansas, to force slavery on a Territory through the central government against the will of the settlers themselves, they now set up as law for all the Territories of the Union. Such a concession lay beyond the power of the Democratic leaders and would merely have occasioned the desertion of their army to the Republican camp. On the other hand, Douglas' "settlers' sovereignty" could not satisfy the slaveholders' party. What it wanted to effect had to be effected within the next four years under the new President, could only be effected by means of the central government and brooked no further delay. It did not escape the slaveholders that a new power had arisen, the Northwest, whose population, having almost doubled between 1850 and 1860, was already pretty well equal to the white population of the slave states<sup>58</sup>—a power that was not inclined either by tradition, temperament or mode of life to let itself be dragged from compromise to compromise in the manner of the old Northern states. The Union was still of value to the South only so far as it handed over the Federal power to it as the means of carrying out the slave policy. If not, then it was better to make the break now than to look on at the development of the Republican Party and the upsurge of the Northwest four years longer, and begin the struggle under more unfavourable conditions. The slaveholders' party therefore played *va banque*<sup>1\*</sup>. When the Democrats of the North declined to go on playing the part of the "poor whites" of the South, the South procured Lincoln the victory by splitting the vote, and then took this victory as a pretext for drawing the sword from the scabbard.

The whole movement was and is based, as one sees, on the *slave question*: Not in the sense of whether the slaves within the existing slave states should be emancipated or not, but whether the twenty million free men of the North should subordinate themselves any longer to an oligarchy of three hundred thousand slaveholders; whether the vast Territories of the republic should be planting-places for free states or for slavery; finally, whether the national policy of

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\*That is, staked all on a single card.—*Ed.*

the Union should take armed propaganda of slavery in Mexico, Central and South America as its device. In another article we will probe the assertion of the London press that the North must sanction secession as the most favourable and only possible solution of the conflict.

*Die Presse*, October 25, 1861.

2

THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES

*We have received from our London correspondent a fresh communication on the events in North America, in which the motives by which the secessionist South is guided are represented in an entirely new light. We will let our informant speak for himself.*

"LET him go, he is not worth thine ire!"<sup>†</sup> Again and again English statesmanship—recently through the mouth of Lord John Russell—cries to the North of the United States this counsel of Leporello to Don Juan's<sup>10</sup> deserted love. •If the North lets the South go, it then frees itself from any admixture of slavery, from its historical original sin, and creates the basis of a new and higher development.

In reality, if North and South formed two autonomous countries, like, perhaps England and Hanover, their separation would then be no more difficult than was the separation of England and Hanover. "The South," however, is neither a territory strictly detached from the North geographically, nor a moral unity. It is not a country at all, but a battle slogan.

The counsel of an amicable separation presupposes that the Southern Confederacy, although it assumed the offensive in the Civil War, at least wages it for defensive purposes. It is believed that the issue for the slaveholders' party is merely one of uniting the Territories it has hitherto dominated into an autonomous group of states and withdrawing from the supreme authority of the Union. Nothing could be more false: "*The South needs its entire territory.*" It will and must have it." With this battle-cry the secessionists fell upon

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<sup>1</sup>Introductory note by the editor of *Die Presse*—Ed.

<sup>†</sup>"*Lass ihn laufen, er ist Deines Zorns nicht wert!*"—Ed.

Kentucky By their "entire territory" they understand in the first place all the so-called *border states*—Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri and Arkansas Further, they lay claim to the entire territory south of the line that runs from the northwest corner of Missouri to the Pacific Ocean What the slaveholders, therefore, call the South, embraces more than three-quarters of the territory hitherto comprised by the Union A large part of the territory thus claimed is still in the possession of the Union and would first have to be conquered from it None of the so-called *border states*, however, not even those in the possession of the Confederacy, were ever *actual slave states*. Rather, they constitute that area of the United States in which the system of slavery and the system of free labour exist side by side and contend for mastery, the actual field of battle between South and North, between slavery and freedom. The war of the Southern Confederacy is, therefore, not a war of defence, but a war of conquest, a war of conquest for the extension and perpetuation of slavery.

The chain of mountains that begins in Alabama and stretches northwards to the Hudson River—the spinal column, as it were, of the United States—cuts the so-called South into three parts The mountainous country formed by the Alleghany Mountains with their two parallel ranges, the Cumberland Range to the west and the Blue [Ridge] Mountains to the east divides wedgelike the lowlands along the western shores of the Atlantic Ocean from the lowlands in the southern valleys of the Mississippi The two lowlands sundered by the mountainous country, with their vast rice swamps and far-flung cotton plantations, are the actual area of slavery. The long wedge of mountainous country driven into the heart of slavery, with its correspondingly clear atmosphere, an invigorating climate and a soil rich in coal, salt, lime-stone, iron ore, gold, in short every raw material necessary for a many-sided industrial development, is already for the most part a free country In accordance with its physical constitution, the soil here can only be cultivated with success by free small farmers Here the slave system vegetates only sporadically and never struck roots. In the largest part of the so-called *border states*, the dwellers on these highlands comprise the core of the free population, which in the interests of self-preservation already sides with the Northern party.

Let us consider the contested territory in detail.

Delaware, the northeasternmost of the border states, is factually and morally in the possession of the Union. All the attempts of the secessionists at forming even one faction favourable to them have from the beginning of the war suffered shipwreck on the unanimity of the population. The slave element of this state has long been in process of dying out. From 1850 to 1860 alone the number of slaves diminished by half, so that with a total population of 112,218 Delaware now numbers only 1,700 slaves. Nevertheless, Delaware is demanded by the Southern Confederacy and would in fact be militarily untenable for the North as soon as the South possesses itself of Maryland.

In Maryland itself the above-mentioned conflict between highlands and lowlands takes place. With a total population of 687,034 there are here 87,188 slaves. That the overwhelming majority of the population is on the side of the Union, the recent general elections to the Congress in Washington have again strikingly proved. The army of 30,000 Union troops, which holds Maryland at the moment, is not only to serve the army on the Potomac as a reserve, but, in particular, is also to hold the rebellious slaveowners in the interior of the state in check. For here a phenomenon manifests itself similar to what we see in other border states where the great mass of the people stands for the North and a numerically insignificant slaveholders' party for the South. What it lacks in numbers, the slaveholders' party makes up in the means of power that many years' possession of all state offices, hereditary preoccupation with political intrigue and concentration of great wealth in few hands have secured to it.

Virginia now forms the great cantonment where the main army of Secession and the main army of the Union confront one another. In the north-west highlands of Virginia the mass of slaves amounts to 15,000, whilst the twenty-times-larger free population for the greater part consists of free farmers. The eastern lowlands of Virginia, on the other hand, number well nigh half a million slaves. Raising Negroes and the sale of the Negroes in the Southern states form their principal source of income. As soon as the ringleaders of the lowlands had put through the secession ordinance by intrigues in the state legislature at Richmond and had in all haste opened the gates of Virginia to the Southern army, northwest Virginia seceded from the secession, formed a new state and under the banner of the Union now defends its territory arms in hand.

against the Southern invaders.

Tennessee, with 1,109,847 inhabitants, of whom 275,784 are slaves, finds itself in the hands of the Southern Confederacy, which has subjected the whole state to martial law and to a system of proscription which recalls the days of the Roman Triumvirate. When in the winter of 1861 the slaveholders proposed a general convention of the people that should give its vote on secession or non-secession, the majority of the people refused any convention, in order to cut off any pretext for the secession movement.<sup>61</sup> Later, when Tennessee was already militarily overrun and subjected to a system of terror by the Southern Confederacy, more than a third of the voters at the elections still declared themselves for the Union.<sup>62</sup> There, as in most of the border states, the mountainous country, east Tennessee, forms the real centre of resistance to the slaveholders' party. On June 17, 1861, a General Convention of the people of east Tennessee assembled in Greenville, declared itself for the Union, deputed the former governor of the state, Andrew Johnson, one of the most ardent Unionists, to the Senate in Washington and published a "declaration of grievances," which lays bare all the means of deception, intrigue and terror by which Tennessee has been "voted out" of the Union. Since then the secessionists have held east Tennessee in check by force of arms.

Similar relationships to those in West Virginia and east Tennessee are found in the north of Alabama, in northwest Georgia and in the north of North Carolina.

Further west, in the border state of Missouri, with 1,173,317 inhabitants and 114,985 slaves—the latter mostly concentrated in the northwestern area of the state—the people's convention of August 1861 decided for the Union.<sup>63</sup> Jackson, the governor of the state and the tool of the slaveholders' party, rebelled against the legislature of Missouri, was outlawed and now takes the lead of the armed hordes that fell upon Missouri from Texas, Arkansas and Tennessee, in order to bring her to her knees before the Confederacy and sever her bond with the Union by the sword. Next to Virginia, Missouri is at the present moment the main theatre of the Civil War.

New Mexico—not a State, but merely a Territory, into which twenty-five slaves were imported during Buchanan's presidency in order to send a slave constitution after them from Washington—has not craved the South, as even the lat-

ter concedes. But the South craves New Mexico and accordingly speewed an armed band of adventurers from Texas over the border. New Mexico has implored the protection of the Union government against these liberators.

It will have been observed that we lay particular emphasis on the numerical proportion of slaves to free men in the individual border states. This proportion is in fact decisive. It is the thermometer with which the vital fire of the slave system must be measured. The soul of the whole secession movement is South Carolina. It has 402,541 slaves and 301,271 free men. Mississippi, which has given the Southern Confederacy its dictator Jefferson Davis, comes second. It has 436,696 slaves and 354,699 free men. Alabama comes third, with 435,132 slaves and 529,164 free men.

The last of the contested border states, which we have still to mention, is Kentucky. Its recent history is particularly characteristic of the policy of the Southern Confederacy. Among 1,555,713 inhabitants Kentucky has 225,490 slaves. In three successive general elections by the people—in the winter of 1861, when elections to a congress of the border states were held, in June 1861 when the elections to the Congress at Washington took place, finally in August 1861 in the elections to the legislature of the State of Kentucky—an ever changing majority decided for the Union. On the other hand, Magoffin, the Governor of Kentucky, and all the high officials of the state are fanatical partisans of the slaveholders' party, as is Breckinridge, representative of Kentucky in the Senate at Washington, Vice-President of the United States under Buchanan, and candidate of the slaveholders' party in the presidential election of 1860. **Too weak to win Kentucky for secession**, the influence of the slaveholders' party was strong enough to make it amenable to a declaration of neutrality on the outbreak of war. The Confederacy recognized the neutrality as long as it served its purposes, as long as it was preoccupied with crushing the resistance in east Tennessee. Hardly was this end attained when it knocked at the gates of Kentucky with the butt end of a gun and the cry "*The South needs its entire territory. It will and must have it!*"

From the southwest and southeast its corps of free-booters simultaneously invaded the "neutral state." Kentucky awoke from its dream of neutrality, its legislature openly took sides with the Union, surrounded the traitorous Governor with a committee of public safety, called the people to arms,

outlawed Breckinridge and ordered the secessionists to evacuate the invaded territory. This was the signal for war. An army of the Southern Confederacy is moving on Louisville, while volunteers from Illinois, Indiana and Ohio flock hither to save Kentucky from the armed missionaries of slavery.

The attempts of the Confederacy to annex Missouri and Kentucky, for example, against the will of these states, prove the hollowness of the pretext that it is fighting for the rights of the individual states against the encroachments of the Union. On the individual states that it counts in the "South" it confers, to be sure, the right to separate from the Union, but by no means the right to remain in the Union.

Even the actual slave states, however much external war, internal military dictatorship and slavery give them everywhere the semblance of harmony, are nevertheless not without resistant elements. A striking example is Texas, with 180,388 slaves out of 601,039 inhabitants. The law of 1845, by virtue of which Texas entered the ranks of the United States as a slave state, entitled it to form not merely one, but five states out of its territory. The South would thereby have gained ten new votes, instead of two, in the American Senate, and increase in the number of its votes in the Senate was a main object of its policy at that time. From 1845 to 1860, however the slaveholders found it impracticable to cut up Texas, where the German population plays an important part, into even two states without giving the party of free labour the upper hand over the party of slavery in the second state.<sup>64</sup> This furnishes the best proof of the strength of the opposition to the slaveholding oligarchy in Texas itself.

Georgia is the largest and most populous of the slave states. It has 462,230 slaves in a total of 1,057,327 inhabitants, therefore nearly half the population. Nevertheless, the slaveholders' party has not so far succeeded in getting the Constitution imposed on the South at Montgomery sanctioned in Georgia by a general vote of the people.<sup>65</sup>

In the State Convention of Louisiana, meeting on March 22, 1861, at New Orleans, Roselius, the political veteran of the State, declared: "The Montgomery Constitution is not a constitution, but a conspiracy. It does not inaugurate a government of the people, but a *detestable and unrestricted oligarchy*. The people were not permitted to play any part in this matter. The Convention of Montgomery has dug the grave of political liberty, and now we are summoned to attend its



funeral "

For the oligarchy of three hundred thousand slaveholders utilized the Congress of Montgomery not only to proclaim the separation of the South from the North. It exploited it at the same time to revolutionize the internal constitutions of the slave states, to completely subjugate the section of the white population that had still maintained some independence under the protection and the democratic Constitution of the Union. Between 1856 and 1860 the political spokesmen, jurists, moralists and theologians of the slaveholders' party had already sought to prove, not so much that Negro slavery is justified, but rather that colour is a matter of indifference and the working class is everywhere born to slavery.

One sees, therefore, that the war of the Southern Confederacy is in the true sense of the word a war of conquest for the extension and perpetuation of slavery. The greater part of the border states and Territories are still in the possession of the Union, whose side they have taken first through the ballot-box and then with arms. The Confederacy, however, counts them for the "South" and seeks to conquer them from the Union. In the border states which the Confederacy has occupied for the time being, it holds the relatively free highlands in check by martial law. Within the actual slave states themselves it supplants the hitherto existing democracy by the unrestricted oligarchy of three hundred thousand slaveholders.

With the relinquishment of its plans of conquest the Southern Confederacy would relinquish its capacity to live and the purpose of secession. Secession, indeed, only took place because within the Union the transformation of the border states and Territories into slave states seemed no longer attainable. On the other hand, with a peaceful cession of the contested territory to the Southern Confederacy the North would surrender to the slave republic more than three-quarters of the entire territory of the United States. The North would lose the Gulf of Mexico altogether, the Atlantic Ocean from Pensacola Bay to Delaware Bay and would even cut itself off from the Pacific Ocean. Missouri, Kansas, New Mexico, Arkansas and Texas would draw California after them. Incapable of wresting the mouth of the Mississippi from the hands of the strong, hostile slave republic in the South, the great agricultural states in the basin between the Rocky Mountains and the Alleghenies, in the valleys of the

Mississippi, the Missouri and the Ohio, would be compelled by their economic interests to secede from the North and enter the Southern Confederacy. These northwestern states, in their turn, would draw after them all the Northern states lying further east, with perhaps the exception of the states of New England, into the same vortex of secession.

Thus there would in fact take place, not a dissolution of the Union, but a *reorganization* of it, a *reorganization on the basis of slavery*, under the recognized control of the slaveholding oligarchy. The plan of such a reorganization has been openly proclaimed by the principal speakers of the South at the Congress of Montgomery and explains the paragraph of the new Constitution which leaves it open to every state of the old Union to join the new Confederacy. The slave system would infect the whole Union. In the Northern states, where Negro slavery is in practice unworkable, the white working class would gradually be forced down to the level of helotry. This would accord with the loudly proclaimed principle that only certain races are capable of freedom, and as the actual labour is the lot of the Negro in the South, so in the North it is the lot of the German and the Irishman, or their direct descendants.

The present struggle between the South and North is, therefore, nothing but a struggle between two social systems, between the system of slavery and the system of free labour. The struggle has broken out because the two systems can no longer live peacefully side by side on the North American continent. It can only be ended by the victory of one system or the other.

If the border states, on the disputed areas of which the two systems have hitherto contended for mastery, are a thorn in the flesh of the South, there can, on the other hand, be no mistake that, in the course of the war up to now, they have constituted the chief weakness of the North. One section of the slaveholders in these districts simulated loyalty to the North at the bidding of the conspirators in the South, another section found that in fact it was in accordance with their real interest and traditional ideas to go with the Union. Both sections have uniformly crippled the North. Anxiety to keep the "loyal" slaveholders of the border states in good humour; fear of throwing them into the arms of secession; in a word, tender regard for the interests, prejudices and sensibilities of these ambiguous allies, has smitten the Union government with

incurable weakness since the beginning of the war, driven it to half measures, forced it to dissemble away the principle of the war and to spare the foe's most vulnerable spot, the root of the evil—*slavery itself*.

When, only recently, Lincoln pusillanimously revoked Fremont's Missouri proclamation on the emancipation of Negroes belonging to the rebels,<sup>66</sup> this occurred merely out of regard for the loud protest of the "loyal" slaveholders of Kentucky. However, a turning point has already been reached. With Kentucky, the last border state has been pushed into the series of battlefields between South and North. With real war for the border states in the border states themselves, the question of winning or losing them is withdrawn from the sphere of diplomatic and parliamentary discussions. One section of slaveholders will throw away the mask of loyalty; the other will content itself with the prospect of compensation such as Great Britain gave the West Indian planters.<sup>67</sup> Events themselves drive to the promulgation of the decisive slogan—*emancipation of the slaves*.

That even the most hardened Democrats and diplomats of the North feel themselves drawn to this point, is shown by some publications of very recent date. In an open letter, General Cass, Secretary of State under Buchanan and hitherto one of the most ardent allies of the South, declares emancipation of the slaves the *conditio sine qua non* of the Union's salvation. In his last review for October, Dr. Brownson, the spokesman of the Catholic party of the North, on his own admission the most energetic adversary of the emancipation movement from 1836 to 1860, publishes an article for Abolition.

"If we have opposed Abolition heretofore," he says among other things, "because we would preserve the Union, we must *a fortiori* now oppose slavery whenever, in our judgment, its continuance becomes incompatible with the maintenance of the Union, or of the nation as a free republican state."<sup>68</sup> Finally, the *World*, a New York organ of the diplomats of the Washington Cabinet, concludes one of its latest blustering articles against the Abolitionists with the words.

"On the day when it shall be decided that either slavery or the Union must go down, on that day sentence of death

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<sup>64</sup> Indispensable condition—Ed

is passed on slavery. If the North cannot triumph *without* emancipation, it will triumph *with* emancipation."

*Die Presse*, November 7, 1861

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### THE CRISIS IN ENGLAND

TO-DAY, as fifteen years ago, England stands face to face with a catastrophe that threatens to strike at the root of her entire economic system. As is known, the potato formed the exclusive food of Ireland and a not inconsiderable section of the English working people when the potato blight of 1845 and 1846 struck the root of Irish life with decay. The results of this great catastrophe are known. The Irish population declined by two million, of which one part died of starvation and the other fled across the Atlantic Ocean. At the same time, this dreadful misfortune helped the English free trade party to triumph. The English landed aristocracy was compelled to sacrifice one of its most lucrative monopolies, and the abolition of the Corn Laws assured a broader and sounder basis for the reproduction and maintenance of the working millions.

What the *potato* was to Irish agriculture, *cotton* is to the dominant branch of Great Britain's industry. On its manufacture depends the subsistence of a mass of people greater than the total number of inhabitants of Scotland and than two-thirds of the present number of inhabitants of Ireland. For according to the census of 1861, the population of Scotland consisted of 3,061,117 persons, that of Ireland still only 5,764,543, whilst more than four millions in England and Scotland live directly or indirectly by the cotton industry. Now the cotton plant is not, indeed, diseased. Just as little is its production the monopoly of a few regions of the earth. On the contrary, no other plant that yields clothing material thrives in equally extensive areas of America, Asia and Africa. The cotton monopoly of the slave states of the American Union is not a natural, but an historical monopoly. It grew and developed simultaneously with the monopoly of the English cotton industry on the world market. In the year 1793, shortly after the time of the great mechanical inventions in England, a Quaker of Connecticut, Eli Whitney, in-

vented the cotton gin, a machine for cleaning cotton, which separates the cotton fibre from the cotton seed. Prior to this invention, a day of a Negro's most intensive labour barely sufficed to separate a pound of cotton from the cotton seed. After the invention of the cotton gin, an old Negro could comfortably supply fifty pounds of cotton daily, and gradual improvements have subsequently doubled the efficiency of the machine. The fetters on the cultivation of cotton in the United States were now burst asunder. Hand in hand with the English cotton industry, it grew swiftly to a great commercial power. Now and then in the course of development, England seemed to take fright at the monopoly of American cotton, as at a spectre that threatened danger. Such a moment occurred, for example, at the time when the emancipation of the Negroes in the English colonies was purchased for £20,000,000. It was a matter for misgiving that the industry in Lancashire and Yorkshire should rest on the sovereignty of the slave-whip in Georgia and Alabama, whilst the English nation imposed on itself so great a sacrifice to abolish slavery in its own colonies. Philanthropy, however, does not make history, least of all commercial history. Similar doubts arose as often as a cotton crop failure occurred in the United States and as, in addition, such a natural phenomenon was exploited by the slaveholders to artificially raise the price of cotton still higher through combination. The English cotton spinners and weavers then threatened rebellion against "King Cotton." manifold projects for procuring cotton from Asiatic and African sources came to light. This was the case, for example, in 1850. However, the following good crop in the United States triumphantly dispelled such yearnings for emancipation. Indeed, in the last few years the American cotton monopoly attained dimensions scarcely dreamt of before, partly in consequence of the free trade legislation, which repealed the hitherto existing differential tariff on the cotton grown by slaves; partly in consequence of the simultaneous giant strides made by the English cotton industry and American cotton cultivation during the last decade. In the year 1857 the consumption of cotton in England already amounted to nearly one and a half billion pounds.

Now, all of a sudden, the American Civil War menaces this great pillar of English industry. Whilst the Union blockades the harbours of the Southern states, in order to cut off the secessionists' chief source of income by preventing the

export of their cotton crop of this year, the Confederacy first lends compelling force to this blockade with the decision not to export a bale of cotton of its own accord, but rather to compel England to come and fetch her cotton from the Southern harbours herself. England is to be driven to the point of forcibly breaking through the blockade, of then declaring war on the Union and so of throwing her sword into the scale of the slave states.

From the beginning of the American Civil War the price of cotton rose continuously, for a considerable time, however, to a less degree than was to be expected. On the whole, the English commercial world appeared to look down very phlegmatically on the American crisis. The cause of this cold-blooded way of viewing things was unmistakable. The whole of the last American crop was long ago in Europe. The yield of a new crop is never shipped before the end of November, and this shipment seldom attains considerable dimensions before the end of December. Till then, therefore, it remained pretty much a matter of indifference whether the cotton bales were held back on the plantations or forwarded to the harbours of the South immediately after their packing. Should the blockade cease at any time before the end of the year, England could safely count on receiving her customary cotton imports in April or March, quite as if the blockade had never taken place. The English commercial world, in large measure misled by the English press, succumbed, however, to the delusion that a spectacle of, perchance, six months' war would end with recognition of the Confederacy by the United States. But at the end of August, North Americans appeared in the market of Liverpool to buy cotton, partly for speculation in Europe, partly for reshipment to North America. This unheard-of event opened the eyes of the English. They began to understand the seriousness of the situation. The Liverpool cotton market has since been in a state of feverish excitement, the prices of cotton were soon driven 100 per cent above their average level, the speculation in cotton assumed the same wild features that characterized the speculation in railways in 1845. The spinning and weaving mills in Lancashire and other seats of the British cotton industry limited their labour time to three days a week, a section of the mills stopped its machines altogether, the irremediable reaction on other branches of industry was not wanting, and at this moment all England trembles at the approach of the

greatest economic catastrophe that has yet threatened her.

The consumption of Indian cotton is naturally increasing, and the rising prices will ensure further increase of importation from the ancient home of cotton. Nevertheless, it remains impossible to revolutionize the conditions of production and the course of trade at, so to speak, a few months' notice. England is, in fact now explaining her long mismanagement of India. Her present spasmodic attempts to replace American cotton by Indian encounter two great obstacles. The lack of means of communication and transport in India, and the miserable condition of the Indian peasant, which prevents him from taking advantage of the momentarily favourable circumstances. But, apart from this, apart from the process of improvement that Indian cotton has still to go through to be able to take the place of American, even under the most favourable circumstances it will be *years* before India can produce for export the requisite quantity of cotton. It is statistically established, however, that in four months the stocks of cotton in Liverpool will be exhausted. They will hold out even as long as this only if the limitation of the labour time to three days a week and the complete stoppage of a part of the machinery is effected by the British cotton spinners and weavers to a still greater extent than hitherto. Such a procedure is already exposing the factory districts to the greatest social sufferings. But if the American blockade continues over January! What then?

*Die Presse*, November 6, 1861

4

ECONOMIC NOTES

London, November 3, 1861.

AT the present moment general politics are non-existent in England. The interest of the country is absorbed in the French financial, commercial and agricultural crisis, the British industrial crisis, the dearth of cotton and the American question.

In circles here competent to judge, people are not for a moment deceived concerning the Bank of France's bill-jobbing with a few big houses on both sides of the Channel being

\* a palliative of the weakest sort All that could be achieved and has been achieved thereby was a *momentary* abatement of the drain of money to England. The repeated attempts of the Bank of France to raise metallic auxiliary troops in Petersburg, Hamburg and Berlin damage its credit, without filling its coffers. The raising of the rate of interest on treasury bills, in order to keep them in currency, and the necessity of effecting a remission of the payments for the new Italian loan of Victor Emmanuel—both are held here to be serious symptoms of French financial sickness. It is known, moreover, that at the present moment two projects contend in the Tuileries for precedence. The full-blooded Bonapartists, with Persigny and Pereire (of the Credit Mobilier<sup>es</sup>), at their head, want to make the Bank of France completely subject to governmental authority, to reduce it to a mere office of the Finance-Ministry, and to use the institution, thus transformed, as an assignat factory.

It is known that this principle was originally at the bottom of the organization of the Credit Mobilier. The less adventurous party, represented by Fould and other renegades of Louis Philippe's time, propose a new national loan, which is to amount to four hundred million francs, according to some; to seven hundred million, according to others. *The Times*, in a leading article today, probably reflects the view of the City when it states that France is completely paralyzed by her economic crisis and robbed of her European influence. Nevertheless, *The Times* and the City are wrong. Should the December power succeed in outlasting the winter without great internal storms, it will then blow the war trumpet in the spring. The internal distress will not thereby be remedied, but its voice will be drowned.

In an earlier letter I pointed out that the cotton swindle in Liverpool during the last few weeks fully reminds one of the maddest days of the railway mania of 1845. Dentists, surgeons, barristers, cooks, widows, workers, clerks and lords, comedians and clergymen, soldiers and tailors, journalists and persons letting apartments, man and wife, all speculated in cotton. Quite small quantities of from one to four bales were bought, sold and sold again. More considerable quantities lay for months in the same warehouse, although they changed owners twenty times. Whoever had bought cotton

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\* The financial community in London.—Ed.



at ten o'clock, sold it again at eleven o'clock with an addition of a half penny a pound. Thus the same cotton often circulated from hand to hand six times in ten hours. This week, however, there came a lull, and for no more rational reason than that a pound of cotton (namely, middling Orleans cotton) had risen to a shilling, that twelve pence make a shilling and are therefore a round figure. So every one had purposed selling out, as soon as the maximum was reached. Hence sudden increase of the supply, and consequent reaction. As soon as the English make themselves conversant with the possibility that a pound of cotton can rise *above* a shilling, the St Vitus' dance will return more madly than ever.

The last official monthly report of the Board of Trade on British exports and imports has by no means dispelled the gloomy feeling. The export tables cover the nine-month's period from January to September 1861. In comparison with the same period of 1860, they show a falling off of about £3,000,000. Of this, £5,671,730 fall to exports to the United States alone, whilst the remainder is distributed over British North America, the East Indies, Australia, Turkey and Germany. Only in Italy is an increase shown. Thus, for example, the export of British cotton commodities to Sardinia, Tuscany, Naples and Sicily has risen from £656,802 for the year 1860 to £1,204,286 for the year 1861; the export of British yarn from £348,158 to £583,373; the export of iron from £120,867 to £160,912, etc. These figures are not without weight in the scale of British sympathy for Italian freedom.

Whilst the export trade of Great Britain has thus declined by nearly £8,000,000 her *import trade* has risen in still higher proportion, a circumstance that by no means [facilitates]\* the adjustment of the balance, [whereas for]\* the first eight months of 1860 the value of the wheat imported amounted to only £6,796,139, for the same period of the present year it totals £13,431,387.

The most remarkable phenomenon revealed by the import tables is the rapid increase of *French imports* which have now attained a volume of nearly £18,000,000 (yearly), whilst English exports to France are not much more considerable than, perhaps, those to Holland. Continental politicians have

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\*Some words are missing from the original, and the words in square brackets have been inserted to complete the meaning.—Ed.

hitherto overlooked this entirely new phenomenon of modern commercial history. It proves that the economic dependence of France on England is, perhaps, six times as great as the economic dependence of England on France, *id.*, that is, one not only considers the English export and import tables, but also compares them with the French export and import tables. It then follows that England has now become the principal export market for France, whereas France has remained a quite secondary export market for England. Hence, despite all chauvinism and all Waterloo rodomontade, the nervous dread of the conflict with "perfidious Albion."

Finally, one more important fact emerges from the latest English export and import tables. While in the first nine months of this year English exports to the United States declined by more than 25 per cent in comparison with the same period of 1860, the port of New York alone has increased its exports to England by £6,000,000 during the first eight months of the present year. During this period the export of American gold to England had almost ceased, while now, on the contrary, gold has been flowing for weeks from England to New York. It is in fact England and France whose harvest deficiencies cover the American deficit, while the Morrill tariff and the economy inseparable from a civil war have simultaneously decimated the consumption of English and French manufactures in North America. And now one may compare these statistical facts with the jeremiads of *The Times* on the financial ruin of North America!

*Die Presse*, November 8, 1861

## 5

### INTERVENTION IN MEXICO

London, November 7. 1861

THE TIMES of today has a leading article in its well-known, confusedly kaleidoscopic, affectedly humorous style, on the French government's invasion of Dappenthal and on Switzerland's protest against this violation of territory. The oracle

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†Vainglorious bluster; from Rodomonte, a boastful leader in Ariosto's *Orlando Furioso*.—Ed.

of Printing House Square recalls how, at the time of most acute struggle between English manufacturers and landowners, little children employed in the factories were led to throw needles into the most delicate parts of the machinery to upset the motion of the whole powerful automaton. The machinery is Europe, the little child is Switzerland and the needle that she throws into the smoothly running automaton is—Louis Bonaparte's invasion of her territory or, rather, her outcry at his invasion. Thus the needle is suddenly transformed into the outcry at the needle's prick and the metaphor into a piece of buffoonery at the expense of the reader who expects a metaphor. *The Times* is further enlivened by its own discovery that Dappenthal consists of a single village called Cressionieres. It ends its short article with a complete contradiction of its beginning. Why, it exclaims, make so much ado about this infinitely small Swiss bagatelle, when every quarter of Europe will be ablaze next spring? One may not forget that, shortly before, Europe was a well regulated automaton. The whole article appears sheer nonsense and yet it has its sense. It is a declaration that Palmerston has given *carte blanche* in the Swiss incident to his ally on the other side of the Channel. The explanation of this declaration is found in the dry notice in the *Moniteur* that on October 31 England, France and Spain concluded a convention on joint intervention in Mexico.<sup>70</sup> The article of *The Times* on Dappenthal and the notice of the *Moniteur* on Mexico stand as close together as the Canton of Waadt and Vera Cruz lie far apart.

It is credible that Louis Bonaparte counted on intervention in Mexico among the many possibilities which he continually has ready to divert the French people. It is sure that Spain, whose cheap successes in Morocco and St Domingo have gone to her head, dreams of a Restoration in Mexico. But it is certain that France's project had not yet matured and that both France and Spain were opposed to a crusade against Mexico under *English* command.

On September 24, Palmerston's private *Moniteur*, the *Morning Post*, announced the details of an agreement that England, France and Spain had reached for joint intervention in Mexico. The following day the *Patrie* denied the existence of any such agreement. On September 27 *The Times*

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\* In west central Switzerland—Ed.

reruted the *Patrie*, without naming it. According to *The Times*' article, Lord Russell had communicated the *English* decision on intervention to the French government, whereupon M Thouvenel had answered that the Emperor of the French had arrived at a like determination. It was now the turn of Spain. In a semi-official organ the Spanish government declared that it purposed an intervention in Mexico, but by no means an intervention alongside of England. It rained *de-mentis*. *The Times* had categorically announced that "the full assent of the American President had been given to the expedition." Hardly had the report reached the other side of the Atlantic Ocean when all the organs of the American government branded it as a lie, since [the American Union,] conjointly with President Lincoln, was going with and not against Mexico. From this it follows that the plan of intervention in its present form originated in the Cabinet of St. James.

No less puzzling and contradictory than the statements concerning the origin of the convention were the statements concerning its objects. One organ of Palmerston, the *Morning Post*, announced that Mexico was not an organized state, with an existing government, but a mere robber's nest. It was to be treated as such. The expedition had only one object—the satisfaction of the Mexican state's creditors in England, France and Spain.<sup>71</sup> To this end the combined forces would occupy the principal ports of Mexico, collect the import and export duties on her coast and hold this "material guarantee" till all debt claims were satisfied.

The other organ of Palmerston, *The Times*, declared, on the contrary, that England was "stepped against plunderings on the part of bankrupt Mexico." It was not a question of the private interests of the creditors, but "they hope that the mere presence of a combined squadron in the Gulf, and the seizure of certain ports, will urge the Mexican government to new exertions in keeping the peace, and will convince the malcontents that they must confine themselves to some form of opposition more constitutional than brigandage."

According to this, the expedition would therefore take place to investigate the official government of Mexico. At the same time, however, *The Times* intimates that "the City of Mexico was sufficiently healthy, should it be necessary to penerate so far."

The most original means of strengthening a government

indisputably consist in the sequestration of its revenues and its territories by force. On the other hand, mere occupation of the ports and collection of the duties in these ports can only cause the Mexican government to set more inland-lying bounds to its domains. Import duties on foreign commodities, export duties on American commodities would in this way be doubled, the intervention would in fact satisfy the claims of European creditors by extortions from European-Mexican trade. The Mexican government can become solvent only by internal consolidation, but it can consolidate itself at home only so long as its independence is respected abroad.

If the expedition's alleged ends are contradictory, then the alleged means to these alleged ends are still more contradictory. The English government organs themselves admit that if one thing or another would be attainable by a one-sided intervention of France or England or Spain, everything becomes unattainable by a *joint* intervention of these states.

One may recall that the Liberal Party in Mexico under Juarez, the official President of the republic, has now the upper hand at almost all points; that the Catholic Party under General Marquez has suffered defeat after defeat, and that the robber band organized by it is driven back to the sierras of Queretaro and dependent on an alliance with Mejia, the Indian chief there. The last hope of the Catholic Party was Spanish intervention.

The only point—says *The Times*—on which there may possibly be a difference between ourselves and our allies, regards the *government of the republic*. England will be content to see it remain in the hands of the Liberal Party which is now in power, while France and Spain are suspected of a partiality for the ecclesiastical rule which has recently been overthrown. It would, indeed, be strange, if France were, in both the old and the new world, to make herself the protector of priests and bandits. Just as in Italy the Partisans of Francis II<sup>nd</sup> at Rome were equipped for their work of making Naples ungovernable, so in Mexico the highways, indeed, the streets of the capital, are infested with robbers, whom the church party openly declares to be its friends.

And just for this reason England strengthens the Liberal governments by undertaking a campaign against them with France and Spain, she seeks to suppress anarchy by supplying the clerical party lying *in extremis*<sup>1</sup> with fresh allied troops from Europe!

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<sup>1</sup>At the last gasp—Ed

Save during the short winter months the coasts of Mexico, pestilential as they are, can only be held by conquest of the country itself. But a third English government organ, *The Economist*, declares the conquest of Mexico to be impossible.

If it is desired—says this paper—to thrust upon her a British prince with an English army, then the fiercest wrath of the United States is excited. France's jealousy would make such conquest impossible, and a motion to this effect would be rejected almost unanimously by an English parliament the moment it was submitted to it. England, for her part, cannot entrust the government of Mexico to France. Of Spain there can be no question whatever.

The whole expedition is therefore a mystification, the key to which the *Patrie* gives in these words: "The convention recognizes the necessity of installing in Mexico a strong government, that can maintain tranquillity and order there."

The question is simply one of applying to the states of America through a new Holy Alliance the principle according to which the Holy Alliance held itself called on to interfere in the internal governmental relations of the countries of Europe. The first plan of this sort was drafted by Chateaubriand for the Bourbons of Spain and France at the time of the Restoration. It was frustrated by Canning and Monroe, the President of the United States, who declared any European interference in the internal affairs of American states to be taboo. Since then the American Union has constantly asserted the Monroe Doctrine as an international law. The present Civil War, however, created the right situation for securing to the side of the European monarchies an intervention precedent on which they can build later. That is the real object of the English-French-Spanish intervention. Its immediate result can only be and is only intended to be the *restoration* of the anarchy just dying out in Mexico.

Apart from all standpoints of international law in general, the occurrence has the great significance for Europe that by concessions in the domain of Continental politics England has purchased the support of Louis Bonaparte in the Mexican expedition.

*Die Presse*, November 12, 1861.

## THE DISMISSAL OF FREMONT

FREMONT'S dismissal from the post of Commander-in-Chief in Missouri<sup>23</sup> forms a turning point in the history of the development of the American Civil War. Fremont has two great sins to expiate. He was the first candidate of the Republican Party for the presidential office (1856) and he is the first general of the North to have threatened the slaveholders with emancipation of slaves (August 30, 1861). He remains, therefore, a rival of candidates for the presidency in the future and an obstacle to the makers of compromises in the present.

During the last two decades there had developed in the United States the singular practice of not electing to the presidency any man who occupied an authoritative position in his own party. The names of such men, it is true, were utilized for election demonstrations; as soon, however, as it came to actual business, they were dropped and replaced by unknown mediocrities of merely local influence. In this manner Polk, Pierce, Buchanan, etc., became Presidents. Likewise A. Lincoln. General Andrew Jackson was in fact the last President of the United States who owed his office to his personal importance, whilst all his successors owed it, on the contrary, to their personal unimportance.

In the election year, 1860, the most distinguished names of the Republican Party were Fremont and Seward. Known for his adventures during the Mexican War, for his intrepid exploration of California and his candidacy of 1856, Fremont was too striking a figure even to come under consideration, as soon as it was no longer a question of a Republican demonstration, but of a Republican success. He did not, therefore, offer himself as a candidate. It was otherwise with Seward, Republican Senator in the Congress at Washington, Governor of the State of New York and, since the rise of the Republican Party, unquestionably its leading orator. It required a series of mortifying defeats to induce Mr. Seward to renounce his own candidacy and to give his oratorical patronage to the then more or less unknown A. Lincoln. As soon, however, as he saw his attempted candidacy shipwrecked, he imposed himself as a Republican Richelieu on a man whom he took for a Republican Louis XIII. He contributed towards making Lincoln President, on condition that Lincoln make him Secre-

tary of State, a station which is in some measure comparable with that of an English Prime Minister. As a matter of fact, Lincoln was hardly President-elect, when Seward had secured the Secretaryship of State. Straightway a singular change took place in the attitude of the Demosthenes<sup>4</sup> of the Republican Party, whom the prophesying of the "irrepressible conflict"<sup>†</sup> between the system of free labour and the system of slavery had made famous. Although elected on November 6, 1860, Lincoln had entered into office as President only on March 4, 1861. In the interval, during the winter session of Congress, Seward made himself the focus of all attempts at compromise; the Northern organs of the South, such as the *New York Herald*, for example, whose *bete noire* Seward had been till then, suddenly extolled him as the statesman of reconciliation and, in fact, it was not his fault that peace at any price did not come to pass. Seward manifestly regarded the Secretaryship of State as a mere preliminary step, and was less preoccupied with the "irrepressible conflict" of the present than with the presidency of the future. He has provided fresh proof that virtuosos of the lungs are dangerously inadequate statesmen. Read his state dispatches! What a repulsive mixture of greatness of phrase and smallness of mind, of mimicry of strength and acts of weakness!

For Seward, therefore, Fremont was the dangerous rival whom it was necessary to ruin; an undertaking that appeared so much the easier since Lincoln, in accordance with his legal tradition, has an aversion for all genius, anxiously clings to the letter of the Constitution and fights shy of every step that could mislead the "loyal" slaveholders of the border states. Fremont's character offered another hold. He is manifestly a man of pathos, somewhat high-stepping and haughty, and not devoid of all melodramatic flights. First the government attempted to drive him to voluntary retirement by a succession of petty chicaneries. When this did not succeed, it deprived him of his command at the very moment when the army organized by himself came face to face with the foe in southwest Missouri and a decisive battle was imminent.

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\*An Athenian orator, born in 384 (or 383) B.C.—Ed.

†Made in a speech delivered by Seward on October 25, 1858, at Rochester. See W. H. Seward, *Works*, ed. G. E. Baker (Boston, 1884), vol. iv, pp. 289-302.—Ed.

‡Bugbear.—Ed.



Fremont is the idol of the states in the Northwest, which sing his praises as the "pathfinder." They regard his dismissal as a personal insult. Should the Union government meet with a few more mishaps like those of Bull Run and Ball's Bluff,<sup>74</sup> it has itself given the opposition, which will then rise up against it and smash the hitherto prevailing diplomatic system of waging war, its leader in John Fremont. To the indictment against the dismissed general which the War Board at Washington has published, we shall return later.

*Die Presse*, November 26, 1861.

7

THE TRENT CASE

London, November 28, 1861

THE CONFLICT of the English mail steamer *Trent* with the North American warship *San Jacinto* in the narrow passage of the Old Bahama Channel is the lion among the events of the day.<sup>75</sup> On the afternoon of November 8 the mail steamer *La Plata* brought information concerning the incident to Southampton, where the electric telegraph at once flashed it to all parts of Great Britain. The same evening the London Stock Exchange was the stage for stormy scenes similar to those at the time of the proclamation of the Italian war. Quotations for government stock sank three-quarters to one per cent. The wildest rumours ran through London. The American Ambassador, Adams, had received his passport, an embargo was imposed on all American ships in the Thames, etc. At the same time an indignation meeting of merchants was held at the Stock Exchange in Liverpool, to demand measures from the English government for the satisfaction of the violated honour of the British flag. Every normal Englishman went to bed with the conviction that he would go to sleep in a state of peace but wake up in a state of war.

Nevertheless, the fact is well-nigh categorically established that the conflict between the *Trent* and the *San Jacinto* brings no war in its train. The semi-official press, like *The Times* and the *Morning Post*, strikes a peaceful note and pours juridically cool deductions on the flickerings of passion. Papers like the *Daily Telegraph*, that at the faintest *mot d'ordre*\*

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\*Word of command—Ed

roar for the British lion, are true models of moderation. Only the Tory opposition press, *The Morning Herald* and *The Standard*, hits out. These facts force every expert to the conclusion that the ministry has already decided not to make a *casus belli* out of the "untoward event."

It must be added that the event, if not the details of its enactment, was anticipated. On October 18, Messrs. Shidell, Ambassador of the Confederacy to France, and Mason, Ambassador of the Confederacy to England, together with their secretaries Eustis and McFarland, had run the blockade from Charleston on the steamship *Theodora* and sailed for Havana, there to seek the opportunity of a passage to Europe under the English flag. In England their arrival was expected daily. North American warships had set out from Liverpool to intercept the gentlemen, with their dispatches, on this side of the Atlantic Ocean. The English ministry had already submitted the question, whether the North Americans were entitled to take such a step, to its official law counsel for their opinion. The answer of these counsel is said to have been in the affirmative.

The juridical question turns in a narrow circle. Since the foundation of the United States, North America has adopted English maritime law in all its rigour. A leading principle of this maritime law is that all *neutral merchantmen* are subject to *search* by the belligerent parties. "This right," said Lord Stowell in a judgment which has become famous, "offers the sole security that no contraband is carried on the neutral ships." The greatest American authority, Kent, states in the same sense. "The duty of self-preservation gives to belligerent nations this right . . . The doctrine of the *English* admiralty on the right of visitation and search . . . has been recognized in its fullest extent by the courts of justice in this country."\* It was not opposition to the right of search, as is sometimes erroneously submitted, that brought about the Anglo-American War of 1812 to 1814. Rather, America declared war because England unlawfully arrogated to herself even the search of American warships, on the pretext of catching deserting English sailors.

The *San Jacinto*, therefore, had the right to search the *Trent* and to confiscate any contraband stowed aboard this

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\*J. Kent, *Commentaries on American Law* (New York, 1826), vol. 1, pp. 142, 144 (Part I) —Ed.

ship That *dispatches* in the possession of Mason, Slidell and Co. come under the category of contraband even *The Times*, *Morning Post*, etc., admit. There remains the question whether Messrs Mason, Slidell and Co. were themselves contraband and might consequently be confiscated<sup>1</sup> The point is a ticklish one and differences of opinion prevail among the doctors of law. Pratt, the most distinguished English authority on "Contraband," in his chapter on "Quasi-Contraband—Dispatches, Passengers" specifically refers to "communication of information and orders from the belligerent government to its officers abroad, or the conveyance of military passengers"<sup>2</sup> Messrs. Mason and Slidell, if not officers, were just as little ambassadors, since their governments are recognized neither by England nor by France. What are they, then? In justification of the very wide conceptions of contraband asserted by England in the Anglo-French wars, Jefferson remarks in his memoirs that contraband, in the nature of the case, excludes any conclusive definition and necessarily leaves great scope for arbitrariness. In any event, however, one sees that from the standpoint of English law the legal question dwindles to a Duns Scots controversy,<sup>3</sup> the force of whose arguments will not go beyond exchange of diplomatic notes

The political side of the North American procedure was estimated quite correctly by *The Times* in these words: "Even Mr. Seward himself must know that the voices of the Southern commissioners, sounding from their captivity, are a thousand times more eloquent in London and in Paris than they would have been if they had been heard in St. James and the Tuileries"<sup>4</sup> And is not the Confederacy already represented in London by Messrs Yancey and Mann?

We reward this latest operation of Mr. Seward as one of the characteristic tactlessnesses of self-conscious weakness that simulates strength. If the naval exploit hastens Seward's removal from the Washington Cabinet, the United States will have no reason to record it as an "untoward event" in the annals of its Civil War.

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<sup>1</sup>F T Pratt, *Law of Contraband of War* (London, 1856),

<sup>2</sup>Any controversy revolving about a cunningly devised or hair-splitting argument; derived from the name of John Duns Scotus (1265?-1308), a scholastic philosopher described as "the Subtle Doctor"—*Ed.*

<sup>3</sup>*The Times*, November 28, 1861—*Ed.*

The *English Correspondence* of November 28 writes concerning the impressions produced by the news of the incident aboard the *Trent*, as follows :

The excitement over this incident that has reigned in London and throughout the country since yesterday is extraordinary. Three hours after the arrival of the telegraphic message referred to, the merchants in Liverpool held a so-called indignation meeting. A Mr. Spence presided and a resolution was moved : " That this meeting, having learnt with indignation that a warship of the American Union has forcibly taken from a British mail steamer certain passengers who were peacefully proceeding from one neutral harbour to another under the protection of our flag, urgently calls on the government to preserve the dignity of the British flag by demanding prompt satisfaction for this affront "

Some very vehement, impassioned speeches and then, again, some conciliatory ones, were delivered. Finally, however, the resolution was carried, but with the amendment that the last words, beginning with " by," be omitted. Many of the older and more cautious merchants disapproved of the calling of the meeting and admonished it not to increase the irritation precipitately.

That there is no lack of hotheads who assert that there is here a clear *casus belli* in the event of the country's not obtaining complete satisfaction, need scarcely be mentioned nevertheless, the more moderate will hold the field and people will await the decision of the Crown lawyers and the government with composure

On the Stock Exchange, consols had rapidly fallen one per cent with the arrival of the news from Southampton ; at closing, however, they had somewhat recovered again. In the City as on all sides, firm confidence is placed in the self-possession and energy of Lord Palmerston. There is no lack of rumours of the worst sort, in particular that the American government had foreseen a quarrel with England ; that in anticipation of this it had already bought up the entire saltpetre supply (60,000 cwt) during the past week, and that Lord Palmerston, because he had exact knowledge of the American Cabinet's intentions, had dispatched troops to Canada and warships to the American stations in good time. Contrariwise, it is maintained by the other side that the American warship had acted quite legally and that there was no cause for complaint.

On this and other questions today's papers express them-

selves at sufficient length in their leading articles. Here might further be mentioned only that Earl Russell, after interrogation of the Crown lawyers through his Under-Secretary of State, Layard, has stated that he cannot give his consent to the desired search of the Confederate ship *Nashville* lying at Southampton.<sup>79</sup> This decision of his had reached Southampton before the new matter of the *Trent* was known there

*Die Presse*, December 2, 1861

8.

THE ANGLO-AMERICAN CONFLICT

If further proof were required that no one would be more delighted by the degeneration of the *Trent* incident into a doughty Anglo-American naval war than the Paris Cabinet, then the attitude of the official and semi-official Paris press provides this proof. Hardly has the *Patrie* triumphantly recounted to its readers that the population of the Northern states is demonstrating for energetic resistance to any English demand for satisfaction, than it is already able to report from London no less warlike things. Thus it announces that at a Cabinet Council held in London on November 30 it has been decided, in the event of an unfavourable reception of the note to be handed by Lord Lyons to the Washington Cabinet, to recognize the Southern states and accredit a charge d'affaires to President Jefferson Davis. Not only does the *Patrie* do its best to incite and add fuel to the fire, the *Moniteur* works in the same direction. The *Moniteur* has the following written to it from Southampton: "In Southampton the opinion is held that this incident can bring the most serious consequences in its train, moreover, this is the general opinion. Since the Southern states have gained much sympathy for themselves in England, this occurrence cannot fail further to increase the number of their supporters."

Concerning the way in which the French government proposes to exploit a possible war between England and the American Union all positive clews are lacking up to now. But the ill-tidings broadcast from Paris prove this much: that such a war would be very suitable for the Tuileries policy, so that the latter positively desires such a misfortune. This

attitude of France is a pointer for the Cabinet of St. James, and it is hardly to be supposed that it has no eye thereto. The fact also deserves to be stressed that, with the exception of the *Morning Post*, the attitude of the London press, and particularly *The Times*, is a very moderate and cautious one. From our London correspondent, who is so well-posted in Anglo-American relations, we have received a letter, dated November 29, which makes the *Trent* case appear in many respects much less dangerous to Western peace than, by the first dispatches from London and by the utterances of the *Morning Post* and the semi-official Paris papers, one was bound to suppose. The communication of our London correspondent elucidates, in the first place, the verdict of the Crown lawyers, denies that the *San Jacinto* forcibly apprehended Messrs. Mason, Slidell and Co. in any way on instructions from the Washington Cabinet and reduces the much discussed Liverpool indignation meeting to its true significance. We let our correspondent speak for himself. He writes :<sup>\*</sup>

London, November 29.

THE counsel of the Crown had yesterday to give their opinion on the naval exploit in the Bahama Channel. Their records of the case consisted of the written reports of the English officers left behind on board the *Trent* and of the oral testimony of Commodore Williams, who was on board the *Trent* as Admiralty agent, but on November 27 disembarked from the *La Plata* at Southampton, whence the telegraph called him at once to London. The Crown counsel acknowledged the right of the *San Jacinto* to visit and search the *Trent*. Since Queen Victoria's proclamation of neutrality on the outbreak of the American Civil War expressly counts dispatches among articles of contraband, there could be no doubt on this point either. There remained, then, the question whether Messrs. Mason, Slidell and Co. were themselves contraband and therefore confiscable. The Crown counsel appear to hold this view, for they dropped the *material* question of law entirely. According to the report of *The Times*, their opinion blames the commander of the *San Jacinto* only in respect of an *error in procedure*. Instead of Messrs. Mason, Slidell

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<sup>\*</sup>These introductory remarks are by the Editor of *Die Presse*.—Ed.

and Co., he should have taken the *Trent* herself in tow as a prize, brought her to the nearest American port and there surrendered her to the judgment of a North American prize court.<sup>77</sup> This is incontestably the procedure corresponding to English and therefore to North American maritime law.

It is equally incontestable that the English frequently violated this rule during the anti-Jacobin war and proceeded in the summary fashion of the *San Jacinto*. However that may be, the whole conflict is reduced by this opinion of the Crown counsel to a *technical error* and consequently robbed of any immediate import. Two circumstances make it easy for the Union government to accept this point of view and therefore to afford formal satisfaction. In the first place, Captain Wilkes, the commander of the *San Jacinto*, could have received no direct instructions from Washington. On the voyage home from Africa to New York, he touched on November 2 at Havana, which he left again on November 4, whilst his encounter with the *Trent* on the high seas took place on November 8. Captain Wilkes' stay of only two days in Havana did not permit any exchange of notes between him and his government. The consul of the Union was the sole American authority with whom he could deal. In the second place, however, he had obviously lost his head, as his failure to insist on the surrender of the dispatches proves.

The importance of the incident lies in its moral effect on the English people and in the political capital that can easily be made out of it by the English cotton friends of secession. Characteristic of the latter is the Liverpool indignation meeting organized by them and previously mentioned by me. The meeting took place on November 27 at three in the afternoon, in the cotton auction-rooms of the Liverpool Exchange, an hour after the alarming telegram from Southampton had arrived.

After vain attempts to press the chairmanship on Mr. Cunard, the owner of the Cunard steamships running between Liverpool and New York, and other high dignitaries of trade, a young merchant named Spence, notorious for a partisan treatise on behalf of the slave republic, took the chair. Contrary to the rule of English meetings, he, the chairman, himself proposed the motion to urge "the government to preserve the dignity of the British flag by demanding prompt satisfaction for this affront." Tremendous applause, handclapping and cheers upon cheers! The main argument of the opening

speaker on the slave republic's behalf consisted in stating that slave ships had hitherto been protected by the American flag from the right of search claimed by England. And then this philanthropist launched a furious attack on the slave trade! He admitted that England had brought about the war of 1812 to 1814 with the United States because she insisted on searching for 'deserting English sailors on the war-ships of the Union. "But," he continued with wonderful dialectic, "but there is some difference between the right of search to take back deserters from the English navy who had escaped under the shelter of an assumed name and the right to seize passengers, men of the highest respectability, proceeding under the shadow of the English flag!" He played his highest trump, however, at the close of his diatribe.

The other day—he bellowed—while I was on the European Continent, I heard an observation made as to the course of our conduct in regard to the United States, and I was unable to reply to the allusion without a blush—that the feeling of every intelligent man upon the Continent was that we would submit to any outrage and suffer every indignity offered to us by the Government of the United States. Our patience had been exercised long enough—as long as it was possible to control it [the patience!]. At last we have arrived at facts this is a very hard and startling fact [!] and it is the duty of every Englishman to apprise the Government of how strong and unanimous is the feeling of this great community on the outrage offered to our flag

This senseless rigmarole was greeted with a cannonade of applause. Opposing voices were howled down and hissed down and stamped down. To the remark of a Mr. Campbell that the whole meeting was irregular, the inexorable Spence replied: "I perfectly agree with you that it is a little irregular but at the same time the fact that we have met to consider is rather an irregular fact."\* To the proposal of a Mr. Turner to adjourn the meeting to the following day, in order that "the city of Liverpool can have its easy and not a clique of cotton brokers usurp its name," cries of "Collar him, throw him out!" resounded from all sides. Unperturbed, Mr. Turner repeated his motion, which, however, was not put to the vote, again contrary to all the rules of English meetings. Spence triumphed. But, as a matter of fact,

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\**Liverpool Daily Post*, November 28, 1861.—Ed.



nothing has done more to cool the temper of London than the news of Mr. Spence's triumph.

*Die Presse*, December 3, 1861.

9.

THE PRINCIPAL ACTORS IN THE TRENT DRAMA

London, December 4, 1861

AT the present moment it is of interests to get acquainted in some measure with the leading figures in the *Trent* drama. On one side stands the active hero, Captain Wilkes, the commander of the *San Jacinto*; on the other, the passive heroes, J. M. Mason and John Slidell. Captain Charles Wilkes is a direct descendant of the brother of the celebrated English demagogue, John Wilkes, who threatened for a moment to shake the throne of George III. The struggle with the North American colonies saved the Hanoverian dynasty at that time from the outbreak of an English revolution, symptoms of which were alike perceptible in the cry of a Wilkes and the letters of a Junius<sup>73</sup> Captain Wilkes, born in New York in 1798, forty-three years in the service of the American navy, commands the squadron that from 1838 to 1842 explored the North and South Pacific Ocean by order of the Union government. He has published a report on this expedition in five volumes. He is also the author of a work on *Western America*, which contains some valuable information on California and the Oregon district. It is now certain that Wilkes improvised his *coup de main*\* independently and without instructions from Washington.

The two intercepted commissioners of the Southern Confederacy—Messrs. Mason and Slidell—form a contrast in every respect. Mason, born in 1798, is descended from one of those aristocratic families of Virginia that fled from England after the Royalists had been defeated at the battle of Worcester. The grandsire of our hero belongs to the circle of men who, along with Washington, Jefferson, etc., are designated by the Americans as "the revolutionary fathers." John Slidell is neither, like Mason, of aristocratic lineage, nor, like his col-

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\*An impetuous and unexpected attack.—Ed.

league, a slaveholder by birth. His native town is New York, where his grandfather and his father lived as honest tallow-chandlers. M<sup>a</sup>son, after he had occupied himself for some years with the study of law, stepped on the political stage. He figured repeatedly since 1826 as a member of the House of Representatives of Virginia; made his appearance in 1837 in the House of Representatives of the American Congress for a session; but his importance only dates from 1847. In that year Virginia elected him to the American Senate, in which he held his seat until the spring of 1861. Slidell, who is now sixty-eight years old, was obliged to leave New York hurriedly in consequence of adultery and a duel, in short, of a scandal. He betook himself to New Orleans, where he lived first by gambling, later by practising law. Having become first a member of the legislature of Louisiana, he soon made his way to the House of Representatives and finally to the Senate of the American Congress. As a director of election rogueries during the presidential election of 1844 and, later, as a participant in a swindle in state lands, he had even somewhat shocked the sort of morals that prevail in Louisiana.

M<sup>a</sup>son inherited influence; Slidell acquired it. The two men found and supplemented each other in the American Senate, the bulwark of the slave oligarchy. In accordance with the American Constitution, the Senate elects a special Committee of Foreign Relations, which plays about the same role as the Privy Council formerly played in England, before the so-called Cabinet, a quantity theoretically unknown to the English constitution, usurped the Privy Council's functions. Mason was for a long time chairman of this committee; Slidell, a prominent member of it.

Mason, firmly convinced that every Virginian is a demigod and every Yankee a plebeian rascal, never sought to conceal his contempt for his Northern colleagues. Haughty, overbearing, insolent, he knew how to knit his brows in a somber, Zeus-like frown and in fact transported to the Senate the manners native to the plantation. A fanatical eulogist of slavery, a shameless slanderer of the North and particularly of the Northern working class, a blusterer against England, Mason wearied the Senate with the prolix importunity of a persistent flow of speech that vainly sought to hide its complete vacuity under 'a hollow pomp. As a sort of demonstration, he went around in recent years in Virginian home-made gray linen, but, and this is characteristic of the man, the

gray coat was adorned with loud buttons, all of which came from a state of New England, from Connecticut.

Whilst Mason played the *Jupiter Tonans*\* of the slave oligarchy on the proscenium, Slidell worked behind the scenes. With a rare talent for intrigue, tireless perseverance and an unscrupulous lack of regard, but at the same time wary, covert, never strutting, but always insinuating himself, Slidell was the soul of the Southern conspiratorial conclave. One may judge the man's repute from the fact that when in 1845, shortly before the outbreak of war with Mexico, he was sent thither as Ambassador, Mexico refused to treat with such an individual.<sup>79</sup> Slidell's intrigues made Polk President. He was one of the most pernicious counsellors of President Pierce and the evil genius of Buchanan's administration.<sup>80</sup> The two, Mason and Slidell, were the chief sponsors of the law on runaway slaves; they brought about the bloodbath in Kansas, and both were wirepullers for the measures whereby Buchanan's administration smuggled all the means to secession into the hands of the South, whilst it left the North defenceless.<sup>81</sup>

As early as 1855 Mason declared on a public occasion in South Carolina that "for the South only one way lies open—immediate, absolute and eternal separation." In March 1861 he declared in the Senate that "he owed the Union government no *allegiance*," but retained his seat in the Senate and continued to draw his senatorial salary as long as the safety of his person allowed—a spy in the supreme council of the nation and a fraudulent parasite on the public exchequer.

Mason's great-grandmother was a daughter of the celebrated Sir William Temple. He is therefore a distant relative of Palmerston. Mason and Slidell appeared to the people of the North not merely as their political opponents, but as their *personal enemies*. Hence the general jubilation over their capture, which in its first days has overwhelmed regard for the danger threatening from England.

*Die Presse*, December 8, 1861.

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\*Jupiter thundering.—Ed.

## THE CONTROVERSIES OVER THE TRENT CASE

London, December 7, 1861.

THE Palmerston press—and on another occasion I will show that in foreign affairs Palmerston's control over nine-tenths of the English press is just as *absolute* as Louis Bonaparte's over nine-tenths of the French press—the Palmerston press feels that it works under “pleasing difficulties” On the one hand, it admits that the Crown lawyers have reduced the charge against the United States to a *mere mistake in procedure*, to a *technical error*. On the other hand, it boasts that on the basis of such a legal quibble a *categorical ultimatum* has been presented to the United States such as can only be justified by a gross violation of law, but not by formal error in the exercise of a recognized right. Accordingly, the Palmerston press now pleads the *material* question of law again. The great importance of the case appears to enjoin a brief examination of the *material* legal question.

By way of introduction, it may be observed that not a single English paper ventures to blame the *San Jacinto* for the visitation and search of the *Trent*. This point, therefore, falls outside the controversy

Besides, we again call to mind the relevant passage in Victoria's proclamation of neutrality of May 13, 1861. The passage reads

*Victoria R.*

Whereas we are happily at peace with the Government of the United States . . . we do hereby strictly charge and command all our loving subjects . . . to abstain from violating or contravening . . . our Royal Proclamation . . . by breaking or endeavouring to break any blockade lawfully and actually established . . . or by *carrying officers . . . dispatches . . .* or any article or articles considered contraband of war All persons so offending will incur and be liable to the several penalties and penal consequences by the said Statute or by the law of nations in that behalf imposed or denounced. And we do hereby declare, that all our subjects, and persons entitled to our protection, who may misconduct themselves . . . will do so at their peril . . . and . . . will . . . incur our high displeasure by such misconduct.\*

\*For the original proclamation of Victoria see M. Bernard, *Historical Account of the Neutrality of Great Britain during the American Civil War* [London, 1870], pp. 135-6.—Ed.

This proclamation of Queen Victoria, therefore, in the first place declared dispatches to be contraband and subjects the ship "that carries such contraband to the "penalties of the law of nations" What are these penalties?

Wheaton, an American writer on international law whose authority is recognized on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean alike, says in his *Elements of International Law*, p. 565 :

The fraudulent carrying of dispatches of the enemy will also subject the *neutral* vessel, in which they are transported to *capture and confiscation*. The consequences of such a service are indefinite, infinitely beyond the effect of any contraband that can be conveyed "The carrying of two or three cargoes of military stores," says Sir W. Scott, "is necessarily an assistance of limited nature; but in the transmission of dispatches may be conveyed the entire plan of a campaign, that may defeat all the plans of the other belligerent.... The confiscation of the noxious article, which constitutes the penalty for contraband . would be ridiculous when applied to *despatches*. There would be *no* freight dependent on their transportation and therefore this penalty could not, in the nature of things, be applied. The vehicle, in which they are carried, must, therefore, be *confiscated*"\*

Walker, in his *Introduction to American Law*, says :

neutrals may not be concerned in bearing *hostile dispatches*, under the penalty of confiscation of the vehicle, and of the cargo also †

Kent, who is accounted a decisive authority in English courts, states in his *Commentaries*

If, on search of a ship, it is found that she carries *enemy dispatches*, she incurs the penalty of capture and of confiscation by judgment of a prize court‡

Dr Robert Phillimore, Advocate of Her Majesty in Her Office of Admiralty, says in his latest work on international law, p 370 :

Official communications from an official person on the public affairs of a belligerent Government are such *despatches* as impress an hostile character upon the carriers of them.

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\*H Wheaton, *Elements of International Law* (London, 1857), pp 565-66 (Sixth Edition)—Ed.

†T Walker, *Introduction to American Law* (Boston, 1855), p 713, Third Edition—Ed.

‡For Kent's discussion of dispatches and the right of search see his *Commentaries on American Law* (New York, 1826), vol 1, pp 141-47—Ed.

The mischievous consequences of such a service cannot be estimated, and extended far beyond the effect of any Contraband that can be conveyed, for it is manifest that by the carriage of such despatches the most important operations of a Belligerent may be forwarded or obstructed. . . The penalty is confiscation of the ship which conveys the despatches and . . . of the cargo, if both belong to the same master.<sup>4</sup>

Two points are therefore established. Queen Victoria's proclamation of May 13, 1861, subjects *English* ships that forward the dispatches of the Confederacy, to the penalties of international law. International law, according to its English and American commentators, inflicts the *penalty* of capture and confiscation on such ships

Palmerston's organs consequently *lied* on higher command—and were naive enough to believe their lie. The captain of the *San Jacinto* had neglected to seek for *dispatches* on the *Trent* and therefore he had likewise found none: the *Trent* had consequently become shotproof through this oversight. The American journals of November 17 to 20, which *could* not yet have been aware of the English lie, *unanimously* state, on the contrary, that the dispatches *have been carried off* and are already in print, for the purpose of submitting them to Congress in Washington. This entirely alters the state of the case. By reason of these dispatches, the *San Jacinto* had the right to take the *Trent* in tow and every American prize court had the duty to confiscate her and her cargo. With the *Trent*, her passengers also came within reach of American jurisdiction

Messrs Mason, Slidell and Co as soon as the *Trent* had touched at Monroe, came under American jurisdiction as rebels. If, therefore, instead of towing the *Trent* herself to an American port, the Captain of the *San Jacinto* contented himself with carrying off the dispatches and their bearers, he in no way worsened the position of Mason, Slidell and Co., whilst, on the other hand, his *error in procedure* benefited the *Trent*, her cargo and her passengers. And it would be, indeed unprecedented, if England wished to declare war on the United States because Captain Wilkes committed an error in procedure harmful to the United States, but useful to England.

The question whether Mason, Slidell and Co. were them-

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<sup>4</sup>R. Phillimore, *Commentaries upon International Law* (Philadelphia, 1857), vol. iii, 370 [284].—Ed.

selves contraband, was only raised and could only be raised because the Palmerston journals had broadcast the *lie* that Captain Wilkes had neither sought for dispatches, nor carried off dispatches. For in this case Mason, Slidell and Co. in fact constituted the sole objects on the ship *Trent* that could possibly fall under the category of contraband. Let us, however, disregard this aspect for the moment. The proclamation of Queen Victoria designates "*officers*" of a belligerent party as contraband. Are "*officers*" merely military officers? Were Mason, Slidell and Co. "*officers*" of the Confederacy? "*Officers*," says Samuel Johnson in his dictionary of the English language, are "*men employed by the public*," that is in German: *öffentliche Beamten*. Walker gives the same definition. (See his dictionary, edition of 1861.)

According to the usage of the English language, therefore, Mason, Slidell and Co., these emissaries, *id est*, officials of the Confederacy, come under the category of "*officers*," whom the royal proclamation declares to be contraband. The Captain of the *Trent* knew them in this capacity and therefore rendered himself, his ship and his passengers confiscable. If, according to Phillimore and all other authorities, a ship becomes confiscable as the carrier of an enemy dispatch because it violates neutrality, in still higher degree is this true of the *person* who carries the dispatches. According to Wheaton, even an enemy *ambassador*, so long as he is in transit, may be intercepted. In general, however, the basis of all international law is that any member of the belligerent party may be regarded and treated as a "belligerent" by the opposing party. "Whilst a man," says Vattel, "continues a citizen of his own country, he is the enemy of all those with whom his nation is at war."<sup>†</sup> One sees, therefore, that the English Crown lawyers reduced the contentious point to a *mere error in procedure, not error in re,* but *error in forma*,<sup>‡</sup> because, actually, no *material violation of law* is in question. The Palmerston organs chatter about the material question of law again because a mere error in procedure, *in the interest of the Trent* at that, gives no plausible pretext for a high-flown

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\*Public officials—*Ed.*

\*\*That is—*Ed.*

†E Vattel, *The Law of Nations; or Principles of the Law of Nature* (Philadelphia, 1835), p. 321.

‡In the matter—*Ed.*

¶In the form—*Ed.*

ultimatum.

Meanwhile, important voices have been raised in this sense from diametrically opposite sides: on the one side, Messrs Bright and Cobden; on the other David Urquhart. These people are enemies in principle and in person: the first two, peace-making cosmopolitans; the other, the "last Englishman"; the former always ready to sacrifice every international right to international trade; the other hesitating not a moment: "*Fiat Justitia, pereat mundus*,"\* and by "justice" he understands "English" justice. The voices of Bright and Cobden are important, because they represent a powerful section of the middle-class interests and are represented in the ministry by Gladstone, Milner-Gibson and also, more or less, by Sir Cornwall Lewis. The voice of Urquhart is important because international law is his life-study and every one recognizes him as an *incorruptible* interpreter of this international law.

The usual newspaper sources will communicate Bright's speech on behalf of the United States and Cobden's letter, which is conceived in the same sense. Therefore I will not linger over them.

Urquhart's organ, *The Free Press*, states in its last number, published on December 4:

We must bombard New York! Such were the frantic cries which met the ears of every one who traversed the streets of London on the evening of this week day, on the arrival of the intelligence of a trifling warlike incident. The act was one which England has committed as a matter of course—namely the seizure on board of a neutral of the persons and property of her enemies.

*The Free Press* further develops the point that, in 1856 at the Congress of Paris, Palmerston, without authority from Parliament or the Crown, had sacrificed English maritime rights in the interest of Russia, and then says that in order to justify this sacrifice, Palmerston's organs stated at that time: "If we maintained the right of search, we should assuredly be involved in a war with the United States on the occasion of the first war in Europe. The very 'organs of public opinion' . . . now call on us to bombard New York because the United States act on those laws which are theirs no less than our own"

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\*Let justice be done though the world perish.—Ed.



"With regard to the utterances of the "organs of public opinion," *The Free Press* remarks :

"The bray of Baron Munchausen's thawing post-horn was nothing to the clangour of the British press on the capture of Messrs. Mason and Slidell."<sup>4</sup> Then humorously, it places side by side, in "strophe" and "anti-strophe," the contradictions by which the English press seeks to convict the United States of a "breach of law."

*Die Presse*, December 11, 1861.

## 11.

### THE WASHINGTON CABINET AND THE WESTERN POWERS

ONE of the most striking surprises of a war so rich in surprises as the Anglo-French-Russian was incontestably the declaration on maritime law agreed to at Paris in the spring of 1856. When the war against Russia began, England suspended her most formidable weapons against Russia : confiscation of enemy-owned commodities on neutral ships and privateering. At the conclusion of the war, England broke these weapons in pieces and sacrificed the fragments on the altar of peace. Russia, the ostensibly vanquished party, received a concession that, by a series of "armed neutralities,"<sup>82</sup> wars and diplomatic intrigues, she had tried in vain to extort since Catherine II. England, the ostensible victor, renounced, on the contrary, the great means of attack and defence that had grown up out of her sea power and that she had maintained for a century and a half against a world in arms.

The humanitarian grounds that served as a pretext for the Declaration of 1856 vanish before the most superficial examination. Privateering is no greater barbarism than the action of volunteer corps or guerillas in land warfare. The privateers are the guerillas of the sea. Confiscation of the private goods of a belligerent nation also occurs in land warfare. Do military requisitions, for example, hit only the cash-box of the enemy government and not the property of private persons also ? The nature of land warfare safeguards enemy

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\**The Free Press*, December 4, 1861.—*Ed.*

possessions that are on neutral soil, therefore under the sovereignty of a neutral power. The nature of sea warfare washes away these barriers, since the sea, as the common highway of the nation, cannot fall to the sovereignty of any neutral power.

As a matter of fact, however, the Declaration of 1856 veils under its philanthropic phrases a great inhumanity. In principle it transforms war from a war of peoples into a war of governments. It endows property with an inviolability that it denies to persons. It emancipates trade from the terrors of war and thereby makes the classes carrying on trade and industry callous to the terrors of war. For the rest, it is self-understood that the humanitarian pretexts of the Declaration of 1856 were only addressed to the European gallery, just like the religious pretexts of the Holy Alliance!

It is a well-known fact that Lord Clarendon, who signed away English maritime rights at the Congress of Paris, acted, as he subsequently confessed in the Upper House, without the foreknowledge or instructions of the Crown. His sole authority consisted in a *private letter* from Palmerston. Up to the present Palmerston has not dared to demand the sanction of the English Parliament for the Declaration of Paris and its signature by Clarendon. Apart from the debates on the contents of the Declaration, there was fear of debates on the question whether, independently of Crown and Parliament, an English minister might usurp the right to sweep away the old basis of English sea power with a stroke of the pen. That this ministerial *coup d'état* did not lead to stormy interpellations, but, rather, was silently accepted as a *fait accompli*,\* Palmerston owed to the influence of the Manchester school.\*\* It found to be in accordance with the interests represented by it, and therefore with philanthropy, civilization and progress also, an innovation which would allow English commerce to continue to pursue its business with the enemy undisturbed on neutral ships, whilst sailors and soldiers fought for the honour of the nation. The Manchester men were jubilant over the fact that by an unconstitutional *coup de main* the minister had bound England to international concessions whose attainment in the constitutional parliamentary way was

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\*Accomplished fact.—*Ed.*

\*\*School of political economy holding to free trade principles.—*Ed.*

wholly improbable. Hence the indignation of the Manchester party in England at the present moment over the disclosures of the blue book submitted by Seward to the Congress in Washington!

As is known, the United States was the only great power that refused to accede to the Declaration of Paris of 1856. If they renounced privateering, then they would have to create a great state navy. Any weakening of their means of war at sea simultaneously threatened them on land with the incubus of a standing army on the European scale. Nevertheless, President Buchanan stated that he was ready to accept the Declaration of Paris, provided that the same inviolability would be assured to all property, enemy or neutral, found on ships, with the exception of contraband of war. His proposal was rejected. From Seward's blue book it now appears that Lincoln, immediately after his assumption of office, offered England and France the adhesion of the United States to the Declaration of Paris, so far as it abolishes privateering, on condition that the prohibition of privateering should be extended to the parts of the United States in revolt, that is, the Southern Confederacy. The answer that he received amounted in practice to recognition of the rights of the Southern Confederacy.<sup>83</sup>

"Humanity, progress and civilization" whispered to the Cabinets of St. James and the Tuileries that the prohibition of privateering would extraordinarily reduce the chances of secession and therefore of dissolution of the United States. The Confederacy was therefore recognized in all haste as a belligerent party, in order afterwards to reply to the Cabinet at Washington that England and France could naturally not recognize the proposal of one belligerent party as a binding law for the other belligerent party. The same "noble uprightness" inspired all the diplomatic negotiations of England and France with the Union government since the outbreak of the Civil War, and had the *San Jacinto* not held up the *Trent* in the Bahama straits, any other incident would then have sufficed to provide a pretext for the conflict that Lord Palmerston aimed at.

*Die Presse*, December 25, 1861.

## THE OPINION OF THE JOURNALS AND THE OPINION OF THE PEOPLE

London, December 25, 1861.

CONTINENTAL politicians, who imagine that in the London press they possess a thermometer for the temper of the English people, inevitably draw false conclusions at the present moment. With the first news of the *Trent* case the English national pride flared up and the call for war with the United States resounded from almost all sections of society. The London press, on the other hand, affected moderation and even *The Times* doubted whether a *casus belli* existed at all.

Whence this phenomenon? Palmerston was uncertain whether the Crown lawyers were in a position to contrive any legal pretext for war. For, a week and a half before the arrival of the *La Plata* at Southampton, agents of the Southern Confederacy from Liverpool had turned to the English Cabinet, denounced the intention of American cruisers to put out from *English* ports and intercept Messrs. Mason, Slidell, etc., on the high seas, and demanded the intervention of the English government. In accordance with the opinion of its Crown lawyers, the latter refused the request. Hence, in the beginning, the peaceful and moderate tone of the London press in contrast to the warlike impatience of the people. So soon, however, as the Crown lawyers—the Attorney-General and the Solicitor-General, both themselves members of the Cabinet—had worked out a technical pretext for a quarrel with the United States, the relationship between the people and the press turned into its opposite. The war fever increased in the press in the same measure as the war fever abated in the people. At the present moment a war with America is just as unpopular with all sections of the English people, the friends of cotton and the cabbage-junkers\* excepted, as the war-howl in the press is overwhelming.

But now, consider the London press! At its head stands *The Times*, whose chief editor, Bob Lowe, was formerly a demagogue in Australia, where he agitated for separation

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\**Krautjunker*, a contemptuous term for country squires.  
—Ed.

from England. He is a subordinate member of the Cabinet, a kind of minister for education, and a mere creature of Palmerston. *Punch* is the court jester of *The Times* and transforms its *sesquipedalia verba*\* into snappy jokes and spiritless caricatures. A principal editor of *Punch* was accommodated by Palmerston with a seat on the Board of Health and an annual salary of a thousand pounds sterling.

The *Morning Post* is in part Palmerston's private property. Another part of this singular institution is sold to the French Embassy. The rest belongs to the *haute volée*† and supplies the most precise reports for court flunkies and ladies' tailors. Among the English people the *Morning Post* is accordingly notorious as the *Jenkins*, (the stock figure for the lackey) of the press.

The *Morning Advertiser* is the joint property of the "licensed victuallers," that is, of the public houses, which, besides beer, may also sell spirits. It is, further, the organ of the Anglican bigots and ditto of the *sporting characters*, that is, of the people who make a business of horse-racing, betting, boxing and the like. The editor of this paper, Mr Grant, previously employed as a stenographer by the newspapers and quite uneducated in a literary sense, has had the honour to get invited to Palmerston's private *sourees*. Since then he has been enthusiastic for the "truly English minister" whom, on the outbreak of the Russian war, he had denounced as a "Russian agent." It must be added that the pious patrons of this liquor-journal stand under the ruling rod of the Earl of Shaftesbury and that Shaftesbury is Palmerston's son-in-law. Shaftesbury is the pope of the low churchmen, who blend the *spiritus sanctus*‡ with the profane spirit of the honest *Advertiser*.

*The Morning Chronicle*! *Quantum mutatus ab illo!*¶ For well-nigh half a century the great organ of the Whig Party and the not unfortunate rival of *The Times*, its star paled after the Whig war. It went through metamorphoses of all sorts, turned itself into a *penny paper* and sought to live by "sensations," thus, for example, by taking the part of the poisoner, Palmer. It subsequently sold itself to the

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\* Words of a foot and a half—*Ed.*

† High rank—*Ed.*

‡ Holy spirit—*Ed.*

¶ How much changed from that!—*Ed.*

French Embassy, which, however, soon regretted throwing away its money. It then threw itself into anti-Bonapartism, but with no better success. Finally, it found the long missing buyer in Messrs. Yancey and Mann—the agents of the Southern Confederacy in London.

The *Daily Telegraph* is the private property of a certain Lloyd. His paper is stigmatized by the English press itself as *Palmerston's mob paper*. Besides this function it conducts a *chronique scandaleuse*.<sup>\*</sup> It is characteristic of this *Telegraph* that, on the arrival of the news about the *Trent*, by *ordre* from above it declared war to be impossible. In the dignity and moderation dictated to it, it seemed so strange to itself that since then it has published half-a-dozen articles about this instance of moderation and dignity displayed by it. As soon, however, as the *ordre* to change its opinion reached it, the *Telegraph* now sought to compensate itself for the constraint put upon it by outbawling all its comrades in howling loudly for war.

The *Globe* is the ministerial evening paper which receives official subsidies from all Whig ministries.

The Tory papers, *The Morning Herald* and the *Evening Standard* both belonging to the same *boutique*,<sup>\*\*</sup> are governed by a double motive: on the one hand, hereditary hate for "the revolted English colonies"; on the other hand, a chronic ebb in their finances. They know that a war with America must shatter the present coalition Cabinet and pave the way for a Tory Cabinet. With the Tory Cabinet official subsidies for *The Herald* and *The Standard* would return. Accordingly, hungry wolves cannot howl louder for prey than these Tory papers for an American war with its ensuing shower of gold!

Of the London daily press, *The Daily News* and *The Morning Star* are the only papers left that are worth mentioning; both work counter to the trumpeters of war. *The Daily News* is restricted in its movement by a connection with Lord John Russell; *The Morning Star* (the organ of Bright and Cobden) is diminished in its influence by its character as a "peace-at-any-price paper."

Most of the London weekly papers are mere echoes of the daily press, therefore overwhelmingly warlike. *The*

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<sup>\*</sup>Chronicle of scandal.—Ed.

<sup>\*\*</sup>Shop.—Ed.

*Observer* is in the ministry's pay. *The Saturday Review* strives for *esprit* \* and believes it has attained it by affecting a cynical elevation above "humanitarian" prejudices. To show "*esprit*," the corrupt lawyers, parsons and school-masters that write this paper have smirked their approbation of the slaveholders since the outbreak of the American Civil War. Naturally, they subsequently blew the war-trumpet with *The Times*. They are already drawing up plans of campaign against the United States displaying an ignorance which is hair-raising.

*The Spectator*, *The Examiner* and, particularly, *Macmillan's Magazine* must be mentioned as more or less respectable exceptions.

One sees: On the whole, the London press—with the exception of the cotton organs, the provincial papers form a commendable contrast—represents nothing but Palmerston and again Palmerston. Palmerston wants war; the English people don't want it. Imminent events will show who will conquer in this duel, Palmerston or the people. In any case, he is playing a more dangerous game than Louis Bonaparte at the beginning of 1859.<sup>84</sup>

*Die Presse*, December 31, 1861.

13.

FRENCH NEWS HUMBUG

ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF WAR

London, December 31, 1861.

THE belief in miracles seems to be withdrawn from one sphere only in order to settle in another. If it is driven out of nature, it now rises up in politics. At least, that is the view of the Paris newspapers and their confederates in the telegraph agencies and the newspaper-correspondence shops. Thus, Paris evening papers of yesterday announce: Lord Lyons has stated to Mr. Seward that he will wait until the evening of December 20, but then depart for London, in the event of the Cabinet at Washington's refusing to surrender the prisoners.

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\*Spirit.—*Ed.*

Therefore, the Paris papers already knew *yesterday* the steps that Lord Lyons took after receiving the dispatches transmitted to him on the *Europa*. Up to *today*, however, news of the arrival of the *Europa* in New York has not yet reached Europe. The *Patrie* and its associates, before they are informed of the arrival of the *Europa* in America, publish in Europe news of the events that ensued in the United States on the heels of the *Europa's* departure. The *Patrie* and its associates manifestly believe that legerdemain requires no magic. One journal over here remarks in its stock exchange article that these Paris inventions, quite like the provocative articles in some English papers, serve not only the political speculations of certain persons in power, but just as much the *stock exchange speculations* of certain private individuals.

The *Economist*, hitherto one of the loudest bawlers of the war party, publishes in its last number a *letter from a Liverpool merchant* and a leading article in which the English public is warned not on any account to under-estimate the effects of a war with the United States. England imported grain worth £15,380,301 during 1861; of the whole amount nearly £6,000,000 fell to the United States. England would suffer more from the inability to buy American grain than the United States would suffer from the inability to sell it. The United States would have the advantage of *prior information*. If they decided for war, then telegrams would fly forthwith from Washington to San Francisco, and the American ships in the Pacific Ocean and the China seas would commence war operations many weeks before England could bring the news of the war to India.

Since the outbreak of the Civil War the American-Chinese trade, and the American-Australian trade quite as much, has diminished to an enormous extent. So far, however, as it is still carried on, it buys its cargoes in most cases with English letters of credit, therefore with English capital. On the contrary, English trade from India, China and Australia, always very considerable, has grown still more since the interruption of the trade with the United States. American privateers would therefore have a great field for privateering; English privateers, a relatively insignificant one. English investments of capital in the United States are greater than the whole of the capital invested in the English cotton industry<sup>85</sup>. American investments of capital in England are nil. The English navy eclipses the American, but not nearly to



the same extent as during the war of 1812 to 1814.

If at that time the American privateers already showed themselves far superior to the English, then how about them now? An effective blockade of the North American ports, particularly in winter, is quite out of the question. In the inland waters between Canada and the United States—and superiority here is decisive for the land warfare in Canada—the United States would, with the opening of the war, hold absolute sway.

In short, the Liverpool merchant comes to the conclusion :

“Nobody in England dares to recommend war for the sake of mere cotton. It would be cheaper for us to feed the whole of the cotton districts for three years at state expense than to wage war with the United States on their behalf for one year.”

*Cæterum censeo* \* that the *Trent* case will not lead to war.

*Die Presse*, January 4, 1862.

#### 14.

### A PRO-AMERICAN MEETING

London, January 1, 1862.

THE anti-war movement among the English people gains from day to day in energy and extent. Public meetings in the most diverse parts of the country insist on *settlement by arbitration* of the dispute between England and America. Memoranda in this sense rain on the chief of the Cabinet, and the independent *provincial press* is almost unanimous in its opposition to the war-cry of the London press.

Subjoined is a detailed report of the meeting held last Monday in Brighton, since it emanated from the working class, and the two principal speakers, Messrs. Cunningham and White, are influential members of Parliament who both sit on the ministerial side of the House.

Mr. Wood (a worker) proposed the first motion, to the effect “that the dispute between England and America arose out of a misinterpretation of international law, but not out of an intentional insult to the British flag; that accordingly

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\*For the rest I think.—Ed.

this meeting is of the opinion that the whole question in dispute should be referred to a neutral power for decision by arbitration; that under the existing circumstances a war with America is not justifiable, but rather merits the condemnation of the English people." In support of his motion Mr. Wood, among other things, remarked:

It is said that this new insult is merely the last link in a chain of insults that America has offered to England. Suppose this to be true, what would it prove in regard to the cry for war at the present moment? It would prove that so long as America was undivided and strong, we submitted quietly to her insults; but now, in the hour of her peril, take advantage of a position favourable to us, to revenge the insult. Would not such a procedure brand us as cowards in the eyes of the civilized world?

Mr. Cunningham: . . . . At this moment there is developing in the midst of the Union an avowed policy of emancipation (Applause), and I express the earnest hope that no intervention on the part of the English government will be permitted (Applause). Will you, freeborn Englishmen, allow yourselves to be embroiled in an anti-republican war? For that is the intention of *The Times* and of the party that stands behind it. . . I appeal to the workers of England, who have the greatest interest in the preservation of peace, to raise their voices and, in case of need, their hands for the prevention of so great a crime (Loud Applause). . . *The Times* has exerted every endeavour to excite the warlike spirit of the land and by bitter scorn and slanders to engender a hostile mood among the Americans. . . . I do not belong to the so-called peace party. *The Times* favoured the policy of Russia and put forth (in 1853) all its powers to mislead our country into looking on calmly at the military encroachments of Russian barbarism in the East. I was amongst those who raised their voices against this false policy. At the time of the introduction of the *Conspiracy Bill*, whose object was to facilitate the extradition of political refugees, no expenditure of effort seemed too great to *The Times*, to force this Bill through the Lower House. I was one of the ninety-nine members of the House who withstood this encroachment on the liberties of the English people and brought about the ministers' downfall<sup>80</sup> (Applause). This minister is now at the head of the Cabinet. I prophesy to him that should he seek to embroil our country in a war with America without good and sufficient reasons, his plan will fail ignominiously. I promise him a fresh ignominious defeat, a worse defeat than was his lot on the occasion of the *Conspiracy Bill* (Loud Applause). . . I do not know the official communication that has gone to Washington; but the opinion prevails that the Crown lawyers have recommended the government to take its stand on the quite narrow legal ground that the Southern commissioners might not be seized without the ship that carried them. Con-

sequently the handing over of Slidell and Mason is to be demanded as the *sine qua non*.\*

Suppose the people on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean does not permit its government to hand them over. Will you go to war with it for the bodies of these two envoys of the slavedrivers? . . . There exists in this country an anti-republican war party. Remember the last Russian war. From the secret dispatches published in Petersburg it was clear beyond all doubt that the articles published by *The Times* in 1855 were written by a person who had access to the secret Russian state papers and documents. At that time Mr. Layard read the striking passages in the Lower House, and *The Times*, in its consternation, immediately changed its tone and blew the war trumpet next morning . . . *The Times* has repeatedly attacked the Emperor Napoleon and supported our government in its demand for unlimited credits for land fortifications and floating batteries. Having done this and raised the alarm cry against France, does *The Times* now wish to leave our coast exposed to the French emperor by embroiling our country in a trans-Atlantic war . . .? It is to be feared that the present great preparations are intended by no means only for the *Trent* case but for the eventuality of a recognition of the government of the slave states. If England does this, then she will cover herself with everlasting shame.

Mr. White . It is due to the working class to mention that they are the originators of this meeting and that all the expenses of organizing it are borne by their committee . The present government never had the good judgment to deal honestly and frankly with the people. . . I have never for a moment believed that there was the remotest possibility of a war developing out of the *Trent* case. I have said to the face of more than one member of the government that not a single member of the government believed in the possibility of a war on account of the *Trent* case. Why, then, these powerful preparations? I believe that England and France have reached an understanding to recognize the independence of the Southern states next spring. By then Great Britain would have a fleet of superior strength in American waters. Canada would be completely equipped for defence. If the Northern states are then inclined to make a *casus belli* out of the recognition of the Southern states, Great Britain will then be prepared. . .

The speaker then went on to develop the dangers of a war with the United States, called to mind the sympathy that America showed on the death of General Havelock, the assistance that the American sailors rendered to the English ships in the unlucky *Peiho* engagement,<sup>87</sup> etc. He closed with the remark that the Civil War would end with the abolition

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\* That which is absolutely indispensable.—Ed.

of slavery and England must therefore stand unconditionally on the side of the North.

The original motion having been unanimously adopted, a memorandum for Palmerston was submitted to the meeting, debated and adopted.

*Die Presse*, January 5, 1862.

15.

THE HISTORY OF SEWARD'S  
SUPPRESSED DISPATCH

London, January 14, 1862.

THE defunct *Trent* case is resurrected, this time, however, as a *casus belli* not between England and the United States, but between the English people and the English government. The new *casus belli* will be decided in Parliament, which assembles next month. Without doubt you have already taken notice of the polemic of *The Daily News* and *The Star* against the *Morning Post* for suppressing and denying Seward's peace dispatch of November 30 which on December 19 was read to Lord John Russell by the American Ambassador, Mr. Adams. Permit me, now, to return to this matter. With the assurance of the *Morning Post* that Seward's dispatch had not the remotest bearing on the *Trent* affair, stock exchange securities fell and property worth millions changed hands, was lost on the one side, won on the other. In business and industrial circles, therefore, the wholly unjustifiable semi-official lie of the *Morning Post* disclosed by the publication of Seward's dispatch of November 30 arouses the most tremendous indignation.

On the afternoon of January 9 the peace news reached London. The same evening the *Evening Star* (the evening edition of the *Morning Star*) interpellated the government concerning the suppression of Seward's dispatch of November 30. The following morning, January 10, the *Morning Post* replied as follows :

It will of course be asked why is it that we have not heard of this sooner seeing that Mr. Seward's dispatch must have reached Mr. Adams some time in December? The explanation of this is very simple. It is that the dispatch re-

ceived by Mr. Adams was not communicated to the English government.\*

On the evening of the same day *The Star* gave the lie to the *Post* completely and declared its "rectification" to be a miserable subterfuge. The dispatch had in fact not been "communicated" to Lord Palmerston and Lord Russell by Mr. Adams, but had been "read out."

Next morning, Saturday, January 11, *The Daily News* entered the lists and proved from the *Morning Post's* article of December 21 that the latter and the government were fully acquainted with Seward's dispatch at that time and deliberately falsified it. The government now prepared to retreat. On the evening of January 11 the semi-official *Globe* declared that Mr. Adams had, to be sure, communicated Seward's dispatch to the government on December 19; this, however, "contained no offer of the kind which Lord Russell supposed the Federal government might have been willing to make any more than that immediate apology for Captain Wilkes' outrage on our flag."† This shamefaced confession of a deliberate deception of the English people for three weeks only fanned the flame higher, instead of quenching it. A cry of anger resounded through all the organs of the industrial districts of Great Britain, which yesterday finally found its echo even in the Tory newspapers. The whole question, it was clearly observed, was placed on the order of the day, not by politicians, but by the commercial public. Today's *Morning Star* remarks on the subject.

Lord John Russell made himself an accomplice in that suppression of the truth which is the virtual suggestion of falsehood—he allowed the *Morning Post* to state, uncontradicted, the very opposite of the truth, but he is incapable of having dictated that mendacious and incalculably pernicious article which appeared on the 21st of December.... There can be only one man high enough in office, and low enough in character, to have inspired the atrocious composition... The Minister who mutilated the Afghan dispatches is alone capable of having suppressed... Mr. Seward's message of peace... The foolish leniency of the House of Commons condoned the one offence. Will not Parliament and people in the infliction of punishment for the other?‡

*Die Presse*, January 18, 1862.

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\**Morning Post*, January 10, 1862.—Ed.

†*Globe*, January 11, 1862.—Ed.

‡*Morning Star*, January 14, 1862.—Ed.

## A COUP D'ETAT OF LORD JOHN RUSSELL.

London, January 17, 1862

LORD John Russell's position during the recent crisis was a thoroughly vexatious one, even for a man whose whole parliamentary life proves that he has seldom hesitated to sacrifice real power for official position. No one forgot that Lord John Russell has lost the Premiership to Palmerston, but no one seemed to remember that he has gained the Foreign Office from Palmerston. All the world considered it a self-evident axiom that Palmerston directed the Cabinet in his own name and foreign policy under the name of Russell. On the arrival of the first peace news from New York, Whigs and Tories vied with one another in trumpet-blasts to the greater glory of Palmerston's statesmanship, whilst the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Lord John Russell, was not even a candidate for praise as his assistant. He was absolutely ignored. Hardly, however, had the scandal caused by the suppressed American dispatch of November 30 broken out, when Russell's name was resurrected from the dead.

Attack and defence now made the discovery that the responsible Minister for Foreign Affairs was called Lord John Russell! But now even Russell's patience gave way. Without waiting for the opening of Parliament and contrary to every ministerial convention, he published forthwith in the official *Gazette* of January 12 his own correspondence with Lord Lyons. This correspondence proves that Seward's dispatch on November 30 was read by Mr. Adams to Lord John Russell on December 19; that Russell expressly acknowledged this dispatch as an *apology* for the act of Captain Wilkes, and that Mr. Adams, after Russell's disclosures, considered a peaceful outcome of the dispute as certain. After this official disclosure, what becomes of the *Morning Post* of December 21, which denied the arrival of any dispatch from Seward relating to the *Trent* case; what becomes of the *Morning Post* of January 10, which blamed Mr. Adams for the suppression of the dispatch, what becomes of the entire wai racket of the Palmerston press from December 19, 1861, to January 8, 1862? Even more! Lord John Russell's dispatch to Lord Lyons of December 19, 1861, proves that the

English Cabinet presented *no war ultimatum*; that Lord Lyons did *not* receive instructions to leave Washington seven days after delivering "this ultimatum"; that Russell ordered the ambassador to avoid every semblance of a threat, and, finally, that the English Cabinet had determined to make a *definitive decision* only after receipt of the American answer. The whole of the policy trumpeted by the Palmerston press, which found so many servile echoes on the Continent, is therefore a mere chimera. It has never been carried out in real life. It only proves, as a London paper states today, that Palmerston "sought to thwart the declared and binding policy of the *responsible* advisers of the Crown."

That Lord John Russell's *coup de main* struck the Palmerston press like a bolt from the blue, one fact proves most forcibly. *The Times* of yesterday suppressed the Russell correspondence and made no mention of it whatever. Only to-day a reprint from the *London Gazette* figures in its columns, introduced and prefaced by a leading article that carefully avoids the real issue, *the issue between the English people and the English Cabinet*, and touches on it merely in the ill-humoured phrase that "Lord Russell has exerted all his ingenuity to extract an apology" out of Seward's dispatch of November 30. On the other hand, the wrathful *Jupiter Tonans* of Printing House Square lets off steam in a second leading article, in which Mr Gilpin, a member of the ministry, the President of the Board of Trade and a partisan of the Manchester school, is declared to be unworthy of his place in the ministry. For last Tuesday, at a public meeting in Northampton, whose parliamentary representative he is, Gilpin, a former bookseller, a demagogue and an apostle of moderation, whom nobody will take for a hero, criminally urged the English people to prevent by public demonstrations an untimely recognition of the Southern Confederacy, which he inconsiderately stigmatized as an offspring of slavery. As if, *The Times* indignantly exclaims, as if Palmerston and Russell—*The Times* now remembers the existence of Lord John Russell once more—had not fought all their lives to put down slavery! It was surely an indiscretion, a *calculated* indiscretion on the part of Mr. Gilpin, to call the English people into the lists against the pro-slavery longings of a ministry to which he himself belongs. But Mr Gilpin, as already mentioned, is no hero. His whole career evidences little capacity for martyrdom. His indiscretion occurred on the

same day as Lord Russell carried out his *coup de main*. We may therefore conclude that the Cabinet is not a "happy family" and that its individual members have already familiarized themselves with the idea of "separation."

No less noteworthy than the English ministerial sequel to the *Trent* drama is its *Russian epilogue*. Russia, which during the entire racket stood silently in the background with folded arms, now springs to the proscenium, claps Mr. Seward on the shoulders—and declares that the moment for the definitive regulation of the maritime rights of neutrals has at last arrived. Russia, as is known, considers herself called on to put the urgent questions of civilization on the agenda of world history at the right time and in the right place. Russia becomes unassailable by the maritime powers the moment the latter give up, with their belligerent rights against neutrals, their power over Russia's export trade. The Paris Convention of April 16, 1856, which is in part a verbatim copy of the Russian "Armed" Neutrality Treaty of 1780 against England is meanwhile not yet law in England. What a trick of destiny if the *Anglo-American* dispute ended with the English Parliament and the English Crown sanctioning a concession that two British ministers made to Russia on their own authority at the end of the *Anglo-Russian* war.

*Die Presse*, January 21, 1862.

## 17.

### A LONDON WORKERS' MEETING

London, January 28, 1862.

THE working class, so preponderant a component part of a society that within living memory has no longer possessed a *peasantry*, is known to be unrepresented in Parliament. Nevertheless, it is not without political influence. No important innovation, no decisive measure has ever been carried through in this country without *pressure from without*, whether it was the opposition that required such pressure against the government or the government that required the pressure against the opposition. By *pressure from without* the Englishman understands great, extra-parliamentary popular demonstra-



tions, which naturally cannot be staged without the lively co-operation of the working class. Pitt understood how to use the masses against the Whigs in his Anti-Jacobin War. The Catholic emancipation, the Reform Bill, the abolition of the Corn Laws, the Ten Hours Bill, the war against Russia, the rejection of Palmerston's Conspiracy Bill,<sup>88</sup> all were the fruit of stormy extra-parliamentary demonstrations, in which the working class, sometimes artificially incited, sometimes acting spontaneously, now as a *persona dramatis*,\* now as the chorus played the principal part or, according to circumstances, the noisy part. So much the more striking is the attitude of the English working class in regard to the American Civil War.

The misery that the stoppage of the factories and the shortening of the labour time, motivated by the blockade of the slave states, has produced among the workers in the northern manufacturing districts is incredible and in daily process of growth.<sup>89</sup> The other component parts of the working class do not suffer to the same extent; but they suffer severely from the reaction of the crisis in the cotton industry on the remaining branches of production, from the curtailment of the export of their own products to the North of America in consequence of the Morrill tariff and from the annihilation of this export to the South in consequence of the blockade. At the present moment, English interference in America has accordingly become a bread-and-butter question for the working class. Moreover, no means of inflaming its wrath against the United States is scorned by its "*natural superiors*." The sole great and widely circulating workers' organ still existing, *Reynolds's Weekly Newspaper*, has been purchased expressly in order that for six months it might reiterate weekly in raging diatribes the *caeterum censeo* of English intervention. The working class is accordingly fully conscious that the government is only waiting for the intervention cry from below, the *pressure from without*, to put an end to the American blockade and English misery. Under these circumstances, the obstinacy with which the working class keeps silent, or breaks its silence only to raise its voice against intervention and for the United States, is admirable. This is a new, brilliant proof of the indestructible excellence of the English popular masses, of that excellence which is the secret of England's greatness and which, to speak in the

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\*Person of the drama—*Ed.*

hyperbolic language of Mazzini, made the common English soldier seem a demi-god during the Crimean War and the Indian insurrection.

The following report on a great *workers' meeting* that took place yesterday in Marylebone, the most populous district of London, may serve to characterize the "policy" of the working class :

Mr. Steadman, the chairman, opened the meeting with the remark that the question was one of a decision on the part of the English people in regard to the *reception* of Messrs. Mason and Slidell. "It has to be considered whether these gentlemen have come on a voyage here to free the slaves from their chains or to forge a new link for these chains."

Mr. Yates : On the present occasion the working class dare not keep silent. The two gentlemen who are sailing across the Atlantic Ocean to our land are the agents of slaveholding and tyrannical states. They are in open rebellion against the lawful Constitution of their country and come here to induce our government to recognize the independence of the slave states. It is the duty of the working class to pronounce its opinion now, if the English government is not to believe that we regard its foreign policy with indifference. We must show that the money expended by this people on the emancipation of slaves cannot be allowed to be uselessly squandered. Had our government acted honestly, it would have supported the Northern states heart and soul in suppressing this fearful rebellion.

After a detailed defence of the Northern states and the observation that "Mr. Lovejoy's violent tirade against England was called forth by the slanders of the English press," the speaker proposed the following motion :

This meeting resolves that the agents of the rebels, Mason and Slidell, now on the way from America to England, are absolutely unworthy of the moral sympathies of the working class of this country, since they are slaveholders as well as the confessed agents of the tyrannical faction that is at once in rebellion against the American republic and the sworn enemy of the social and political rights of the working class in all countries.

Mr. Whyune supported the motion. It was, however, self-understood that every personal insult to Mason and Slidell must be avoided during their presence in London.

Mr. Nicholas, a resident "*of the extreme North* of the United States," as he announced, who was in fact sent to the

meeting by Messrs. Yancey and Mann as the *advocatus diaboli*,\* protested against the motion.

I am here, because here freedom of speech prevails. With us at home, the government has permitted no man to open his mouth for three months. Liberty has been crushed not only in the South, but also in the North. The war has many foes in the North, but they dare not speak. No less than two hundred newspapers have been suppressed or destroyed by the mob. The Southern states have the same right to secede from the North as the United States had to separate from England.

Despite the eloquence of Mr. Nichols, the first motion was carried unanimously. He now sprang up afresh: "If they reproached Messrs. Mason and Slidell with being slaveholders, the same thing would apply to Washington and Jefferson, etc."

Mr. Beale refuted Nichols in a detailed speech and then brought forward a second motion.

In view of the ill-concealed efforts of *The Times* and other misleading journals to represent English public opinion on all American affairs falsely; to embroil it in war with millions of our kinsmen on any pretext whatever, and to take advantage of the momentary perils of the republic to defame democratic institutions, this meeting regards it as the very special duty of the workers, since they are not represented in the Senate of the nation, to declare their sympathy with the United States in their titanic struggle for the maintenance of the Union, to denounce the shameful dishonesty and advocacy of slaveholding on the part of *The Times* and kindred aristocratic journals; to express themselves most emphatically in favour of the strictest policy of non-intervention in affairs of the United States and in favour of the settlement of all matters that may be in dispute by commissioners or arbitration courts nominated by both sides; to denounce the war policy of the organ of the stock exchange swindlers, and to manifest the warmest sympathy with the strivings of the Abolitionists for a final solution of the slave question.

This motion was unanimously adopted, as well as the final motion "to forward to the American government *per medium* of Mr. Adams a copy of the resolutions framed, as an expression of the feelings and opinions of the working class of England."

*Die Presse*, February 2, 1862.

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\* Devil's advocate.—Ed

## ‘ANTI-INTERVENTION FEELING

London, January 31, 1862.

LIVERPOOL'S commercial greatness derives its origin from the *slave trade*. The sole contributions with which Liverpool has enriched the poetic literature of England are odes to the slave trade. Fifty years ago Wilberforce could set foot on Liverpool soil only at the risk of his life. As in the preceding century the slave trade, so in the present century the trade in the product of slavery—cotton—formed the material basis of Liverpool's greatness. No wonder, therefore, that Liverpool is the centre of the English friends of secession. It is in fact the sole city in the United Kingdom where during the recent crisis it was possible to organize a quasi-public meeting in favour of a war with the United States. And what does Liverpool say now? Let us hearken to one of its great daily organs, the *Daily Post*.

In a leading article entitled "The Cute Yankees" it is stated among other things

The Yankees, with their usual adroitness, contrived to convert a loss into a gain. In point of fact they have so managed affairs as to make England subservient to their advantage. Great Britain has the advantage of displaying her power (but to what end?) The Yankees were always in favour of the unlimited privilege of neutrals, but Great Britain was opposed to it (this privilege was contested to the limit during the Anti-Jacobin War, the Anglo-American War of 1812 to 1814, and again, more recently in 1842, during the negotiations between Lord Ashburton and the Secretary of State Daniel Webster). Now our opposition must cease. *The Yankee principle is virtually recognized*. Mr. Seward establishes the fact....(declares that England has given way in principle and that through the *Trent* case the United States have obtained a concession to secure which they had hitherto exhausted every means of diplomacy and of war in vain).

More important still is the *Daily Post's* admission of the revulsion in public feeling, even in Liverpool.

The Confederate—it says—have certainly done nothing to forfeit the good opinion entertained of them. Quite the contrary. They have fought manfully and made dreadful sacrifices. If they do not obtain their independence every one must admit that they deserve it....Public opinion, however, has now run counter to their claims. They are no

longer the fine fellows they were six months ago. They are pronounced by implication to be a very sorry set.

...A reaction has in fact set in. The anti-slavery people, who, to use a vulgarism, shrunk in their shoes in the presence of popular excitement, now come forth to thunder big words against man-selling and the slave-owners of the Southern states... The walls of the town were yesterday posted with a great placard full of denunciation and angry invective, and a London evening paper, the *Sun*, remembered *something to Mr. Mason's disadvantage*. "the author of the accursed Fugitive Slave Law..." The Confederates have lost by the *Trent* affair. It was to be their gain; it has turned out to be their ruin. The sympathy of this country will be withdrawn from them and they will have to realize as soon as possible their peculiar situation. They have been very ill-used but they will have no redress.<sup>1</sup>

After this admission by such a friend of secession as the Liverpool daily paper it is easy to explain the altered language that some important organs of Palmerston now suddenly make use of before the opening of Parliament. Thus *The Economist* of last Saturday has an article entitled, "Shall the Blockade be Respected?"

It proceeds in the first place from the *axiom* that the blockade is a mere *paper blockade* and that its violation is therefore permitted by international law. France demanded the blockade's forcible removal. The practical decision of the question lay accordingly in the hands of England, who had a great and pressing motive for such a step. In particular she was in need of American cotton. One may remark incidentally that it is not quite clear how a "mere paper blockade" can prevent the shipping of cotton.

"But nevertheless," cries *The Economist*, "*England must respect the blockade*" Having motivated this judgment with a series of sophisms, it finally comes to the gist of the matter.

It would be undesirable in a case of this kind—it says—for our government to take any steps or to enter any course of action in which they would not carry the whole country cordially and spontaneously with them. Now we doubt whether the great body of the British people are yet *prepared* for any interposition which would *even have the semblance* of siding with, or aiding the establishment of, a slave republic. The social system of the Confederate states is based on slavery, the Federalists have done what they could... to persuade us that slavery lay at the root of the Secession movement, and

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<sup>1</sup> *Liverpool Daily Post*, January 13, 1862.—Ed.

that they, the Federalists, were hostile to slavery;—and slavery is our especial horror and detestation.

But the real error of the popular movement is here:—it is the *Restoration* and not *Dissolution* of the Union that would be the consolidation and perpetuation of Negro servitude, and that it is in the independence of the South and not in her defeat, that we can alone look with confidence for the early amelioration and ultimate extinction of the slavery we abhor... We hope soon to make this clear to our readers. But it is not clear yet. *The majority of Englishmen still think otherwise*; and as long as they do, any intervention on the part of our government which should place us in a position of actual opposition to the North, and inferential alliance with the South, would scarcely be supported by the hearty co-operation of the British nation.

In other words, the attempt at such intervention would cause the downfall of the ministry. And this also explains why *The Times* pronounces itself so decidedly against any intervention and for England's neutrality.

*Die Presse*, February 4, 1862

## 19.

### ON THE COTTON CRISIS

SOME days ago the annual meeting of the Chamber of Commerce of Manchester took place. It represents Lancashire, the the greatest industrial district of the United Kingdom and the chief seat of British cotton manufacture. The chairman of the meeting, Mr. Potter, and the principal speakers at it, Messrs. Bazley and Turner, represent Manchester and a part of Lancashire in the Lower House. From the proceedings of the meeting, therefore, we learn *officially* what attitude the great centre of English cotton industry will adopt in the "Senate of the nation" in face of the American crisis.

At the meeting of the Chamber of Commerce *last year* Mr. Ashworth, one of England's biggest cotton barons, had celebrated with Pindaric extravagance the unexampled expansion of the cotton industry during the last decade. In particular he stressed the point that even the commercial crises of 1847 and 1857 had produced no falling off in the export of English cotton yarns and textile fabrics. He explained

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\**The Economist*, January 25, 1862—Ed.

the phenomenon by the wonder-working powers of the free trade system introduced in 1846. Even then it sounded strange that this system, though unable to spare England the crises of 1847 and 1857, should be able to withdraw a *particular* branch of English industry from the influence of those crises. But what do we hear today? All the speakers, Mr. Ashworth included, confess that since 1858 an unprecedented glutting of the Atlantic markets has taken place and that in consequence of steadily continuing *overproduction* on a mass scale the present stagnation *was bound* to occur, even without the American Civil War, the Morrill tariff and the blockade. Whether without these aggravating circumstances the falling off in last year's exports would have been as much as £6,000,000, naturally remains an open question but does not appear improbable when we hear that the principal markets of Asia and Australia are stocked with sufficient English cotton manufactures for twelve months.

Thus, according to the confession of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, which in *this* matter speaks with authority, the crisis in the English cotton industry has so far been the result not of the American blockade, but of English overproduction. But what would be the consequences of a continuation of the American Civil War? To this question we again receive an unanimous answer. Measureless suffering for the working class and ruin for the smaller manufacturers. "It is said in London," observed Mr. Cheatham, "that they have still plenty of cotton to go on with; but it is not a question of cotton; but it is a question of *price*, and at present prices the capital of the millowners is being destroyed."

The Chamber of Commerce, however, declares itself to be decidedly *against any intervention* in the United States, although most of its members are sufficiently swayed by *The Times* to consider the dissolution of the Union to be unavoidable.

The last thing—says Mr. Potter—that we should do is to recommend, anything like intervention. The last place where such a thing could be entertained, was Manchester. Nothing would tempt them to recommend something which is morally wrong.

Mr. Bazley. The American quarrel must be left to the principle of non-intervention. The people of that vast country must really settle their own affairs.

Mr. Cheatham. The leading opinion in this district is wholly opposed to intervention in the American dispute. It is necessary to make a clear pronouncement on this, because

strong pressure would be put upon the Government if there was any doubt of it.

What, then, does the Chamber of Commerce recommend? The English government ought to remove all the obstacles of an administrative character that still impede cotton imports into India. In particular, it ought to lift the import duty of 10 per cent. with which English cotton yarns and textile fabrics are burdened in India. The regime of the East India Company had hardly been done away with, India had hardly been incorporated in the British Empire,<sup>80</sup> when Palmerston introduced this import duty on English manufactures through Mr. Wilson, and that at the same time as he sold Savoy and Nice for the Anglo-French commercial treaty.<sup>81</sup> Whilst the French market was opened to English industry to a certain extent, the East Indian market was closed to it to a greater extent.

With reference to the above, Mr. Bazley remarked that since the introduction of this tax great quantities of English machinery had been exported to Calcutta and Bombay and factories had been erected there in the English style. These were preparing to snatch the best Indian cotton from them. If 15 per cent for freight were added to the 10 per cent import duty, the rivals artificially called into being through the initiative of the English government enjoyed a protective duty of 25 per cent.

In general, bitter resentment was expressed at the meeting of magnates of English industry at the protectionist tendency that was developing more and more in the colonies, in Australia in particular. The gentlemen forget that for a century and a half the colonies protested in vain against the "colonial system" of the motherland. At that time the colonies demanded free trade. England insisted on prohibition. Now England preaches free trade, and the colonies find protection against England better suited to their interests.

*Die Presse*, February 8, 1862.



THE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE\*  
ON THE ADDRESS

London, February 7, 1862.

THE opening of Parliament was a lustreless ceremony. The absence of the Queen and the reading of the Speech from the Throne by the Lord Chancellor banished every theatrical effect. The Speech from the Throne itself is short without being striking. It recapitulates the *faits accomplis*\* of foreign politics and, for an estimation of these facts, refers to the documents submitted to Parliament. Only one phrase created a certain sensation, the phrase in which the Queen "trusts there is no reason to apprehend any disturbance of the peace of Europe." This phrase in fact implies that European peace is relegated to the domain of hope and faith.

In accordance with parliamentary practice, the gentlemen who moved the Reply to the Speech from the Throne in the two Houses had already been commissioned by the ministers with this business three weeks ago. In conformity with the usual procedure, their Reply consists of a broad echo of the Speech from the Throne and of fulsome praises that the ministers bestow upon themselves in the name of Parliament. When Sir Francis Burdett anticipated the official movers of the Address in 1811 and seized the opportunity to subject the Speech from the Throne to a cutting criticism, Magna Charta itself appeared to be imperilled. Since that time no further enormity of the kind has happened.

The interest of the debate on the Speech from the Throne is therefore limited to the "hints" of the official Opposition club and the "counter-hints" of the ministers. This time, however, the interest was more academic than political. It was a question of the best funeral oration on Prince Albert, who during his life found the yoke of the English oligarchy by no means light. According to the *vox populi*,† Derby and Disraeli have borne off the academic palm, the first as a natural speaker, the others as a rhetorician.

The "business" part of the debate turned on the United States, Mexico, and Morocco.

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\*Accomplished facts.—*Ed.*

†Voice of the people.—*Ed.*

With regard to the United States, the *Outs* (those out of office) eulogised the policy of the *Ins* (the *meati possidentes*\*). Derby, the Conservative leader in the House of Lords, and Disraeli, the Conservative leader in the Lower House, opposed not the Cabinet, but each other.

Derby in the first place gave vent to his dissatisfaction over the absence of "*pressure from without*." He "admired," he said, the stoical and dignified bearing of the factory workers. As far as the mill owners were concerned, however he must exclude them from his commendation. For them the American disturbance had come in extraordinarily handy, since overproduction and glutting of all markets had in any case imposed on them a restriction of trade.

Derby went on to make a violent attack on the Union government, "which had exposed itself and its people to the most undignified humiliation" and had not acted like "gentlemen," because it had not taken the initiative and voluntarily surrendered Mason, Slidell and company and made amends. His seconder in the Lower House, Mr. Disraeli, at once grasped how very damaging Derby's onslaught was to the hopes of the Conservatives. He therefore declared to the contrary: "When I consider the great difficulties which the statesmen of North America have to encounter....I would venture to say that they have met these manfully and courageously."

On the other hand—with the consistency customary to him—Derby protested against the "new doctrines" of maritime law. England had at all times upheld belligerent rights against the pretensions of neutrals. Lord Clarendon, it was true, had made a dangerous concession at Paris in 1856. Happily, this had not yet been ratified by the Crown, so that "it did not change the position of international law." Mr. Disraeli, on the contrary, manifestly in collusion with the ministry here, avoided touching on this point at all.

Derby approved of the non-intervention policy of the ministry. The time to recognize the Southern Confederacy has not yet come, but he demands authentic documents for the purpose of judging "how far the blockade is bona fide and effective and...whether the blockade has been such a one as ought to be recognized and respected by the law of nations" Lord John Russell, on the other hand, declared that the Union government had employed a sufficient number of ships in the

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\* Blessed possessors.—Ed.

blockade, but had not everywhere carried this out consistently. Mr. Disraeli will permit himself no judgment on the nature of the blockade, but demands ministerial papers for enlightenment. He gives such emphatic warning against any premature recognition of the Confederacy since England is compromising herself at the present moment by threatening an American state (Mexico), the independence of which she herself was the first to recognize.

After the United States, it was Mexico's turn. No member of Parliament condemned a war without declaration of war, but they condemned interference in the internal relations of a country under the shibboleth of a "non-intervention policy," and the coalition of England with France and Spain in order to intimidate a semi-defenceless land. As a matter of fact, the *Outs* merely indicated that they reserve Mexico to themselves for party manoeuvres. Derby demands documents on both the Convention between the three powers and the mode of carrying it out. He approves of the Convention *because*—in his view—the right way was for each of the contracting parties to enforce its claims *independently* of the others. Certain public rumours caused him to fear that at least one of the powers—Spain—purposed operations verging on betrayal. As if Derby really believed the great power, Spain, capable of the audacity of acting *counter* to the will of England and France! Lord John Russell answered: The three powers pursued *the same* aim and would anxiously avoid hindering the Mexicans from regulating their own affairs.

In the Lower House, Mr. Disraeli defers any judgment prior to scrutinizing the documents submitted. However, he finds "the announcement of the government *suspicious*." The independence of Mexico was first recognized by England. This recognition recalls a notable policy—the anti-Holy-Alliance policy—and a notable man, Canning. What singular occasion, then, drove England to strike the first blow against this independence? Moreover, the intervention has changed its pretext within a very short time. Originally it was a question of satisfaction for wrong done to English subjects. Now there are whispers concerning the introduction of new governmental principles and the setting up of a new dynasty. Lord Palmerston refers members to the papers submitted and to the Convention that prohibits the "subjugation" of Mexico by the Allies or the imposition of a form of government distaste-

ful to the people. At the same time, however, he discloses a secret diplomatic corner. He has it from hearsay that a party in Mexico desires the transformation of the republic into a monarchy. The strength of this party he does not know. He "for his part, only desires that some form of government be set up in Mexico with which foreign governments may treat." He declares the *non-existence of the present government*. He claims for the alliance of England, France and Spain the prerogative of the Holy Alliance to decide over the existence or non-existence of foreign governments. "That is the utmost," he adds modestly, "which the government of Great Britain is desirous of obtaining." Nothing more!

The last "open question" of foreign policy concerned Morocco. The English government has concluded a convention with Morocco in order to enable her to pay off her debt to Spain, a debt with which Spain could never have saddled Morocco without England's leave. Certain persons, it appears, have advanced Morocco money with which to pay her instalments to Spain, thus depriving the latter of a pretext for further occupation of Tetuan and renewal of war.<sup>82</sup> The English government has in one way or another guaranteed these persons the interest on their loan and, in its turn, takes over the administration of Morocco's customs houses as security.

Derby found this manner of ensuring the independence of Morocco "*rather strange*," but elicited no answer from the ministers. In the Lower House Mr. Disraeli went into the transaction further: it was "to some extent unconstitutional," since the ministry had saddled England with new financial obligations behind Parliament's back. Palmerston simply referred him to the "documents" submitted.

Home affairs were hardly mentioned. Derby merely warned members, out of regard "for the state of mind of the Queen," not to raise "disturbing" controversial questions like parliamentary reform. He is ready to pay his tribute of admiration regularly to the English working class, on condition that it suffers its exclusion from popular representation with the same stoicism as it suffers the American blockade.

It would be a mistake to infer from the idyllic opening of Parliament an idyllic future. Quite the contrary! Dissolution of Parliament or dissolution of the ministry is the motto of this year's session. Opportunity to substantiate these alternatives will be found later.

*Die Presse*, February 12, 1862.

## AMERICAN AFFAIRS

PRESIDENT Lincoln never ventures a step forward before the tide of circumstances and the call of general public opinion forbids further delay. But once "old Abe" has convinced himself that such a turning-point has been reached, he then surprises friend and foe alike by a sudden operation executed as noiselessly as possible. Thus, in the most unassuming manner, he has quite recently carried out a coup<sup>1</sup> that half a year earlier would possibly have cost him his presidential office and even a few months ago, would have called forth a storm of debate. We mean the *removal* of *McClellan* from his post of Commander-in-Chief of all the Union armies. Lincoln first of all replaces the Secretary of war, Cameron,<sup>2</sup> by an energetic and ruthless lawyer, Mr. Edwin Stanton. To Generals Buell, Halleck, Butler, Sherman and other commanders of whole departments or leaders of expeditions, Stanton then issued an order of the day in which they were notified that in future they would take all orders, open and secret, from the War Department direct and, on the other hand, would have to report directly to the War Department. Finally, Lincoln issued some orders in which he signed himself "Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy," an attribute constitutionally pertaining to him. In this "quiet" manner "the young Napoleon" was deprived of the supreme command he had hitherto held over all the armies and restricted to the command of the army on the Potomac,<sup>3</sup> although the title of "Commander-in-Chief" was left to him. The successes in Kentucky, Tennessee and on the Atlantic coast have propitiously inaugurated the assumption of the supreme command by President Lincoln.

The post of Commander-in-Chief hitherto occupied by McClellan has been bequeathed the United States by England and corresponds approximately to the dignity of a Grand Connetable<sup>4</sup> in the old French army. During the Crimean War even England discovered the inexpediency of this old-fashioned institution. A compromise was accordingly effected by which part of the attributes hitherto pertaining to the Commander-in-Chief were transferred to the Secretary of War.

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<sup>1</sup>Grand Constable—Ed

The requisite material for an estimate of McClellan's Fabian\* tactics on the Potomac is still lacking. That his influence, however, acted as a brake on the general conduct of the war, is beyond doubt. One can say of McClellan what Macaulay says of Essex: "The military mistakes of Essex sprang for the most part from political compunction. He was honestly, but by no means warmly attached to the cause of Parliament, and next to a great defeat he feared nothing so much as a great victory." McClellan and most of the officers of the regular army who got their training at West Point are more or less bound to their old comrades in the enemy camp by the ties of *esprit de corps*.† They are inspired by like jealousy of the *parvenus*‡ among the "civilian soldiers." In their view, the war must be waged in a strictly businesslike fashion, with constant regard to the restoration of the Union on its old basis, and therefore must above all be kept free from revolutionary tendencies affecting matters of principle. A fine conception of a war that is essentially a war of principles! The first generals of the English Parliament fell into the same error. "But," says Cromwell, "how changed everything was as soon as men took the lead who professed a principle of *godliness and religion*!"

The *Washington Star*, McClellan's special organ, declares in one of its latest issues: "The aim of all General McClellan's military combinations is to restore the Union *completely*, exactly as it existed before the outbreak of the rebellion" No wonder, therefore, if on the Potomac, under the eyes of the supreme general, the army was trained to catch slaves! Only recently, by special *ordre*, McClellan expelled the Hutchinson family of musicians from the camp because they sang anti-slavery songs.

Apart from such "anti-tendencial" demonstrations, McClellan covered the traitors in the Union Army with his saving shield. Thus, for example, he promoted Maynard to a higher post, although Maynard, as the papers made public by the inquiry *comité*§ of the House of Representatives prove,

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\*Used to designate a policy like that of Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus (d 203 B.C.) who avoided direct engagements with Hannibal during the Second Punic War.—*Ed.*

\*\*Corps spirit.—*Ed.*

†Upstarts.—*Ed.*

‡Committee.—*Ed.*

worked as the agent of the secessionists. From General Patterson, whose treachery determined the defeat at Manassas, to General Stone, who effected the defeat at Ball's Bluff in direct agreement with the enemy, McClellan knew how to keep every military traitor from court martial, and in most cases even from dismissal. The inquiry comite of Congress has in this respect revealed the most surprising facts. Lincoln resolved to prove by an energetic step that with his assumption of the supreme command the hour of the traitors in epaulets had struck and a turning point in the war policy had been reached. By his order, General Stone was arrested in his bed at two o'clock in the morning of February 10 and transported to Fort Lafayette. A few hours later, the order for his arrest, signed by Stanton, appeared; in this the charge of high treason is formulated, to be judged by a court martial. The arrest and putting of Stone on trial took place without any previous communication to General McClellan.

As long as he himself remained in a state of inaction and wore his laurels merely in advance, McClellan was obviously determined to allow no other general to forestall him. Generals Halleck and Pope had resolved on a combined movement to force General Price, who had already been saved once from Fremont by the intervention of Washington, to a decisive battle. A telegram from McClellan forbade them to deliver the blow. General Halleck was "ordered back" by a similar telegram from the capture of Fort Columbus, at a time when this fort stood half under water. McClellan had expressly forbidden the generals in the West to correspond with one another. Each of these was obliged first to address himself to Washington, as soon as a combined movement was intended. President Lincoln has now given them back the necessary freedom of action.

How advantageous to secession McClellan's general military policy was, is best proved by the panegyrics that the *New York Herald* continually lavishes upon him. He is a hero after the *Herald's* own heart. The notorious Bennett, the proprietor and editor-in-chief of the *Herald*, had formerly bossed the administrations of Pierce and Buchanan through his "special representatives," alias correspondents, at Washington. Under Lincoln's administration he sought to win the same power again in a roundabout way, by having his "special representatives," Dr. Joes, a man of the South and brother of an officer who had deserted to the Confederacy,

worm himself into McClellan's favour. Under McClellan's patronage, great liberties must have been allowed this Joes at the time when Cameron was at the head of the War Department. He evidently expected Stanton to guarantee him the same privileges and accordingly presented himself on February 8 at the War Office, where the Secretary of War, his chief secretary and some members of Congress were just taking counsel concerning war measures. He was shown the door. He got up on his hind legs and finally beat a retreat, threatening that the *Herald* would open fire on the present War Department in the event of its withholding from him his "special privilege" of having, in particular, Cabinet deliberations, telegrams, public communications and war news confided to him in the War Department. Next morning, February 9, Dr. Joes had assembled the whole of McClellan's General Staff at a champagne breakfast with him. Misfortune, however, moves fast. A non-commissioned officer entered with six men, seized the mighty Joes and brought him to Fort McHenry, where, as the *ordre* of the Secretary of War expressly states, he is to be kept under strict watch as a spy.

*Die Presse*, March 3, 1862

## 22.

### THE SECESSIONISTS' FRIENDS IN THE LOWER HOUSE

#### RECOGNITION OF THE AMERICAN BLOCKADE

London, March 8, 1862.

*PARTURIUNT montes* <sup>1\*</sup> Since the opening of Parliament the English friends of *Secessia* had threatened a "motion" on the American blockade. The resolution has at length been introduced in the Lower House in the very modest form of a motion in which the government is urged "to submit further documents on the state of the blockade"—and even this insignificant motion was rejected without the formality of a division.

Mr. Gregory, the member for Galway, who moved the

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\*The mountains are in labour.—*Ed.*



resolution, had in the parliamentary session of last year, shortly after the outbreak of the Civil War, already introduced a motion for recognition of the Southern Confederacy. To his speech of this year a certain sophistical adroitness is not to be denied. The speech merely suffers from the unfortunate circumstances that it falls into two parts, of which the one cancels the other. One part describes the disastrous effects of the blockade on the English cotton industry and therefore demands removal of the blockade. The other part proves from the papers submitted by the ministry, two memorials by Messrs. Yancey and Mann and by Mr. Mason among them, that the blockade does not exist at all, except on paper, and therefore should no longer be recognized.<sup>66</sup> Mr. Gregory spiced his argument with successive citations from *The Times*. *The Times*, for whom a reminder of its oracular pronouncements is at this moment thoroughly inconvenient, thanks Mr. Gregory with a *leader* in which it holds him up to public ridicule. Mr. Gregory's motion was supported by Mr. Bentinck, an ultra-Tory who for two years has laboured in vain to bring about a secession from Mr. Disraeli in the Conservative camp.

It was a ludicrous spectacle in and by itself to see the alleged interests of English industry represented by Gregory, the representative of Galway, an unimportant seaport in the West of Ireland, and by Bentinck, the representative of Norfolk, a purely agricultural district.

Mr. Forster, the representative of Bradford, a centre of English industry, rose to oppose them both. Forster's speech deserves closer examination, since it strikingly proves the unreality of the phrases concerning the character of the American blockade given currency in Europe by the friends of secession. In the first place, he said, the United States have observed all formalities required by international law. They have declared no port in a state of blockade without previous proclamation, without special notice of the moment of its commencement or without fixing the fifteen days after the expiration of which entrance and departure shall be forbidden to foreign neutral ships.

The talk of the legal "inefficacy" of the blockade rests, therefore, merely on the allegedly frequent cases in which it has been broken through. Before the opening of Parliament it was said that 600 ships had broken through it. Mr. Gregory now reduces the number to 400. His evidence rests

on two lists handed the government, the one on November 30 by the Southern commissioners Yancey and Mann, the other, the supplementary list, by Mason. According to Yancey and Mann, more than 400 ships broke through between the proclamation of the blockade and August 20, running the blockade either inwards or outwards. According to customs-house report, however, the total number of the incoming and outgoing ships amounts to only 322. Of this number, 119 departed before the declaration of the blockade, 56 before the expiration of the time allowance of fifteen days. There remain 147 ships. Of these 147 ships, 25 were river boats that sailed from inland to New Orleans, where they lay idle; 106 were coastal vessels; with the exception of three ships, all were, in the words of Mr. Mason himself, "quasi-inland" vessels.<sup>66</sup> Of these 106, 66 sailed between Mobile and New Orleans.

Any one who knows this coast knows how absurd it is to call the sailing of a vessel behind lagoons, so that it hardly touches the open sea and merely creeps along the coast, a breach of the blockade. The same holds of the vessels between Savannah and Charleston, where they sneak between islands in narrow tongues of land. According to the testimony of the English consul, Bunch, these flat-bottomed boats only appeared for a few days on the open sea. After deducting 106 coastal vessels, there remain 16 departures for foreign ports; of these, 15 were for American ports, mainly Cuba, and one for Liverpool. The "ship" that berthed in Liverpool was a schooner, and so were all the rest of the "ships," with the exception of a sloop. There has been much talk, exclaimed Mr. Forster, of sham blockades. Is this list of Messrs. Yancey and Mann not a sham list? He subjected the supplementary list of Mr. Mason to a similar analysis, and showed further that the number of cruisers that slipped out only amounted to three or four, whereas in the last Anglo-American war no less than 516 American cruisers broke through the English blockade and harried the English seaboard. "The blockade, on the contrary, had been wonderfully effective from its commencement."

Further proof is provided by the reports of the English consuls; above all, however, by the Southern price lists. On January 11 the price of cotton in New Orleans offered a premium of 100 per cent. for export to England; the profit on import of salt amounted to 1500 per cent and the profit on contraband of war was incomparably higher. Despite this

alluring prospect of profit it was just as impossible to ship cotton to England as salt to New Orleans or Charleston. "In fact, however, Mr Gregory does not complain that the blockade was inefficacious, but that it was too efficacious. He urges us to put an end to it and with it to the crippling of industry and commerce. One answer suffices: Who urges this House to break the blockade? The representatives of the suffering districts? Does this cry resound from Manchester, where the factories have to close, or from Liverpool, where from lack of freight the ships lie idle in the docks? On the contrary. It resounds from Galway and is supported by Norfolk."

On the side of the friends of secession Mr Lindsay, a large shipbuilder of North Shields, made himself conspicuous. Lindsay had offered his shipyards to the Union, and, for this purpose, had travelled to Washington, where he experienced the vexation of seeing his business propositions rejected. Since that time he has turned his sympathies to the land of *Secessia*.

The debate was concluded with a circumstantial speech by Sir R. Palmer, the Solicitor-General, who spoke in the name of the government. He furnished well grounded juridical proof of the strength and sufficiency of the blockade in international law. On this occasion he in fact tore to pieces—and was taxed with so doing by Lord Cecil—the "new principles" proclaimed at the Paris Convention of 1856. Among other things, he expressed his astonishment that in a British Parliament Gregory and his associates ventured to appeal to the authority of Monsieur de Hautefeuille. The latter, to be sure, is a brand-newly discovered "authority" in the Bonapartist camp. Hautefeuille's compositions in the *Revue Contemporaine* on the maritime rights of neutrals prove the completest ignorance or *mauvaise foi* at higher command.

With the complete fiasco of the parliamentary friends of secession in the blockade question, all prospect of a breach between England and the United States is eliminated.

*Die Presse*, March 12, 1862

## THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR [I]

FROM whatever standpoint one regards it, the American Civil War presents a spectacle without parallel in the annals of military history. The vast extent of the disputed territory; the far-flung front of the lines of operation; the numerical strength of the hostile armies, the creation of which drew barely any support from a prior organizational basis; the fabulous costs of these armies; the manner of leading them and the general tactical and strategical principles in accordance with which the war was waged are all new in the eyes of the European onlooker.

The secessionist conspiracy, organized, patronized and supported long before its outbreak by Buchanan's administration, gave the South an advantage, by which alone it could hope to achieve its aim. Endangered by its slave population<sup>97</sup> and by a strong Unionist element among the whites themselves, with a number of free men two-thirds smaller than the North, but readier to attack, thanks to the multitude of adventurous idlers that it harbours—for the South everything depended on a swift, bold, almost foolhardy offensive. If the Southerners succeeded in taking St. Louis, Cincinnati, Washington, Baltimore and perhaps Philadelphia, they might then count on a panic, during which diplomacy and bribery could secure recognition of the independence of all the slave states. If this first onslaught failed, at least at the decisive points, their position must then become daily worse, simultaneously with the development of the strength of the North. This point was rightly understood by the men who in truly Bonapartist spirit had organized the secessionist conspiracy. They opened the campaign in corresponding manner. Their bands of adventurers overran Missouri and Tennessee, while their more regular troops invaded east Virginia and prepared a *coup de main* against Washington. With the miscarriage of this coup, the Southern campaign was, from the military standpoint, lost.

The North came to the theatre of war reluctantly, sleepily, as was to be expected with its higher industrial and commercial development. The social machinery was here far more complicated than in the South, and it required far more time to give its motion this unwonted direction. The enlist-

ment of the volunteers for three months was a great, but perhaps unavoidable mistake. It was the policy of the North to remain on the defensive in the beginning at all decisive points, to organize its forces, to train them through operations on a small scale and without the risk of decisive battles, and as soon as the organization was sufficiently strengthened and the traitorous element simultaneously more or less removed from the army, to pass finally to an energetic, unflagging offensive and, above all, to reconquer Kentucky, Tennessee, Virginia and North Carolina. The transformation of the civilians into soldiers was bound to take more time in the North than in the South. Once effected, one could count on the individual superiority of the Northern man.

By and large, and allowing for mistakes which sprang more from political than from military sources, the North acted in accordance with those principles. The guerrilla warfare in Missouri and West Virginia, while it protected the Unionist populations, accustomed the troops to field service and to fire, without exposing them to decisive defeats. The great disgrace of Bull Run was to some extent the result of the earlier error of enlisting volunteers for three months. It was senseless to allow a strong position, on difficult terrain and in possession of a foe little inferior in numbers, to be attacked by raw recruits in the front ranks. The panic which took possession of the Union army at the decisive moment, the cause of which has still not been clarified, could surprise no one who was in some degree familiar with the history of people's wars. Such things happened to the French troops very often from 1792 to 1795; they did not, however, prevent these same troops from winning the battles of Jemappes and Fleurus, Moutenotte, Castiglione and Rivoli. The jests of the European press over the Bull Run panic had only one excuse for their silliness—the previous bragging of a section of the North American press.

The six months' respite that followed the defeat of Manassas was utilized by the North better than by the South. Not only were the Northern ranks recruited in greater measure than the Southern. Their officers received better instructions; the discipline and training of the troops did not encounter the same obstacles as in the South. Traitors and incompetent interlopers were more and more removed, and the period of the Bull Run panic already belongs to the past. The armies on both sides are naturally not to be measured by

the standard of great European armies or even of the former regular army of the United States. Napoleon could in fact drill battalions of raw recruits in the depots during the first month, have them on the march during the second and during the third lead them against the foe; but then every battalion received a sufficient stiffening of officers and non-commissioned officers, every company some old soldiers and on the day of the battle the new troops were brigaded together with veterans and, so to speak, framed by the latter. All these conditions were lacking in America. Without the considerable mass of military experience that emigrated to America in consequence of the European revolutionary commotions of 1848-1849, the organization of the Union Army would have required a much longer time still.<sup>68</sup> The very small number of the killed and wounded in proportion to the sum total of the troops engaged (customarily one in twenty) proves that most of the engagements, even the latest in Kentucky and Tennessee, were fought mainly with firearms at fairly long range, and that the incidental bayonet charges either soon halted before the enemy's fire or put the foe to flight before it came to a hand-to-hand encounter. Meanwhile, the new campaign has been opened under more favourable auspices with the advance of Buell and Halleck through Kentucky to Tennessee. After the reconquest of Missouri and West Virginia, the Union opened the campaign with the advance into Kentucky.<sup>69</sup> Here the secessionists held three strong positions, fortified camps. Columbus on the Mississippi to their left, Bowling Green in the centre, Mill Spring on the Cumberland River to the right. Their line stretched three hundred miles from west to east. The extension of this line denied the three corps the possibility of affording each other mutual support and offered the Union troops the chance of attacking each individually with superior forces. The great mistake in the disposition of the Secessionists sprang from the attempt to hold all they had occupied. A single, fortified, strong central camp, chosen as the battlefield for a decisive engagement and held by the main body of the army, would have defended Kentucky far more effectively. It must either have attracted the main force of the Unionists or put the latter in a dangerous position should they attempt to march on without regard to so strong a concentration of troops.

Under the given circumstances the Unionists resolved to attack those three camps one after another, to manoeuvre

their enemy out of them and force him to accept battle in open country. This plan, which conformed to all the rules of the art of war, was carried out with energy and dispatch. Towards the middle of January a corps of about 15,000 Unionists marched on Mill Spring, which was held by 20,000 Secessionists.<sup>300</sup> The Unionists manoeuvred in a manner that led the enemy to believe he had to deal with a weak reconnoitring corps. General Zollicoffer fell forthwith into the trap, sallied from his fortified camp and attacked the Unionists. He soon convinced himself that a superior force confronted him. He fell and his troops suffered a complete defeat, like the Unionists at Bull Run. This time, however, the victory was exploited in quite other fashion.

The stricken army was hard pressed until it arrived broken, demoralized, without field artillery or barrage, in its encampment at Mill Spring. This camp was pitched on the northern bank at the Cumberland River, so that in the event of another defeat the troops had no retreat open to them save across the river by way of a few steamers and river boats. We find in general that almost all the Secessionist camps were pitched on the *enemy* side of the stream. To take up such a position is not only according to rule, but also very practical if there is a bridge in the rear. In such case the encampment serves as the bridge head and gives its holders the chance of throwing their fighting forces at pleasure on both banks of the stream and so maintaining complete command of these banks. Without a bridge in the rear, on the contrary, a camp on the enemy side of the stream cuts off the retreat after an unlucky engagement and compels the troops to capitulate, or exposes them to massacre and drowning, a fate that befell the Unionists at Ball's Bluff on the enemy side of the Potomac, whither the treachery of General Stone had sent them.

When the beaten Secessionists had pitched their camp at Mill Spring, they had at once understood that an attack by the enemy on their fortifications must be repulsed or in a very short time capitulation must follow. After the experience of the morning they had lost confidence in their powers of resistance. Accordingly, when next day the Unionists advanced to attack the camp, they found that the foe had taken advantage of the night to put across the stream, leaving the camp, the baggage, the artillery and stores behind him. In this way the extreme right of the Secessionist line was pushed

back to Tennessee, and east Kentucky, where the mass of the population is hostile to the slaveholders' party, was reconquered for the Union.

At the same time—towards the middle of January—the preparations for dislodging the Secessionists from Columbus and Bowling Green commenced. A strong flotilla of mortar vessels and ironclad gunboats was held in readiness, and the news was spread in all directions that it was to serve as a convoy to a large army marching along the Mississippi from Cairo to Memphis and New Orleans. All the demonstrations on the Mississippi, however, were merely mock manoeuvres. At the decisive moment the gunboats were brought to the Ohio and thence to the Tennessee, up which they travelled as far as Fort Henry. This place, together with Fort Donelson on the Cumberland River, formed the second line of defence of the Secessionists in Tennessee. The position was well chosen, for in case of a retreat behind the Cumberland the latter stream would have covered its front, the Tennessee its left flank, while the narrow strip of land between the two streams was sufficiently covered by the two forts above-mentioned. The swift action of the Unionists, however, broke through the line itself before the left wing and the centre of the first line were attacked.

In the first week of February the gunboats of the Unionists appeared before Fort Henry, which surrendered after a short bombardment. The garrison escaped to Fort Donelson, since the land forces of the expedition were not strong enough to encircle the place. The gunboats now travelled down the Tennessee again, upstream to the Ohio and thence up the Cumberland as far as Fort Donelson. A single gunboat sailed boldly up the Tennessee through the very heart of the State of Tennessee, skirting the State of Mississippi and pushing on as far as Florence in North Alabama, where a series of swamps and banks (known by the name of the Muscle Shoals) forbade further navigation. This fact, that a single gunboat made this long voyage of at least 150 miles and then returned, without experiencing any kind of attack, proves that Union sentiment prevails along the river and will be very useful to the Union troops should they push forward so far.

The boat expedition up the Cumberland now combined its movements with those of the land forces under Generals Halleck and Grant. The Secessionists at Bowling Green were deceived over the movements of the Unionists. They accord-



ingly remained quietly in their camp, while a week after the fall of Fort Henry, Fort Donelson was surrounded on the land side by 40,000 Unionists and threatened on the river side by a strong flotilla of gunboats. Like the camp at Mill Spring and Fort Henry, Fort Donelson had the river lying in the rear, without a bridge for retreat. It was the strongest place the Unionists had attacked up to the present. The works were carried out with the greatest care; moreover the place was capacious enough to accommodate the 20,000 men who occupied it. On the first day of the attack the gunboats silenced the fire of the batteries trained towards the river side and bombarded the interior of the defence works, while the land troops drove back the enemy outposts, and forced the main body of the Secessionists to seek shelter right under the guns of their own defence works. On the second day the gunboats, which had suffered severely the day before, appear to have accomplished but little. The land troops, on the contrary, had to fight a long and, in places, hot encounter with the columns of the garrison, which sought to break through the right wing of the enemy in order to secure their line of retreat to Nashville. However, an energetic attack of the Unionist right wing on the left wing of the Secessionists and considerable reinforcements that the left wing of the Unionists received, decided the victory in favour of the assailants. Diverse outworks had been stormed. The garrison, forced into its inner lines of defence, without the chance of retreat and manifestly not in a position to withstand an assault next morning, surrendered unconditionally on the following day.

*Die Presse*, March 26, 1862.

## THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR [II]\*

WITH Fort Donelson the enemy's artillery, baggage and military stores fell into the hands of the Unionists; 13,000 Secessionists surrendered on the day of its capture; 1,000 more the next day, and as soon as the outposts of the victors appeared before Clarksville, a town that lies further up the Cumberland River, it opened its gates. Here, too, considerable supplies for

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\*Conclusion of yesterday's feuilleton.—*Ed.*, *Die Presse*

the Secessionists had been stored.

The capture of Fort Donelson presents only one riddle: the flight of General Floyd with 5,000 men on the second day of the bombardment. These fugitives were too numerous to be smuggled away in steamboats during the night. With some measures of precaution on the part of the assailants, they could not have got away.

Seven days after the surrender of Fort Donelson, Nashville was occupied by the Federals. The distance between the two places amounts to about 100 English miles, and a march of 15 miles a day, on very wretched roads and during the most unfavourable season of the year, redounds to the honour of the Unionist troops. On receipt of the news of the fall of Fort Donelson, the Secessionists evacuated Bowling Green, a week later they abandoned Columbus and withdrew to Mississippi island, 45 miles south. Thus Kentucky was completely reconquered for the Union. Tennessee, however, can be held by the Secessionists only if they invite and win a big battle. They are said in fact to have concentrated 65,000 men for this purpose. Meanwhile, nothing prevents the Unionists from bringing a superior force against them.

The leadership of the Kentucky campaign from Somerset to Nashville deserves the highest praise. The reconquest of so extensive a territory, the advance from the Ohio to the Cumberland during a single month, evidence an energy, resolution and speed such as have seldom been attained by regular armies in Europe. One may compare, for example, the slow advance of the Allies from Magenta to Solferino in 1859—without pursuit of the retreating foe, without endeavour to cut off his stragglers or in any way to envelop and encircle whole bodies of his troops.

Halleck and Grant, in particular, furnish good examples of resolute military leadership. Without the least regard either for Columbus or Bowling Green, they concentrate their forces on the decisive points, Fort Henry and Fort Donelson, launch a swift and energetic attack on these and precisely thereby render Columbus and Bowling Green untenable. Then they march at once to Clarksville and Nashville, without allowing the retreating Secessionists time to take up new positions in north Tennessee. During this rapid pursuit the corps of Secessionist troops in Columbus remains completely cut off from the centre and right wing of its army. English papers have criticized this operation unjustly. Even if the attack on

Fort Donelson failed, the Secessionists kept busy by General Buell at Bowling Green could not dispatch sufficient men to enable the garrison to follow the repulsed Unionists into the open country or to endanger their retreat. Columbus, on the other hand, lay so far off that it could not interfere with Grant's movements at all. In fact, after the Unionists had cleared Missouri of the Secessionists, Columbus was for the latter an entirely useless post. The troops that formed its garrison had greatly to hasten their retreat to Memphis or even to Arkansas in order to escape the danger of ingloriously laying down their arms.

In consequence of the clearing of Missouri and the reconquest of Kentucky the theatre of war has so far narrowed that the different armies can co-operate to a certain extent along the whole line of operations and work for the achievement of definite results. In other words, the war now takes on for the first time a *strategic* character, and the geographical configuration of the country acquires a new interest. It is now the task of the Northern generals to find the Achilles heel of the cotton states.

Up to the capture of Nashville no concerted strategy between the army of Kentucky and the army on the Potomac was possible. They were too far apart from one another. They stood in the same front line, but their lines of operation were entirely different. Only with the victorious advance into Tennessee did the movements of the army of Kentucky become important for the entire theatre of war.

The American papers influenced by McClellan are going great guns with the "anaconda"\* envelopment theory. According to this an immense line of armies is to wind round the rebellion, gradually constrict its coils and finally strangle the enemy. This is sheer childishness. It is a rehash of the so-called "*cordon system*" devised in Austria about 1770, which was employed against the French from 1792 to 1797 with such great obstinacy and with such constant failure. At Jemappes, Fleurus and, more especially, at Moutenotte, Mille-simo, Dego, Castiglione and Rivoli, the knock-out blow was dealt to this system. The French cut the "anaconda" in two by attacking at a point where they had concentrated superior forces. Then the coils of the "anaconda" were cut to pieces seriatim.

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\*A large snake, species of boa, found in South America.—Ed.

In well populated and more or less centralised states there is always a centre, with the occupation of which by the foe the national resistance would be broken. Paris is a shining example. The slave states, however, possess no such centre. They are thinly populated, with few large towns and all these on the seacoast. The question therefore arises: Does a military centre of gravity nevertheless exist, with the capture of which the backbone of their resistance breaks, or are they, as Russia still was in 1812, not to be conquered without occupying every village and every plot of land, in a word, the entire periphery? Cast a glance at the geographical formation of *Secessia*, with its long stretch of coast on the Atlantic Ocean and its long stretch of coast on the Gulf of Mexico. So long as the Confederates held Kentucky and Tennessee, the whole formed a great compact mass. The loss of both these states drives an immense wedge into their territory, separating the states on the North Atlantic Ocean from the states on the Gulf of Mexico. The direct route from Virginia and the two Carolinas to Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi and even, in part, to Alabama leads through Tennessee, which is now occupied by the Unionists. The sole route that, after the complete conquest of Tennessee by the Union, connects the two sections of the slave states goes through Georgia. This proves that *Georgia is the key to Secessia*. With the loss of Georgia the Confederacy would be cut into two sections which would have lost all connection with one another. A reconquest of Georgia by the Secessionists, however, would be almost unthinkable, for the Unionist fighting forces would be concentrated in a centre position, while their adversaries, divided into two camps, would have scarcely sufficient forces to summon to a united attack.

Would the conquest of all Georgia, with the seacoast of Florida, be requisite for such an operation? By no means. In a land where communication, particularly between distant points, depends more on railways than on highways, the seizure of the railways is sufficient. The southernmost railway line between the states on the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic coast goes through Macon and Gordon near Milledgeville.

The occupation of these two points would accordingly cut *Secessia* in two and enable the Unionists to beat one part after another. At the same time, one gathers from the above that no Southern republic is capable of living without the possession of Tennessee. Without Tennessee, Georgia's vital

spot lies only eight or ten days' march from the frontier; the North would constantly have its hand at the throat of the South, and on the slightest pressure the South would have to yield or fight for its life anew, under circumstances in which a single defeat would cut off every prospect of success.

From the foregoing considerations it follows:

The Potomac is *not* the most important position of the war theatre. The taking of Richmond and the advance of the Potomac army further South—difficult on account of the many streams that cut across the line of march—could produce a tremendous moral effect. From a purely military standpoint, they would decide *nothing*.

The decision of the campaign belongs to the Kentucky army, now in Tennessee. On the one hand, this army is nearest the decisive points; on the other hand, it occupies a territory without which Secession is incapable of living. This army would accordingly have to be strengthened at the expense of all the rest and the sacrifice of all minor operations. Its next points of attack would be Chattanooga and Dalton on the Upper Tennessee, the most important railway centres of the entire South. After their occupation the connection between the eastern and western states of *Secessia* would be limited to the connecting lines in Georgia. The further question would then arise of cutting off another railway line with Atlanta and Georgia, and finally of destroying the last connection between the two sections by the capture of Macon and Gordon.

On the contrary, should the "anaconda" plan be followed, then despite all successes in particular cases and even on the Potomac, the war may be prolonged indefinitely, while the financial difficulties together with diplomatic complications acquire fresh scope.

*Die Presse*, March 27, 1862.

London, April 28, 1862

A MAJOR theme of diplomatic circles here is France's appearance on the Mexican scene. It is found puzzling that Louis Bonaparte should have increased the expeditionary troops at the moment when he promised to reduce them, and that he should want to go forward whilst England draws back. It is known here very well that the impulse for the Mexican expedition came from the Cabinet of St. James and not from that of the Tuileries. It is equally well known that Louis Bonaparte likes to carry out all his undertakings, but particularly the overseas adventures, under England's aegis. As is known, the restored Empire has not yet emulated the feat of its original in quartering the French armies in the capital cities of modern Europe. As a *pis aller*,† on the other hand, it has led them to the capital cities of ancient Europe, to Constantinople, Athens and Rome, and, over and above that, even to Peking. Should the theatrical effect of a trip to the capital city of the Aztecs be lost, and the opportunity for military archaeological collections *a la* Montauban? If, however, one considers the present state of French finance and the future serious conflicts with the United States and England to which Louis Bonaparte's advance into Mexico can lead, one is then obliged to reject without further question the foregoing interpretation of his proceedings, which is popular with various British papers.

At the time of the Convention of July 17, 1861, when the claims of the English creditors were to be settled, but the English plenipotentiary demanded at the same time an examination of the entire register of the Mexican debts or misdeeds, Mexico's Foreign Minister put down the debt to France at \$200,000, therefore a mere bagatelle of some £40,000. The account *now* drawn up by France, on the other hand, by no means confines itself to these modest limits.

Under the Catholic administration of Zuloaga and Miramon, an issue of Mexican state bonds to the amount of \$14,000,000 was contracted per medium of the Swiss banking

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\*Refers to a Paris banker, Isaac Jules Mires (1809-71)—Ed.

†Last resource—Ed.

house of J. B. Jecker and Co. The whole sum that was realised by the first issue of these bonds came to only 5 per cent. of the nominal amount, or to \$700,000. The sum total of the bonds issued fell very soon into the hands of prominent Frenchmen, among them relatives of the Emperor and fellow wire-pullers of "*haute politique*." The house of Jecker and Co let these gentlemen have the aforesaid bonds for far less than their original nominal price.\*

Miramón contracted this debt at a time when he was in possession of the capital city. Later, after he had come down to the role of a mere guerrilla leader, he again caused state bonds to the nominal value of \$38,000,000 to be issued through his so-called Finance Minister, Señor Peza-y-Peza. Once more it was the house of Jecker and Co. which negotiated the issue, but on this occasion limited its advances to the modest sum of barely \$500,000, or from one to two per cent to the dollar. Once more the Swiss bankers knew how to dispose of their Mexican property as quickly as possible, and once more the bonds fell into the hands of those "prominent" Frenchmen, among whom were some *habitués*\*\* of the imperial court whose names will live on in the annals of the European bourses as long as the *affaire* Miramón.

This debt, then of \$52,000,000, of which not even \$1,200,000 have hitherto been advanced, the administration of President Juárez declines to recognise, on the one hand, because it knows nothing about it and, on the other hand, because Messrs Miramón, Zuloaga and Peza-y-Peza were possessed of no constitutional authority to contract such a state debt. The above mentioned "prominent" Frenchmen, however, had to carry the contrary view at the decisive place. Lord Palmerston was, for his part, opportunely instructed by some members of Parliament that the whole affair would lead to highly objectional interpellations in the Lower House. Among other things to be feared, was the question whether British land and sea power might be employed to support the gambling operations of certain *rouge-et-noir*† politicians on the other side of the Channel. Accordingly Palmerston caught eagerly at the Conference of Orizaba to withdraw from a

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\*High politics.—*Ed.*

\*\*Customary frequenters of any place, especially one of amusement.—*Ed.*

†Red and black, a game of chance.—*Ed.*

business that threatens us with the filth of an international *affaire Mires*.

*Die Presse*, May 12, 1862.

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## THE ENGLISH PRESS AND THE FALL OF NEW ORLEANS

London, May 16, 1862.

ON the arrival of the first reports of the fall of New Orleans *The Times*, *Herald*, *Standard*, *Morning Post*, *Daily Telegraph* and other English "sympathisers" with the Southern "nigger-drivers" proved strategically, tactically, philologically, exegetically, politically, morally and fortificationally that the report was one of the "canards" which Reuter, Havas, Wolff and their understrappers so often let fly. The natural means of defence of New Orleans, it was said, had been strengthened not only by newly constructed forts, but by submarine infernal machines of every sort and ironical gunboats. Then there was the Spartan character of the New Orleansists and their deadly hate of Lincoln's hirelings. Finally, was it not before New Orleans that England had suffered the defeat which brought her second war against the United States (1812 to 1814) to an ignominious end? Consequently there was no reason to doubt that New Orleans would immortalize itself as a second Saragossa or a Moscow<sup>101</sup> of the "South." Besides, it harboured 15,000 bales of cotton, with which it was so easy to light an inextinguishable, self-consuming fire, quite apart from the fact that in 1814 the duly damped cotton bales proved more indestructible by cannon fire than the earthworks of Sebastopol. It was therefore as clear as daylight that the fall of New Orleans was a case of the familiar Yankee brag.

When the first reports were confirmed two days later by steamers arriving from New York, the bulk of the English pro-slavery press persisted in its scepticism. *The Evening Standard*, especially, was so positive in its unbelief that in the same number it published a first leader which proved the half-moon city's impregnability in black and white, whilst its "latest news" announced in large type the impregnable city's fall. *The Times*, however, which has always held discretion



for the better part of valour, veered round. It still doubted, but at the same time it made ready for all eventualities, since New Orleans was a city of "rowdies" and not of heroes. On this occasion *The Times* was right. New Orleans is a settlement of the dregs of the French *Bohème*, in the true sense of the word a French *convict colony*—and never, with the changes of time, has it belied its origin. Only, *The Times* came *post festum* to this pretty widespread understanding.

Finally, however, the *fait accompli* struck even the blindest Thomas. What was to be done? The English pro-slavery press now proves that the fall of New Orleans is an advantage for the Confederates and a defeat for the Federals.

The fall of New Orleans allowed General Lovell to reinforce Beauregard's army with his troops; Beauregard was the more in need of reinforcements since 160,000 men (a gross exaggeration!) were said to have been concentrated on his front by Halleck and, on the other hand, General Mitchell had cut Beauregard's communications with the East by breaking the railroad connection of Memphis with Chattanooga, that is, with Richmond, Charleston and Savannah.<sup>102</sup> After this cutting of his communications (which we indicated as the necessary strategic move long before the battle of Corinth), Beauregard had no longer any railway connections from Corinth save those with Mobile and New Orleans. After New Orleans had fallen and he had been made dependent on the single railroad to Mobile, he naturally could no longer procure the necessary provisions for his troops, on that account fell back on Memphis and, in the estimation of the English pro-slavery press, his provisioning capacity is of course increased by the entry of Lovell's troops!

On the other hand, remark the same oracles, the yellow fever will mop up the Federals in New Orleans and, finally, if the city itself is no Moscow, is not its mayor a Brutus? Only read (cf. New York) his melodramatically valorous epistle to Commodore Farragut<sup>103</sup> "Brave words, Sir, brave words!" But hard words break no bones.

The press organs of the Southern slaveholders, however, do not construe the fall of New Orleans so optimistically as their English comforters. This will be seen from the following extracts:

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\*After the feast.—Ed.

The *Richmond Dispatch* says :

What has become of the ironclad gunboats, the *Mississippi* and the *Louisiana*,<sup>104</sup> from which we expected the salvation of the half-moon city ? In respect of their effect on the foe, these ships might just as well have been ships of glass. It is useless to deny that the fall of New Orleans is a heavy blow. The Confederate government is thereby cut off from west Louisiana, Texas, Missouri and Arkansas.

The *Norfolk Day Book* observes :

This is the most serious defeat since the beginning of the war. It augurs privations and want for all classes of society and, what is worse, it threatens the supplies for our army.

The *Atlantic Intelligencer* laments :

We expected a different result. The approach of the enemy was no surprise attack, it had been long foreseen, and we had been promised that should he even pass by Fort Jackson, fearful artillery contrivances would force him to withdraw or assure his annihilation. In all this we have deceived ourselves, as on every occasion when defences were supposed to guarantee the safety of a place or town. It appears that modern inventions have annihilated the defensive capacity of fortifications. Ironclad gunboats destroy them or sail past them unceremoniously. Memphis, we fear, will share the fate of New Orleans. Would it not be folly to deceive ourselves with hope ?

Finally, the *Petersburg Express*

The capture of New Orleans by the Federals is the most extraordinary and most fateful event of the whole war.

*Die Presse*. May 20, 1862.

## 27.

### A TREATY AGAINST THE SLAVE TRADE

London, May 18, 1862.

THE Treaty for the suppression of the slave trade concluded between the United States and England on April 7 of this year in Washington<sup>105</sup> is now communicated to us *in extenso* \* by the American newspapers. The main points of this important document are the following: The right of search is reciprocal, but can be exercised only by such warships on either side as have for this purpose received special authority

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\* \* At length.—Ed.

from one of the contracting powers. From time to time the contracting powers supply one another with complete statistics concerning the sections of their navies that have been appointed to keep watch on the traffic in Negroes. The right of search can be exercised only against merchantmen within a distance of 200 miles from the African coast and south of 42 degrees North latitude, and within 30 nautical miles of the coast of Cuba. Search, whether of English ships by American cruisers or of American ships by English cruisers, does not take place in that part of the sea (therefore within three nautical miles of the coast) which counts as English or American territory, no more does it take place before the ports or settlements of foreign powers.

Mixed courts, composed half of Englishmen, half of Americans and resident in Sierra Leone, Capetown and New York, will pass judgment on the prize vessels. In the event of a ship's condemnation, her crew will be handed over to the jurisdiction of the nation under whose flag the ship sailed so far as this can be done without extra cost. Not only the crew (including the captain, mate etc.), but also the owners of the vessel will then incur the penalties customary to the country. Compensation of owners of merchantmen that have been acquitted by the mixed courts, is to be paid within a year by the power under whose flag the capturing warship sailed. Not only the presence of captive Negroes is regarded as affording legal grounds for the seizure of ships, but also specially made arrangements in the construction of the ship for the traffic in Negroes, manacles, chains and other instruments for safeguarding the Negroes and, lastly, stores of provisions that bear no relation to the requirements of the ships' company. A ship on which such suspicious articles are found has to furnish proof of her innocence and even in the event of acquittal can claim no compensation.

Commanders of cruisers, who exceed the authority conferred on them by the Treaty, are to be subjected to punishment by their respective governments. Should the commander of a cruiser of one of the contracting powers harbour a suspicion that a merchant vessel under escort by one or more warships of the other contracting power carries Negroes on board, or was engaged in the African slave trade, or is equipped for this trade, he has then to communicate his suspicion to the commander of the escort and, in company with him, search the suspected ship, the latter is to be conducted to

the place of residence of one of the mixed courts if, according to the Treaty, it comes under the category of suspicious ships. The Negroes found on board condemned ships are placed at the disposal of the government under whose flag the capture was made. They are to be set at liberty at once and remain free under guarantee of the government in whose territory they find themselves. The Treaty can only be terminated after ten years. It remains in force for a full year from the date of the notice given by one of the contracting parties.

The traffic in Negroes has been dealt a mortal blow by this Anglo-American Treaty—the result of the American Civil War. The effect of the Treaty will be completed by the Bill recently introduced by Senator Sumner, which repeals the law of 1808 dealing with the traffic in Negroes on the coasts of the United States and punishes the transport of slaves from one port of the United States to another as a crime. This Bill in large measure paralyzes the trade that the states raising Negroes (border slave states) carry on with the states consuming Negroes (the slave states proper).

*Die Presse*, May 22, 1862.

## 28

### THE SITUATION IN THE AMERICAN THEATRE OF WAR

THE capture of New Orleans, as the detailed reports now at hand show, is distinguished as a deed of valour almost unparalleled. The fleet of the Unionists consisted merely of wooden ships: about six, each having from 14 to 25 guns, supported by a numerous flotilla of gunboats and mortar vessels. This fleet had before it two forts that blocked the passage of the Mississippi. Within range of the 100 guns of these forts the stream was barred by a strong chain, behind which was a mass of torpedoes, fire-floats and other instruments of destruction. These first obstacles had therefore to be overcome in order to pass between the forts. On the further side of the forts, however, was a second formidable line of defence formed by ironclad gunboats, among them the *Manassas*, an iron ram, and the *Louisiana*, a powerful floating battery. After the Unionists had bombarded the two forts, which com-

pletely command the stream, for six days without any effect, they resolved to brave their fire, force the iron barrier in three divisions, sail up the river and risk battle with the "ironsides". The hazardous enterprise succeeded. As soon as the flotilla effected a landing before New Orleans, the victory was naturally won.

Beauregard had now nothing more to defend in Corinth. His position there had only any import so long as it covered Mississippi and Louisiana, and especially New Orleans. He now finds himself strategically in the position that a lost battle would leave him no other choice than to disband his army into guerrillas; for without a large town, where railroads and supplies are concentrated, in the rear of his army, he can no longer hold masses of men together.

McClellan has incontrovertibly proved that he is a military incompetent who, having been raised by favourable circumstances to a commanding and responsible position, wages war not in order to defeat the foe, but rather in order not to be defeated by the foe and thus forfeits his own usurped greatness. He bears himself like the old so-called "manoeuvring generals" who excused their anxious avoidance of any tactical decision with the plea that by strategic envelopment they obliged the enemy to give up his positions. The Confederates always escape him, because at the decisive moment he never attacks them. Thus, although their plan of retreat had already been announced ten days before, even by the New York papers (for example, the *Tribune*), he let them quietly retire from Manassas to Richmond. He then divided his army and flanked the Confederates strategically, whilst with one corps of troops he established himself before Yorktown. Siege operations always afford a pretext for wasting time and avoiding battle. As soon as he had concentrated a military force superior to the Confederates, he let them retire from Yorktown to Williamsburg and from there further, without forcing them to join battle. A war has never yet been so wretchedly waged. If the rearguard action near Williamsburg ended in defeat for the Confederate rearguard instead of in a second Bull Run for the Union troops, McClellan was wholly innocent of this result.

After a march of about twelve miles (English) in a twenty-four hours' downpour of rain and through veritable seas of mud, 8,000 Union troops under General Heintzelman (of German descent, but born in Pennsylvania) arrived in

the vicinity of Williamsburg and met with only weak pickets of the enemy. As soon, however, as the latter had assured himself of their numerically inferior strength, he dispatched from his picked troops at Williamsburg reinforcements that gradually increased the number of his men to 25,000 strong. By nine o'clock in the morning battle had been joined in earnest, by half past twelve General Heintzelman discovered that the engagement was going in favour of the foe. He sent messenger after messenger to General Kearny, who was eight miles to his rear, but could only push slowly forward in consequence of the complete "dissolution" of the roads by the rain. For a whole hour Heintzelman remained without reinforcements and the 7th and 8th Jersey regiment, which had exhausted its stock of powder, began to run for the woods on either side of the road. Heintzelman now caused Colonel Menill and a squadron of Pennsylvania cavalry to take up a position on both fringes of the forest, with the threat of firing on the fugitives. This brought the latter once more to a standstill.

Order was further restored by the example of a Massachusetts regiment, which had likewise exhausted its powder, but now fixed bayonets to its muskets and awaited the foe with calm demeanour. At length Kearny's vanguard under Brigadier [General] Berry (from the State of Maine) came in sight. Heintzelman's army received its rescuers with a wild "Hurrah", he had the regimental band strike up "Yankee Doodle" and Berry's fresh forces form a line almost half a mile in length in front of his exhausted troops. After preliminary musket fire, Berry's brigade made a bayonet charge at the double and drove the foe off the battlefield to his earthworks, the largest of which after repeated attacks and counter-attacks remained in the possession of the Union troops. Thus the equilibrium of the battle was restored. Berry's arrival had saved the Unionists. The arrival of the brigades of Jameson and Birney at four o'clock decided the victory. At nine o'clock in the evening the retreat of the Confederates from Williamsburg began; on the following day they continued it—in the direction of Richmond—hotly pursued by Heintzelman's cavalry. On the morning after the battle, between six and seven o'clock, Heintzelman had already caused Williamsburg to be occupied by General Jameson. The rear-guard of the fleeing foe had evacuated the town from the opposite end only half an hour before. Heintzelman's battle

was an infantry battle in the true sense of the word. Artillery hardly came into action. Musket fire and bayonet attack were decisive. If the Congress at Washington wanted to pass a vote of thanks, it should have been to General Heintzelman, who saved the Yankees from a second Bull Run, and not to McClellan, who in his wonted fashion avoided "the tactical decision" and let the numerically weaker adversary escape for the third time

The Confederate army in Virginia has better chances than Beauregard's army, first because it is facing a McClellan instead of a Halleck and then because the many streams on its line of retreat flow crosswise from the mountains to the sea. However, in order to avoid breaking up into bands *without a battle*, its generals will sooner or later be forced to accept a decisive battle, just as the Russians were obliged to fight at Smolensk and Borodino,<sup>100</sup> though *against* the will of their generals, who judged the situation correctly. Lamentable as McClellan's military leadership has been, the constant retirements, accompanied by abandonment of artillery, munitions and other military stores, and simultaneously the small, unlucky rearguard engagements, have at any rate badly demoralized the Confederates, as will become manifest on the day of a decisive battle. We arrive, therefore, at the following summary of the situation

Should Beauregard or Jefferson Davis lose a decisive battle, their armies will then break up into bands. Should one of them win a decisive battle, which is altogether unlikely, in the best case the disbanding of their armies will then be deferred. They are not in a position to make the least lasting use even of a victory. They cannot advance 20 English miles without coming to a standstill and again awaiting the renewed offensive of the foe.

There still remains to examine the chances of guerrilla war. But precisely in respect to the present war of the slaveholders it is most amazing how slight, or rather how wholly lacking is the participation of the population in it. In 1913 the communications of the French were continually interrupted and harassed by Colomb, Lutzow, Chernyshev and twenty other leaders of insurgents and Cossacks. In 1812 the population in Russia vanished completely from the French line of march; in 1814 the French peasants armed themselves and slew the patrols and stragglers of the Allies. But here nothing happens at all. Men resign themselves to

the fate of the big battles and console themselves with "*Victrix causa diu placuit, sed victa Catoni*."\*<sup>107</sup> The tall talk of war by water passes off in smoke. There can be hardly any doubt, it is true, that the *white trash*, as the planters themselves call the "poor whites," will attempt guerilla warfare and brigandage. Such an attempt, however, will very quickly transform the possessing planters into *Unionists*. They will themselves call the troops of the Yankees to their aid. The alleged burnings of cotton, etc., on the Mississippi rest exclusively on the testimony of two Kentuckians who are said to have come to Louisville—certainly not up the Mississippi. The conflagration in New Orleans was easily organized. The fanaticism of the merchants of New Orleans is explained by the fact that they were obliged to take a quantity of Confederate treasury bonds for hard cash. The conflagration at New Orleans will be repeated in other towns; assuredly also, much will be otherwise burnt; but theatrical coups like this can only bring the dissension between the planters and the "*white trash*" to a head and herewith—"finis Secessiae"!!!

*Die Presse*, May 30, 1862.

29.

## ENGLISH HUMANITY AND AMERICA

HUMANITY in England, like liberty in France, has now become an export article for the *traders in politics*. We recollect the time when Tsar Nicholas had Polish ladies flogged by soldiers<sup>108</sup> and when Lord Palmerston found the moral indignation of some parliamentarians over the event "unpolitical." We recollect that about a decade ago a revolt took place on the Ionian Islands<sup>109</sup> which gave the English governor there occasion to have a not inconsiderable number of Grecian women flogged. *Probatum est*,† said Palmerston and his Whig colleagues who at that time were in office. Only a few years ago proof was furnished to Parliament from official documents that the tax collectors in India employed means of

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\* "The cause of the victor pleased the gods, but that of the vanquished pleased Cato."—*Ed.*

\*\* "The end of Session."—*Ed.*

† It is approved.—*Ed.*



coercion against the wives of the ryots,\* the infamy of which forbids giving further details. Palmerston and his colleagues did not, it is true, dare to justify these atrocities, but what an outcry they would have raised, had a *foreign* government dared to proclaim publicly its indignation over these English infamies and to indicate not indistinctly that it would step in if Palmerston and colleagues did not at once disavow the Indian tax officials. But Cato the Censor himself could not watch over the morals of the Roman citizens more anxiously than the English aristocrats and their ministers over the "humanity" of the war-waging Yankees!

The ladies of New Orleans, yellow beauties, tastelessly bedecked with jewels and comparable, perhaps, to the women of the old Mexicans, save that they do not devour their slaves in *natura*,\*\* are this time—previously it was the harbours of Charleston—the occasions for the British aristocrats' display of humanity. The English women who are starving in Lancashire (they are, however, not ladies, nor do they possess any slaves), have inspired no parliamentary utterance hitherto, the cry of distress from the Irish women, who, with the progressive eviction of the small tenant farmers *en masse* in green Erin, are flung half naked on the street and hunted from house and home quite as if the Tartars had descended upon them, has hitherto called forth only one echo from Lords, Commons and Her Majesty's government—homilies on the absolute rights of landed property.

But the ladies of New Orleans! That, to be sure, is another matter. These ladies were far too enlightened to participate in the tumult of war, like the goddesses of Olympus, or to cast themselves into the flames, like the women of Sagunt<sup>††</sup>. They have invented a new and safe mode of heroism, a mode that could have been invented only by female slaveholders and, what is more, only by female slaveholders in a land where the free part of the population consists of shopkeepers by vocation, tradesmen in cotton or sugar or tobacco, and does not keep slaves, like the *cives*† of the ancient world. After their men had run away from New Orleans or had crept into their back closets, these ladies rushed

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\* Indian peasant cultivators who hold land under the *ryotwari* system.—*Ed.*

\*\* In a state of nature.—*Ed.*

† Citizens.—*Ed.*

into the streets in order to spit in the faces of the victorious Union troops or to stick out their tongues at them or, like Mephistopheles, to make in general "an unseemly gesture," accompanied by insulting words. These Magaeras imagined they could be ill-mannered "with impunity"

This was their heroism. General Butler issued a proclamation in which he notified them that they should be treated as street-walkers, if they continued to act as street-walkers. Butler has, indeed, the makings of a lawyer, but does not seem to have given the requisite study to English statute law. Otherwise, by analogy with the laws imposed on Ireland under Castlereagh, he would have prohibited them from setting foot on the streets at all. Butler's warning to the "ladies" of New Orleans has aroused such moral indignation in Earl Carnarvon, Sir J. Walsh (who played so ridiculous and odious a role in Ireland) and Mr. Gregory, who was already demanding recognition of the Confederacy a year ago, that the Earl in the Upper House, the knight and the man "without a handle to his name" in the Lower House, interrogated the Ministry with a view to learning what steps it thought of taking in the name of outraged "humanity." Russell and Palmerston both castigated Butler, both expected that the government at Washington would disavow him, and the so very tender-hearted Palmerston, who behind the back of the Queen and without the fore-knowledge of his colleagues recognised the *coup d'état* of December 1851 (on which occasion "ladies" were actually shot dead, whilst others were violated by Zouaves\*) merely out of "human admiration"—the same tender-hearted Viscount declared Butler's warning to be an "*infamy*." Ladies, indeed, who actually own slaves—such ladies were not even to be able to vent their anger and their malice on common Union troops, peasants, artisans and other rabble with impunity! It is "infamous"

Among the public here, no one is deceived by this humanity farce. It is meant in a measure to call forth, in a measure to fortify the feeling in favour of intervention, in the first place on the part of France. After the first melodramatic outburst, the knights of humanity in the Upper and Lower House, likewise as at command, threw their emotional mask away. Their declamation served merely as a prologue

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\*A body of infantry in the French service, originally Algerians.—Ed.

to the question whether the Emperor of the French had come to an understanding with the English government in the matter of mediating, and whether the latter, as they hoped, had received such an offer favourably. Russell and Palmerston both declared they did not know of the offer. Russell declared the present moment extremely unfavourable for any mediation. Palmerston, more guarded and reserved, contented himself with saying that at the present moment the English government had no intention of mediating.

The plan is that during the recess of the English Parliament France should play her role of mediator and, in the autumn, if Mexico is secure, should open her intervention. The lull in the American theatre of war has resuscitated the intervention speculators in St James and the Tuileries from their marasmus. This lull is itself due to a strategic error in the Northern conduct of the war. If after its victory in Tennessee the Kentucky army had rapidly advanced on the railroad centres in Georgia, instead of letting itself be drawn South down the Mississippi on a side track, Reuter and Co would have been cheated of their business in "intervention" and "mediation" reports. However that may be, Europe can wish nothing more fervently than that the *coup d'etat* should attempt "to restore order in the United States" and "to save civilization" there likewise.

*Die Presse*, June 20, 1862

30

A SUPPRESSED DEBATE ON MEXICO AND  
THE ALLIANCE WITH FRANCE

London, July 16, 1862

ONE of the most curious of English parliamentary devices is the count out. What is the count out? If less than 40 members are present in the Lower House, they do not form a *quorum*, that is, an assembly capable of transacting business. If a motion is introduced by an independent parliamentarian, which is equally irksome to both oligarchical factions, the *Ins* and the *Outs* (those in office and those in opposition), they then come to an agreement that on the day of the debate parliamentarians from both sides will gradually be lacking, *alias*

otherwise absent themselves. When the emptying of the benches has reached the necessary maximum, the government whip, that is, the parliamentarian entrusted with party discipline by the ministry of the day, then tips the wink to a brother previously chosen for this purpose. Brother parliamentarian gets up and quite nonchalantly requests the chairman to have the house counted. The counting takes place and, behold, it is discovered that there are less than 40 members assembled. Herewith the proceedings come to an end. The obnoxious motion is got rid of without the government party or the opposition party having put itself in the awkward and compromising position of being obliged to vote it down.

At yesterday's sitting the count out was brought up in an interesting manner. Lord R. Montagu had given notice of a motion for that day which dealt with the communication of new diplomatic documents on *intervention in Mexico*. He began his speech with the following words :

I was warned yesterday that both front benches had agreed to count out the House on this motion. I do not suppose the House will be so indifferent to a subject which affects it so nearly. The papers on the affairs of Mexico had a peculiar interest in themselves. The last of them was delivered on Saturday, and it would be unconstitutional not to submit that policy to discussion by the House

But Lord R. Montagu had reckoned without his host. After he himself had spoken, Layard had replied to him on behalf of the government and Fitzgerald had delivered himself of some official chatter on behalf of the Tories, Kinglake (a Liberal member) rose. The exordium of his speech concluded with the following words :

The whole series of negotiations disclosed by the papers is a good illustration of the way in which the French government uses its relations with this country as a means to prop the Imperial throne. It is of great moment for the French government to divert attention from affairs at home by causing it to be seen that the French government is engaged in some great transactions abroad, in concert with one of the great settled States of Europe.

Hardly had Kinglake uttered these words when an "honourable" member of the House moved that the House be "counted" And behold ! The House had dwindled to only 33 members. Lord Montagu's motion had been killed by the same count out against which he had protested at the beginning of the debate.

Apart from Kinglake's interrupted speech, only that of Lord Montagu possessed any material interest. Lord R. Montagu's speech contains the following important analysis of the facts of the case.

Sir Charles Wyke had concluded a treaty with Mexico. Out of servility to Louis Bonaparte this treaty was not ratified by Lord John Russell. Sir Charles Wyke concluded the said treaty after France, through her connection with Almonte, the leader of the reactionary party, had entered a path which abrogated the joint convention between England, France and Spain. Lord John Russell himself declared in an official dispatch that this treaty satisfied all the legitimate demands of England. In his correspondence with Thouvenel, however, he promised, in compliance with Bonaparte's wish, not to ratify the treaty for the time being. He allowed Thouvenel to communicate this decision to the *Corps Legislatif*. Indeed, Lord John Russell lowered himself so far as to promise Thouvenel that he would break off all communication with Sir Charles Wyke until July 1, 1862—a date that gave Thouvenel time to answer. Thouvenel answered that Bonaparte did not contest England's right to act in isolation, but disapproved of the Anglo-Mexican treaty concluded by Sir Charles Wyke. Thereupon Russell ordered Wyke to withhold the ratification of the treaty.

England, added Lord Montagu, lends her influence to enforce the fraudulent claims on the Mexican Treasury with which Morny "and *perhaps persons of higher standing* in France" have provided themselves per medium of the Swiss bourse-swindler Jecker.

These operations in Mexico—he continued—were not divulged until after Parliament was prorogued and when no question could be asked about them. The first extra-Parliamentary war was waged in 1857. *The Noble Viscount* (i.e., Palmerston) defended that on the ground that the principle of the previous sanction of Parliament did not apply to Asiatic war, now it was made not to apply to wars in America. It would next not be supposed to apply to wars in Europe. Yet if this were permitted Parliament would become a mere farce. For how could that House control the expenditure, if negotiations were to be carried on in secret and wars were to be begun without sanction?

Lord Montagu wound up with the words.

We combined with the murderer of his country's liberties (i.e. Louis Napoleon) and joined him in planting a despotism

on free will. Even now we cannot shake off our accomplice, although we see him doomed to the abhorrence of man and the vengeance of Heaven (We have already given an abstract of Layard's reply in the *Abendblatt*.)

*Die Presse*, July 20, 1862.

31.

A CRITICISM OF AMERICAN AFFAIRS

THE crisis which at the moment dominates conditions in the United States has been brought about by two-fold causes: military and political.

Had the last campaign been conducted according to a single strategic plan, the main army of the West must then, as previously explained in these columns, have availed itself of its successes in Kentucky and Tennessee to penetrate through north Alabama to Géorgia and to seize there the railroad centres at Decatur, Milledgeville, etc. The connection between the Eastern and the Western army of the Secessionists would thereby have been broken and their mutual support rendered impossible. Instead of this, the Kentucky army marched south down the Mississippi in the direction of New Orleans and its victory near Memphis had no other result than to dispatch the greater part of Beauregard's troops to Richmond, so that the Confederates here now suddenly confronted McClellan, who had not exploited the defeat of the enemy's troops at Yorktown and Williamsburg and, on the other hand, had from the first split up his own fighting forces, with a superior army in a superior position. McClellan's generalship, already described by us previously, was in itself sufficient to secure the downfall of the strongest and best disciplined army. Finally, War Secretary Stanton made an unpardonable mistake. To make an impression abroad, he suspended recruiting after the conquest of Tennessee and so condemned the army to constant attenuation, just when it stood most in need of reinforcements for a rapid, decisive offensive. Despite the strategic blunders and despite McClellan's generalship, with a steady influx of recruits the war, if not decided by now, would nevertheless have been rapidly nearing a victorious decision. Stanton's step was so much the more unfortunate as the South was then enlisting every man from 18 to

35 years old to a man and was therefore staking everything on a single card. It is those people who have been trained in the meantime that almost everywhere give the Confederates the upper hand and secure the initiative to them. They held Halleck fast, dislodged Curtis from Arkansas, beat McClellan and under Stonewall Jackson gave the signal for the guerrilla raids that now reach as far as the Ohio.

In part, the military causes of the crisis are connected with the political. It was the influence of the Democratic Party that elevated an incompetent like McClellan, because he was formerly a supporter of Breckinridge, to the position of Commander-in-Chief of all the military forces of the North. It was anxious regard for the wishes, advantages and interests of the spokesmen of the *border slave states* that hitherto broke off the Civil War's point of principle and, so to speak, deprived it of its soul. The "loyal" slaveholders of these border states saw to it that the fugitive slave laws dictated by the South were maintained and the sympathies of the Negroes for the North forcibly suppressed, that no general could venture to put a company of Negroes in the field and that slavery was finally transformed from the Achilles' heel of the South into its invulnerable hide of horn. Thanks to the slaves, who perform all productive labours, the entire manhood of the South that is fit to fight can be led into the field!

At the present moment, when secession's stocks are rising, the spokesmen of the border states increase their claims. However, Lincoln's appeal to them shows, where it threatens them with inundation by the Abolition party, that things are taking a revolutionary turn. Lincoln knows what Europe does not know, that it is by no means apathy or giving way under pressure of defeat that causes his demand for 300,000 recruits to meet with such a cold response. New England and the Northwest, which have provided the main body of the army, are determined to enforce a revolutionary waging of war on the government and to inscribe the battle-slogan of "Abolition of Slavery!" on the star-spangled banner. Lincoln yields only hesitantly and uneasily to this pressure from without, but knows that he is incapable of offering resistance to it for long. Hence his fervent appeal to the border states to renounce the institution of slavery voluntarily and under the conditions of a favourable contract. He knows that it is only the continuance of slavery in the border states that has so

far left slavery untouched in the South and prohibited the North from applying its great radical remedy. He errs only if he imagines that the "loyal" slaveholders are to be moved by benevolent speeches and rational arguments. They will yield only to force.

So far we have only witnessed the first act of the Civil War—the *constitutional* waging of war. The second act, the revolutionary waging of war, is at hand.

Meanwhile, during its first session the Congress, which has now adjourned, has decreed a series of important measures that we will briefly summarize here.

Apart from its financial legislation, it has passed the Homestead Bill that the Northern popular masses had long striven for in vain,<sup>111</sup> by this a part of the state lands is given gratis for cultivation to the colonists, whether American born or immigrants. It has abolished slavery in [the District of] Columbia and the national capital, with monetary compensation for the former slaveholders.<sup>112</sup> Slavery has been declared "forever impossible" in all the *Territories* of the United States.<sup>113</sup> The Act under which the new State of West Virginia is taken into the Union prescribes abolition of slavery by stages and declares all Negro children born after July 4, 1863, to be born free. The conditions of this emancipation by stages are on the whole borrowed from the law that was enacted 70 years ago in Pennsylvania for the same purpose.<sup>114</sup> By a fourth Act all slaves of rebels are to be emancipated as soon as they fall into the hands of the republican army. Another law, which is now being put into effect *for the first time*, provides that these emancipated Negroes may be militarily organized and sent into the field against the South. The independence of the Negro republics of Liberia and Hayti has been recognised<sup>115</sup> and, finally, a treaty for the abolition of the slave trade has been concluded with England.

Thus, however the dice may fall in the fortunes of battle, it can now safely be said that Negro slavery will not long outlive the Civil War.

*Die Presse*, August 9, 1862.



## ABOLITIONIST DEMONSTRATIONS IN AMERICA

It was previously observed in these columns that President Lincoln, legally cautious, constitutionally conciliatory, by birth a citizen of the border slave state of Kentucky, escapes only with difficulty from the control of the "loyal" slaveholders, seeks to avoid any open breach with them and precisely thereby calls forth a conflict with the parties of the North which are consistent in point of principle and are pushed more and more into the foreground by events. The speech that Wendell Phillips delivered at Abington, Massachusetts, on the occasion of the anniversary of the slaves' emancipation in the British West Indies, may be regarded as a prologue to this conflict.

Together with Garrison and G. Smith, Wendell Phillips is the leader of the Abolitionists in New England. For 30 years he has without intermission and at the risk of his life proclaimed the emancipation of the slaves as his battle-cry, regardless alike of the persiflage of the press, the enraged howls of paid rowdies and the conciliatory representations of solicitous friends. Even by his opponents he is acknowledged as one of the greatest orators of the North, as combining iron character with forceful energy and purest conviction. The *London Times*—and what could characterize this magnanimous paper more strikingly—today denounces Wendell Phillips' speech at Abington to the government at Washington. It is an "abuse" of freedom of speech.

Anything more violent it is scarcely possible to imagine—says *The Times*—and anything more daring in time of Civil War was never perpetrated in any country by any sane man who valued his life and liberty. In reading the speech . . . it is scarcely possible to avoid the conclusion that the speaker's object was to force the government to prosecute him.\*

And *The Times*, in spite of or, perhaps, because of its hatred of the Union government, appears not at all disinclined to assume the role of public prosecutor!

In the present state of affairs Wendell Phillips' speech is of greater importance than a battle bulletin. We therefore

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\**The Times*, August 22, 1862.—Ed.

epitomize its most striking passages.\*

The government, he says among other things, fights for the maintenance of slavery, and therefore it fights in vain. Lincoln wages a political war. Even at the present time he is more afraid of Kentucky than of the entire North. He believes in the South. The Negroes on the Southern battle-fields, when asked whether the rain of cannon-balls and bombs that tore up the earth all round and split the trees asunder, did not terrify them, answered: "No, massa; we know that they are not meant for us!" The rebels could speak of McClellan's bombs in the same way. They know that they are not meant for them, to do them harm. I do not say that McClellan is a traitor; but I say that if he were a traitor, he must have acted exactly as he has done. Have no fear for Richmond; McClellan will not take it. If the war is continued in this fashion, without a rational aim, then it is a useless squandering of blood and gold. It would be better were the South independent today than to hazard one more human life for a war based on the present execrable policy. To continue the war in the fashion prevailing hitherto, requires 125,000 men a year and a million dollars a day.

But you cannot get rid of the South. As Jefferson said of slavery: "The Southern states have the wolf by the ears, but they can neither hold him nor let him go." In the same way we have the South by the ears and can neither hold it nor let it go. Recognize it tomorrow and you will have no peace. For eighty years it has lived with us, in fear of us the whole time, with hatred for us half the time, ever troubling and abusing us. Made presumptuous by conceding its present claims, it would not keep within an imaginary border line a year—nay, the moment that we speak of conditions of peace, it will cry victory! We shall never have peace until slavery is uprooted. So long as you retain the present tortoise at the head of our government, you make a hole with one hand in order to fill it with the other. Let the entire nation endorse the resolutions of the New York Chamber of Commerce<sup>10</sup> and then the army will have something for which it is worth while fighting. Had Jefferson Davis the power, he would not capture Washington. He knows that

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\*For the complete speech see W. Phillips, *Speeches, Lectures and Letters, Series 1* (Boston, 1864), pp. 448-463. The address is entitled "The Cabinet."—Ed.

the bomb that fell in this Sodom would rouse the whole nation.

The entire North would thunder with one voice: "Down with slavery, down with everything that stands in the way of saving the republic!" Jefferson Davis is quite satisfied with his successes. They are greater than he anticipated, far greater! If he can continue to swim on them till March 4, 1863, England will then, and this is in order, recognize the Southern Confederacy . . . The President has not put the Confiscation Act into operation. He may be honest, but what has his honesty to do with the matter? He has neither insight nor foresight. When I was in Washington, I ascertained that three months ago Lincoln had written the proclamation for a general emancipation of the slaves and that McClellan blustered him out of his decision and that the representatives of Kentucky blustered him into the retention of McClellan, in whom he places no confidence. It will take years for Lincoln to learn to combine his legal scruples as an attorney with the demands of the Civil War. This is the appalling condition of a democratic government and its greatest evil.

In France a hundred men, convinced for good reasons, would carry the nation with them; but in order that our government may take a step, nineteen millions must previously put themselves in motion. And to how many of these millions has it been preached for years that slavery is an institution ordained by God! With these prejudices, with paralyzed hands and hearts, you entreat the President to save you from the Negro! If this theory is correct, then only salveholding despotism can bring a temporary peace. . . . I know Lincoln. I have taken his measure in Washington. He is a first-rate *second-rate* man. He waits honestly, like another Vesenius, for the nation to take him in hand and sweep away slavery through him . . . In past years, not far from the platform from which I now speak, the Whigs fired off small mortars in order to stifle my voice. And what is the result?

The sons of these Whigs now fill their own graves in the marshes of Chickahominy! Dissolve this Union in God's name and put another in its place, on the cornerstone of which is written: "Political equality for all the citizens of the world. . . ." During my stay in Chicago I asked lawyers of Illinois, among whom Lincoln had practised, what sort of

man he was. Whether he could say No. The answer was "He lacks backbone. If the Americans wanted to elect a man absolutely incapable of leadership, of initiative, then they were bound to elect Abraham Lincoln . . . . Never has a man heard him say No! . . ." I asked: "Is McClellan a man who can say No?" The manager of the Chicago Central Railroad, on which McClellan was employed, answered "He is incapable of making a decision. Put a question to him and it takes an hour for him to think of the answer. During the time that he was connected with the administration of the Central Railroad, he never decided a single important controversial question."

And these are the two men who, above all others, now hold the fate of the Northern republic in their hands! Those best acquainted with the state of the army assure us that Richmond could have been taken five times, had the do-nothing at the head of the army of the Potomac allowed it; but he preferred to dig up dirt in the Chickahominy swamps, in order ignominiously to abandon the locality and his dirt ramparts. Lincoln, out of cowardly fear of the border slave states, keeps this man in his present position, but the day will come when Lincoln will confess that he has never believed in McClellan. Let us hope that the war lasts long enough to transform us into men, and then we shall quickly triumph. God has put the thunderbolt of emancipation into our hands in order to crush this rebellion. . . .

*Die Presse*, August 30, 1862

### 33.

## THE SITUATION IN NORTH AMERICA

London, November 4.

GENERAL BRAGG, who commands the Southern army in Kentucky—the other fighting forces of the South ravaging it are restricted to guerrilla bands—with his irruption into this border state issued a proclamation that throws considerable light on the latest combined moves of the Confederacy. Bragg's proclamation, addressed to the States of the Northwest, implies that his success in Kentucky is a matter of course, and obviously calculates on the contingency of a victorious

advance into Ohio, the central state of the North. In the first place, he declares the readiness of the Confederacy to guarantee free navigation on the Mississippi and the Ohio. This guarantee only acquires import from the time that the slaveholders find themselves in possession of the border states. At Richmond, therefore, it was implied that the simultaneous incursions of Lee into Maryland and Bragg into Kentucky would secure possession of the border states at a blow. Bragg then goes on to prove the justification of the South, which only fights for its independence, but, for the rest, wants peace. The real, characteristic point of the proclamation, however, is the offer of a separate peace with the Northwestern states, the invitation to them to secede from the Union and join the Confederacy, since the economic interests of the Northwest and the South are just as harmonious as those of the Northwest and Northeast are inimically opposed. We see the South barely fancied itself safely in possession of the border states, when it officially blabbed out its ulterior object of a reconstruction of the Union, to the exclusion of the states of New England.

Like the invasion of Maryland, however, that of Kentucky has also come to grief as the former in the battle of Antietam Creek, so the latter in the battle of Perryville, near Louisville. As there, so here, the Confederates found themselves on the offensive having attacked the advance guard of Buell's army. The Federals owed their victory to General McCook, the commander of the advance guard, who held his ground against the foe's far superior forces long enough to give Buell time to bring his main body into the field. There is not the slightest doubt that the defeat at Perryville will entail the evacuation of Kentucky. The most considerable guerrilla band, formed out of the most fanatical partisans of the slave system in Kentucky and led by General Morgan, has been annihilated at Frankfort (between Louisville and Lexington) at almost the same time. Finally, the decisive victory of Rosecrans at Corinth supervenes, which makes imperative the hastiest retreat of the beaten army commanded by General Bragg.

Thus the Confederate campaign for the reconquest of the lost border slave states, which was undertaken on a large scale with military skill and with the most favourable chances, has come utterly to grief. Apart from the immediate military results, these struggles contribute in another way to the re-

moval of the main difficulty. The hold of the slave states proper on the border states naturally rests on the slave element of the latter, the same element that enforces diplomatic and constitutional considerations on the Union government in its struggle against slavery. In the border states, however, the principal theatre of the Civil War, this element is in practice being reduced to nothing by the Civil War itself. A large section of the slaveholders, with its "black chattels" is constantly migrating to the South, in order to bring its property to a place of safety. With each defeat of the Confederates this migration is renewed on a large scale.

One of my friends, a German officer,<sup>117</sup> who has fought under the star-spangled banner in Missouri, Arkansas, Kentucky and Tennessee in turn, writes to me that this migration is wholly reminiscent of the exodus from Ireland in 1847 and 1848. Furthermore, the energetic sections of the slaveholders, the youth, on the one hand, and the political and military leaders, on the other, separate themselves from the bulk of their class, since they either form guerrilla bands in their own states and, as guerrilla bands, are annihilated, or they leave home and are enlisted in the army or the administration of the Confederacy. Hence the result: on the one hand, an immense reduction of the slave element in the border states, where it had always to contend with the "encroachments" of competing free labour. On the other hand, removal of the energetic section of the slaveholders and its white following. There is left behind only a sediment of "moderate" slaveholders, who will soon grasp greedily at the pile of money offered them by Washington for the redemption of their "black chattels," whose value will in any case be lost as soon as the Southern market is closed to their sale. Thus the war itself brings about a solution by actually revolutionizing the form of society in the border states.

For the South the favourable season for waging war is over; for the North it is beginning, since the inland rivers are now navigable once more and the combination of land and sea warfare already attempted with so much success is again feasible. The North has eagerly availed itself of the interval. "Ironclads," ten in number, for the rivers of the West, are rapidly nearing completion; to which must be added twice as many semi-armoured vessels for shallow waters. In the East many new armoured vessels have already left the yards, whilst others are still under the hammer. All will be ready

by the first of January, 1863. Ericsson, the inventor and builder of the *Monitor*, is directing the building of nine new ships after the same model. Four of them are already "afloat."

On the Potomac, in Tennessee and Virginia, as well as at different points in the South—Norfolk, Newbern, Port Royal, Pensacola and New Orleans—the army daily receives fresh reinforcements. The first levy, of 300,000 men, which Lincoln announced in July has been fully provided and is in part already at the seat of war. The second levy of 300,000 men for nine months is gradually being raised. In some states conscription has been done away with by voluntary enlistment; in none does it encounter serious difficulties. Ignorance and hatred have decried conscription as an unheard-of occurrence in the history of the United States. Nothing can be more mistaken. During the War of Independence and the second war with England (1812-14) great bodies of troops were conscripted, indeed, even in sundry small wars with the Indians, without thus ever having encountered opposition worth mentioning.<sup>13</sup>

It is a noteworthy fact that during the present year Europe furnished the United States with an emigrant contingent of approximately 100,000 souls and that half of these emigrants consist of Irishmen and Britons. At the recent congress of the English "Association for the Advancement of Science" at Cambridge, the economist Merivale was obliged to remind his countrymen of a fact which *The Times*, *The Saturday Review*, *Morning Post* and *The Morning Herald*, not to speak of the *dei minorum gentium*,<sup>14</sup> have so completely forgotten, or want to make England forget, namely, the fact that the majority of the English surplus population finds a new home in the United States.

*Die Presse*, November 10, 1862.

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<sup>14</sup> Gods of lesser peoples.—*Ed.*

## THE DISMISSAL OF McCLELLAN

McCLELLAN'S dismissal! That is Lincoln's answer to the election victory of the Democrats.

The Democratic journals had stated with the most positive assurance that the election of Seymour as Governor of New York State would entail the immediate revocation of the proclamation in which Lincoln declared slavery abolished in *Secessia* from January 1, 1863.<sup>110</sup> The paper that took this prophetic imprint had hardly left the press when their favourite general—their favourite because “next to a great defeat he most feared a decisive victory”—was deprived of his command and went back to private life.

We recall that to this proclamation of Lincoln, McClellan replied with a counter-proclamation, an order of the day to his army, in which he indeed forbade any demonstration against the President's measure, but at the same time let slip the fatal words: “The remedy for political errors, if any are committed, is to be found only in the action of the people at the polls.”\* McClellan, at the head of the main army of the United States therefore appealed from the President to the impending elections. He threw the weight of his position into the scales. A *pronunciamento* in the Spanish manner aside, he could not have demonstrated his hostility to the President's policy more strikingly. Accordingly, after the election victory of the Democrats<sup>120</sup> the only choice left Lincoln was either to sink to the level of a tool of the pro-slave compromise party or with McClellan to remove from under it its point of support in the army.

McClellan's dismissal at the present moment is accordingly a political demonstration. In any case, however, it had become unavoidable. Halleck, the Commander-in-Chief,<sup>121</sup> in a report to the Secretary of War, had charged McClellan with direct insubordination. For, shortly after the defeat of the Confederates in Maryland on October 6, Halleck ordered the crossing of the Potomac, particularly as the lower water-level of the Potomac and its tributaries favoured military operations at the time. In defiance of this command McClellan remained immovable, under the pretext of his army's inability

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\*McClellan's General Order 163, October 7, 1862.—Ed.



to march due to lack of provisions. In the report mentioned, Halleck proves that this was a hollow subterfuge, that, compared with the Western Army, the Eastern army, enjoyed great privileges in regard to commissariat and that the supplies still lacking could have been received just as well south as north of the Potomac.<sup>122</sup> A second report links up with this report of Halleck's; in it the committee appointed to inquire into the surrender of Harper's Ferry to the Confederates accuses McClellan of having concentrated the Union troops stationed near that arsenal in an inconceivably slow fashion—he let them march only six English miles (about one and a half German miles) a day—for the purpose of its relief. Both reports, that of Halleck and that of the Committee, were in the President's hands prior to the election victory of the Democrats.

McClellan's generalship has been described in these columns so repeatedly that it is sufficient to recall how he sought to substitute strategical envelopment for tactical decision and how indefatigable he was in discovering considerations of general-staff discretion which forbade him either to take advantage of victories or to anticipate defeats. The brief Maryland campaign has cast a false halo about his head.<sup>123</sup> Here, however, we have to consider the facts that he received his general marching orders from General Halleck, who also drew up the plan of the first Kentucky campaign, and that victory on the battlefield was due exclusively to the bravery of the subordinate generals, in particular of General Reno, who fell, and of Hooker, who has not yet recovered from his wounds. Napoleon once wrote to his brother Joseph that on the battlefield there was danger at all points alike and one ran into its jaws most surely when one sought to avoid it. McClellan seems to have grasped this axiom, but without giving it the particular application which Napoleon suggested to his brother. During the whole of his military career McClellan has never been on the battlefield, has never been under fire, a peculiarity that General Kearny strongly stresses in a letter which his brother published after Kearny, fighting under Pope's command, had fallen in one of the battles before Washington.

McClellan understood how to conceal his mediocrity under a mask of restrained earnestness, laconic reticence and dignified reserve. His very defects secured him the unshakable confidence of the Democratic Party in the North and "loyal

the higher officers of his army he gained supporters through the formation of a general staff of dimensions hitherto unheard of in military history. A section of the older officers, who had belonged to the former army of the Union and had received their training in the Academy at West Point, found in him a point of support for their rivalry with the newly sprung up "civil generals" and for their secret sympathies with the "comrades" in the enemy camp. The soldier, finally, knew his military qualities only by hearsay, whilst for the rest he ascribed to him old merits of the commissariat and was able to tell many glorious tales of his reserved condescension. A single gift of the supreme commander McClellan possessed—that of assuring himself of popularity with his army.

McClellan's successor, Burnside, is too little known to pronounce an opinion about. He belongs to the Republican Party. Hooker, on the other hand, who assumes command of the army corps serving specifically under McClellan, is incontestably one of the doughtiest blades in the Union "Fighting Joe," as the troops call him, played the largest part in the successes in Maryland. He is an *Abolitionist*.

The same American papers which bring us the news of McClellan's dismissal, acquaint us with utterances of Lincoln in which he resolutely declares that he will not deviate a hair's breadth from his proclamation.

He [Lincoln]—observes *The Morning Star* with justice—has by successive exhibitions of firmness, taught the world to know him as a slow, but solid man, who advances with excessive caution, but does not back. Each step of his administrative career has been in the right direction and has been stoutly maintained. Starting from the resolution to exclude slavery from the territories, he has come within sight of the ulterior result of all anti-slavery movements—its extirpation from the whole soil of the Union—and has already reached the high vantage ground at which the *Union* ceased to be responsible for the enslavement of a single human being.\*

*Die Presse*, November 29, 1862.

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\**Morning Star*, November 22, 1862.—Ed.

## ENGLISH NEUTRALITY

## THE SITUATION IN THE SOUTHERN STATES

London, November 29, 1862.

THE negotiations between the Cabinet here and the government at Washington on the corsair *Alabama*<sup>124</sup> are still pending, whilst fresh negotiations on the renewed fitting-out of Confederate warships in English ports have already begun. Professor Francis W Newman, one of the theoretical representatives of English radicalism, publishes in today's *Morning Star* a letter in which, among other things, he says :

When the American Consul at Liverpool had got opinion of counsel as to the illegality of the *Alabama* and sent his complaint to Earl Russell, the law officers of the Crown were consulted and they, too, condemned it as illegal. But so much time was lost in this process that the pirate meanwhile escaped.

Is our Government a second time going to wink at the successors of the *Alabama* escaping? Mr Gladstone has made me fear that they are in that speech of his at Newcastle . . . he said that he had been informed that the rebel President, whom he penegyrized, was "soon to have a navy." Did this allude to the navy his Liverpool friends are building? . . . Lord Palmerston and Lord Russell as much as the Tory Party are animated by a hatred of republicanism strong enough to overbear all ordinary scruples, while Mr Gladstone, a probable future Prime Minister, has avowed himself an admirer of perjured men, leagued together against law to extend slavery.\*

Of the papers that arrived from America today, the *Richmond Examiner*, an organ of the Confederates, is perhaps the most interesting. It contains a detailed article on the situation, the most important features of which I summarize in the following extract.

The extraordinary and sudden increase in the enemy's sea power threatens to make our prospects gloomy. This weapon has acquired such a range that in many respects it seems more dangerous to us than the power of the enemy on land. The Yankees now command 200 more warships than at the outbreak of the war. Great preparations have been made for naval operations during the coming winter and, apart

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\**Morning Star*, November 29, 1862.—Ed.

from the vessels already fit for service, some 50 ironclad war-ships are in process of construction. We have every reason to believe that in the armament and construction of its ships the Yankee fleet which will descend upon our coast this winter far surpasses its predecessors. The objectives of the forthcoming expeditions are of the greatest importance. It is intended to capture our last seaports, complete the blockade and, finally, open up points of invasion in Southern districts, in order with the beginning of the new year to put the Emancipation Acts into practical operation. It would be foolish to deny the advantages which must accrue to our enemy from the capture of our last seaports, or to dismiss such misfortune lightly with the consoling thought that we can still always beat the foe by waging war in the interior. . . . With Charleston, Savannah and Mobile in the enemy's hands, the blockade would be carried out with a severity of which even our sufferings hitherto have given no idea. We would have to give up all thought of building a fleet on this side of the Atlantic Ocean and submit anew to the humiliation of surrendering our shipbuilding to the enemy or destroying it ourselves. Our great system of railroad connections in the cotton states would be more or less broken through, and perhaps too late we would make the discovery that the land warfare, on which such great hopes are built, would have to be continued under circumstances which forbade the maintenance, provisioning and concentration of great armies. These disastrous results arising from a capture of our seaports sink into insignificance, however, before a greater danger, the greatest danger of this war—the occupation of points in the cotton states from which the enemy can carry out his emancipation plan. Great efforts are naturally being made to safeguard this pet measure of the Abolitionists from falling through and to prevent the spirit of revenge, which Mr Lincoln has corked in a bottle till January 1, from fizzling out in the harmless hissing of soda-water. . . . The attempt is now made on our most defenceless side, the heart of the South is to be poisoned. . . . Prediction of future misfortune sounds bad to the ears of the masses, who blindly believe in the government and consider boasting to be patriotism. . . . We do not assert that *Charleston, Savannah and Mobile* are not in a condition for defence. In the South there are naturally whole scores of military authorities, according to whom these ports are more impregnable than Gibraltar; but military men and their mouth-pieces have too often lulled our people into false security. . . . We heard the same story with regard to New Orleans. According to their description, its defensive works surpassed those of Tyre against Alexander. Nevertheless, the people woke up one fine morning to see the enemy's flag waving from its harbour. The defensive condition of our ports is a secret of official circles. But the indications of the immediate past are not comforting. A few weeks ago *Galveston* fell into the enemy's hands almost without a struggle.<sup>125</sup> The local newspapers had been forbidden to write about the town's

means of defence. No cry for help resounded save that which struck the deaf ear of the government. The people were not roused. Their patriotism was requested to remain in ignorance, to trust the leaders and to submit to the decrees of providence. In this way another prize was presented to the enemy. The method of wrapping all military matters in a mantle of secrecy has borne bad fruit for the South. It may have reduced criticism to dead silence and drawn a veil over the mistakes of the government. But it has not blinded the foe. He always seems accurately instructed on the state of our defence works, whilst our people first learn of their weakness when they have fallen into the hands of the Yankees.

*Die Presse*, December 4, 1862.

PART THREE

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN KARL MARX AND  
FREDERICK ENGELS (1861-1866)

1. MARX TO ENGELS<sup>1</sup>

January 11, 1860.

In my opinion, the biggest things that are happening in the world today are on the one hand the movement of the slaves in America started by the death of John Brown, and on the other the movement of the serfs in Russia. . . .<sup>128</sup>

I have just seen in the *Tribune* that there has been a fresh rising of slaves in Missouri, naturally suppressed. But the signal has now been given. If things get serious by and by, what will then become of Manchester?

2. ENGELS TO MARX

January 26, 1860.

Your opinion of the significance of the slave movement in America and Russia is now confirmed. The Harper's Ferry affair<sup>127</sup> with its aftermath in Missouri bears its fruit; the free Negroes in the South are everywhere hunted out of the states, and I have just read in the first New York cotton report (W. P. Wright and Co., January 10, 1860) that the planters have hurried their cotton on to the ports in order to guard against any probable consequences arising out of the Harper's Ferry affair.

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<sup>1</sup>This and the following extracts relating to the American Civil War are taken from the complete German edition of the works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: *Gesamtausgabe, Dritte Abteilung* ("Der Briefwechsel zwischen Marx und Engels") Band 2 (1854-1860) and Band 3 (1861-1867) [Collected Works, Third Division ("The Correspondence Between Marx and Engels"), vols 2 and 3], Berlin, 1930. A number of the letters are contained in K. Marx and F. Engels, *Correspondence, A Selection with Commentary and Notes*, London and New York, 1934.—Ed.

### 3. ENGELS TO MARX

January 7, 1861

Things in North America are also becoming exciting. Matters must be going very badly for them with the slaves if the Southerners play so risky a game. The least volunteer *putsch* from the North could set everything ablaze. In any case, it seems that one way or another slavery is rapidly going to come to an end, and then it will be the same with cotton production. But how this will react on England will then soon become manifest. And with such mighty movements an ass like Bonaparte believes he can permanently fish in troubled waters.

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### 4. MARX TO ENGELS

June 9, 1861.

Many thanks for the letter about America. Should anything important (militarily) occur, then always write me your opinion about it. According to the picture that I have formed of General Scott—now, moreover, 76 years old—from the Mexican War (see Ripley<sup>128</sup>), I expect the greatest blunders from him unless the old donkey is controlled by others. Slowness and indecision, above all. For the rest, I see by the facts reported in the *Tribune* that the North now speaks openly of a slave war and the destruction of slavery.

### 5. ENGELS TO MARX

June 12, 1861.

Unfortunately, I have not collected any newspapers on the American War, and many places, likewise, are not to be found on the map. The main thing is this

The South had prepared in secret for years, but particularly since the excitement of the presidential election; through the treason of Buchanan's ministers it had obtained money and arms *en masse* at the last moment. Till March 4, therefore, the North was completely paralyzed. Even up to the fall of Sumter Lincoln did nothing or could do nothing but concentrate somewhat more and put in somewhat better trim the few troops of the line (18,000 men in all, mostly dis-

persed in the West against the Indians). Now, after the attack on Sumter, the North was at length sufficiently aroused to reduce all opposition outbursts to silence and thereby to make possible a powerful military action. Seventy-five thousand men raised, who may now be on the move, but ten times this number seem to have offered themselves, and there may now be as many as 100,000 men on the move, though not yet concentrated by a long way. A further levy by Lincoln is daily expected and will require less time, since everything is now better prepared. The 75,000 men, or rather that part of them which is stationed in the neighbourhood of Washington, on the Ohio opposite Kentucky and at St. Louis in Missouri (not counting, therefore, the reserves in Ohio and Pennsylvania), has been sufficient to restore for the present the equilibrium between the forces of the North and South on the line of the Potomac and even to permit for the moment the offensive of the North over a short distance.

The first objective of both the South and the North was Washington. The offensive of the South against it was far too weak; beyond Richmond the main force appears to have been no longer strong enough for a timely blow. The only thing that was achieved was the dispatch of a mobile column to Harper's Ferry on the Potomac, above Washington. This position is eminently suitable for an offensive against the North (Maryland and Pennsylvania); it lies at the confluence of the Shenandoah, an important river, and the Potomac, is tactically of great strength and completely dominates both streams. The Federal arsenal seems to have been placed there not unintentionally by a government that foresaw and favoured a future secession. The occupation of Harper's Ferry interrupts the domination of the Potomac line by the Union troops at a sensitive spot and gives the Southern troops, in the event of their advancing in numbers as far as this line, complete command of both banks forthwith.

On the holding of Washington by the North hung the fate of Maryland and Delaware; cut off from the South, occupied by Union troops, they fell at once to the Union. Second success of the Union.

The reconquest of Missouri by the Germans of St. Louis was the third success, and is of enormous importance, since the possession of St. Louis bars the Mississippi. How far the neutrality of Kentucky is favourable to the North or South will presumably depend on circumstances and events. At any



rate, it restricts the theatre of war for the present to the territory lying to the west.

Result: After all the preparations of the South, then, it has accomplished nothing more than that the North, with only one month's preparation, has already conquered from it the capital of the country and three slave states, and a fourth slave state does not dare to secede; that the Southern offensive has come to a halt at the Potomac, and the North has already moved across this river, so far without meeting resistance. For every additional man that the South can now put in the field, the North will put three to four. The states that have seceded have about 7,500,000 inhabitants, of whom more than 3,000,000 are slaves; 1,000,000 whites, at least, must be deducted for watching over the slaves, so that barely two and a half million remain to form the mass of the population available for war. If ten per cent of these are raised—the strongest force, I should say, that has ever been raised for defence—that gives, at most, 250,000 men. But so many will certainly not be got together. Switzerland, with nearly the same population—rather more than two million—has about 160,000 militiamen *on paper*. The North, on the other hand, counting the free states only, numbers 20,000,000, who are *all* available, with the exception, perhaps, of California, Utah and the remotest Western Territories. Let us say there is an available population of 17,000,000, and let us take not ten per cent of these, but only its third part, 3½ per cent, as available for a war of offence, then that gives over 500,000 men, more than sufficient to overwhelm the South, despite its utmost efforts. As far as the relationship, man to man, is concerned, there is no question that physically and morally the people of the North are considerably superior to those of the South. The combativeness of the Southerner is combined to an appreciable extent with the cowardice of the assassin. Every man goes about armed but only *to be able to down his adversary* in a quarrel *before the latter expects the attack*. That is on the average . . . . [*The remainder of the letter is missing.*]

## 6. MARX TO ENGELS

July 1, 1861.

Please write me at once<sup>6</sup> what you think of the movements (military) in Virginia. The blunders of the militia officers—Brigadier-General Pierce,<sup>120</sup> by trade a "tailor" from Massachusetts—will naturally be repeated often enough on both sides. Is Washington still threatened? Do you think the Southerners at Manassas Junction hold an offensive position? Or are not the fellows rather on the point of retreat? In Missouri the defeat of the Southerners seems to be decisive, and the terrible "Colonel Bernstein" has now turned up there too. According to a private letter to Weber, "Colonel Willich" is at the head of a corps from Cincinnati.<sup>120</sup> He does not seem to have gone to the front yet. A closer study of this American business has shown me that the conflict between South and North—after the latter has abased itself for the past fifty years by one concession after another—was finally (apart from the new and shameless demands of "chivalry") brought to a head by the weight thrown into the scales by the extraordinary development of the Northwestern states. The population there, richly mixed with fresh German and English elements, and in addition self-working farmers for the most part, was naturally not so easily intimidated as the gentlemen of Wall Street and the Quakers of Boston. According to the last census (1860), the population there increased by 67% between 1850 and 1860, numbering 7,870,869 in 1860, whereas the total free population of the seceded slave states is about 5,000,000, according to the same census. In 1860 these Northwestern states provided the bulk of the government party and the President.<sup>121</sup> And it was just this part of the North which decided against any recognition of the independence of a Southern Confederacy. Naturally, they cannot allow the lower part and delta of the Mississippi to fall into the hands of foreign states. Likewise, it was the population of these Northwestern states, who in the Kansas affair (from which the present war actually dates) came to grips with the border ruffians. Closer examination of the history of the secession movement reveals that secession, Constitution (Montgomery), Congress (*ibid*), etc. are all usurpations. In no place did they allow the people to vote *en masse*. Very characteristic articles appeared at the time in the Southern papers on these "usurpations," in which it is

not merely a question of seceding from the North, but of consolidating and intensifying the oligarchy of the 300,000 slaveholders in the South against the 5,000,000 whites.

## 7. ENGELS TO MARX

July 3, 1861.

Your questions about the state of affairs in Virginia are more easily put than answered. Is Washington still threatened? Not immediately, otherwise the Southerners would not have given up much ground but one does not really know the relative strength of the opposing forces. If the first main attack of the Northerners should be decisively repulsed, there's no telling what will happen, as one can't say where they will then come to a standstill. Still, it's three to one, that the Potomac would then be a sufficient obstacle.

Position at Manassas Junction—determined by its being necessary for the Southerners to maintain their communications with northwest Virginia by means of the railway to Paris and Strasburg. Should Manassas Junction be lost, their nearest railway communication with West Virginia (on the other side of the mountains) is the line from Richmond via Gordonsville to Staunton—80 miles further south; they lose the chance of rapidly moving their first-line reserves, those immediately behind the front, from west to east, etc., as required, and whatever is in West Virginia may be cut off or driven far afield. That is the significance of the position—if it is tactically of any importance is more than I can say, the maps do not allow of any conclusions. Altogether, the war in West Virginia will in the first place be a fight for the railway junctions.

The affair at Big Bethel has no importance whatever; tactically shockingly mismanaged; to make a night attack with such volunteers, and in divided columns into the bargain, could only end in confusion, one column firing on the other, and flight.

On the other hand, two things seem to be badly carried out in the North: 1. The masses of newly-trained and fully mobile troops appear not to be brought forward at all, but to be left idle some four or five hundred miles from the battlefield, whereas they would be invaluable on the Potomac—and 2. Brave old Scott again seems to have vast encircle-

ment plans, which only result in a vast splitting up of his forces; how far this may lead to defeats cannot be foretold in view of the slack organization and the unknown heroes of the South.

What do you mean about not voting on secession? Here it was in all the papers that the Convention decisions had been ratified in every state by a popular vote.

## 8. MARK TO ENGELS

July 5, 1861.

With regard to the secession business, the affair is quite incorrectly reported in the English papers. With the exception of South Carolina, there was everywhere the strongest opposition to secession.

*First: border slave states.* In the winter of 1861 a border state Convention was held. Virginia, Kentucky, Arkansas, Maryland, Delaware, Tennessee and North Carolina were invited to it. For this purpose conventions were held in each of these states in order to send delegates to the General Convention.

*Delaware* refused even to call a convention for this purpose.

*Tennessee* ditto. Its democratic legislature took it out of the Union by a *coup de main*. Later, however, election held, to ratify this invalid act. This took place under the reign of terrorism. More than a third did not vote at all. Of the remainder one-third against secession, in particular the whole of east Tennessee, which is now arming against secession.<sup>12</sup>

*Kentucky.* 100,000 for the Union ticket, only a few thousand for secession.

*Maryland* declared for the Union, and has now elected six Union men as members of Congress.

*North Carolina* and even *Arkansas* elected Union delegates, the former even by a large majority.<sup>13</sup> Later terrorized.

*Virginia.* The people elected a Union Convention (according to majority). A part of these fellows let themselves be bought. At the height of the South fever—fall of Sumter—an Ordinance of Secession passed *secretly* by 88 to 55. All other steps—while the Ordinance was kept secret—for the capture of the Federal Navy Yard at Norfolk and the Federal Armoury at Harper's Ferry in secret. Were betrayed to the

Federal authorities before their execution. Alliance with Jeff Davis' government resolved upon in secret and great masses of Confederate troops suddenly thrown into the state. Under the protection of these troops (in real Bonapartist style) now elections for secession. Nevertheless 50,000 Union votes, in spite of systematic terrorism. Northwestern Virginia has now, as you know, openly separated from the secession movement.<sup>134</sup>

*Second. Gulf States.* A real popular vote occurred only in a few states. In most cases, the *Conventions*, elected to decide on the attitude of the Southern states to Lincoln's election (they formed later *their* delegates at the Montgomery Congress), usurped the power not only to decide on secession, but also to recognize the constitution, Jeff Davis, etc. You will get an idea of the methods adopted from the following excerpts from Southern papers

*Texas*, in which after South Carolina the greatest slave party and terrorism, nevertheless 11,000 votes for the Union.<sup>135</sup>

*Alabama.* The inhabitants neither voted on secession nor the new constitution, etc. The Convention elected here passed the Ordinance of Secession with 61 against 39 votes. But the 39 of the Northern countries, inhabited almost entirely by whites, represented more free men than the 61,<sup>136</sup> according to the *United States Constitution* every slaveowner votes for 3/5 of his slaves.

*Louisiana.* At the election for delegates to the Convention more Union votes were cast than secession votes.<sup>137</sup> But the delegates deserted to the other side

The west of Carolina, the east of Tennessee, the north of Alabama and Georgia, mountain districts with interests very different from those of the Southern swamps.

The December 2nd character<sup>138</sup> of the whole secession manoeuvre (the fellows are consequently obliged to provoke a war in order to keep the movement alive under the slogan "The North against the South"), which you can see from the following excerpts, is further revealed by the fact that the traitors in Buchanan's Administration,<sup>139</sup> who stood at the head of the movement—Floyd, Secretary of War, Toucey, Secretary of the Navy; Cobb, Secretary of the Treasury; Thompson, Secretary of the Interior—together with the leading senators of the South, were most deeply involved in the *dilapidations*, running into many millions, which were referred to a Committee of Enquiry in the course of December 1860

by Congress (the House of Representatives). For a part of these fellows (at least) it was a matter of escaping penal servitude. That is why they are the most willing tools of the 300,000 slaveholder oligarchy. That the latter, as a result of their concentration, position and resources, able for the moment to put down any opposition, obvious. In a part of the "poor whites" they found the mob, who acted for them as substitutes of the Zouaves.

*Georgia. The Griffin Union*: "It is mockery for the same men who made the Constitution in Montgomery to come back to Georgia and ratify it under the name of a state convention" *The Macon Journal*. "The State Conventions . . . called for another purpose . . . assume that they are the people, and under such an assumption of power can appoint delegates to a General Convention without consulting the people. All the acts of the Congress of their Confederacy are passed in secret session with closed doors, and what is done is kept from the people" *The Augusta Chronicle and Sentinel* (the biggest Georgia paper). "The whole movement for secession, and the formation of a new government, so far at least as Georgia is concerned" (and Georgia has the largest population of all the slave states) "proceed on only a quasi consent of the people, and was pushed through, under circumstances of great excitement and frenzy—by a fictitious majority. With all the appliances brought to bear, etc., the election of January 4 showed a falling-off of nearly 3,000, and an absolute majority of elected deputies of 79. But, upon assembling, by wheedling, coaxing, buying, and all the arts of deception, the convention showed a majority of 31 (against Union) . . . . The Georgia Convention and the Confederate Congress have gone forward in their work, as none can deny, without authority from the people"

*Alabama. The Mobile Advertiser*. "The Convention has adopted the permanent Constitution in behalf of the State of Alabama . . . .<sup>140</sup> The great fact stands forth that the delegates were not chosen for any such purpose." *The North Alabamian*. "The Convention made haste to usurp the prerogative, and ratify the Constitution . . . It is a remarkable fact, that the substantial, physical force of the country, the hard-fisted, hard-working men, expected to do all the fighting when the country calls, were from the beginning opposed to the Ordinance of Secession."

*Mississippi*. Similar complaints about usurpation in

*Jackson Mississippian* and the *Vicksburg Whig*. }

Louisiana. *New Orleans True Delta*: "Here secession succeeded only by suppressing the election returns . . . the government has been changed into *despotism*." In the *State Convention* of Louisiana (New Orleans) of March 22, 1861, old *Rosehus* (one of the leading politicians in the United States) says: "The Montgomery instrument . . . did not inaugurate a government of the people, but an *odious and unmitigated oligarchy*. The people had not been permitted to act in the matter."

In Louisville, Kentucky, on March 16, 1861, Senator Guthrie (pro-slavery man, Secretary of the Treasury under Pierce) said the whole movement was a plot and usurpation. Amongst other things that: "In Alabama a majority of the popular vote was cast against going out, but a small majority of the delegates were for secession, they took Alabama out, and refused the people to have any voice in the matter. The vote of Louisiana, too, was against secession, but the delegates suppressed it"

## 9 ENGELS TO MARX

November 27, 1861.

Have these Yankees then gone completely crazy to carry out the mad coup with the Confederate Commissioners?<sup>141</sup> The fact that here in the Channel too, a warship was waiting for the mail steamer, proves that general instructions must have been issued from Washington. To take political prisoners by force on a foreign ship, is the clearest *casus belli* there can be. The fellows must be sheer fools to land themselves in for a war with England. If war should actually break out, you can send your letters to New York via Germany or the Havre addressed to an intermediary, but you will have to take care that you don't give any assistance to the enemies of the Queen

## 10 MARX TO ENGELS

December 9, 1861.

War, as I have declared in the *Presse* from the first day, will not break out with America, and I only regret that I

had not the means to exploit the asininity of the Reuter and Times-swayed Stock Exchange during this fool period.

## 11. MARX TO ENGELS

December 19, 1861.

As for *war with America*, Pam\* may possibly succeed in bringing it about, but not easily. He must have a *pretext*, and I do not think that Lincoln will furnish it. A part of the Cabinet, Milner-Gibson, Gladstone, *plus ou moins*† Lewis, cannot be fooled like John Russell.

Considered in itself, the Americans have not erred, either *materially* or *formally*, according to the British maritime law prevailing over there. Hence they have resorted to an *error in form*, a technicality, a legal quibble, since Pam wanted a pretext. But this is false too. According to British maritime law two things must be distinguished. Whether a neutral ship carries *belligerent* goods and persons or *contraband* of war, no matter if the latter consists of goods of persons. In the latter case the ship is to be seized with cargo and persons and brought into a port for adjudication. In the former case—if there is *no doubt* that the goods have not *gone over* into the possession of neutrals (which is of itself impossible in the case of persons), the belligerent goods or persons are confiscable on the high sea, while the ship, etc., goes free. England has continually asserted this jurisprudence—apart from the authorities—as I have convinced myself by looking up all the squabbles with neutrals since 1793 in Cobbett's Register.

On the other hand, since the English crown lawyers have restricted the question to an error in form, and thus conceded the Yankees the *right* of confiscating any British ship that carries belligerents and towing it into a port for adjudication, the Yankees can very easily declare—and they will do so, in my opinion—that they are satisfied with this concession, will not violate the *form* in confiscation, etc., in the future, and yield up Mason and Slidell for the nonce.

If Pam wants war absolutely, he can bring it about of course. In my opinion *that is not his purpose*. If the Americans act in the manner I have supposed, Pam will have furnished stupid John Bull another proof that he is "the truly

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\*Palmerston.—Ed.

†More or less.—Ed.



English minister." The fellow will then be allowed to do anything. He will utilize the opportunity to

(1) Force the Yankees to recognize the Paris declaration on the rights of neutrals;

(2) under this pretext call upon and make Parliament sanction the resignation of the old English maritime law, signed by Clarendon at his (Pam's) instructions behind the back of the crown and without Parliament knowing it in advance, *which he hasn't dared to do as yet.*

Pam is old, and the Russians have endeavoured to force through the declaration issued in Paris ever since the time of Catherine II. They still lack two things: *the sanction of the British Parliament, and the adherence of the United States.* Both of these will be accomplished upon this occasion. The show of war seems to me to be merely theatrical accessories in order to exhibit the definitive resignation of his own maritime law to stupid John Bull as a victory won over the Yankees by the pluck of the "truly English minister"

Subsidiary reasons for the war show would be: diversion from Poland (since even fellows like Cunningham of Brighton demand in public meetings the stoppage of further payment of the Dutch-Russian loan) and diversion from Denmark, where Russia is at this instant engaged in pushing aside Glucksburg, the heir presumptive it appointed itself.

It is possible, of course, that the Yankees will not yield, and then Pam is compelled to go to war by his preparations and rodomontades up to now. Yet I should like to bet 100 to 1 against it.

## 12. MARX TO ENGELS

March 3, 1862.

I should be glad if you supplied me *this week* (by Friday morning) with an *English* article on the American War. You can write *entirely without constraint*. *The Tribune* will print it as the letter of a foreign officer. *Nota bene*. \* *The Tribune* hates McClellan, who is in league with the Democratic Party and who, *so long as* he was Commander-in-Chief of all the armies, prevented any action not only on the Potomac (where this was perhaps justified), but in *all* theatres of war, parti-

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\*Note well.—Ed.

cularly in the West, by *direct intervention*. (He was also the soul of the extremely disgraceful intrigue against Fremont.) This Mc, moreover, out of *esprit de corps* and hatred of the civilians, protected all the traitors in the army, e.g., Colonel Maynard and General Stone. The arrest of the latter ensued a day or two after [Mc]Clellan had been deposed as Commander-in-Chief of the whole army. In the same way the shameless Washington "representative" of the *New York Herald* was arrested as a spy contrary to M'Clellan's wishes and after he had entertained the entire staff of M'C[lellan] the day before at a champagne breakfast.

### 13 ENGELS TO MARX

March 5, 1862.

You shall have the article. The braggarts in the South are now getting a glorious beating. The reception that the gunboats on the Tennessee River have had everywhere as far as Florence, Alabama (here the muscle shoals begin, which interrupt navigation) is most gratifying. Accordingly even in west Tennessee, on the plains, a decisive majority for the Union. Fifteen thousand prisoners, among them the Confederates' best general, Johnston, who decided Bull Run by his rapid concentration in the centre, is no poke.<sup>142</sup>

### 14 MARX TO ENGELS

March 6, 1862.

Of [England's] total exports, amounting to 125,115,133 pounds (1861), 42,260,970 pounds' worth go to English "possessions" and "colonies" If one adds to these England's further exports to Asia, Africa, and America, 23 to 24 per cent at most then remain for export to the European states. If Russia goes forward in Asia at the double quick march of the last ten years, until she concentrates all her efforts on India, then it is all up with John Bull's world market, and this end is further hastened by the protectionist policy of the United States, which now, if only to revenge themselves on John Bull, will assuredly not give it up so soon. Moreover, John Bull discovers with horror that his principal

colonies in North America and Australia become protectionists in precisely the same measure as John Bull becomes a free-trader. The self-complacent, brutal stupidity with which John admires Pam's "spirited policy" in Asia and America, will cost him damned dear.

That the Southerners will have concluded peace by July 1862 does not appear to me very probable. When the Northerners have secured (1) the border states—and it is these that were at stake from the beginning—and (2) the Mississippi to New Orleans and Texas, a second period of the war will presumably begin in which the Northerners will not put forth great military efforts, but by quarantining the Gulf states will finally drive these to voluntary re-annexation.

Bull's behaviour during the present war is possibly the most barefaced that has ever been witnessed.

In the matter of brutality on the English side, the *Mexican Blue Book* surpasses anything that history has known. Menchikov seems a gentleman, compared with Sir C. Lennox Wyke. This canaille not only develops the most unbounded zele in carrying out Pam's secret instructions, but seeks to revenge himself by boorishness for the fact that Senor Zamacona, the Mexican Minister for Foreign Affairs (now out of office) and a former journalist, is invariably his superior in the exchange of diplomatic notes. As regards the fellow's style, here are a few samples from his notes to Zamacona. "The arbitrary act of stopping all payments for the space of two years is depriving the parties interested of their money for that space of time, which is a dead loss of so much value to them." "A starving man may justify, in his own eyes, the fact of stealing a loaf on the ground that imperious necessity impelled him thereto; but such an argument cannot, in a moral point of view, justify his violation of the law, which remains as positive, *apart from all sentimentality*, as if the crime had not had an excuse. *If he was actually starving*, he should have first asked the baker to assuage his hunger, but doing so (starving?) of his own free will, without permission, is acting exactly as the Mexican government has done towards its creditors on the present occasion." "With regard to the light in which you view the question, as expressed in your above named note, you will excuse me for stating that it cannot be treated of partially, WITHOUT also taking into consideration the opinions of those who directly suffer from the parctical operation of such ideas as emanating from yourself."

"I had a full right to complain of having first of all *heard* of this extraordinary measure by *seeing* it in printed bills *placarded through* the public streets." "I have a duty to perform both to my own God and to that to *which* I am accredited *which* impels me, etc." "I suspend all official relations with the government of this Republic until *that* of Her Majesty shall adopt such measures as *they* shall deem necessary. Zamacona writes to him that the intrigues of the foreign diplomatists for twenty-five years are chiefly to blame for the troubles in Mexico. Wyke replies to him that "the population of Mexico is so degraded as to make them dangerous, not only to themselves, but to everybody coming into contact with them!"

Zamacona writes to him that the proposals which he makes put an end to the autonomy of the republic and run counter to the dignity of any independent state. Wyke answers: "Excuse me for adding that such a proposition as I have made to you does not necessarily become undignified and impracticable simply because *you, an interested person (i.e., as Mexico's Foreign Minister), are pleased to say so*" However, *satis superque*.\*

#### 15. MARX TO ENGELS

April 28, 1862.

What is of particular interest to the fellows† at the moment is America, and I wish you would send me an article on the progress of the war (I mean the battle of Corinth), if possible, this week still, and generally that you would write me every time there's any turn in the military situation. If only to spread correct views on this important matter in Germany. (I have already worked up your former articles for them; they've already been printed.)

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\*Enough and more than enough.—Ed.

†Refers to *Die Presse*.—Ed.

May 5, 1862.

About America :

1. Battle of Corinth Ranks with all the big, well-fought modern battles where the contending forces are fairly equal, Eylau, Wagram, Lutzen, Bautzen (here, the French were indeed much stronger, but were without cavalry and therefore powerless to pursue), Borodino, Magenta and Solferino.<sup>143</sup> The battle burns slowly, as Clausewitz says, like damp powder, exhausts both parties and at the finish the *positive* advantages gained by the victorious side are more of a moral than a material nature. At any rate, the *momentary* advantage which Beauregard obtained on the Sunday was far more intensive and greater than that which Grant and Buell obtained on the Monday. The bulk of the trophies remained with the Confederates, despite the fact that they were finally beaten, that is, forced to abandon their attack and to withdraw. So much for the tactical aspect. The strategical aspect, however, is this.

Beauregard had concentrated all the troops that he could obtain, in order, where possible, to fall on the advancing Federal divisions individually. This miscarried; the troops of Grant, Buell and Wallace were sufficient to repel him. If they had lost the battle, the Federals would have lost Tennessee; now they have held it. Beauregard has only his entrenchments at Corinth to thank for not having been obliged to go further south forthwith. Whether these entrenchments are capable of safeguarding him against an attack by Halleck (who has now assumed command), we are not in a position to know. Just as little is the report to be trusted that he has received colossal reinforcements from Mississippi, Louisiana and Alabama. If this is partly the case, then they are merely recruits, who are more in his way than of use to him. On the other hand, at Pittsburg Landing the forces were so nearly in equilibrium that *without reinforcements* Halleck, likewise, will not lightly undertake the storming of an entrenched camp or any other big offensive enterprise. Apart from those in the engagement at Pittsburg Landing, we do not know what other troops the Federals have in Tennessee or Kentucky; it is therefore hard to say how the chances stand. Meanwhile the Unionists have cut the railroad line from Memphis to Chattanooga (*id est*, to Richmond, Charleston

and Savannah) both west and east of Corinth. Beaur[égard] is hereby restricted to one railroad (to Mobile and New Orleans) and it is questionable whether he will be able to provision his troops for long in Corinth.

2 Virginia. The hero McClellan is in a dead fix. I think he will bury his false glory here. He has had another division transferred from McDowell to himself, but it will avail little. Only the *armoured ships* can save him, another of which (the *Galena*) has left for Monroe. On this subject see today's *Morning Star*, American correspondence, very interesting for Austria. From this you will also see why recently the *Monitor* remained lying idle when the *Merrimac*, *Yorktown*, etc, captured the three transports. By sweeping the rivers right and left, and by flank and rear fire, these ships could save the ass or traitor once more, just as the gunboats at Pittsburg Landing saved Sherman (who only had young troops that had never been under fire)

3 Mountain Department Fremont is still in Wheeling, and in consequence thereof the mountainous part of south Virginia, as of east Tennessee, is still in the hands of the enemy. Accordingly, *the best Union districts of all!* Why that is so is not explicable. In any case, the Confederate regiment recruited at the beginning of April in Knoxville, Tennessee, will doubtless desert at the first shot

Bonaparte is up to his tricks again in America. He will take care not to stir up this wasps' nest. Before the end of the year (*vide*\* *The Morning Star*) his ironclads, as well as all French merchantmen, would be off the ocean, and then adieu to pleasure!

Apropos! In today's *Standard* (or *Morning Herald*) you will have seen that *General Hecker* has become "nigger-catcher-in-chief" (Manhattan). *Be sure and put the paper by.*

## 17. MARX TO ENGELS

May 6, 1862.

I shall write to Dana once more. I miss the sending of the *Tribune* sadly. This is a mean trick of Greeley and McElrath. From the last numbers of the *Tribune* for March I have learnt two things. Firstly, that McClellan had been

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\*See.—Ed.

accurately informed eight days beforehand of the Confederates' retreat. Secondly, that *The Times'* Russell availed himself of his nosing in Washington during the *Trent* affair to gamble on the Stock Exchange in New York. . . .

Bonaparte's present manoeuvres in Mexico (the affair originally emanated from Pam) are explained by the fact that Jaurez only recognizes the official debt to France of £46,000. But Miramon and his gang, per medium of the Swiss banker Jecker et Co., had issued state bonds to the amount of \$52,000,000 (on which about \$4,000,000 have been paid). These state bonds—Jecker et Co. being only the *hommes de pailles*\*—have fallen almost for zero into the hand of Morny et Co. They demand recognition of them by Jaurez. *Hinc illae lacrimae*†

Schurz is—a brigadier-general with Fremont!!!

#### 18. ENGELS TO MARX

May 12, 1862.

What puts me off the Yankees in regard to any success is not the military position, taken by itself. This, solely as a result of the slackness and obtuseness that manifest themselves throughout the North. Where is there revolutionary energy anywhere among the people? They let themselves get a beating and are quite proud of the lickings they receive. Where throughout the North is there even a single symptom that the people are in earnest about anything? I have never come across such a state of affairs; not in Germany in the worst times. The Yankees, on the contrary, already seem to find most joy in the thought that they will cheat their state creditors.

#### 19. ENGELS TO MARX ‡

May 23, 1862.

McClellan continues in his well-known manner. The Confederates always escape him because he never has a go

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\*Men of straw.—Ed.

†Hence these tears.—Ed.

‡This letter was almost entirely included by Marx in his article on "The Situation in the American Theatre of War" (*Die Presse*, May 30, 1862) —Ed

at them, his excuse for which is that they are stronger, a good deal, than he. For that reason, indeed, they always run away. Never yet has a war been waged in such a fashion, and for this he then obtains his vote of thanks. Meanwhile these small, unlucky rearguard engagements and the continual desertions are still sufficient to demoralize the Confederates badly,<sup>144</sup> and when it comes to the decisive battle, they will find it out.

The capture of New Orleans is a deed of valour on the part of the fleet. The passing of the forts, that is, was altogether excellent. After this, everything was simple. The moral effect on the Confederates was evidently enormous, and the material effect will have already made itself felt. Beauregard has now nothing more to defend in Corinth; the position had only any meaning so long as it covered Mississippi and Louisiana, and especially New Orleans. Beauregard has now been put in such a strategic position that the loss of a single battle leaves him no other choice than to disband his army into guerillas; for without a large town, where railroads and resources are concentrated, in the rear of his army, he cannot hold masses of men together.

If the Confederate army in Virginia is beaten, it must then, after the previous demoralizing affairs, soon dissolve into guerillas automatically. It has admittedly better chances, because the many streams on its line of retreat flow cross-wise from the mountains to the sea, and because it has this donkey McCl[ellan] opposed to it; nevertheless, in the nature of things it will be driven either to accept a decisive battle or to break up into bands *without* a battle. Just as the Russians were obliged to fight at Smolensk and Borodino, though *against* the will of their generals who judged the situation correctly.

Should Beauregard or the Virginia army win a battle, and be it ever so big, this can still avail little. The Confederates are not in a position to make the least use of it. They cannot advance twenty English miles without coming to a standstill and must consequently await a renewed attack. They lack everything. For the rest, I consider this case to be quite impossible without direct treachery.

On a single battle, then, now hangs the fate of the Confederate armies, it still remains to examine the chances of guerilla warfare. Now in respect of precisely the present war it is most amazing how slight or, much rather, how wholly



lacking is the participation of the population in it. In 1813, indeed, the communications of the French were continually interrupted and cut up by Colomb, Lutzow, Chernyshev and twenty other insurgents and Cossack leaders; in 1812 the population in Russia disappeared completely from the French line of march; in 1814 the French peasants armed themselves and slew the patrols and stragglers of the Allies. But here nothing happens at all. Men resign themselves to *the fate of the big battles* and console themselves with *victrix causa deis*, etc. The tall talk of war to the knife dissolves into mere muck. And shall guerrillas come forth on the terrain? I certainly expect that after the definite dissolution of the armies the white trash of the South will attempt something of the sort, but I am too firmly convinced of the bourgeois nature of the planters to doubt for a moment that this will make them rabid Union men forthwith. The former are bound to attempt this with brigandage, and the planters will everywhere receive the Yankees with open arms. The bonfires on the Mississippi are based exclusively on the two Kentuckians who are said to have come to Louisville—certainly not up the Mississippi. The conflagration in New Orleans was easily organised and will be repeated in other towns; assuredly, much will otherwise be burnt also; but this business must necessarily bring the split between the planters and merchants, on one side, and the white trash, on the other, to a head and therewith secession is undone.

The fanaticism of the New Orleans merchants for the Confederacy is simply explained by the fact that the fellows have had to take a quantity of Confederate scrip for hard cash. I know several instances of this here. This must not be forgotten. A good forced loan is a famous means of fettering the bourgeois to the revolution and diverting them from their class interests through their personal interests.

## 20. MARX TO ENGELS

May 27, 1862.

The blowing up of the *Merrimac* seems to me an evident act of cowardice on the part of the dirty dogs of Confederacy.<sup>145</sup> The hounds could still risk something. It is wonderfully fine how *The Times* (which supported all the Coercion Bills against Ireland with so much fiery zeal) wails that

"liberty" must be lost in the event of the North tyrannizing the South. *The Economist* is also good. In its last number it declares that the Yankees' financial prosperity—the non-depreciation of their paper money—is *incomprehensible* to it (although the matter is perfectly simple). It had hitherto consoled its readers from week to week with this depreciation. Although it now admits that it does not understand what is its business and has misled its readers concerning this, it is at present solacing them with dark doubts about the "military operations," of which it officially knows nothing.

What extraordinarily facilitated the paper operations of the Yankees<sup>146</sup> (the main point being the confidence placed in their cause and therewith in their government) was without question the circumstance that in consequence of secession the West was almost denuded of paper money and therefore of a circulating medium generally. All the banks whose principal securities consisted of the bonds of slave states, were bankrupted. Moreover, currency for millions, which circulated in the West in the form of direct banknotes of the Southern banks, was swept away. Then, partly in consequence of the Morrill tariff, partly in consequence of the war itself, which largely put an end to the import of luxuries, the Yankees had a balance of trade and therefore a rate of exchange favourable to themselves and against Europe the whole time. An unfavourable rate of exchange might have badly affected the patriotic confidence in their paper on the part of the philistines.

For the rest—this comical concern of John Bull for the interest on the national debt that Uncle Sam will have to pay! As if it were not a mere bagatelle in comparison with Bull's national debt; moreover the United States are unquestionably richer today than were the Bulls with their debt of a billion in 1815.

Has Pam not got Bonaparte into a pretty pickle in Mexico ?

## 21. ENGELS TO MARX

May 29, 1862.

Anneke is with Buell's army and from today is writing in the *Augsburger* I am rather anxious about Halleck's troops; the affair drags on so long, and yet he does not appear to receive any reinforcements, though Spence's lies in *The*

*Times*, have surely no significance Willich is a colonel (the eternal colonel') and commands the 32nd Indiana regiment.

A certain amount of guerrilla warfare does now seem after all to be beginning, but it is certainly not of great importance, and if only a victory ensues, the reserve forces following in its wake, together with some cavalry, will soon put an end to the business. In case of a defeat, it would of course be vexatious.

## 22 ENGELS TO MARX

June 4, 1862.

At last, then, we learn from Anneke's letter that, counting Pope and Mitchell's forces, Halleck had rather more than 100,000 men and 300 guns on April 26, and that he was waiting for the arrival of Curtis and Sigel with further reinforcements. Up to April 29 the condition of the army seems to have been passable on the whole; A[nneke] says nothing about sickness. Accordingly, I consider the talk of sickness to be sheer invention. For the rest, it must be said that Stanton and Halleck understand how to make the press and the public mistrustful, in order that the public may get news of some sort, it is surely easy enough to have a correspondent with each army, who is told what he is to write by the general. Presumably, then the big battle will be fought as soon as Sigel and Curtis are on the spot. The calculations of Spence to the effect that 120,000 men are necessary to keep the border states in order, are ludicrous; hardly a single man seems to be stationed in Kentucky (outside possible training camps for recruits at Louisville, out of whom, however, Sigel's corps will presumably be formed) and, according to Anneke, there were merely convalescents, etc., in Nashville; otherwise, outside the armies of Halleck and McClellan, only Fremont (who, it seems, still has no army at all), Banks (who must be very weak) and McDowell, all of whom, however, count as part of the *active* army, are stationed in the border states. On the other hand, Spence errs in the other direction: 1 At the present moment the armies of the Federals certainly do not number 500,000 men in all, 2 They have assuredly more than 90,000 men distributed along the

coast. My calculation is something like this :

On the coast	. 100,000 men
Sigel and Curtis	.. 30,000 „
Banks and Fremont	.. 30,000 „
McClellan	.. 80,000 „
At Washington	.. 30,000 „
McDowell	.. 30,000 „
Halleck	.. 100,000 „

altogether, therefore, 400,000 men in the field, to whom I add about 60,000 recruits, convalescents and small detachments that may be distributed in Missouri, along both banks of the lower Ohio and Tennessee, and partly in the towns of the Northeast. *Summa summarum*,\* 460,000 men. I am supported in this calculation by the new levy of 50,000 men, which will presumably be followed very soon by a second of equal strength ; it seems to be desired to maintain the army at a normal strength of 500,000 men.

It was Stanton's biggest blunder and sheer vainglory to suspend recruiting. Materially, that has done much harm and is to blame for all the loss of time at Corinth and Richmond ; and morally, this present countermand does much more harm still—apart from the fact that it will be much harder to obtain recruits now. Otherwise, there are people enough available ; in consequence of immigration the Northern states must have at least three to four per cent more people of from 20 to 35 years of age than any other country.

For the rest, Monsieur Anneke appears in his letters as the same old grumbling fault-finder and wiseacre who judges the army not according to the circumstances and not according to the adversary either, but by old, schooled European armies, and not even by these as they are, but as they *should* be. The blockhead ought, however, to think of the confusion that he himself must have experienced often enough in Prussian manoeuvres.

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\*In sum.—Ed.

July 30, 1862.

things go wrong in America, and it is after all Mr. Stanton who is chiefly to blame, for the reason that after the conquest of Tennessee he suspended recruiting out of sheer vainglory and so condemned the army to constant weakening just when it stood most in need of reinforcements for a rapid, decisive offensive. With a steady influx of recruits, even if the war were not decided by now, its success would nevertheless have been beyond doubt. With continual victories recruits would also have come freely. This step was all the sillier as the South was then enlisting all men from 18 to 35 years of age, and was therefore staking everything on a *single* card. It is those people who have joined up in the meantime who now give the Confederates the upper hand everywhere and secure the initiative to them. They held Halleck fast, dislodged Curtis from Arkansas, smote McClellan and under Jackson in the Shenandoah valley gave the signal for the guerrilla raids that now reach as far as the Ohio. No one could have acted more stupidly than Stanton.

Further. When Stanton saw that he could not dislodge McClellan from the command of the Potomac army, he perpetrated the stupidity of weakening him by conferring special commands on Fremont, Banks and McDowell *and of splitting up the forces to the end of removing McClellan*. The consequence of this is, not only that McC[lellan] has been beaten, but also that public opinion now maintains that it is not McC[lellan], but Stanton who is to blame for the defeat. Serves Mr. Stant[on] right.

All that would be of no consequence, it might even be of service, in that the war would at last be waged in a revolutionary way. But there's the trouble. The defeats do not stir these Yankees up; they make them slack. If, merely to obtain recruits, they have already come to the point of declaring themselves prepared to take them *for nine months only*, what is meant is nothing other than this: we are in a bad way, and all we want is the semblance of an army as a means of making a demonstration during the peace negotia-

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\*Part of this letter is included by Marx in his article on "A Criticism of American Affairs" (*Die Presse*, August 9, 1862).—Ed.

tions. Those 300,000 volunteers were the criterion, and by refusing to provide them the North declares that to it its whole cause is *au fond*\* muck. Furthermore, what cowardice in government and Congress. They are afraid of conscription of resolute financial steps, of attacks on slavery, of everything that is urgently necessary; they let everything loaf along as it will, and if the semblance of some measure finally gets through Congress, the honourable Lincoln so qualifies it that nothing at all is left of it any longer. This slackness, this collapse like a punctured pig's bladder, under the pressure of defeats that have annihilated one army, the strongest and best, and actually left Washington exposed, this total absence of any elasticity in the whole mass of the people—this proves to me that it is all up. The few mass meetings, etc., do not mean anything, they don't attain even the stir of a presidential election.

In addition, the total lack of talent. One general more stupid than the other. Not one that would be capable of the least initiative or of independent decision. For three months the initiative once more wholly with the adversary. Then, one financial measure more lunatic than the other. Helplessness and cowardice everywhere, save among the common soldiers. The politicians in like case—just as absurd and devoid of counsel. And the populace is more helpless than if it had lingered three thousand years under the Austrian sceptre.

For the South, on the contrary—it's no use shutting one's eyes to the fact—it's a matter of bloody earnest. That we get no cotton is already one proof. The guerrillas in the border states are a second. But that after being thus shut off from the world, an agricultural people can sustain such a war and after severe defeats and losses in resources, men and territory, can nevertheless now stand forth as the victor and threaten to carry its offensive right into the North, this is in my opinion decisive. Besides, they fight quite famously, and with the second occupation of Kentucky and Tennessee, what Union feeling still existed there outside the highlands is now surely lost.

If they get Missouri, they get the Territories, too, and then the North can pack up.

As said, if the North does not proceed forthwith in revo-

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\*At bottom.—Ed.

lutionary fashion, it will get an ungodly hiding and deserve it—and it looks like it.

#### 24. MARX TO ENGELS

July 30, 1862.

As to America, that, says he [Lassalle],<sup>147</sup> is quite interesting. The Yankees have no "ideas." "Individual liberty" is merely a "negative idea," etc., and more of this old, decayed, speculative rubbish.

#### 25. MARX TO ENGELS

August 7, 1862.

I do not altogether share your views on the American Civil War. I do not think that all is up. The Northerners have been dominated from the first by the representatives of the border slave states, who also pushed McClellan, that old partisan of Breckinridge, to the top. The Southerners, on the other hand, acted as one man from the beginning. The North itself has turned the slaves into a military force on the side of the Southerners, instead of turning it against them. The South leaves productive labour to the slaves and could therefore put its whole fighting strength in the field without disturbance. The South had unified military leadership, the North had not. That no strategic plan existed was already obvious from all the manoeuvres of the Kentucky army after the conquest of Tennessee. In my opinion all this will take another turn. In the end the North will make war seriously, adopt revolutionary methods and throw over the domination of the border slave statesmen. A single Negro regiment would have a remarkable effect on Southern nerves.<sup>148</sup>

The difficulty of getting the 300,000 men seems to me purely political. The Northwest and New England wish to and will force the government to give up the diplomatic method of conducting war which it has used hitherto, and they are now making terms on which the 300,000 men shall come forth. If Lincoln does not give way (which he will do, however), there will be a revolution.

As to the lack of military talent, the method which has prevailed up till now of selecting generals purely from considerations of diplomacy and party intrigue is scarcely designed

to bring talent to the front. General Pope seems to me to be a man of energy, however.<sup>140</sup>

With regard to the financial measures, they are clumsy, as they are bound to be in a country where up to now no taxes (for the whole state) have in fact existed; but they are not nearly so idiotic as the measures taken by Pitt and Co. The present depreciation of money is due, I think, not to economic but to purely political reasons—distrust. It will therefore change with a different policy.

The long and short of the business seems to me to be that a war of this kind must be conducted on revolutionary lines, while the Yankees have so far been trying to conduct it constitutionally.

## 26. ENGELS TO MARX

September 9, 1862.

The Bull Run affair, No. II,\* was a capital bit of work by Stonewall Jackson, who is by far the best chap in America. Had he been supported by a frontal attack of the main Confederate army and had everything gone well (even only tolerably well), then it would probably have been all up with Monsieur Pope. As it is, however, the affair has led to nothing save that the Confederates have gained a great moral advantage—respect for their enterprising spirit and for Jackson—and a few square miles of territory, but have, on the other hand, hastened the unification and concentration of the *whole Federal army* before Washington. We shall now, presumably, get further news by the next steamer of fresh encounters, in which the Federals might well be victorious if their generals were not so bloody stupid. But what is to be done with such a pack of hounds! Pope is the lousiest of the lot; he can only brag, revoke, lie and conceal reverses. Truly, the wiseacre of the general staff. McClellan now appears to one to be again altogether a sensible man. Furthermore, the *ordre* that all future major-generals are to pass the Prussian ensign's examination. It is too pitiable, and the lads in the South, who at least know what they want, strike me as heroes in comparison with the flabby management

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\*The second Battle of Bull Run took place toward the end of August, 1862.—Ed.



of the North. Or do you still believe that the gentlemen in the North will crush the "rebellion"?

27. MARX TO ENGELS

September 10, 1862.

As regards the Yankees, I am assuredly still of my previous opinion that the North will finally prevail; certainly the Civil War may go through all sorts of episodes, even armistices, perhaps, and be long drawn out. The South would and could only conclude peace on condition that it received the border slave states. In this even California would also fall to it; the Northwest would follow, and the entire Federation, with perhaps the exception of the New England states, would form a single country once more, this time under the acknowledged supremacy of the slaveholders. It would be the reconstruction of the United States on the basis demanded by the South. This, however, is impossible and will not happen.

The North can, for its part, only conclude peace if the Confederacy limits itself to the old slave states and those confined between the Mississippi River and the Atlantic. In this case the Confederacy would soon come to its blessed end. Intervening armistices, etc., on the basis of a *status quo*, could at most entail pauses in the prosecution of the war.

The manner in which the North wages war is only to be expected from a *bourgeois* republic, where fraud has so long reigned supreme. The South, an oligarchy, is better adapted thereto, particularly as it is an oligarchy where the whole of the productive labour falls on the Negroes and the four millions of "white trash" are filibusters by profession. All the same, I would wager my head that these boys come off second best, despite "Stonewall Jackson." To be sure, it is possible that it will come to a sort of revolution in the North itself first.

Willich is a brigadier-general and, as Kapp has related in Cologne, Steffen is now to take the field also.

It seems to me that you let yourself be swayed a little too much by the military aspect of things.

## 28. ENGELS TO MARX

October 16, 1862.

What do you think of America? The financial crash, which with these stupid paper-money measures cannot fail to come, seems near. Militarily, the North will now, presumably, get on its feet again somewhat.

## 29. MARX TO ENGELS

October 29, 1862.

As for America, I believe that the Maryland campaign was decisive in so far as it showed that even in this section of the border states most sympathetic to the South support for the Confederates is weak. But the whole struggle turns on the border states. Whoever gets them dominates the Union. At the same time the fact that Lincoln issued the forthcoming Emancipation Act<sup>150</sup> at a moment when the Confederates were pushing forward in Kentucky, shows that all consideration for the loyal slaveholders in the border states has ceased. The emigration of the slaveowners from Missouri, Kentucky and Tennessee to the South, with their black chattels, is already enormous, and if the war is prolonged for a while as it is certain to be, the Southerners will have lost all hold there. The South began the war for these territories. The war itself was the means of destroying its power in the border states, where, apart from this, the ties with the South were becoming weaker every day because a market can no longer be found for the breeding of slaves and the internal slave trade. In my opinion, therefore, for the South it will only be a matter now of the defensive. But their sole possibility of success lay in an offensive. If the report is confirmed that Hooker is getting the active command of the Potomac army, that McClellan is being "retired" to the "theoretical" post of Commander-in-Chief and that Halleck is taking over the chief command in the West, then the conduct of the war in Virginia may also take on a more energetic character. Moreover the most favourable time of year for the Confederates is now past.

There is no doubt at all that morally the collapse of the Maryland campaign was of the most tremendous importance.

As to finance, the United States know from the time of the

War of Independence and we know from the Austrian experience, how far one can go with depreciated paper money. It is a fact, that the Yankees never exported more corn to England than they have this year, that the present harvest is again far above the average and that the trade balance was never more favourable for them than it has been for the last two years. As soon as the new system of taxation (a very hackneyed one, it is true, exactly in Pitt's style) comes into operation, the paper money which up to now has only been continually emitted will also at last begin to flow back again. An extension of the paper issue on the present scale will therefore become superfluous and further depreciation will thus be checked. What had made even the present depreciation less dangerous than it was in France, and even in England, in similar circumstances, has been the fact that the Yankees never prohibited *two prices*, a gold price and a paper price. The actual damage done resolves itself into a state debt for which the proper equivalent has never been received and a premium on jobbing and speculation.

When the English boast that their depreciation was never more than 11½ per cent (other people believe that it amounted to more than double this during some time), they conveniently forget that they not only continued to pay their old taxes but every year paid new ones as well, so that the return flow of the banknotes was assured from the beginning, while the Yankees have actually carried on the war for a year and a half *without taxes* (except the greatly diminished import duties), simply by repeating the issue of paper. For a process of this kind, which has now reached the turning point, the actual depreciation is still comparatively small.

The fury with which the Southerners have received Lincoln's Acts proves their importance. All Lincoln's Acts appear like the mean pettifogging conditions which one lawyer puts to his opposing lawyer. But this does not alter their historic content, and indeed it amuses me when I compare them with the drapery in which the Frenchman envelops even the most unimportant point.

Of course, like other people, I see the repulsive side of the form the movement takes among the Yankees, but I find the explanation of it in the nature of "bourgeois" democracy. The events over there are a world upheaval, nevertheless, and there is nothing more disgusting in the whole business than the English attitude towards them.

### 30. ENGELS TO MARX

November 5, 1862.

As regards America I also think, of course, that the Confederates in Maryland have received an unexpected moral blow of great significance. I am also convinced that the definite possession of the border states will decide the result of the war. But I am by no means certain that the affair is going to proceed along such classic lines as you appear to believe. Despite all the screams of the Yankees, there is still no sign whatever available that the people regard this business as a real question of national existence. On the contrary, these election victories of the Democrats go to prove rather that the party which has had enough of the war is growing. If there were only some proof or some indication that the masses in the North were beginning to rise as they did in France in 1792 and 1793, then it would all be very fine. But the only revolution to be expected seems rather to be a Democratic counter-revolution and a rotten peace, including the partition of the border states. That this would not be the end of the affair by a long way—granted. But for the present moment I must say I cannot work up any enthusiasm for a people which on such a colossal issue allows itself to be continually beaten by a fourth of its own population and which after eighteen months of war has achieved nothing more than the discovery that all its generals are idiots and all its officials rascals and traitors. After all the thing must happen differently, even in a bourgeois republic, if it is not to end in utter failure. I entirely agree with what you say about the meanness of the English way of looking at the business.

### 31. ENGELS TO MARX

November 15, 1862.

I impatiently await the steamer that is bringing news of the New York elections. If the Democrats triumph in the State of New York,<sup>151</sup> then I no longer know what I am to think of the Yankees. That a people placed in a great historical dilemma, which is at the same time a matter of its own existence, can after eighteen months' struggle become reactionary in its mass and vote for climbing down, is a bit beyond my understanding. Good as it is from one aspect

that even in America the bourgeois republic exposes itself in thoroughgoing fashion, so that in future it can never again be preached on its own merits, but solely as a means and a form of transition to the social revolution, still it is mortifying that a lousy oligarchy with only half the number of inhabitants proves itself just as strong as the unwieldy, great, helpless democracy. For the rest, if the Democrats triumph, the worthy McClellan and the West Pointers have the better of it most beautifully, and its glory will soon be at an end. The fellows are capable of concluding peace, if the South returns to the Union on condition that the President shall always be a Southerner and the Congress shall always consist of Southerners and Northerners in equal numbers. They are even capable of proclaiming Jeff Davis President of the United States forthwith and to surrender even the whole of the border states, if there is no other way to peace. Then, good-bye America.

Of Lincoln's emancipation, likewise, one still sees no effect up to the present, save that from fear of Negro inundation the Northwest has voted Democratic.

## 32. MARX TO ENGELS

November 17, 1862.

It seems to me that you are looking too much at only one side of the American quarrel. I have looked at a mass of Southern papers in the American coffee-house and have seen from these that the Confederacy is in a tight corner. The English newspapers have suppressed the battle of "Corinth." The Southern papers describe it as the most extraordinarily bad luck that has befallen them since the armed rising. The State of Georgia has declared the Confederate "Conscription Acts" to be null and void.<sup>133</sup> In the person of Floyd the thief, Virginia has disputed the right of the "creatures (literally) of Jefferson Davis" further to levy troops in his state. Oldham, representative of Texas in the Congress of Richmond, has lodged a protest against the transportation of the "picked troops" of the Southwest to the East, that is, Virginia. From all these disputes two things emerge quite incontestably:

That the Confederate government has overreached itself in its violent efforts to fill the ranks of the army;

That the states are asserting their "state rights" against

the separatist Confederacy, just as the latter made them its pretext against the Union.

I regard the victories of the Democrats in the North as a reaction, which was made easy for this conservative and blackleg element by the Federal government's bad direction of the war and financial blunders. It is for the rest a species of reaction met with in every revolutionary movement and at the time of the Convention, for instance, was so strong that it was considered counter-revolutionary to want to submit the death of the King to *suffrage universel* and under the Directory so strong that Mr. Bonaparte I had to bombard Paris.

On the other hand, the elections have no bearing on the composition of the Congress prior to December 4, 1863; they serve, therefore, merely, as a spur to the Republican government, over whose head the sword hangs. And in any case the Republican House of Representatives will put the term of life allotted to it to better use, if only from hatred of the opposing party.

As to McClellan, he has in his own army Hooker and other Republicans, who will any day arrest him on the order of the government

In addition, there is the French attempt at intervention, which will call forth a reaction against the reaction.

I do not therefore regard things as so bad. What might be much more injurious in my view is the sheep's attitude of the workers in Lancashire. Such a thing has never been heard of in the world. All the more is this the case as the manufacturing rabble do not even pretend "to make sacrifices" themselves, but leave to the rest of England the honour of keeping their army going for them; that is, impose on the rest of England the costs of maintenance of their variable capital.

During this recent period England has disgraced herself more than any other country, the workers by their christian slave nature, the bourgeois and aristocrats by their enthusiasm for slavery in its most direct form. But the two manifestations supplement one another.

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\*Universal suffrage.—Ed.

November 20, 1862.

If the Mexicans (*les derniers des hommes*\*) would but tick *les crapauds*† once, but the latter dogs themselves—the allegedly radical bourgeois—are now talking in Paris of “*l’honneur du drapeau*” ‡

If Spence does not down the Northerners, nothing will help; not even McClellan’s bad generalship.

December 30, 1862.

Burnside’s defeat is being exaggerated frightfully. It is clear that it must affect the morale of the army, but not as seriously by a long way as if it had been beaten in the open field. The tactical arrangements seem to have been very bad. Manifestly the flank attack of the left wing ought first to have been developed before the frontal attack under Sumner took place. This, however, was let slip altogether. Sumner seems to have been in a thorough mess before Franklin had even come to serious fighting. Then Burnside does not seem to have been able to come to any decision on the use of his reserves. The successes of the left wing should have led him to send at least part of them thither, since it was there that the decisive action had to take place; instead of this he employed them in front, and here also too late, namely, 1. as a *relief* and not as a support for Sumner’s beaten troops, and 2. so shortly before dark that it was night before half came into action. These observations are naturally made on the basis of the poor materials the American papers provide and without knowledge of the terrain. For the rest, it seems to me that Burnside might well have dislodged the *canaille*§ wholly by envelopment, especially as he seems to have had certainly 150,000 men against 100,000; but the belief that Washington can only remain covered as long as one disposes one’s forces transversely before the foe has evidently kept

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\*The lowest of men.—Ed.

†The toads.—Ed.

‡The honour of the flag.—Ed.

§Scum or mob.—Ed.

him from this. The folly of giving the Confederates a month's time in which to establish themselves in the position and then attacking them in front is, however, only to be criticized by a flogging.

### 35. MARK TO ENGELS

January 2, 1863.

Burnside seems to have committed great tactical blunders in the battle of Fredericksburg. He was obviously nervous in the employment of such great military forces. As far, however, as the fundamental animosity is concerned: 1. In connection with the wait of 26 days, there is unquestionably direct treason at work in the war administration at Washington. Even the New York correspondent of *The Times* admitted that only after weeks did Burnside obtain resources which had been promised him immediately; 2. That nevertheless he then made this attack, shows the moral weakness of the man. The worthy *Tribune* began to cast suspicion on him and threatened him with dismissal. This paper, with its enthusiasm and its ignorance, does great harm.

The Democrats and M'Clellanists naturally cried out in unison, in order to exaggerate the unfortunate position. For the "rumour" that M'Clellan, "the Monk" of *The Times*, had been summoned to Washington, we are indebted to Mr. Reuter.

"Politically" the defeat was good. They ought not to have had good luck before January 1, 1863. Anything of the sort could have caused the "Proclamation" to be revoked.

*The Times* and Co. are utterly furious over the workers' meetings in Manchester, Sheffield and London.<sup>154</sup> It is very good that the eyes of the Yankees are opened in this way. For the rest, Opdyke (Mayor of New York and political economist) has already said at a meeting in New York: "We know that the English working class are with us, and that the governing classes of England are against us."

I greatly regret that Germany does not hold similar demonstrations. They cost nothing and "internationally" bring in large returns. Germany would have all the more warrant for these, as in this war she has done more for the Yankees than France in the eighteenth century. It is the old German



- stupidity of not making herself felt in the world theatre and stressing what she actually accomplishes.

### 36. MARX <sup>2</sup>TO ENGELS

February 13, 1863.

Things go damned slowly in the United States. I hope that J. Hooker bites his way out.<sup>125</sup>

### 37. ENGELS TO MARX

February 17, 1863.

Things look rotten in Yankeeland. It is true that with the customary irony of world history the Democrats, as against the philistine, have now become the war party, and the bankrupt poetaster Ch. Mackay has again made himself thoroughly ridiculous. I also hear from private sources in New York that the preparations of the North are being continued on a hitherto unheard of scale. But, on the other hand, the signs of moral slackening are increasing daily and the inability to conquer is daily becoming greater. Where is the party whose victory and *avenement*<sup>\*</sup> would be synonymous with prosecution of the war *a outrance*<sup>†</sup> and by every means? The people has been bamboozled, that is the trouble, and it is lucky that a peace is a physical impossibility, otherwise they would have made one long ago, merely to be able to live for the almighty dollar again.

A Confederate major, who participated in the engagements near Richmond on Lee's staff, told me during the last few days that according to papers which Lee himself had shown him, the rebels had no less than 40,000 stragglers at the end of these actions! He referred specifically to the Western regiments of the Federals with great respect; for the rest, however, he is an ass. [*The conclusion of the letter is missing.*]

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<sup>\*</sup>Advent.—Ed.

<sup>†</sup>To a finish.—Ed.

### 38. MARX TO ENGELS

March 24, 1863.

What I consider very important in America's most recent history is that they will again give out *letters of marque*.<sup>\*</sup> *Quoad*† England, this will put quite a different complexion on matters and under favourable circumstances may lead to war with England, so that the self-satisfied Bull would see besides his cotton also corn withdrawn from under his nose. On his own hook, Seward had at the beginning of the Civil War taken the liberty of *accepting* the decisions of the Congress of Paris of 1856, as applicable to America *for the time being*. (This came out on the printing of the dispatches on the *Trent* affair.) The Washington Congress and Lincoln, furious at the outfitting of Southern pirates in Liverpool, etc., have now put an end to this joke. This has given rise to great dismay on the Stock Exchange here but the faithful hounds of the press naturally obey *ordres* and do not mention the matter in the newspapers.

### 39. ENGELS TO MARX

June 11, 1863.

There are nice goings on in America. Fighting Joe has made an awful fool of himself with his boast,<sup>100</sup> Rosecrans is asleep, and only Grant operates well. His movement against Vicksburg from southwest to northeast, cutting off the relief army, repulsing it, then rapid advance against Vicksburg and even the impetuous, unavailing assaults, are all very good. I do not believe in the possibility of assembling sufficient relief troops in time. On the other hand, we have so often seen the American generals suddenly operate well for a fortnight and then perpetrate the greatest asinities once more, that one can say nothing whatever about their future movements.

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<sup>\*</sup> [A commission issued by a government authorising a private person to take the property of a foreign state or of a foreign citizen as redress for an injury done by such a state or by one of its citizens.—Ed.]

† As regards.—Ed.

#### 40. MARX TO ENGELS

July 6, 1863.

. In my opinion, the expedition of the Southerners against the North has been forced on Lee by the clamour of the Richmond papers and their supporters. I regard it as a complete *coup de desespoir*. For the rest, this war will drag on for a long time, and in the interest of *Europe* that is greatly to be desired.

#### 41. MARX TO ENGELS

August 15, 1863.

The philistines here are raving mad with *The Times*, because *The Times* has taken them in so nicely with the Confederate loan. These honourable men might surely have known that *The Times*, as Cobbett had already revealed to them, is nothing but a "commercial concern," which does not care a damn how the balance falls, if only the balance comes out in its own favour. The fellows from *The Times*, like *J. Spence*—"that man," says the *Richmond Enquirer*, "whom we have paid in solid gold"—obtained the loan scrip in part for nothing, in part at a 50 per cent discount on the nominal amount. It was therefore good business to boost it up to 105.

It seems to me very important for the United States that they should, above all, take possession of the remaining ports. Charleston, Mobile, etc., by reason of the collision into which they may any day come with Boustrapa.<sup>137</sup> The imperial Lazarillo de Tormes<sup>138</sup> now caricatures not only his uncle, but even himself. For the "suffrage," in Mexico is surely a fine caricature of the suffrage by which he made not merely himself, but Nice and Savoy French. To my mind, there is no doubt that he will break his neck in Mexico, if he is not already hanged beforehand.

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<sup>1</sup>Stroke of despair.—Ed.

## 42. MARX TO ENGELS

May 26, 1864

What do you say of Grant's operations? *The Times*, of course, has admiration only for Lee's strategy, concealed behind retreats. "It", said Tussy<sup>us</sup> this morning, "considers this very canny, I dare say" I wish for nothing more fervently than that Butler may have success. It would be priceless, if he marched into Richmond first. It would be bad if Grants had to retreat, but I think that fellow knows what he is about. At any rate, the first Kentucky campaign, Vicksburg and the beating that Bragg got in Tennessee, are due to him.

## 43 ENGELS TO MARX

May 30, 1864

Once more, the Virginian campaign bears the character of indecisiveness or, more strictly speaking, of the difficulty of bringing matters to a decision at all on this terrain. I do not attach any importance to the news per the *Scotia*: it merely signifies that the eight days' rain has saved Lee from the necessity of continually fighting battles *a la* Sulferino. And that is a great deal for him. Two more such battles and his army, which had been obliged to take up a new position to the rear every evening, would undoubtedly have been in a very sorry state, hardly able to make a further stand anywhere *before* Richmond. Grant has certainly also gained by the lull, but not in the same measure. The reinforcements that he now obtains will not be worth much. Still, I should not be surprised if Lee soon withdrew to Richmond. There the decisive struggle will then take place.

## 44. MARX TO ENGELS

June 7. 1864.

The American news seems to me to be very good, and I was particularly delighted with today's leader in the *Times*, in which it proves that Grant is being beaten continuously and will possibly be punished for his defeats—by the capture of Richmond

June 9, 1864

I am very eager to know how things will go in Virginia. The forces still seem very closely balanced, and a trifling contingency, the possibility of smiting a single corps of Grant's separately, can again give Lee the upper hand. The struggle before Richmond may be fought under quite other conditions for Butler is certainly weaker than Beauregard, otherwise he would not have let himself be forced on the defensive, and even if both are equally strong, Lee still becomes stronger by effecting a junction with Beauregard in Richmond than Grant by one with Butler, for from his entrenched encampment Lee can appear on either side of the James River in full strength, whereas Grant must detach troops (to the south side of the stream). I hope, however, that Grant will carry the thing through all the same; at any rate it is certain that after the first Battle of the Wilderness<sup>100</sup> Lee has evinced little inclination to fight decisive actions in the open field, but has, on the contrary, kept his main force constantly in entrenched positions and only ventured brief offensive skirmishes. I also like the methodical course of Grant's operations. For this terrain and this adversary, that is the only correct method

September 4, 1864

What do you think of things in America? Lee avails himself of his entrenched encampment at Richmond in quite masterly fashion; no wonder it is already the third campaign centring on this place. He holds Grant's hosts fast with relatively few troops and employs the larger part of his men in offensive operations in West Virginia and in threatening Washington and Pennsylvania. Excellent example for the Prussians to study, they can learn from it in detail how a campaign for the entrenched encampment of Coblenz must be conducted, but are naturally far too haughty to learn anything from these improvised generals. Grant—six years ago a lieutenant discharged from the army for intoxication, subsequently a drunken engineer in St. Louis—has much unity of purpose and great contempt for the life of his cannon-

fodder, he also seems to be very resourceful as a *small* strategist (that is, in day-to-day movements); but I seek in vain for signs of his having a broad enough outlook to survey the campaign as a whole. The campaign against Richmond seems to me to be miscarrying; the impatience with which G[rant] attacks now at one point, now at another, but nowhere perseveringly with sap and mine, is a bad sign. In general, engineering matters seem to be in a bad state among the Yankees, besides theoretical knowledge, such matters also require a traditional practice, which is not so easily improvised. —Whether Sherman will settle with Atlanta is questionable;<sup>101</sup> still, he has, I believe, better chances. The guerrilla and cavalry raids in his rear will scarcely do him much harm. The fall of Atlanta would be a very hard blow for the South; Rome would straightway fall with it and the South's gun foundries, etc., are situated there; in addition, the railroad connection between Atlanta and South Carolina would be lost —Farragut is a constant quantity. The fellow knows what he is doing. But whether Mobile itself will fall is very problematical. The town is very strongly fortified and, as far as I know, can only be taken from the landward side, since deep-draught ships cannot approach near enough. But what an imbecility is this dispersal of the attacking forces on the coast where Charleston and Mobile are attacked simultaneously, instead of one after the other, but each time in full strength.

I do not pay much attention to the peace talk that is becoming so widespread. Not even to the alleged direct negotiations of Lincoln<sup>102</sup>. I regard all this as an election manoeuvre. As things stand thus far, Lincoln's re-election appears to me to be pretty certain.

#### 47 MARX TO ENGELS

September 7, 1864.

As regards America, I consider the present moment, *entre nous*,\* to be very critical. If it brings Grant a great defeat or Sherman a great victory, then it's all right. A chronic series of small checks, precisely at the present election time, would be dangerous. I am entirely of your opinion that thus far

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\*Between us.—Ed.

Lincoln's re-election is pretty certain, *still a hundred to one*. But in the model country of the democratic swindle this election time is full of contingencies that may give the logic of events (an expression that Magnus Urquhart<sup>1</sup> considers to be just as senseless as "the justice of a locomotive") a quite unexpected smack in the face. An armistice seems to be very necessary for the South, to save it from complete exhaustion. It has been the first to bring up this cry not only in its Northern organs, but directly in the Richmond organs, though now, when it has found an echo in New York, the *Richmond Examiner* throws it back to the Yankees with scorn. That Mr. Davis has decided to treat the Negro soldiers as "prisoners of war"—latest official instruction of his War Secretary—is very characteristic.

Lincoln has in his hands great resources with which to carry this election. (Peace proposals on his part are naturally mere humbug!) The election of an opposition candidate would probably lead to a real *revolution*. But all the same one cannot fail to recognize that for the coming eight weeks, in which the issue will in the first instance be decided, much depends on military accident. This is absolutely the most critical point since the beginning of the war. If this is shifted, old Lincoln can then blunder on to his heart's content. For the rest, the old man cannot possibly "make" generals. He could already choose his ministers better. The Confederate papers, however, attack their ministers quite as much as the Yankees do those at Washington. If Lincoln gets through this time—as is very probable—it will be on a much more radical platform and under wholly changed circumstances. In conformity with his legal manner, the old man will then find more radical methods compatible with his conscience.

#### 48 ENGELS TO MARX

November 9, 1864.

The affair at Richmond seems to be nearing the end. But as long as Lee is not compelled to confine himself to the pure defensive, especially to draw all the troops out of the Shenandoah valley to his army, and as long as Richmond is not

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Great Urquhart See biographical notes, Urquhart, David.  
—Ed.

completely encircled, all of Grant's advancing against the works of R[ichmond] or Petersburg means little. It is like Sebastopol, where no encirclement also occurred.—I should like to see what Monsieur de Beauregard will do; probably no more than Hood before him, if as much. I haven't the slightest confidence in this puffed-up hero.

#### 49 MARX TO ENGELS

December 2, 1864.

The worst of such an agitation is that one is much bothered as soon as one participates in it. For example, it was again a matter of an Address, this time to Lincoln,\* and again I had to compose the stuff (which was much harder than a substantial work)—in order that the phraseology to which this sort of scribbling is restricted should at least be distinguished from the democratic, vulgar phraseology. . . .

As the Address to Lincoln was to be handed to Adams, part of the Englishmen on the Committee wanted to have the deputation introduced by a member of Parliament since it was customary. This hankering was defeated by the majority of the English and the unanimity of the Continentals, and it was declared, on the contrary, that such old English customs ought to be abolished. On the other hand: M. Le Lubetz,<sup>108</sup> like a real *crapaud*, wanted to have the Address made out, not to Lincoln, but to the American people. I have made him duly ridiculous and explained to the Englishmen that the French democratic etiquette is not worth a farthing more than the monarchical etiquette.

#### 50. MARX TO ENGELS

February 6, 1865.

Lincoln's answer† to us in today's *Times*.

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\*For the Address of the First International to Lincoln see pp. 1147-1149.—*Ed.*

†For Lincoln's answer to the Address of the First International, as transmitted by Adams, the American ambassador, see pp. 1149-1150.—*Ed.*



February 7, 1865.

In America the opening of the campaign before Richmond in March-April will probably be decisive for the whole year. Should Grant succeed in dislodging Lee from there, then the Confederacy is played out its armies disperse and the bandit war, as it is already being carried on at present in west Tennessee and in general almost everywhere, is the sole enemy left. At the present time Lee's army is in reality already the only one that the Southerners have; everything depends on its disruption. We can already assume that the territory from which Lee draws his resources is restricted to south Virginia, the Carolinas and at most, a part of Georgia.

## 52. MARX TO ENGELS

February 10, 1865

The fact that Lincoln has replied to us so courteously and to the "Bourgeois Emancipation Society" so rudely and purely formally has made *The Daily News* so angry that it did not print the reply to us. When, however, it saw to its sorrow that *The Times* did so, it had to publish it belatedly in the *stop press*. Levy, too, has had to swallow the bitter pill. The difference between L[incoln]'s reply to us and to the bourgeois has made such a stir here that the "Clubs" in the West End are shaking their heads over it. You can understand how much good this does our people.

## 53. MARX TO ENGELS

March 4, 1865

The Confederacy seems to be at an end.

## 54. ENGELS TO MARX

April 16, 1865.

What do you say to Richmond? I had expected that instead of running away, Lee would act like a *soldier* and capitulate, in order to secure at least better conditions for

the army. But it is better so. He ends now as a shabby fellow; the tragedy ends comically.

#### 55. MARX TO ENGELS

May 1, 1865.

The *chivalry of the South* ends worthily. In this connection the assassination of Lincoln was the greatest piece of folly that they could commit.<sup>164</sup> Johnson is stern, inflexible, revengeful and as a former poor white has a deadly hatred of the oligarchy. He will stand less on ceremony with the fellows, and through the assassination he finds the temper of the North adequate to his intentions

#### 56. ENGELS TO MARX \*

May 3 1865

At Richmond Grant has repeated exactly the battle of Jena—so far as the strategic design is concerned—and with the same result: capture of the whole hostile army. Save that he did not need to march so far to gather the fruits

Now Johnston has also capitulated<sup>165</sup> and thereby I have won my wager made two months ago. that on May 1 the Southerners would no longer have any army. Such as still offer resistance will be taken as brigands and rightly so. In any case, Johnson will insist on confiscation of the large landed property<sup>166</sup> and thereby make the pacification and reorganization of the South a somewhat more acute matter. Lincoln would hardly have insisted on this.

The Southern sympathisers here solaced themselves for the hypocritical howl that they had to set up because of the murder by prophesying that in four weeks there would be a Grant I, Emperor of America. The donkeys have deceived themselves nicely!

For the rest, the "Ighnesses" must surely feel frightfully angry that the murder of Lincoln has produced such a colossal effect throughout the world. None of them has yet had the honour.

57. MARX TO ENGELS

May 9, 1865.

Today I have to submit an "Address to President Johnson"

58 MARX TO ENGELS

May 20, 1865.

Cutting enclosed, in which is my Address to Johnson.

59. MARX TO ENGELS

June 24 1865.

Johnson's policy disquiets me.<sup>107</sup> Ridiculous affectation of severity against single persons; up to the present extremely vacillating and weak is substance. The reaction has already begun in America and will soon be greatly strengthened, if the hitherto prevailing slackness does not quickly cease.

60 ENGELS TO MARX

July 15, 1865

I, too, like Mr Johnson's policy less and less. His hatred of Negroes comes out more and more violently, while as against the old lords of the South he lets all power go out of his hands. If things go on like this, in six months all the old villains of secession will be sitting in Congress at Washington. Without coloured suffrage nothing whatever can be done there, and J[ohnson] leaves it to the vanquished, the ex-slaveholders, to decide upon this matter. It is too absurd. However, one must certainly reckon with things developing differently from what Messrs. the Barons imagine. The majority of them are surely totally ruined and will be glad to sell land to migrants and speculators from the North. These will come soon enough and change many things. The mean whites, I think, will gradually die out. With this stock there is noth-

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<sup>107</sup>For the Address of the First International to Johnson, see pp. 1150-1152.—Ed



ing more to be done ; what is left after two generations will merge with the migrants into a stock entirely different. The Negroes will probably become small squatters as in Jamaica. So that finally, indeed, the oligarchy goes down, but the process could now be brought to a speedy conclusion on the spot at one time, whilst, as it is, it becomes long drawn out.

61 MARX TO ENGELS

April 23, 1866

After the Civil War phase the United States are really only now entering the revolutionary phase, and the European wiseacres, who believe in the omnipotence of Mr. Johnson, will soon be disillusioned.